Assessment, new techno-scientific muse, which pilots the structural system reform and the style of management in schools today with hope of a greater efficiency, withdraws humanity to pedagogical practices and develop a anxiety’s climate, not conducive to learning. This impasse of desire, by a « case-file child » logic, threatens the very symbolic structures and the construction of thought. This perverse cycle uncovers the obscure side to good intentions, echoing the historical past of the Occident.

Taking care of a hyperactive child at school gives 2 meanings to the word ‘care’: worrying about a vulnerable person and health care with the recognition of his behaviour disorder, the unruly pupil becomes a disabled pupil. But how does an undisciplined pupil become a psychiatric case? How do you recognise a hyperactive child at school, that is, from a medical point of view, a child with ADD/ADHD (Attention Deficient Disorder with or without Hyperactivity)? Teachers contribute to the medical diagnosis (...) by filling in behavioural tests. Then, in order to be taken care of, the child will need to have his hyperactivity recognised as a disability. To help the teacher, the doctor will give them advice on how to teach the child. Nevertheless, this desirable partnership raises difficulties. Between a paramedical support teacher and an educationalist doctor isn’t there a risk of witnessing a dilution of roles? The lifting of doctor-patient confidentiality called for by some teachers is emblematic of this confusion. Canguilhem’s distinction between normal and pathological will guide our reflection on the medical care of the hyperactive child at school. This case arouses an ethical issue about the medicalisation of our society. (shrink)

Dans le contexte pénitentiaire actuel de la lutte contre la désocialisation, des associations offrent un soutien psychologique et social aux familles des prisonniers. La recherche-action « Regards d’enfants sur l’incarcération » dont rend compte cet article, menée en collaboration avec deux de ces associations, consiste à créer des groupes de soutien pour les enfants qui ont un parent ou un proche en prison. L’objectif de cette recherche-action est d’évaluer les conditions, moyens et outils qui permettraient d’offrir une possibilité d’échange aux (...) enfants pour leur rendre possible de partager leurs expériences et d’exprimer ce qui ne peut être dit à des parents, des proches et à leur environnement social (amis, école, voisins...). Les résultats confirment le besoin manifeste de renforcer les pratiques professionnelles autour des familles, et notamment des enfants, grands absents dans nos dispositifs d’accompagnement français. (shrink)

Dans le contexte pénitentiaire actuel de la lutte contre la désocialisation, des associations offrent un soutien psychologique et social aux familles des prisonniers. La recherche-action « Regards d’enfants sur l’incarcération » dont rend compte cet article, menée en collaboration avec deux de ces associations, consiste à créer des groupes de soutien pour les enfants qui ont un parent ou un proche en prison. L’objectif de cette recherche-action est d’évaluer les conditions, moyens et outils qui permettraient d’offrir une possibilité d’échange aux (...) enfants pour leur rendre possible de partager leurs expériences et d’exprimer ce qui ne peut être dit à des parents, des proches et à leur environnement social (amis, école, voisins...). Les résultats confirment le besoin manifeste de renforcer les pratiques professionnelles autour des familles, et notamment des enfants, grands absents dans nos dispositifs d’accompagnement français. (shrink)

L’article traite d’une analyse approfondie de quatre rapports d’évaluation documentant la procédure de diagnostic du trouble du spectre de l’autisme (TSA dorénavant) chez les enfants à l’âge de l’école maternelle en Suède. Rédigés par des professionnels (pédopsychiatres et pédopsychologues), ces rapports contiennent un compte rendu des différentes observations, entretiens et résultats de tests effectués tout au long d’une procédure de diagnostic TSA, ainsi que des recommandations de traitements et de plans d’interventions, avec une fonction “mobile,” c’est-à-dire qu’ils atteignent d’autres professionnels (...) et non-initiés autres que les parents de l’enfant, pour que leur impact soit plus durable. L’objectif général de cet article est de démontrer la façon dont les savoirs professionnels sont étroitement liés aux connaissances parentales ou à “l’expertise intime” unique des parents (Lilley, 2011) dans les descriptions écrites constituant les rapports d’évaluation, lorsque les professionnels essaient de rendre compte et d’établir un diagnostic TSA pour un enfant spécifique. Notre conclusion est que des connaissances ainsi co-construites peuvent être comprises comme la matérialisation et la démonstration empirique de la présence d’un réseau d’expertise en autisme (Eyal, 2013), qui remplace les formes historiques précédentes de l’appropriation par les acteurs professionnels des connaissances parentales durant la procédure du diagnostic TSA chez les enfants (Eyal et al., 2010: 177). (shrink)

This encyclopedia article on the philosophy of sexuality discusses the main themes, concepts, and debates in the field, including the metaphysics (or philosophical anthropology) of sex, the morality of sexual behavior, pragmatic and utilitarian evaluations of sexuality, and sexual perversion.

Les programmes d’éducation inclusive (IE) visent à intégrer les enfants handicapés dans les écoles ordinaires en leur offrant une éducation de qualité dans un environnement sans obstacles. Si l’éducation inclusive fait désormais partie intégrante du programme de développement mondial, de nombreuses questions subsistent à propos de la meilleure façon de mettre en œuvre ces programmes d’éducation inclusive, compte tenu des contextes et des défis différents qui se présentent dans les pays en développement. “One Class for All” est un programme d’éducation (...) informelle financé par Light for the World, une ONG internationale, et mis en œuvre par 14 organisations partenaires éthiopiennes. Les auteurs de cet article ont utilisé un modèle d’évaluation descriptive de la mise en œuvre combinant des éléments qualitatifs et quantitatifs pour évaluer l’étendue, la qualité et la satisfaction des programmes d’éducation informelle mis en œuvre par un échantillon de partenaires de Light for the World. Les données utilisées comprenaient des données de suivi de la mise en œuvre de routine, une enquête auprès de tous les partenaires de mise en œuvre, des entretiens avec des informateurs clés et des observations structurées des écoles et des participants dans les écoles de l’échantillon en Éthiopie. L’évaluation a principalement indiqué la nécessité de plans de développement plus structurés pour chaque école et d’un programme de formation des enseignants plus structuré. Cette évaluation contribue à la littérature limitée sur la mise en œuvre d’un programme d’éducation inclusive dans un pays africain. (shrink)

