Volume 33, Issue 8, November 2020, Page 1096-1120.

The research aim is to predict popular psychology based on perfectionism, cognitive style, and emotional schema. The population of the study included men, and women aged 20 to 60 living in the city. According to Krejcie & Morgan’s table, 383 people were selected using a non-proportional stratified random sampling method. To collect data, a popular psychology questionnaire, Hill’s perfectionism questionnaire, Leahy’s emotional schema questionnaire, and Witkin’s cognitive style test were employed. The results showed that there was a significant and positive (...) impact of perfectionism (The Beta coefficient = 0.18, p-value < 0.05) and emotional schema (The Beta coefficient = 0.30, p-value < 0.05) on popular psychology; while there was no correlation between cognitive style and popular psychology which its equation can be presented as PP = 0.3ES + 0.18P + 1.11. Regarding the model, R2 = 0.14 indicates that the model explains 14% of the variances in popular psychology. (shrink)

In 1969, John McCarthy and Pat Hayes uncovered a problem that has haunted the field of artificial intelligence ever since--the frame problem. The problem arises when logic is used to describe the effects of actions and events. Put simply, it is the problem of representing what remains unchanged as a result of an action or event. Many researchers in artificial intelligence believe that its solution is vital to the realization of the field's goals. Solving the Frame Problem presents the various (...) approaches to the frame problem that have been proposed over the years. The author presents the material chronologically--as an unfolding story rather than as a body of theory to be learned by rote. There are lessons to be learned even from the dead ends researchers have pursued, for they deepen our understanding of the issues surrounding the frame problem. In the book's concluding chapters, the author offers his own work on event calculus, which he claims comes very close to a complete solution to the frame problem. Artificial Intelligence series. (shrink)

Volume 23, Issue 3-4, November - December 2024, Page 219-244.

Nietzsche est trop mal connu et trop méconnu. On lui a fait dire tout et n'importe quoi! On l'a dit nihiliste, lui qui a éreinté le nihilisme. On a fait de lui un misanthrope violent, lui qui était la courtoisie, la sensibilité et la douceur mêmes. On a voulu faire de lui un précurseur du nazisme, lui, l'ami des Juifs qui ne haïssait tant rien que le militarisme et le germanisme. On sait que Nietzsche proclamait que "Dieu est mort!". Mais (...) sait-on de quel Dieu il parlait et sait-on qu'il fut le prophète de la Vie et de l'Amour du Destin... On sait que Nietzsche était un philosophe du soupçon et le pourfendeur de toutes les espérances. (shrink)

Etudes d'histoire de la philosophie (3e edition) / Emile BoutrouxDate de l'edition originale: 1908Sujet de l'ouvrage: Philosophie -- HistoireCe livre est la reproduction fidele d'une oeuvre publiee avant 1920 et fait partie d'une collection de livres reimprimes a la demande editee par Hachette Livre, dans le cadre d'un partenariat avec la Bibliotheque nationale de France, offrant l'opportunite d'acceder a des ouvrages anciens et souvent rares issus des fonds patrimoniaux de la BnF.Les oeuvres faisant partie de cette collection ont ete numerisees (...) par la BnF et sont presentes sur Gallica, sa bibliotheque numerique.En entreprenant de redonner vie a ces ouvrages au travers d'une collection de livres reimprimes a la demande, nous leur donnons la possibilite de rencontrer un public elargi et participons a la transmission de connaissances et de savoirs parfois difficilement accessibles.Nous avons cherche a concilier la reproduction fidele d'un livre ancien a partir de sa version numerisee avec le souci d'un confort de lecture optimal. Nous esperons que les ouvrages de cette nouvelle collection vous apporteront entiere satisfaction.Pour plus d'informations, rendez-vous sur www.hachettebnf.frhttp: //gallica.bnf.fr/ark: /12148/bpt6k4915s. (shrink)

Agricultural water management provides the basic support and guarantee for targeted poverty alleviation. This paper presents a 3E + 1 evaluation model for the performance of agricultural water management in targeted poverty alleviation based on 3E theory, which is more scientific, reasonable, and reliable. On this basis, an evaluation index system including three levels of indicators is designed, and the weight of each evaluation index and performance evaluation model is determined. A case study of a county in the old district (...) of Maoshan in Jiangsu province was conducted using the proposed evaluation theory and methods. The results show that the overall performance of agricultural water management for targeted poverty alleviation in this area was good but needs more improvement in innovation. The evaluation results are roughly consistent with the evaluations of higher authorities, experts, and scholars, which proves that the evaluation system is scientific and reasonable. (shrink)

A critique of the hypothesis of extended cognition.

