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Results for ', Kantian Maxim, Sinnott-Armstrong, Self-Imposed Impossibility, Time-Indexed Maxim, Zimmerman'
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- 'Ought' Implies 'Can' and the Argument from Self-Imposed Impossibility: a Critical Examination.Mostofa N. Mansur - 2013 - Copula 30:12.Defenders of the Kantian maxim, i.e. ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, defend the maxim taking the term “implication” in the sense of ‘entailment’. But if it is granted that “implication” means entailment, then it can be shown that the Kantian maxim that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ is false. Sinnott-Armstrong attempts to prove the falsity of the maxim by his argument from Self-Imposed Impossibility in which he offers his famous example of Adams. But Sinnott-Armstrong’s example of Adams appears (...)No categories
- Hypnotizing Libet: Readiness potentials with non-conscious volition.Alexander Schlegel, Prescott Alexander, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Adina Roskies, Peter Ulric Tse & Thalia Wheatley - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 33 (C):196-203.The readiness potential (RP) is one of the most controversial topics in neuroscience and philosophy due to its perceived relevance to the role of conscious willing in action. Libet and colleagues reported that RP onset precedes both volitional movement and conscious awareness of willing that movement, suggesting that the experience of conscious will may not cause volitional movement (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). Rather, they suggested that the RP indexes unconscious processes that may actually cause both volitional movement and (...)
- Proceedings of the 4th World Conference on Research Integrity: Brazil, Rio de Janeiro. 31 May - 3 June 2015.Lex Bouter, Melissa S. Anderson, Ana Marusic, Sabine Kleinert, Susan Zimmerman, Paulo S. L. Beirão, Laura Beranzoli, Giuseppe Di Capua, Silvia Peppoloni, Maria Betânia de Freitas Marques, Adriana Sousa, Claudia Rech, Torunn Ellefsen, Adele Flakke Johannessen, Jacob Holen, Raymond Tait, Jillon Van der Wall, John Chibnall, James M. DuBois, Farida Lada, Jigisha Patel, Stephanie Harriman, Leila Posenato Garcia, Adriana Nascimento Sousa, Cláudia Maria Correia Borges Rech, Oliveira Patrocínio, Raphaela Dias Fernandes, Laressa Lima Amâncio, Anja Gillis, David Gallacher, David Malwitz, Tom Lavrijssen, Mariusz Lubomirski, Malini Dasgupta, Katie Speanburg, Elizabeth C. Moylan, Maria K. Kowalczuk, Nikolas Offenhauser, Markus Feufel, Niklas Keller, Volker Bähr, Diego Oliveira Guedes, Douglas Leonardo Gomes Filho, Vincent Larivière, Rodrigo Costas, Daniele Fanelli, Mark William Neff, Aline Carolina de Oliveira Machado Prata, Limbanazo Matandika, Sonia Maria Ramos de Vasconcelos & Karina de A. Rocha - 2016 - Research Integrity and Peer Review 1 (Suppl 1).Table of contentsI1 Proceedings of the 4th World Conference on Research IntegrityConcurrent Sessions:1. Countries' systems and policies to foster research integrityCS01.1 Second time around: Implementing and embedding a review of responsible conduct of research policy and practice in an Australian research-intensive universitySusan Patricia O'BrienCS01.2 Measures to promote research integrity in a university: the case of an Asian universityDanny Chan, Frederick Leung2. Examples of research integrity education programmes in different countriesCS02.1 Development of a state-run “cyber education program of research ethics” (...)No categories
- I’m not the person I used to be: The self and autobiographical memories of immoral actions.Matthew L. Stanley, Paul Henne, Vijeth Iyengar, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Felipe De Brigard - 2017 - Journal of Experimental Psychology. General 146 (6):884-895.People maintain a positive identity in at least two ways: They evaluate themselves more favorably than other people, and they judge themselves to be better now than they were in the past. Both strategies rely on autobiographical memories. The authors investigate the role of autobiographical memories of lying and emotional harm in maintaining a positive identity. For memories of lying to or emotionally harming others, participants judge their own actions as less morally wrong and less negative than those in which (...)
- Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions: An Empirical Study.Joshua May, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Jay G. Hull & Aaron Zimmerman - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):265–273.In defending his interest-relative account of knowledge in Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005), Jason Stanley relies heavily on intuitions about several bank cases. We experimentally test the empirical claims that Stanley seems to make concerning our common-sense intuitions about these bank cases. Additionally, we test the empirical claims that Jonathan Schaffer seems to make in his critique of Stanley. We argue that our data impugn what both Stanley and Schaffer claim our intuitions about such cases are. To account for these (...)
- Moral skepticisms.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.All contentious moral issues--from gay marriage to abortion and affirmative action--raise difficult questions about the justification of moral beliefs. How can we be justified in holding on to our own moral beliefs while recognizing that other intelligent people feel quite differently and that many moral beliefs are distorted by self-interest and by corrupt cultures? Even when almost everyone agrees--e.g. that experimental surgery without consent is immoral--can we know that such beliefs are true? If so, how? These profound questions lead (...)
- How strong is this obligation? An argument for consequentialism from concomitant variation.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):438-442.The rule ‘Keep your promises’ is often presented as a challenge to consequentialism, because the ground of your moral obligation not to break a promise seems to lie in the past fact that you made the promise, which is not a consequence of the act. A different picture emerges, however, when we move beyond the question of whether you have any moral obligation at all to the related question of how strong that obligation is.If I promise to meet you and (...)
- Which features of patients are morally relevant in ventilator triage? A survey of the UK public.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Hazem Zohny, Julian Savulescu, Dominic Wilkinson, Vincent Conitzer, Jana Schaich Borg & Lok Chan - 2022 - BMC Medical Ethics 23 (1):1-14.Background In the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, many health systems, including those in the UK, developed triage guidelines to manage severe shortages of ventilators. At present, there is an insufficient understanding of how the public views these guidelines, and little evidence on which features of a patient the public believe should and should not be considered in ventilator triage. Methods Two surveys were conducted with representative UK samples. In the first survey, 525 participants were asked in an open-ended (...)No categories
- Essentially Embodied Kantian Selves and The Fantasy of Transhuman Selves.Robert Hanna - 2022 - Studies in Transcendental Philosophy 3 (3).By “essentially embodied Kantian selves,” I mean necessarily and completely embodied rational conscious, self-conscious, sensible (i.e., sense-perceiving, imagining, and emoting), volitional or willing, discursive (i.e., conceptualizing, judging, and inferring) animals, or persons, innately possessing dignity, and fully capable not only of free agency, but also of a priori knowledge of analytic and synthetic a priori truths alike, with egocentric centering in manifestly real orientable space and time. The basic theory of essentially embodied Kantian selves was spelled (...)No categories
- Cell and Psyche - The Biology of Purpose.Edmund Ware Sinnott - 2008 - Read Books.CELL AND PSYCHE THE BIOLOGY OF PURPOSE By EDMUND W. SINNOTT. PREFACE TO THE TORCHBOOK EDITION: SINCE the publication of this little book, as the McNair Lectures at the University of North Carolina, the author has written two others, as well as a number of papers, on the same gen eral theme. Though these elaborate the argument a little further, the essence of it is in Cell and Psyche. This is admittedly a specula tion, but one based solidly on (...)
- Blame, not ability, impacts moral “ought” judgments for impossible actions: Toward an empirical refutation of “ought” implies “can”.Vladimir Chituc, Paul Henne, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Felipe De Brigard - 2016 - Cognition 150 (C):20-25.Recently, psychologists have explored moral concepts including obligation, blame, and ability. While little empirical work has studied the relationships among these concepts, philosophers have widely assumed such a relationship in the principle that “ought” implies “can,” which states that if someone ought to do something, then they must be able to do it. The cognitive underpinnings of these concepts are tested in the three experiments reported here. In Experiment 1, most participants judge that an agent ought to keep a promise (...)