In Treatise 2.3.4 Hume provides an explanation of why ‘we naturally desire what is forbid, and take a pleasure in performing actions, merely because they are unlawful’. Hume’s explanation of this phenomenon has barely received any attention so far. But a detailed analysis bears fruit for both Humean scholarship and contemporary moral psychology. After putting the passage in its context, I explain why desiring and taking pleasure in performing certain actions merely because they are unlawful poses a challenge to Hume’s (...) theory of evaluation. Then I propose a solution of the challenge which draws on Hume’s treatment of malice, and highlights the role played by comparison and the self in these apparently paradoxical passions. Finally, I distinguish three views in contemporary discussions of desiring something under the guise of the bad (negationism, parasitism, at-face-valuism), and I argue that Hume’s account stands out as a particularly plausible version of the third view. (shrink)

This paper argues that a proper evaluation of the notion of efficiency in business ethics requires that we separate efficiency qua human good from the originally value-neutral sense of the term. The adverse consequences of hyper-efficiency consist in paradoxically causing greater inefficiencies (‘perversity’) as well as a negative impact on the human capacities to pursue various forms of excellence (‘jeopardy’). In contrast to its negative consequences, the precious good of efficiency can be formulated in terms of Alasdair MacIntyre’s influential practice-institution (...) framework. The paper proposes that efficiency be defined in terms of the kind of success towards which it aims; while it never quite reaches the status of an internal good, efficiency fluctuates between being an external good proper and what we call a paradoxical good, with attributes of both internal and external goods. The archetype of a paradoxical good is the good of success qua victory in the domain of sports, which shares attributes of internal goods (since it is defined as a necessary and desirable goal by the practice itself) and external goods (since victory for one implies the defeat of another, a zero-sum logic). The paper fleshes out the consequences of this paradox in MacIntyre’s framework by proposing a three-stage model of success and efficiency for various practices. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly to show the partial agreement between two ap-proaches to capitalism, considered as will of power and perverse metamorphosis of desire: Magatti’s conception of ‘techno-nihlist capitalism’ and the idea of ‘libidinal economy’, proposed by Deleuze&Guattari and Lyotard. Secondly, to evaluate the difference be-tween Magatti and Deleuze, in the light of the impact of financial crisis, understood as contraction of will of power and crisis of desire. From this clinical point of view, what is (...) at stake is reconceptualizing the nature of desire as a generative power, against the deleuzian concept of desire as nomad and anonyme flux: the key question is the possibility to think the will of power as a desire to shape social bonds, beyond its perverse temptation to kill the Other. (shrink)

. The reasoning behind the reforms to education that began in 2000-2001 in Québec stemmed in part from a need to put the focus on the student’s intellectual development, rather than on overall personal development, as was the case in the 1970s. At this point, has intellectual development truly become a priority in teaching? Without providing a definitive or categorical answer, the author argues that, in some settings, socialization is more important than instruction and, in some subjects, knowledge as a (...) subjective justification takes precedence over strictly epistemological grounds. La réforme de l’éducation entamée en 2000-2001 au Québec a été justifiée en partie par la nécessité de mettre l’accent sur le développement intellectuel de l’élève et non plus, comme ça aurait été le cas dans les années 1970, sur le développement intégral de la personne. Or, aujourd’hui, le développement intellectuel est-il réellement devenu une priorité dans l’enseignement? Sans répondre de manière définitive ou catégorique, l’auteur soutient que dans certains milieux, la socialisation a plus d’importance que l’instruction et que dans certaines matières, la justification subjective de la connaissance prend le dessus sur une justification strictement épistémologique. (shrink)

Ce livre n'est pas un essai réservé à un cercle restreint d'intellectuels. Nous l'avons écrit pour vous, parents, grands-parents, enseignants, citoyens curieux du XXIe siècle qui aimez que l'on parle avec précision et que l'on pense avec intégrité. Nous avons ensemble, linguiste et physicien, tenté de répondre à ces cinq questions que, souvent, vous vous posez : Langue et science, nées jumelles, sont-elles devenues antinomiques? Ne constituent-elles pas une part de la spécificité humaine? Un langage juste et une pensée brillante (...) garantissent-ils un comportement éthique? Comment donner à nos enfants le goût des mots et le désir de savoir? Pourquoi la priorité conférée à notre école "Lire, écrire, compter" doit-elle devenir "Lire, écrire, compter, raisonner"? (shrink)

Abstract : This introduction to a special issue on "Normes and normativity" emphasizes the difficulties and challenges of distinguishing between a positive approach and a normative approach to norms in economics. Collective life is organized by norms, however the mere fact that they regularly influence behaviours does not imply their desirability. A strict description of norms may require consideration of ethical issues, which may be reported by different methods; choosing among norms however is an activity of a fundamentally normative nature, (...) which questions the legitimacy of decisions and evaluations. The very possibility of a demarcation between is and ought is not straightforward. In welfare economics in particular, the standard approaches that aim to avoid value judgements (welfarism) or to isolate them (axiomatics) can be problematic. To conclude, we present the four articles in the special issue meant to illustrate these issues regarding the nature, knowledge, value of norms and the positive-normative distinction. -/- Résumé : Cette introduction à un dossier thématique sur le thème "Normes et normativité" insiste sur les difficultés et les enjeux de la distinction entre les approches positives et normatives des normes en économie. La vie collective est organisée par des normes, mais qu’elles ordonnent les comportements dans les faits n’impliquent pas qu’elles soient désirables. Une stricte description des normes peut nécessiter de prendre en compte les questions éthiques, lesquelles peuvent être traduites par différentes méthodes ; choisir les normes en revanche est une activité de nature fondamentalement normative, qui interroge la légitimité des décisions et des évaluations. La possibilité même de démarcation entre positif et normatif ne va pas de soi : en particulier en économie du bien-être, les approches standards qui visent à éviter les jugements de valeur (le welfarisme) ou à les isoler (l’axiomatique) peuvent s’avérer problématiques. Pour conclure, nous présentons les quatre articles du numéro qui illustrent ces questionnements relatifs à la nature, la connaissance, la valeur des normes et la distinction entre normatif et positif. (shrink)

