Aspiration by Agnes Callard locates standing assumptions in the theory of rationality, moral psychology and autonomy that preclude the possibility of working to acquire new values. The book also explains what changes need to be made if we are to make room for this form of agency, which I call aspiration.

This interesting book is a compilation of the lectures and discussions held during a four-day event "Grand Challenges for Science in the 21st Century" organized by Para Limes at the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. The elite group of speakers included Nobel laureate Sydney Brenner who called on all scientists to adopt a truth-seeking approach and not be afraid of challenging assumptions. The other panellists were Martin Rees, Astronomer Royal and past President of the Royal Society, the much-cited Terrence Sejnowski (...) from the renowned Salk Institute for Biological Studies, the well-known keynote speaker in economics and complexity sciences Brian Arthur, the former President of the European Research Council Helga Nowotny and the Director of the Parmenides Center for the Conceptual Foundations of Science Eors Szathmary. The lively sessions were moderated by the Danish writer Tor Norretranders. The panel tackled topics from evolution and the origin of the universe to modern technologies and artificial intelligence. The challenges presented during the event are bound to get the reader thinking about what may lie ahead in our future. (shrink)

This paper seeks to determine the extent to which individuals with borderline personality disorders can be held morally responsible for a particular subset of their actions: disproportionate anger, aggressions and displays of temper. The rationale for focusing on these aspects lies in their widespread acknowledgment in the literature and their plausible primary association with blame directed at BPD patients. BPD individuals are indeed typically perceived as “difficult patients” (Sulzer 2015, Bodner et al. 2011), significantly more so than schizophrenic or depressive (...) patients (Markam 2003). The “responsibility question” for patients with BPD has already been raised (Martin 2010, Zachar & Potter 2009, Bray 2003), but this paper tackles it from a novel perspective. First, I narrow down the category of things for which the responsibility question is specific to individual with BPD. After that, I argue that some of the diagnosis criteria of BPD such as emotional instability or impulsivity might serve as excusing factors targeting the “control condition” on moral responsibility. Second, this paper also considers another widely accepted condition on moral responsibility: the epistemic condition. The view defended in the paper is that the answer to the responsibility question for individuals with BPD, concerning both the control condition and the epistemic condition, hinges on an understanding of their epistemic profile. (shrink)

Questo inedito di Ágnes Heller costituisce un approfondimento di un par­ticolare aspetto della sua teoria della morale, la cosiddetta ‘estetica morale’ relativa all’analisi del nesso fra bontà del­l’individuo e manifestazione este­tica di tale bontà nell’azione e nel carattere della sua per­so­nalità. Il saggio of­fre, in primo luogo, una sintesi della teoria morale complessiva di Heller, pre­sentandone alcuni temi fondamentali – la scelta esistenziale della mo­rale, la sintesi tra for­malismo e teleologismo in etica – per poi introdurre il pro­blema dell’estetica (...) morale, e in par­ti­colare le condizioni del giudizio eti­co relativo alla bontà della persona, la rilevanza morale dei sentimenti, la differenza etica fra persona bella e persona sublime.This Heller’s essay, published here for the first time, concerns a specific part of her Theory of Morals: the moral aesthetics, i.e. the relation between individual goodness and its manifestation in the way of acting and in the character of the personality. First, the essay presents a summary of Heller’s ethics: the role of the existential choice of goodness, the link between formalism and teleologism. Then, it analyses some themes of the moral aesthetics like the conditions of ethical judgment on the whole person’s goodness, the moral aspect of feelings, the ethical difference between beautiful and sublime person. (shrink)

Müller proposes a position-taking theory to account for the manifest image of emotional feelings as “feelings towards”. He reduces the process of position-taking to goal-based construal, which is akin to the stimulus-goal comparison process central in appraisal theories. Although this reduction can account for the heat of emotional feelings and the intuition that non-linguistic organisms can also have feelings, it may fail to keep the position-taking aspect on board. Moreover, the image of emotional feelings as active position-takings may itself be (...) questioned and replaced with a passive image. I end by acknowledging that a passive image is still compatible with an active underlying mechanism as is the case in appraisal theories but even more so in the goal-directed theory. (shrink)