- Moral knowledge?: new readings in moral epistemology.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons (eds.) - 1996 - New York: Oxford University Press.In Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology, editors Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons bring together eleven specially commissioned essays by distinguished moral philosophers exploring the nature and possibility of moral knowledge. Each essay represents a major position within the exciting field of moral epistemology in which a proponent of the position presents and defends his or her view and locates it vis-a-vis competing views. The authors include established philosophers such as Peter Railton, Robert Audi, Richard Brandt, and Simon (...)
- Moral Knowledge New Readings.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons (eds.) - 1996 - Oxford University Press USA.In Moral Knowledge?: New Readings in Moral Epistemology, editors Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons bring together eleven newly written essays by distinguished moral philosophers exploring the nature and possibility of moral knowledge. Each essay represents a major position within the exciting field of moral epistemology in which a proponent of the position presents and defends his or her view and locates it vis-a-vis competing views. The first chapter, written by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, provides a framework for understanding the basic (...)
- Moral psychology as cognitive science: Explananda and acquisition.Susan Dwyer - unknownDepending on how one looks at it, we have been enjoying or suffering a significant empirical turn in moral psychology during this first decade of the 21st century. While philosophers have, from time to time, considered empirical matters with respect to morality, those who took an interest in actual (rather than ideal) moral agents were primarily concerned with whether particular moral theories were ‘too demanding’ for creatures like us (Flanagan, 1991; Williams, 1976; Wolf, 1982). Faithful adherence to Utilitarianism (...)Export citation
Bookmark - Moral Psychology, Volume V: Virtue and Character.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Christian Miller (eds.) - 2017 - MIT Press.Philosophers have discussed virtue and character since Socrates, but many traditional views have been challenged by recent findings in psychology and neuroscience. This fifth volume of Moral Psychology grows out of this new wave of interdisciplinary work on virtue, vice, and character. It offers essays, commentaries, and replies by leading philosophers and scientists who explain and use empirical findings from psychology and neuroscience to illuminate virtue and character and related issues in moral philosophy. The contributors discuss such topics as eliminativist (...)
- Cognitive Enhancement in Courts.Anders Sandberg, Julian Savulescu & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2013 - In Judy Illes & Barbara J. Sahakian (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics. Oxford University Press.Human cognitive performance has crucial significance for legal process, often creating the difference between fair and unfair imprisonment. Lawyers, judges, and jurors need to follow long and complex arguments. They need to understand technical language. Jurors need to remember what happens during a long trial. The demands imposed on jurors in particular are sizeable and the cognitive challenges are discussed in this chapter. Jurors are often subjected to both tremendous decision complexity and tremendous evidence complexity. Some of these problems (...)No categories$81.70 new (collection) View on Amazon.comDirect download (3 more)Export citation Bookmark 6 citations
- Killing versus totally disabling: a reply to critics.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Franklin G. Miller - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (1):12-14.We are very grateful to the commentators for taking the time to respond to our little article, ‘What Makes Killing Wrong?’ They raise many points, so we cannot respond to them all, but we do want to head off a few misinterpretations.Our critics in this journal avoid one careless misinterpretation, but less informed readers have pressed this misinterpretation in popular venues, so we need to start by renouncing it. We do not deny that killing humans is morally wrong. To (...)
- Replies to Dreier and McNaughton.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Philosophical Books 49 (3):218-228.I very much appreciate the time and care that Jamie Dreier and David McNaughton put into my book, Moral Skepticisms. Their comments raise profound and challenging issues that I cannot treat adequately here. All I can hope to do is point to some directions in which further discussion should proceed.
- How Stable are Moral Judgments?Paul Rehren & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (4):1377-1403.Psychologists and philosophers often work hand in hand to investigate many aspects of moral cognition. In this paper, we want to highlight one aspect that to date has been relatively neglected: the stability of moral judgment over time. After explaining why philosophers and psychologists should consider stability and then surveying previous research, we will present the results of an original three-wave longitudinal study. We asked participants to make judgments about the same acts in a series of sacrificial dilemmas three (...)