This article examines certain motifs from Luis Buñuel's late bourgeois trilogy-- The Discreet Charm of the Bourgoisie ( Le Charme Discret de la Bourgeoisie, 1972), The Phantom of Liberty ( Le Fantôme de la Liberté, 1974), and That Obscure Object of Desire ( Cet Obscur Objet du Désir , 1977)--in order to show how they anticipate key trends in contemporary post-Marxian philosophy. In doing so, it draws upon the work of Slavoj Žižek, whose Lacanian revision of Hegel has provided a (...) model of ideology critique that preserves the structure of dialectical thought while avoiding the impulse to project a closed vision of subjectivity and historical change. In particular, such a model offers a means of reconsidering Buñuel’s concern with the perverse . Rather than having a singular ideological content (i.e., the repressed desire for freedom within bourgeois consciousness), the perverse in Buñuel’s films serves as a more volatile index of ideological conflict: freedom becomes perverse from the perspective of law, and law becomes perverse from the perspective of freedom. To recognize these dialectical reversals not only offers a means of appreciating Buñuel’s sense of humor, but also sheds light on how the late films situate "bourgeois" and "revolutionary" impulses in a much more complex, interdependent, and dynamic relationship with one another.  . (shrink)

Les recherches linguistiques, quelle que soit leur méthode, comportent toujours un élément de réflexion. Dans la ligne du livre remarquable de Denis Vasse, Le temps du désir, cet article veut contribuer à la réflexion sur „l'origine de la parole”. En effet, la conscience de notre corps ne manque pas de nous révéler des résidus de la vie inconsciente qui est à l'origine des structures de notre corps et du „corps subtil” qui est notre langage. Ces résidus sont e. a. les (...) trois dimensions corporelles , qui manifestement trouvent leur origine dans les trois phases de l'évolution psychique , et qui constituent trois formes de symbolisation appelées respectivement „expression”, „communication” et „signification”. L'„expression” est le corps subtil que l'enfant qui vient au monde donne en échange de tout ce qu'il reçoit de la mère. Par cet échange, la vie, commencée dans le sein maternel, prend l'aspect plus humain d'une présence réciproque. Mais la séparation de la naissance entraîne avec elle une menace constante de la mort, qui est - déjà plus humaine qu'une désintégration purement biologique des cellules vivantes - la déreliction, la détresse de l'enfant nécessiteux. Dans cette phase psychique, la conscience naissante ébauche une première structure d'elle-même : celle de la distinction entre l'intêrieur et l'extérieur ; l'homme ne cessera jamais de se considérer imaginairement comme le centre d'un monde qui l'entoure et dont il est la raison il'être. Et la dimension corporelle qui correspond à cette imagination, est celle du mouvement horizontal, le mouvement produit par les bras et les yeux. Puisqu'il ne fait encore que consommer, l'enfant commence par „com-prendre”, „saisir” la présence de l'autre. Le passage de l'„expression” à la „communication” va de pair avec la transition à la phase anale. L'enfant, par des jeux primitifs comme celui du „fort” et „da” , a appris à accepter une séparation plus longue de la mère, ou plutôt à refouler l'angoisse devant la menace de la mort, qui était la dereliction. Le temps où il apprend à se tenir debout et à retenir la défécation, est aussi le temps où sa conscience naissante s'ouvre à la concurrence de frère et de soeur , surtout à celle du père : la possession de la mère doit être partagée. Ce ne sont plus seulement les cris qui servent de corps subtil pour réaliser la présence réciproque ; celle-ci s'acquiert maintenant par le tenue du corps. La tenue du corps est le langage primitif qui est en fait une „communication” ; il fait trouver le moyen de relâcher encore le cordon ombilical et d'accepter la concurrence d'autres possesseurs de la mère, tout en éloignant l'angoisse de perdre celle-ci. L'objet de l'angoisse se déplace maintenant vers le danger de tomber, de faillir dans la maîtrise du corps et de subir amèrement l'humilitation de l'impuissance. La tension inconsciente, produite par cette angoisse, fair surgir une nouvelle dimension imaginaire : l'opposition entre le haut et le bas. L'effort que demandera toujours la construction de cette dimension verticale , continuera à servir d'étalon dans l'évaluation de tout ce qui demande de l'effort¹, en particulier le travail et la réalisation technique. Pour cette raison il est normal de dire que les salaires et les prix „ montent" — non pas qu'ils augmentent -; pour la même raison le fruit de l'effort, la puissance ou la sécurité, est symbolisé par un siège : le thrône du roi, le siège du président, la chaire du professeur, le siège aussi d'une ville, la pos-session du domaine. Il faut une troisième naissance pour que le langage de l'enfant passe enfin à la forme spécifiquement humaine de „signification”. Apprendre à parler, c.-à-d. à donner aux cris jusque là désordonnés, le „sens” de l'articulation, de l'ordre consécutif, c'est découvrir un monde qui dépasse de loin la présence de la mère et du père. Ce monde est „un relais qui vient s'interposer entre corps et le corps de l'autre ” . Le passage à la „signification” interfère d'ailleurs avec la phase phallique et encore avec l'éclosion du „je” comme sujet. L'ordre articulé des mots qui se suivent engendre la signification, précisément parce qu'il permet à autrui de „suivre” la pensée ; il est aussi symbole de la vie qui doit être une conduite ordonnée. En tant que tel il permet de refouler l'angoisse devant de désordre moral, la conduite désordonnée et devant le blâme ou la réprobation qui en seront la conséquence. En imaginant les projets d'une conduite future , la conscience se projette littéralement en avant et elle crée la troisième dimension, celle du lointain et du proche. Elle prend ici enfin la forme spécifiquement humaine de ïintentionalité, dirigée vers un paradis lointain qui tiendra la place de celui qu'elle vient de perdre. Pourquoi l'intentionalité est-elle spécifiquement humaine ? Parce qu'il est propre à l'essence humaine de chercher le sens de la vie et d'être déjà responsable de ce que cette vie pourra devenir plus tard. Or, c'est là aussi la structure du langage : une proposition, une phrase ne se construisent pas sans être prévues d'avance ; elle ne sont compréhensibles que quand la suite des vocables présente un ordre acceptable par les autres et une cohérence suffisamment logique ; et cependant cet ordre peut être si spécifiquement personnel, qu'il devient une parole authentique, nouvelle lorsque le sens en est cherché et créé par moi. Il s'ensuit que chercher l'origine de la parole, c'est chercher aussi le sens de l'existence humaine : par sa structure la parole reproduit l'histoire humaine et évoque le destin de l'homme. (shrink)