A lively debate in the literature on moral progress concerns the role of practical reasoning: Does it enable or subvert moral progress? Rationalists believe that moral reasoning enables moral progress, because it helps enhance objectivity in thinking, overcome unruly sentiments, and open our minds to new possibilities. By contrast, skeptics argue that moral reasoning subverts moral progress. Citing growing empirical research on bias, they show that objectivity is an illusion and that moral reasoning merely rationalizes pre-existing biased moral norms. In (...) this article, I argue that both the rationalists and the skeptics fail to understand fully the role of practical reasoning by focusing exclusively on moral reasoning to the neglect of social reasoning. In the first half of the article, I argue against the skeptics by vindicating moral reasoning. I identify a Democratic Model of moral reasoning which is reliable and effective in overcoming bias. In the second part of the article, I argue against the rationalists. Drawing on a paradigmatic case of moral progress, i.e., the British abolition of the slave trade, I illustrate that moral reasoning, even when sound, is insufficient to motivate progressive action. The explanation for this puzzling phenomenon is not that the moral norm against cruelty is inert, as skeptics might suggest. Rather, it is that the moral norm against cruelty was overridden by the social norm of slavery which was tied to the British joint commitments to freedom and national honour. The debate between rationalists and skeptics centers around the moral rationality of human action, failing to recognize that human action is in fact primarily about social rationality. I defend a joint commitment account of social rationality, and offer a novel Communitarian Model of social reasoning which follows the logic of social rationality to revise social norms. I defend the reliability and efficacy of the Communitarian Model of social reasoning by applying it to the abolitionist social movement to show how Britons gave fellow Britons social reasons grounded in their joint commitments to freedom and national honour to end slavery. (shrink)

Agnes Heller conversó con la Redacción de Areté el 24 de abril de 2003, durante una visita a la Universidad Católica para dictar la Lección Inaugural del Año Académico de la Facultad de Letras y Ciencias Humanas. En la conversación estuvieron presentes los profesores Pepi Patrón, Fidel Tubino y Miguel Giusti.

Freud, Psychoanalysis and Symbolism offers an innovative general theory of symbolism, derived from Freud's psychoanalytic theory and relocated within mainstream scientific psychology. It is the first systematic investigation of the development of Freud's treatment of symbolism throughout his published works, and discovers in those writings a broad theory which is far superior to the widely accepted, narrow, 'official' view. Agnes Petocz argues that the treatment of symbolism must begin with the identification and clarification of a set of logical constraints and (...) psychological requirements which any general theory of symbolism must respect, and that these requirements have been neglected by existing accounts across a number of disciplines. Her newly proposed 'Freudian broad' theory of symbolism, by contrast, does meet these requirements, but only after it has been rehabilitated within a revised psychoanalytic context, encompassing major changes to our understanding of the concepts of unconscious and repression and the role of language. (shrink)

This article explores communicative processes in Chinese involving Chinese American children in order to explain the notion of preference for ambiguity, a characteristic often invoked when describing the Chinese as a group. It also speculates on the impact this notion has on children's socialization. Preference for ambiguity can be defined as making ambiguous something that is otherwise clear-communicating ambiguously or conveying something that is ambiguous-communicating ambiguity. Treating ambiguity as an interaction-centered and activity-bound phenomenon rather than a purely semantic or logical (...) problem, this article locates ambiguity in the intersubjectivity co-constructed by all participants and explores its role in the construction of cultural, situational and interpersonal contexts. It shows that ambiguity is shaped not only by lexico-grammar but also by discourse structure. This article draws data from a total of 30 hours of audio/video recorded classroom interactions involving 4 teachers and about 35 students in two Chinese Heritage Language Schools in the USA as well as from observations and interviews. In the classroom context, children are compelled to make speculations and draw inferences regarding their interlocutors' references, intentions, dispositions and goals. They do so without confronting their interlocutors or holding their interlocutors accountable. In contrast, teachers freely and vocally formulate, clarify, question and interpret children's utterances in an effort to make the children's stances unequivocal. This study suggests that the communicative patterns observed with respect to ambiguity may play an important part in the socialization of cultural knowledge and cognitive styles. (shrink)

Many appraisal theories claim that appraisal causes emotion. Critics have rejected this claim because they believe (a) it is incompatible with the claim that appraisal is a part of emotion, (b) it is not empirically supported, (c) it is circular and hence nonempirical, and (d) there are alternative causes. I reply that (a) the causal claim is incompatible with the part claim on some but not all interpretations of the causal claim and the part claim, (b) the lack of empirical (...) support can be remedied, (c) there may even be ways to cope with the circularity problem, and (d) it is unclear to what extent the alternative causes differ from appraisal. (shrink)