- Some ethics of deep brain stimulation.Joshua August Skorburg & Walter Sinnott Armstrong - 2020 - In Dan J. Stein & Ilina Singh (eds.), Global Mental Health and Neuroethics. Elsevier. pp. 117-132.Case reports about patients undergoing Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) for various motor and psychiatric disorders - including Parkinson’s Disease, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, and Treatment Resistant Depression - have sparked a vast literature in neuroethics. Questions about whether and how DBS changes the self have been at the fore. The present chapter brings these neuroethical debates into conversation with recent research in moral psychology. We begin in Section 1 by reviewing the recent clinical literature on DBS. In Section 2, we (...)
- Scrupulosity and Moral Responsibility.Jesse Summers & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2022 - In Matt King & Joshua May (eds.), Agency in Mental Disorder: Philosophical Dimensions. Oxford University Press.Scrupulosity is a form of OCD where patients obsess about morality and sometimes compulsively confess or atone. It involves chronic doubt and anxiety as well as deviant moral judgments. This chapter argues that Scrupulosity is a mental illness and that its distortion of moral judgments undermines, or at least reduces, patients’ moral responsibility. The authors go on to argue that this condition challenges popular deep-self theories of responsibility, which assert that one is only blameworthy or praiseworthy for actions that (...)
- Self-improvement: an essay in Kantian ethics.Robert N. Johnson - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.Is there any moral obligation to improve oneself, to foster and develop various capacities in oneself? From a broadly Kantian point of view, Self-Improvement defends the view that there is such an obligation and that it is an obligation that each person owes to him or herself. The defence addresses a range of arguments philosophers have mobilized against this idea, including the argument that it is impossible to owe anything to yourself, and the view that an obligation to (...)
- Responsibility for forgetting.Samuel Murray, Elise D. Murray, Gregory Stewart, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Felipe De Brigard - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1177-1201.In this paper, we focus on whether and to what extent we judge that people are responsible for the consequences of their forgetfulness. We ran a series of behavioral studies to measure judgments of responsibility for the consequences of forgetfulness. Our results show that we are disposed to hold others responsible for some of their forgetfulness. The level of stress that the forgetful agent is under modulates judgments of responsibility, though the level of care that the agent exhibits toward performing (...)
- Paul Bloomfield.Diana Meyers, Joel Kupperman, Margaret Gilbert, Sonia Michel & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - In Paul Bloomfield (ed.), Morality and Self-Interest. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Making moral principles suit yourself.Matthew Stanley, Paul Henne, Laura Niemi, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Felipe De Brigard - 2021 - Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 1.Normative ethical theories and religious traditions offer general moral principles for people to follow. These moral principles are typically meant to be fixed and rigid, offering reliable guides for moral judgment and decision-making. In two preregistered studies, we found consistent evidence that agreement with general moral principles shifted depending upon events recently accessed in memory. After recalling their own personal violations of moral principles, participants agreed less strongly with those very principles—relative to participants who recalled events in which other people (...)
- Albert A. Anderson, Steven V. Hicks, and Lech Witkowski, eds., Mythos and Logos. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004, 268 pp.(indexed). ISBN 90-420-1020, $73.00 (pb). Kevin Bales, Disposable People. Berkley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2004, 298 pp.(indexed). ISBN 0-520-24384-6, $17.95 (pb). [REVIEW]Mark Coeckelbergh, Mark T. Conard, Aeon J. Skoble, William Lane Craig & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2005 - Journal of Value Inquiry 39:139-141.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- “Self-Affection” and “Temporal Thickness” in Phenomenology of Perception.Juho Hotanen - 2020 - Chiasmi International 22:87-100.In the “Temporality” chapter of Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty refers to the Kantian notion of “self-affection.” The subject has an affective self-relation through time because the subject is of time. Merleau-Ponty shows that it is crucial that self-affection is not understood as an immediate self-coincidence. According to him, the idea of an immediate self-possession renders self-relation impossible. Instead, temporal self-relation should be understood as a paradox of connection and difference: the (...)