How we evaluate things and what we desire are closely connected. In typical cases, the things we desire are things that we evaluate as good or desirable. According to evaluation theories of desire, this connection is a very tight one: desires are evaluations of their objects as good or as desirable. There are two main varieties of this view. According to Doxastic Evaluativism, to desire that p is to believe or judge that p is good. According to Perceptual Evaluativism, to (...) desire that p is to perceive p as being good (or for p to seem good). The present paper poses a puzzle for such views. The puzzle should be familiar to theorists interested in the normativity and metaphysics of the emotions, but I am unaware of its application to desire. The aim of the present paper is to present the puzzle as it applies to desire, which should be of independent interest, but I also hope that by shining a light on the puzzle in this domain, we might put ourselves in a better position to offer a solution in all cases. At the end of the paper, I gesture towards a promising way ahead that departs from relying on contradictory contents. (shrink)

For an agent to be motivated by a normatively perverse reason is to be motivated by a normative or evaluative thought as such which, if true, would count as such against the action that it motivates the agent to perform, or against the attitude that it motivates the agent to take. For example, that an action is morally wrong or prudentially bad counts, as such, against performing the action. When the thought that an action is morally wrong or prudentially bad (...) motivates me as such to perform the action, my motivating reason is normatively perverse. If being motivated by normatively perverse reasons is possible, then what, if anything, is wrong about it? I present and reject some accounts of what may be wrong about normative perversity. In the course of this discussion some desiderata emerge. Then I defend the suggestion that normative perversion is socially undesirable, in that it undermines certain valuable interpersonal and intrapersonal relations. Entering and maintaining these relations is constitutive of valuing people as beings to whom reasonable justification is owed. I show how this account satisfies the desiderata. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Lack, Perversion, ShameJustin Garson, PhD (bio)I am extremely grateful to the commentators for giving me so much food for thought. Space considerations prevent me from engaging with all of the interesting points they raise, or responding at the length they warrant. For that reason, I chose to structure my response in terms of three recurring themes or distinctions: lack/perversion, madness/mental illness, and shame/pride. Hopefully, the philosophical richness (...) of the commentaries has already indicated the fruitfulness of returning, anew, to the Late Modern distinction between madness and idiocy.Lack and PerversionSeveral commentators directly challenge my characterization of the distinction between idiocy and madness as one between a lack, and a perversion, of the ordinary powers of reason.On the one hand, commentators point to the extent to which Late Modern theorists of madness still frame madness in terms of a lack, rather than a positive being. Jeppsson points out correctly that the Late Modern theorist still insists that madness stems from a lack of some sort or another: “one lacks proper premises to draw conclusions from, lacks a proper appreciation of reality.” Madness is not merely a different mode of reasoning about the world, but one that issues from a certain absence. Kusters, similarly, points out that the projects of Locke and Heinroth “remain insufficient because they remain focused on the mad as lacking something…a lack that prevents them from being part of the communal,” although he thinks Kant’s Aberwitz comes closest to a genuinely positive account. Tsou minimizes the relevance of the distinction between madness and idiocy by pointing out that both represent deviations from (hence they both “lack”) “normal psychological reason.”On the other hand, Banicki points out that even to construe madness in terms of a “lack” or “failure” (a failure of function, of reason, of action) is to presume, at least indirectly, a positive account of madness: after all, the mad person can only properly be said to “fail” in the exercise of their reason because they are the sort of being that participates in reason. A tree or a stone cannot be said to “fail” in the exercise of its reason (as Gipps puts it, “a baobab cannot jump to conclusions”). These commentators have helped me to clarify and sharpen the distinction between lack and perversion and the way they intersect with the categories of idiocy and madness.To put my view summarily: idiocy is, in its essence, just a way of lacking reason, in the same way that being poor is, in its essence, just a way of lacking wealth. But madness is not, in its essence, [End Page 327] a way of lacking reason. It is a way of exercising reason, but via perversion, where perversion must be understood as having the resonance both of excessive and also of driving toward an unexpected end.As I indicated in the paper, the distinction between lack and perversion is easiest to think about in terms of sexuality. A person may lack sexual desire: They may find themselves for long stretches of time with little to no desire for sex, the absence of sexual fantasies, and the inability to stimulate themselves or be stimulated by others. Crucially, being devoid of sexual desire is not a way of being sexual, any more than being dead is a way of being alive, or being a fish a way of being a mammal. By contrast, having a meager sexual desire is a way of being sexual, but via a lack or diminution: It is a way of not having much of it around.In contrast, one can have what is called a “perverse” sexuality: Sexuality infused with the desire to dominate, or be dominated, or to be watched from afar, or to couple with beasts or machines. This is a way of being sexual; it is even a kind of rampant sexuality. One talks of “harnessing” their sexuality, “restraining” it, “unleashing” it. For some, perversions may be terrifying to contemplate, almost unthinkable, even revolting. For others perversion is ecstatic; it transports one to another world in which one sees everything differently; the one who exercises her perversions morphs into an... (shrink)