Standard dual-process models in the action domain postulate that stimulus-driven processes are responsible for suboptimal behavior because they take them to be rigid and automatic and therefore the default. We propose an alternative dual-process model in which goal-directed processes are the default instead. We then transfer the dual- process logic from the action domain to the emotion domain. This reveals that emotional behavior is often attributed to stimulus-driven processes. Our alternative model submits that goal-directed processes could be the primary determinant (...) of emotional behavior instead. We evaluate the type of empirical evidence required for validating our model and we consider implications of our model for behavior change, encouraging strategies focused on the expectancies and values of action outcomes. (shrink)

In this paper, I try to resolve a contradiction arising from the combination of two theses: (1) self-forgiveness is sometimes morally justified and (2) only victims can rightly forgive. As has been pointed out by other philosophers, both are plausible but the two taken together are inconsistent. In the literature, self-forgiveness is painted as an “imperfect” form of forgiveness or as a “second best option” because it entails a violation of the victim’s prerogative to forgive. So far, this view has (...) not directly been challenged and philosophers have focused on the task of giving a plausible account of self-forgiveness while leaving the claim according to which forgiveness is among the victim’s prerogative unchallenged. I argue that self-forgiveness is largely independent from the victim’s forgiveness both morally and conceptually. (shrink)

The ecological approach to object pretend play, developed from the ecological perspective, suggests an action- and affordance based perspective to account for pretend object play. Theoretical, as well as empirical reasons, support the view that children in pretense incorporate objects into their play in a resourceful and functionally appropriate way based on the perception of affordances. Therefore, in pretense children are not distorting reality but rather, they are perceiving and acting upon action possibilities. In this paper, we argue for the (...) viability of an ecological theoretical framework to pretend object play which has been traditionally understood as a representational and metarepresentational ability. We discuss the origins and basic assumptions of the ecological approach to pretense. We layout details by presenting a qualitative analysis of a pretend play episode and discuss the results of an experimental study inspired by the ecological assumptions. We discuss pretend object play in the context of ecological work on tool use. We address the relationship between the enactive and the ecological approaches to pretend play, pointing out similarities as well as differences. We conclude that ecological and enactive approaches have shown that it is possible to challenge accepted interpretations and seek explanatory frameworks that could move the field in new directions. (shrink)

Un parallèle est fréquemment établi entre le blâme de soi et le blâme d'autrui. Cet article cherche à montrer que celui-ci est infondé et que le blâme de soi et le blâme d’autrui ne sont que superficiellement analogues. Pour ce faire, nous montrerons qu’aucun des rapprochements défendus dans la littérature contemporaine n’est concluant. Nous commencerons par distinguer la phénoménologie du blâme de soi de celle du blâme d’autrui. Dans un second temps, nous distinguerons la fonction du blâme de soi de (...) celle du blâme d’autrui. Finalement, nous montrerons que le blâme de soi est moralement acceptable dans des cas où le blâme d’autrui est interdit. À travers cette discussion, nous espérons montrer que le blâme de soi est une attitude fondamentalement différente du blâme d’autrui et qu’il mérite notre attention en tant que phénomène distinct. -/- A parallel is often drawn between self-blame and interpersonal blame. This article seeks to show that this parallel is unfounded and that self-blame and interpersonal blame are only superficially analogous. To this end, we will show that none of the comparisons defended in contemporary literature is conclusive. We will begin by distinguishing the phenomenology of self-blame from that of interpersonal blame. Second, we will distinguish the function of self-blame from that of interpersonal blame. Finally, we will show that self-blame is morally permissible in cases where interpersonal blame is prohibited. With this discussion, we hope to show that self-blame is a fundamentally different attitude from interpersonal blame and that it deserves our attention as a distinct phenomenon. (shrink)

Agnes Arber's international reputation is due in part to her exceptional ability to interpret the German tradition of scholarship for the English-speaking world. The Mind and the Eye is an erudite book, revealing its author's familiarity with philosophy from Plato and Aristotle through Aquinas to Kant and Hegel; but it is not dull, because the quiet enthusiasm of the author shines through. In this book she turns from the work of a specialist in one science to those wider questions which (...) any scientist must ask at intervals. What, in short, is the relationship between the eye that sees and the mind that weighs and pronounces? An important feature of this Cambridge Science Classics reissue is the introduction provided by Professor P. R. Bell, who as a Cambridge botany student at the time that Agnes Arber was writing The Natural Philosopby of Plant Form, is uniquely able to set The Mind and the Eye in the context of contemporary biological research. (shrink)