- Northern prince syndrome" : self-affection and self-description in post-Kantian philosophy of religion.Carsten Pallesen - 2013 - In Marius Timmann Mjaaland, Ulrik Houlind Rasmussen & Philipp Stoellger (eds.), Impossible time: past and future in the philosophy of religion. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Breve storia dell'etica.Sergio Cremaschi - 2012 - Roma RM, Italia: Carocci.The book reconstructs the history of Western ethics. The approach chosen focuses the endless dialectic of moral codes, or different kinds of ethos, moral doctrines that are preached in order to bring about a reform of existing ethos, and ethical theories that have taken shape in the context of controversies about the ethos and moral doctrines as means of justifying or reforming moral doctrines. Such dialectic is what is meant here by the phrase ‘moral traditions’, taken as a name for (...)
- Mad Speculation and Absolute Inhumanism: Lovecraft, Ligotti, and the Weirding of Philosophy.Ben Woodard - 2011 - Continent 1 (1):3-13.continent. 1.1 : 3-13. / 0/ – Introduction I want to propose, as a trajectory into the philosophically weird, an absurd theoretical claim and pursue it, or perhaps more accurately, construct it as I point to it, collecting the ground work behind me like the Perpetual Train from China Mieville's Iron Council which puts down track as it moves reclaiming it along the way. The strange trajectory is the following: Kant's critical philosophy and much of continental philosophy which has followed, (...)
- Meillassoux’s Virtual Future.Graham Harman - 2011 - Continent 1 (2):78-91.continent. 1.2 (2011): 78-91. This article consists of three parts. First, I will review the major themes of Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude . Since some of my readers will have read this book and others not, I will try to strike a balance between clear summary and fresh critique. Second, I discuss an unpublished book by Meillassoux unfamiliar to all readers of this article, except those scant few that may have gone digging in the microfilm archives of the École normale (...)
- A Kantian Account of Trauma.Helga Varden - 2022 - Kantian Review (4):1-19.In our societies today, the prevalence of serious, untreated trauma means that we cannot reliably expect to receive or give unconditional love, understood as love which functions within a normative framework to protect each and all of us as having dignity. Serious, untreated trauma makes unconditional love, so understood, unreliable because each time the pattern of the psychological damage (trauma) is triggered in the traumatized person, in the wrongdoers, or in the bystanders, their behaviour easily becomes self- and (...)
- The Kantian Capacity for Moral Self-Control: Abstraction at Two Levels.Marijana Vujoševiċ - 2020 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 102 (1):102-130.As a rule, the Kantian capacity for self-control is interpreted as a kind of tool for compelling ourselves to act on the basis of the maxims we have adopted. To the extent that we merely acknowledge its role in following already-adopted maxims, however, we fail to capture the distinctive aspect of moral self-control identified by Kant. In this paper, I propose a fuller account of the Kantian capacity for moral self-control; I do so mainly by (...)
- Recent work on Kantian maxims I: Established approaches.Rob Gressis - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (3):216-227.Maxims play a crucial role in Kant's ethical philosophy, but there is significant disagreement about what maxims are. In this two-part essay, I survey eight different views of Kantian maxims, presenting their strengths, and their weaknesses. Part I: Established Approaches, begins with Rüdiger Bubner's view that Kant took maxims to be what ordinary people of today take them to be, namely pithily expressed precepts of morality or prudence. Next comes the position, most associated with Rüdiger Bittner and Otfried Höffe, (...)
- Self-Injury: Symbolic Sacrifice/Self-Assertion Renders Clinicians Helpless.Christa Kruger - 2003 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (1):17-21.In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.1 (2003) 17-21 [Access article in PDF] Self-Injury:Symbolic Sacrifice/Self-Assertion Renders Clinicians Helpless Christa Krüger Keywords feminism, iconic communication, moral conflict, oppression, psychiatrist/psychologist roles, societal norms. POTTER'S PAPER CONSIDERS self-injury in women diagnosed with borderline person ality disorder (BPD) to be a form of body modification where the body is used to communicate meaning. She touches on symbolism as a possible explanatory theory (...)