This paper argues that pleasure and pains are not qualia and they are not to be analyzed in terms of supposedly antecedently intelligible mental states like bodily sensation or desire. Rather, pleasure and pain are char- acteristic of a distinctive kind of evaluation that is common to emotions, desires, and (some) bodily sensations. These are felt evaluations: pas- sive responses to attend to and be motivated by the import of something impressing itself on us, responses that are nonetheless simultaneously con- (...) stitutive of that import by virtue of the broader rational patterns of which they are a part and that they serve to de?ne. This account of felt eval- uations makes sense of the way in which pleasures and pains grab our attention and motivate us to act and of the peculiar dual objectivity and subjectivity of their implicit evaluations, while o?ering a phenomenology adequate to both emotional and bodily pleasures and pains. (shrink)

The Islamic Republic of Iran punishes homosexuality with death but it actively recognizes transsexuality, and partially funds sex change operations. This article aims to examine how this seemingly progressive stance on transsexuality is connected to the IRI's larger oppressive apparatus of gender. It will first provide an overview of the cultural politics of gender and sexuality under the Islamic Republic's rule, and will then discuss the confluence of religious and medical literatures that led the Islamic Republic to adopt its new (...) discourse on transsexuality despite – or perhaps rather because of – its sex/gender politics. The article does not deny that this emerging discourse has been somewhat empowering for those transsexuals who genuinely desire surgical transformation. But empowering as it might have been for such transsexuals, the emerging discourse is still deeply troubling since it systematically regards homosexuality and more generally any sexual or gender non-conformity as unintelligible, perverse, and punishable by law, except for those willing to transform their "wrong bodies." The article will, therefore, demonstrate that the IRI's permission of transsexuality and sex change operations is motivated by a goal that is more about assimilating gender atypical individuals into the heteronormative order than about broadening horizons for sex/gender possibilities. The article ends by discussing how this discourse is making non-surgical trans/multi-gendered identity illegible and illegitimate not only as a publicly recognized possibility, but also with regard to transpersons' own self-perception and self-constitution of their gender and sexual subjectivity. (shrink)

À partir d’une analyse des diverses conceptions de l’éducation dans les contextes historiques et culturels du Niger, de la Réunion et de l’Amazonie brésilienne, nous allons nous focaliser sur leur interaction, et notamment sur la capacité du système scolaire à s’ouvrir à d’autres formes d’éducation, comme les savoirs et savoir-faire traditionnels. L’exemple du Niger montre comment un système qui ignore la diversité et refuse une dialectique des formes de connaissance conduit à l’échec scolaire et au rejet de l’école par une (...) partie importante de la population. À la Réunion, si l’école coranique s’ouvre à la diversité, ce n’est pas le cas de la forme scolaire qui continue à rejeter et à exclure les élèves qui lui sont socialement et culturellement éloignés. Dans l’Amazonie brésilienne, nous constatons que c’est par la reconnaissance de la diversité culturelle et le métissage des différentes formes de savoir à l’intérieur de l’école qu’il est possible de favoriser la réussite scolaire et le désir d’école.Drawing on an analysis of the various approaches to education in the historical and cultural contexts of Niger, Reunion Island and the Brazilian Amazonia, we’ll focus our attention on their interaction, and more particularly on the ability of the school system to open up to other forms of education, such as traditional knowledge and know-how. Through the Niger case, we will see how a system which disregards diversity and refuses dialectical forms of knowledge leads to school failure and rejection of school by a major part of the population. In Reunion Island, while Koranic schools are going along with diversity, current educational policies do not, and continue to reject and exclude pupils with a different social and cultural background. The Brazilian Amazonia case will show that the acceptance of cultural diversity and the intermixing of various forms of knowledge within the school can lead to school success and to the desire to learn. (shrink)

Le phénomène de « perversion » occupe une position bien particulière dans les domaines psychopathologique et psychanalytique. Selon la théorie de Freud, le rêve a pour effet de libérer les désirs refoulés pendant la journée. Au lieu d’être refoulés au tréfonds de l’inconscient, la plupart des vécus du pervers se manifestent dans sa vie en prenant des formes anormales ou immorales telles que le voyeurisme ou l’exhibitionnisme. La perversion est donc un phénomène foncièrement conscient et corporel. Or, si (...) la phénoménologie est définie comme l’analyse de la structure des vécus de la conscience intentionnelle, il s’avère nécessaire d’analyser phénoménologiquement cette structure de la perversité au lieu de se contenter d’étudier la conscience dite saine ou normale. Pour aborder cette question, cet article analyse le texte de Marc Richir, intitulé Phantasia, imagination, affectivité, car il y tente de dégager la structure de la conscience du pervers d’une façon tout à fait innovante. (shrink)