In this paper, I take scientific models to be epistemic representations of their target systems. I define an epistemic representation to be a tool for gaining information about its target system and argue that a vehicle’s capacity to provide specific information about its target system—its informativeness—is an essential feature of this kind of representation. I draw an analogy to our ordinary notion of interpretation to show that a user’s aim of faithfully representing the target system is necessary for securing this (...) feature. (shrink)

This article aims to answer the main question raised – is Rorty’s moral philosophy possible? To what extent is it possible to treat it as an authentic theory? Rorty’s criticism of Kant and the Kantians, as one of the key points of contemporary moral philosophy, determines the posture in the moral domain and provides a certain place in discourse. The article states that, despite the fact that Rorty’s moral philosophy is not based on a particular theoretical concept, it can be (...) considered as a fragmented whole consisting of several parts, one of which is the agent’s openness to the choice of moral identity. At the same time, we will critically question the position of Rorty himself – while maintaining the suspicion towards the sources of moral knowledge, he maintains an insufficient distance with one of his own sources of moral knowledge, namely historical progress. (shrink)

The paper sketches the historical development from emotion as a mysterious entity and the source of maladaptive behaviour, to emotion as a collection of ingredients and the source of also adaptive behaviour. We argue, however, that the underlying mechanism proposed to take care of this adaptive behaviour is not entirely up for its task. We outline an alternative view that explains so-called emotional behaviour with the same mechanism as non-emotional behaviour, but that is at the same time more likely to (...) produce adaptive behaviour. The phenomena that were initially seen as requiring a separate emotional mechanism to influence and cause behaviour can also be explained by a goal-directed mechanism provided that more goals and other complexities inherent in the goal-directed process are taken into account. (shrink)

Introduces fundamental epistemological and metaphysical issues and concepts. Deals comprehensively with Eastern as well as Western philosophy.

The acquisition of complex motor, cognitive, and social skills, like playing a musical instrument or mastering sports or a language, is generally associated with implicit skill learning . Although it is a general view that SL is most effective in childhood, and such skills are best acquired if learning starts early, this idea has rarely been tested by systematic empirical studies on the developmental pathways of SL from childhood to old age. In this paper, we challenge the view that childhood (...) and early school years are the prime time for skill learning by tracking age-related changes in performance in three different paradigms of SL. We collected data from participants between 7 and 87 years for a Serial Reaction Time Task testing the learning of motor sequences, an Artificial Grammar Learning task testing the extraction of regularities from auditory sequences, and Probabilistic Category Learning in the Weather Prediction task , a non-sequential categorization task. Results on all three tasks show that adolescence and adulthood are the most efficient periods for skill learning, since instead of becoming less and less effective with age, SL improves from childhood into adulthood and then later declines with aging. (shrink)

Objections to the use of historical case studies for philosophical ends fall into two categories. Methodological objections claim that historical accounts and their uses by philosophers are subject to various biases. We argue that these challenges are not special; they also apply to other epistemic practices. Metaphysical objections, on the other hand, claim that historical case studies are intrinsically unsuited to serve as evidence for philosophical claims, even when carefully constructed and used, and so constitute a distinct class of challenge. (...) We show that attention to what makes for a canonical case can address these problems. A case study is canonical with respect to a particular philosophical aim when the features relevant to that aim provide a reasonably complete causal account of the results of the historical process under investigation. We show how to establish canonicity by evaluating relevant contingencies using two prominent examples from the history of science: Eddington’s confirmation of Einstein’s theory of general relativity using his data from the 1919 eclipse and Watson and Crick’s determination of the structure of DNA. (shrink)

In this paper, I characterize visual epistemic representations as concrete two- or three-dimensional tools for conveying information about aspects of their target systems or phenomena of interest. I outline two features of successful visual epistemic representation: that the vehicle of representation contain sufficiently accurate information about the phenomenon of interest for the user’s purpose, and that it convey this information to the user in a manner that makes it readily available to her. I argue that actual epistemic representation may involve (...) tradeoffs between these and is successful to the extent that they are present. (shrink)