- Race, time, and utopia: critical theory and the process of emancipation.William M. Paris - 2024 - New York: Oxford University Press.Any given society will be comprised of multiple forms of life. That is to say, people will adhere to diverse patterns of organizing and justifying how they make use of their time. One might think that for all of us, time is divided by seconds, minutes, and hours and thus we all live in the same form of life. We are all given 24 hours in a day, and it is up to us all, individually, to decide how (...)
- Unity and sameness of self as depicted in being and time.Michael E. Zimmerman - 1975 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 6 (3):157-167.
- God Inside Time and Before Creation.Dean Zimmerman - 2001 - In Gregory E. Ganssle & David M. Woodruff (eds.), God and Time: Essays on the Divine Nature. New York, US: Oxford University Press. pp. 75--94.Many theists reject the notion that God’s eternity consists in his timelessness — i.e., in his lacking temporal extension and failing to possess properties at any times. Some of these “divine temporalists” hold that, for philosophical reasons, it is impossible to accept both the timelessness of God and the view that God knows what happens at different times and brings about events in time. 1 Many reject divine timelessness as a dubious import from Platonism with no biblical or theological (...)
- Francesca Maria Crasta. La filosofia della natura di Emanuel Swedenborg. 336 pp., illus., bibl., index. Milan: FrancoAngeli, 1999. L 42,000. [REVIEW]Inge Jonsson - 2002 - Isis 93 (2):312-313.Emanuel Swedenborg has been a literary celebrity for more than two centuries because of his vivid depictions of heaven and hell. But to a considerable extent this renown has also excluded him from the history of science, to which he actually belongs. He was active as an exegete and a visionary only during the last twenty‐five years of his long life, and before he got a divine call to found a new Christian church he had published a great number of (...)No categories
- Photographic Architecture in the Twentieth Century.Claire Zimmerman - 2014 - Univ of Minnesota Press.Photographic Architecture and the Spread of German Modernism is a “picture anthropology” of modern architecture, showing how photography shaped its development, its reception, and its history in the 20th c. At first, architects used photography to promote their practices, even as they doubted its value and efficacy as a means of representation. Unlike other representations, photographs were both too real, and not real enough. Furthermore, the photographic image acted on its subject like an alchemical agent. Photography altered the material that (...)
- The great transformation: the beginning of our religious traditions.Karen Armstrong - 2006 - New York: Knopf.In the ninth century BCE, the peoples of four distinct regions of the civilized world created the religious and philosophical traditions that have continued to nourish humanity to the present day: Confucianism and Daoism in China, Hinduism and Buddhism in India, monotheism in Israel, and philosophical rationalism in Greece. Later generations further developed these initial insights, but we have never grown beyond them. Rabbinic Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, for example, were all secondary flowerings of the original Israelite vision. Now, in (...)
- Kantian duties to the self, explained and defended.Jens Timmermann - 2006 - Philosophy 81 (3):505-530.The present article is an attempt to clarify the Kantian conception of duties to the self and to defend them against common objections. Kant’s thesis that all duty rests on duties to the self is shown to follow from the autonomy of the human will; and the allegation that they are impossible because the agent could always release himself from such a duty turns out to be question-begging. There is no attempt to prove that there are such (...)
- (1 other version)Introduction.William Desmond - 2000 - Ethical Perspectives 7 (4):217-219.The contributions in the current issue of Ethical Perspectives mainly derive from a conference on Catholic Intellectual Traditions organized jointly by the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and the Erasmus Institute, University of Notre Dame, and held at Leuven from November 10th to the 11th, 2000. As the reader can see from a quick perusal of the table of contents, the contributions cover a diverse range of topics. The reader might well ask what such contributions have to do with a journal concerned (...)