This paper explores the perversion of reality in the context of advanced technologies, such as AI, VR, and AR, through the lens of Jean Baudrillard’s theory of hyperreality and the precession of simulacra. By examining the transformative effects of these technologies on our perception of reality, with a particular focus on the usage of digital avatars, the paper highlights the blurred distinction between the real and the simulated, where the copy becomes more ‘real’ than the original. Drawing on Baudrillard’s (...) concept of hyperreality, the paper delves into the perversion of reality as individuals seek refuge in virtual pleasure paradises and embrace artificial pleasures through their digital avatars, disconnecting from genuine human experiences. The convergence of AI, VR, and AR technologies amplifies this hyperreal condition, where digital avatars mimic or surpass the depth of human relationships, challenging our understanding of what is real. In line with Baudrillard’s theory, the paper explores the objectification and commodification of reality within digital spaces, specifically examining the digital avatars’ role in the erosion of genuine human connections. It explores the implications of these avatars in terms of consent, exploitation, and loss of authenticity, echoing Baudrillard’s concerns about the distortion of reality in contemporary society. Recognizing the implications of these technologies, the paper calls for a critical reflection on their transformative power. It emphasizes the need for a nuanced understanding of the hyperreal condition and ethical responsibility in engaging with AI, VR, and AR, particularly in relation to the usage of digital avatars. By resisting the seductive allure of digital escapism and preserving genuine human connections, we can navigate the perversion of reality and cultivate empathy, compassion, and meaningful interactions that transcend the simulated experiences offered by technology. (shrink)

Marking a ground-breaking moment in the debate surrounding bodies and "body politics," Elizabeth Grosz's Space, Time and Perversion contends that only by resituating and rethinking the body will feminism and cultural analysis effect and unsettle the knowledges, disciplines and institutions which have controlled, regulated and managed the body both ideologically and materially. Exploring the fields of architecture, philosophy, and--in a controversial way--queer theory, Grosz shows how these fields have conceptually stripped bodies of their specificity, their corporeality, and the vestigal (...) traces of their production as bodies. Her tour de corpe investigates the work of Michel Foucault, Teresa de Lauretis, Gilles Deleuze, Judith Butler and Alphonso Lingis. Grosz considers their work by examining the ways in which the functioning of bodies transforms understandings of space and time, knowledge and desire. Begining with an exposition of the epistemological implications of bodily and sexual difference, Grosz examines the effects such knowledge have on the reception of meaning. She looks at the relationship between the knowledge of difference and the way that knowledge validates, affirms, avows and valorizes subjects. Grosz then extends this analysis to an investigation of the relationship between space, time, bodies and the spatial "arts" such as architecuture, urban planning and geography. In the last section, Grosz moves toward a radical consideration of bodies and their relationship to transgression and perversity. Controversially showing the ways in which "queer" theory fails to offer a truly transformative conception of bodies and their politics, Grosz finds "queer" a reactive category "which sees itself in opposition to a straight norm and thus defines itself in terms of this norm." Consequentially, "queer" theory inherits the acceptance of an entire range of sexual practices, without "asking what they share and without taking into account the profound tension that may exist among these practices." Grosz's Space, Time and Perversity is a diverse and incisive collection of essays from a renowned feminist philosopher. (shrink)

El artículo presenta las elaboraciones conceptuales de Deleuze y Guattari en torno a la perversión, especialmente según las propuestas que los autores desarrollan en El anti-Edipo. Capitalismo y Esquizofrenia. Se trabajará la idea de que la perversión, así como otras formas de lo psíquico, están entramadas al interior del campo social, en una relación de continuidad y siguiendo un proceso de producción de lo real, que es lo que Deleuze y Guattari entienden por deseo. El carácter histórico del delirio y (...) el carácter grupal del fantasma muestran esa continuidad entre lo psíquico y lo social como expresión de modos no-normados de la subjetividad en tanto que reivindicaciones políticas del deseo. (shrink)

In "Perversion and the Unnatural as Moral Categories" (Ethics, 90:191-202, January 1980) David Levy argues against a number of theories of perversion by means of the method of counter-example. This is inappropriate since many familiar accounts are not attempts to provide a "one-over-many" formula for a core of clear cases. Rather, like Levy himself, many understand perversions as "unnatural" or "non-human" actions, i.e. as distortions of human nature. Here there is agreement on the intension of the term. Differences (...) in the extension arise in virtue of the relational character of the meaning. For what counts as a distortion of human nature depends on the paradigm of human nature one endorses. In these cases the appropriate way to decide between competing lists of perversions is to evaluate the competing paradigms of human nature on which they rest. Typically these paradigms embody important value assumptions. (shrink)

Popular filmic and literary stereotypes of teachers from Brodie and Chips to Keating and Schneebly have not only reflected a public desire for radically innovative and perverse teaching practices, but also created those paradigms in ways that are not always readily identifiable or traceable. This article seeks to analyse tensions between traditional institutional protocols and contemporary populist opinion on the role of the effective teacher. In doing so, the article takes Peter Weir’s Dead Poets Society (1989) as a primary example (...) of those tensions and argues for a perverse ‘foolosophical’ view of pedagogical performance and a new appreciation for the necessity of ignorance in the classroom. Since ignorance and understanding are not taken as unambiguous antonyms, the article proposes that effective teaching and learning occur most effectively in the interstices between humility and hospitality. (shrink)

Evaluative judgements have both belief-like and desire-like features. While cognitivists think that they can easily explain the belief-like features, and have trouble explaining the desire-like features, non-cognitivists think the reverse. I argue that the belief-like features of evaluative judgement are quite complex, and that these complexities crucially affect the way in which an agent's values explain her actions, and hence the desire-like features. While one form of cognitivism can, it turns out that non-cognitivism cannot, accommodate all of these complexities. The (...) upshot is that that form of cognitivism can explain both features of evaluative judgements, and that non-cognitivism can explain neither. (shrink)