Critics of appraisal theory have difficulty accepting appraisal (with its constructive flavor) as an automatic process, and hence as a potential cause of most emotions. In response, some appraisal theorists have argued that appraisal was never meant as a causal process but as a constituent of emotional experience. Others have argued that appraisal is a causal process, but that it can be either rule-based or associative, and that the associative variant can be automatic. This article first proposes empirically investigating whether (...) rule-based appraisal can also be automatic and then proposes investigating the automatic nature of constructive (instead of rule-based) appraisal because the distinction between rule-based and associative is problematic. Finally, it discusses experiments that support the view that constructive appraisal can be automatic. (shrink)

Hélène Charron est une bonne connaisseuse de l’histoire des sciences sociales en France. Après avoir étudié dans sa thèse la place des femmes et leur légitimité dans le champ social de la recherche en sciences sociales au cours des cinquante premières années de leur structuration en discipline nouvelle (entre 1890 et 1940), elle s’intéresse dans ce nouveau livre au contenu de ces recherches du point de vue des rapports sociaux de sexe. Elle choisit de les analyser dans la revue emblématique (...) d... (shrink)

Les astrologues étaient, au xviii e siècle, l’une des cibles satiriques des auteurs des Lumières, qui appelaient « superstition » ce qui ne rentrait pas dans le cadre de la science et de la religion instituées. Le traitement de ces personnages dans les œuvres de Walter Scott et d’E.T.A. Hoffmann indique toutefois qu’un tournant a eu lieu au début du xix e siècle : à partir notamment du modèle schillérien, cette figure à l’identité ambiguë a acquis une profondeur nouvelle grâce (...) à sa capacité à revêtir de nombreux masques. Scott et Hoffmann ne représentent pas l’astrologie comme une menace ou un objet de dérision qu’il convient de tourner en ridicule. Elle est devenue chez eux aussi bien un « moment » du passé qui possède une valeur d’exemplarité historique, qu’une des voies permettant la défense des pouvoirs de l’imagination et d’une vision enchantée du monde. Il est donc pertinent de remettre en question certaines idées que ces auteurs défendent à propos de leur œuvre : la prose de Walter Scott n’est pas aussi opposée à celle de Hoffmann qu’il l’a affirmé, et Hoffmann, en ce qui concerne du moins l’histoire des croyances, hérite lui aussi du rationalisme des Lumières qu’il entend dénoncer. (shrink)

Réunies en collectif de recherche et d'écriture, cinq femmes psychanalystes se penchent sur la question très actuelle de l'affirmation de la femme, portée par la figure inconsciente de l'Animus. Elles revendiquent une remise en cause des théories de CG Jung sur l'Animus, et des points de vue passéistes qui irriguent la littérature traitant de ce sujet à la suite du "maître". Elles témoignent ici en toute liberté de leurs expériences psychiques et de leur relation avec cette âme masculine inconsciente. Plusieurs (...) sujets sont abordés : la femme et sa créativité, le corps de la femme, l'épreuve du manque de père, l'expression de la femme et celle de la mère, la femme et la violence, la femme entre archaïsme et modernité. Un livre dont la forme fait une large part aux illustrations et au graphisme pour offrir un ensemble accessible même aux non-spécialistes. (shrink)

Utilising science and technology to maximize human performance is often an essential feature of military activity. This can often be focused on mission success rather than just the welfare of the individuals involved. This tension has the potential to threaten the autonomy of soldiers and military physicians around the taking or administering of enhancement neurotechnologies (e.g., pills, neural implants, and neuroprostheses). The Hybrid Framework was proposed by academic researchers working in the U.S. context and comprises “rules” for military neuroenhancement (e.g., (...) ensuring transparency and maintaining dignity of the warfighter). Integrating traditional bioethical perspectives with the unique requirements of the military environment, it has been referenced by military/government agencies tasked with writing official ethical frameworks. Our two-part investigation explored the ethical dimensions of military neuroenhancements with military officers – those most likely to be making decisions in this area in the future. In three workshops, structured around the Hybrid Framework, we explored what they thought about the ethical issues of enhancement neurotechnologies. From these findings, we conducted a survey (N = 332) to probe the extent of rule endorsement. Results show high levels of endorsement for a warfighter’s decision-making autonomy, but lower support for the view that enhanced warfighters would pose a danger to society after service. By examining the endorsement of concrete decision-making guidelines, we provide an overview of how military officers might, in practice, resolve tensions between competing values or higher-level principles. Our results suggest that the military context demands a recontextualisation of the relationship between military and civilian ethics. (shrink)