- The End Times of Philosophy.François Laruelle - 2012 - Continent 2 (3):160-166.Translated by Drew S. Burk and Anthony Paul Smith. Excerpted from Struggle and Utopia at the End Times of Philosophy , (Minneapolis: Univocal Publishing, 2012). THE END TIMES OF PHILOSOPHY The phrase “end times of philosophy” is not a new version of the “end of philosophy” or the “end of history,” themes which have become quite vulgar and nourish all hopes of revenge and powerlessness. Moreover, philosophy itself does not stop proclaiming its own death, admitting itself to be half dead (...)No categories
- Ethics, X-Phi, and the Expanded Methodological Toolbox: How the Think Aloud Method and Interview Reveal People’s Judgments on Issues in Ethics and Beyond.Kyle Thompson - 2019 - Dissertation, Claremont Graduate UniversityEthics isn’t a conversation exclusive to philosophers. There is value, then, in not only understanding how laypeople think about issues in ethics, but also bringing their judgments into dialogue with those of philosophers in order to make sense of agreement, disagreement, and the consequences of each. Experimental philosophers facilitate this dialogue uniquely by capturing laypeople’s judgments and analyzing them in light of philosophical theory. They have done so almost exclusively by using face valid quantitative surveys about philosophically interesting thought experiments. (...)
- Deontic morality and control. Ishtiyaque Haji. Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 2002. Pp. XIV, 288.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):492–495.In everyday life it is common to judge people morally responsible for their actions, but there is a time-honored philosophical challenge to this practice with which we are all familiar. The challenge can be put briefly as follows: moral responsibility requires that agents have a certain kind of control that is compatible with neither causal determinism nor its contradictory, causal indeterminism; hence moral responsibility is impossible. Haji notes that judgments about moral responsibility- which I will call hypological judgments—are not (...)
- Perception and Normative Self-Consciousness.Maxime Doyon - 2015 - In Maxime Doyon & Thiemo Breyer (eds.), Normativity in Perception. New York, NY: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 38-55.The idea that our perceptual openness to the world is normative can mean different things. In the Kantian tradition of Peter Strawson, Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell, this openness is essentially tied to epistemic justification, that is to say, to our readiness to provide reasons for our actions and our beliefs about how things are. In the phenomenological tradition inaugurated by Edmund Husserl, the notion of norm-responsiveness that is relevant to perceptual experience has less to do with epistemic justification (...)
- Barbara M. Benedict. Curiosity: A Cultural History of Early Modern Inquiry. x + 321 pp., frontis., illus., index.Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 2001. $45. [REVIEW]Peter Harrison - 2002 - Isis 93 (1):120-121.In recent years historians of science have come to an increasing appreciation of the role played by such moral and affective categories as “trust,” “wonder,” “pedantry,” and “self‐discipline” in the knowledge‐making enterprises of the early modern period. Barbara Benedict's book on curiosity is a most welcome contribution to the literature devoted to such topics. In a lively and entertaining work, Benedict sets out to “analyse literary representations of the way curious people, including scientists, authors, performers, and readers, were engaged (...)No categories
- Identity, control and responsibility: The case of Dissociative Identity Disorder.Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):509-526.Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) (formerly known as Multiple Personality Disorder) is a condition in which a person appears to possess more than one personality, and sometimes very many. Some recent criminal cases involving defendants with DID have resulted in "not guilty" verdicts, though the defense is not always successful in this regard. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Stephen Behnke have argued that we should excuse DID sufferers from responsibility, only if at the time of the act the person was insane (...)
- The Transcendental Claim of Deconstruction.Maxime Doyon - 2014 - In Zeynep Direk & Leonard Lawlor (eds.), A Companion to Derrida. Chichester, West Sussex, United Kingdom: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 132–149.Most twentieth‐century European philosophers have attempted to think anew the Kantian question about the necessary conditions of experience. A rapid survey of last century's European philosophy would easily show that in spite of the various criticisms formulated against the very project of transcendental foundationalism, the vast majority of the philosophers in the so‐called Continental tradition have not abandoned the project of formulating transcendental arguments altogether. These transcendental inquiries into the conditions of possibility of all these phenomena are certainly more (...)
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