The concept of perversion has traditionally been applied particularly to the sexual sphere, in order to condemn certain desires and certain practices as wrong or inappropriate because of their unnaturalness, as they are understood as a deviation from a given function of sexuality. In this article, I explore the question whether and how such a concept could be applied to another central dimension of our existence, namely our death and, in particular, whether it makes sense to talk of perverted (...) attitudes towards (our own) death. In the first section I present a fairly common account of what is a perverted attitude towards sex and explain how that account can be used to define a perverted attitude towards death. I come up with four suggestions (one based on belief in the afterlife and three secular ones, based respectively on the notion of death as meaningless, on Heidegger’s concept of authenticity and on the evolutionary function of death). In the second section, I explore potential connections between perversion in sex and perversion in death. I conclude that, outside the Catholic worldview, perverted attitudes to sex do not bring along perverted attitudes towards death, nor is there a connection the other way around. In fact, certain kinds of perverted attitudes towards death are even inimical to sexual perversion. In the third section, I present a metaphysical and an ethical reason to doubt that we can and should talk of a function of death or sex. (shrink)

The global resurgence of right-wing radicalization presents significant theoretical and political challenges for critical thought. Contemporary neoliberal authoritarianism integrates diverse and often contradictory ideological elements, creating a complex and enigmatic constellation. This article examines the mechanisms of social aggregation underpinning neoliberal subjectivity today. Drawing on empirical findings from my study of the social appropriation of the concepts of “Law” and “Market” in contemporary Argentine society, I argue that authoritarian neoliberalism gains mass appeal by offering individuals symbolic frameworks of belonging. Central (...) to this process is the construction of a collective “We,” framed through an appeal to equality that paradoxically serves as a vehicle for punitive desires directed toward a phantasmic otherness. The case of these new modes of social aggregation highlights how the egalitarian principle retains legitimacy among social actors, albeit in a distorted form when tied to exclusionary political demands. (shrink)

Sexual perversity has traditionally been defined in terms of violating externally imposed criteria for natural or normal sex. The theory proposed here views sexual desires in terms of their own internal structure, such that perverse desires are those which are self-defeating because they are contradictory. Sadism, masochism, and certain private acts between consenting heterosexual and homosexual adults are shown to be perverse in illustrating the use of this hopefully nonideological method.

In this essay I examine the conceptual relation between emotions and their corresponding evaluations, desires, behavior and goals. Such conceptual relation is of the utmost importance in order to account for the unity or oneness of emotion, for if the different aspects of emotion are linked conceptually, then to have one such aspect would imply having all the others. After I discuss how emotions are related to their corresponding evaluations, desires and behavior, I show how each aspect of emotion is (...) related to the others. Next, I argue that indeed there is such conceptual or quasi-conceptual relation between emotions, evaluations and conative or desiderative states. However, while intentional behavior in terms of actions is conceptually related to some emotions, other times the emotion-specific desires are either non-forward-looking, and thus do not give rise to intentional actions, or they may be overridden, and the resultant behavioral manifestations are not conceptually related to emotion. Next, I argue that emotions are eudaimonistic, in the sense that they are essentially concerned with important goals, concerns and attachments that comprise our conception of the good life and well-being. Finally, I examine the conceptual relation between emotions and their respective goals, and argue that while emotions logically presuppose such goals, the reverse is not the case. (shrink)

La révolution sexuelle et procréatique redessine les contours de la parentalité postmoderne. L’article examine la notion d’« enfant désiré » en la confrontant aux logiques de la procréatique. L’instrumentalisation de l’enfant à naître nous confronte à la place qu’occupent les pertes prénatales précoces dans la psychologie individuelle et collective. La clinique psychopathologique de la survivance périnatale offre une piste pour mesurer ces effets. L’« enfant désiré » de la société procréatique ne bénéficierait pas de l’accueil sécurisant que (...) l’on croit : bien au contraire, il serait exposé à une forme de violence sociale. Ces données méritent d’être prises en compte pour comprendre la parentalité postmoderne. (shrink)

Law and Perversion as the Limit of Enjoyment. On the Question of Jouissance in Psychoanalysis and Phenomenology. As a psychoanalyst, Jacques Lacan differentiated between the impossibility of symbolic representation covering the real (le réel) and the enjoyment (jouissance), which only partially subject itself to such signifiers and therefore leaves a real rest - the object a. This object a, which is different from the imaginary object, represents a non-assimilable excess that occurs on the one hand as the cause of (...) desire (désir) and on the other hand refers back to the intrinsically concealed presence of object a as the origin of fear. The cure consists in crossing this phantasm to give up the original identification; that is, to see the tension between the desire for recognition and the demand in need (besoin) and thereby to dissolve it. Insofar as the subject is split between the singular truth of desire and a general knowledge about it, interdiction, law and perversion are forming a special relation as frontier of enjoyment. (shrink)

Comment la mondialisation artistique et la globalisation esthétique sont interprétées dans les écoles supérieures d’art? Par une réflexion sur la normalisation des pratiques artistiques du fait de la prédominance de certains modèles de réussites, par des conflits autour des traditions théoriques (pensées antiracistes, postcoloniales et décoloniales) et par une interrogation quant à la libéralisation du secteur éducatif. Cet article propose également un cadrage historique de l’arrivée de ces vocabulaires dans les écoles et de leur inscription dans débats idéologiques contradictoires. Il (...) évoque les effets concrets des savoirs tacites en éducation artistique sur l’évaluation des jeunes artistes en écoles. Comment éviter le double écueil d’une assignation racialisante des étudiant·es ou bien de son contraire, une politique de recrutement aveugle au racisme structurel. (shrink)

Human affectivity is a research topic situated at the intersection of psychology, philosophical anthropology, theory of action and ethics. This article reconstructs the Aristotelian theory of emotions in the context of his theory of aspiration /recij ) and in terms of their function as primary evaluators of situations, which forms the basis for virtue ethics. The Aristotelian model integrates desire, motivation and morality for a rational being in community. Affects reveal the profile of relevance of the world to a person (...) as an indispensable basis for the work of practical reason. They are analysed in the dimensions of their cognitive core, their social, bodily, and motivational aspects. Affectivity constitutes a primary evaluative response to situations and thereby disposes human beings to realise their call to morally good, virtuous and fulfilling action. (shrink)

The book contains contributions by leading figures in philosophy of mind and action, emotion theory, and phenomenology. As the focus of the volume is truly innovative we expect the book to sell well to both philosophers and scholars from neighboring fields such as social and cognitive science. The predominant view in analytic philosophy is that an ability for self-evaluation is constitutive for agency and intentionality. Until now, the debate is limited in two (possibly mutually related) ways: Firstly, self-evaluation is usually (...) discussed in individual terms, and, as such, not sufficiently related to its social dimensions; secondly, self-evaluation is viewed as a matter of belief and desire, neglecting its affective and emotional aspects. The aim of the book is to fill these research lacunas and to investigate the question of how these two shortcomings of the received views are related. (shrink)

Contingent valuation surveys generally elicit stated preferences by asking how much a respondent would be willing to pay for an environmental improvement. By drawing on linguistic theory, we propose that the modal phrasing of this question establishes a particular type of commitment towards a hypothetical payment, namely a subjective want or desire. Based on the idea that beyond subjective desires, considerations about what is morally adequate may guide expressed values and that elicitation of these can be linguistically facilitated, we employ (...) an experimental framework to investigate the effects of different modals ( willing, should and appropriate) in the elicitation question on stated preferences. We find that elicited amounts with appropriate are higher than those elicited with willing and should for environmental improvements more associated with use values, while differences are non-significant for environmental improvements more associated with non-use values. We discuss the implications of our findings for stated preference studies, as well as the potential broader theoretical implications that our study entails regarding linguistic representations of the moral entrenchment of environmental values. (shrink)

The ability to attribute beliefs and desires is taken by many to be an essential component of human social cognition, enabling us to predict, explain and shape behaviour and other mental states. In this paper, I argue that there are certain basic responses to attributed attitudes which have thus far been overlooked in the study of social cognition, although they underlie many of the moves we make in our social interactions. The claim is that belief and desire attributions allow for (...) the possibility to agree or disagree and to approve or disapprove, respectively. These evaluative responses may seem obvious but they are of considerable theoretical interest because they can’t be reduced to other roles of belief and desire attribution and are always an open possibility for attributers. What’s more, the responses of agreement/disagreement and approval/disapproval are indispensable for such attributions to be intelligible to us in the first place. (shrink)

The concept of yu 欲 is an under-explored concept in the scholarship on early Confucianism. Perhaps due to the focus on the term “the yu of eyes and ears,” a common term in early Chinese philosophy denoting desires for sensual gratification, or on the Daoist stance on desires, many scholars tend to emphasize the negative and the hedonistic connotations of the term. For example, Chad Hansen notes that the early Confucians do not “make desires central in their account of human (...) guidance,”1 and that Confucius uses “desire” “more to describe dispositions that conflict with his favored dao.”2 In the same vein, when many scholars analyze Xunzi’s account of desires they focus on its... (shrink)

Cet article se concentre sur le jeu de danse d’une petite fille de neuf ans, filmé par elle-même dans la cour d’une école primaire écossaise, en 2018. Olivia incorpore dans son jeu des objets numériques, non numériques, et son environnement, passant de la sélection de chansons sur un téléphone à la danse avec la caméra, au jeu avec le vent, et à la manipulation d’un cône de signalisation. Elle créé un espace de jeu personnel au milieu de l’espace commun, marqué (...) par la musique, le mouvement, les objets et elle-même. Cet article examine comment, à travers ce processus de danse ludique, Olivia met en scène son enfance genrée au féminin, dans sa façon d’interagir avec les gens, l’espace et les objets. Olivia s’inscrit ainsi dans la tradition du jeu dansé des filles. Mais dans la cour post-numérique, les objets numériques deviennent une partie de son jeu, suivant une autre tradition enfantine du jeu, le “bricolage”, dans lequel les enfants utilisent le monde qui les entoure, à travers le temps et l’espace. (shrink)

La « parentalité » est une notion peu employée dans le milieu scolaire. Les relations parents-enseignants sont par ailleurs de plus en plus problématiques. À partir de situations d’analyse des pratiques avec des enseignants, l’auteur de cet article fait l’hypothèse que la prise en compte d’une « parentalité en souffrance » permettrait une évolution positive de ces relations. Les crises identitaires que traversent la famille et l’école viennent en effet complexifier et conflictualiser leurs relations et parfois créer de la confusion (...) dans leurs places respectives. La construction de nouvelles alliances suppose le dégagement d’espaces tiers propres à médiatiser ces relations. La prise en compte de la place particulière que représente l’école entre l’enfant et ses parents ainsi que l’élaboration du « parent interne » chez les enseignants constituent deux pistes de travail. Une « parentalité partagée » pourrait ainsi servir de base à des alliances à même de garantir une place à l’enfant ou adolescent devenu élève. (shrink)

How are emotions related to values? This book argues against a perceptual theory of emotions, which sees emotions as perception-like states that help us gain evaluative knowledge, and argues for a caring-based theory of emotions, which sees emotions as felt desires or desire satisfactions, both of which arise out of caring about something.

The purpose of this study is to determine whether there are cross-cultural differences between Chinese and Canadian business students with respect to their assessment of the ethicality of various business behaviors. Using a sample of 147 business students, the results indicate cultural crossvergence; the Chinese (72 students) and Canadians (75 students) exhibit different ethical attitudes toward questionable business practices at the individual level but not at the corporate level. A social desirability bias (a tendency to deny socially unacceptable actions and (...) to admit to socially desirable ones) is also found to be a cross-cultural phenomenon, with the Canadians demonstrating a greater bias than the Chinese. Finally, this bias causes respondents to increase their assessment of the un-ethicality of questionable business activities. (shrink)