Humans and other animals have an evolved ability to detect discrete magnitudes in their environment. Does this observation support evolutionary debunking arguments against mathematical realism, as has been recently argued by Clarke-Doane, or does it bolster mathematical realism, as authors such as Joyce and Sinnott-Armstrong have assumed? To find out, we need to pay closer attention to the features of evolved numerical cognition. I provide a detailed examination of the functional properties of evolved numerical cognition, and propose that (...) they prima facie favor a realist account of numbers. (shrink)

Cognitive science and hathayoga both make emphatic claims about the relationship between the body and the mind. To examine this complementary relationship I draw upon the five main approaches currently being used by cognitive science and then consider their implications within the context of three specific points of contact with hathayoga theory: the rejection of dualism, the nature of consciousness, and the role of the nervous and circulatory systems in religious experience. This type of comparative analysis can provide additional information (...) about the nature of consciousness and the potential practices that heighten our awareness or knowledge of it. Consequently, cognitive science offers a new and provocative way to dialogue with Indian yoga traditions in terms of the methods and theories of modernity. (shrink)

The philosophical case for extended cognition is often made with reference to ‘extended-memory cases’ ; though, unfortunately, proponents of the hypothesis of extended cognition as well as their adversaries have failed to appreciate the kinds of epistemological problems extended-memory cases pose for mainstream thinking in the epistemology of memory. It is time to give these problems a closer look. Our plan is as follows: in §1, we argue that an epistemological theory remains compatible with HEC only if its (...) epistemic assessments do not violate what we call ‘the epistemic parity principle’. In §2, we show how the constraint of respecting the epistemic parity principle stands in what appears to be a prima facie intractable tension with mainstream thinking about cases of propositional memory. We then outline and evaluate in §3 several lines of response. (shrink)

This paper motivates taking seriously the possibility that brains are basically protean: that they make use of neural structures in inventive, on-the-fly improvisations to suit circumstance and context. Accordingly, we should not always expect cognition to divide into functionally stable neural parts and pieces. We begin by reviewing recent work in cognitive ontology that highlights the inadequacy of traditional neuroscientific approaches when it comes to divining the function and structure of cognition. Cathy J. Price and Karl J. Friston, (...) and Colin Klein identify the limitations of relying on forward and reverse inferences to cast light on the relation between cognitive functions and neural structures. There is reason to prefer Klein’s approach to that of Price and Friston’s. But Klein’s approach is neurocentric - it assumes that we ought to look solely at neural contexts to fix cognitive ontology. Using recent work on mindreading as a case study, we motivate adopting a radically different approach to cognitive ontology. Promoting the Protean Brain Hypothesis, we posit the possibility that we may need to look beyond the brain when deciding which functions are being performed in acts of cognition and in understanding how the brain contributes to such acts by adapting to circumstance. (shrink)

We show that the length of a hierarchy of domains with totality, based on the standard domain for the natural numbers \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} ${\Bbb N}$\end{document} and closed under dependent products of continuously parameterised families of domains will be the first ordinal not recursive in \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $^3E$\end{document} and any real. As a part of the proof we show that the domains of the hierarchy share (...) important properties with the types of continuous functionals. The main result can also be viewed as a representation theorem for recursion in \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $^3E$\end{document}. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Cognitive Equivalence The Complementarity Argument Evolutionary Arguments Conclusion: The Importance of the Mark of the Cognitive.

How does mental content feature in conscious thought? I first argue that for a thought to be conscious the content of that thought must conscious, and that one has to appeal to cognitive phenomenology to give an adequate account of what it is for the content of a thought to be conscious. Sensory phenomenology cannot do the job. If one claims that the content of a conscious thought is unconscious, one is really claiming that there is no such thing as (...) conscious thought. So one must either accept that there is such a thing as cognitive phenomenology, or deny the existence of conscious thought. Once it is clear that conscious thought requires cognitive phenomenology, there is a pressing question about the exact relationship between a thought’s cognitive phenomenological properties and its content. I conclude with a discussion of the nature of this relationship. (shrink)

In Cognitive Integration: Attacking The Bounds of Cognition Richard Menary argues that the real pay-off from extended-mind-style arguments is not a new form of externalism in the philosophy of mind, but a view in which the 'internal' and 'external' aspects of cognition are integrated into a whole. Menary argues that the manipulation of external vehicles constitutes cognitive processes and that cognition is hybrid: internal and external processes and vehicles complement one another in the completion of cognitive tasks. (...) However, we cannot make good on these claims without understanding the cognitive norms by which we manipulate bodily external vehicles of cognition. -/- Shaun Gallagher: “Menary sets out some extremely welcome clarifications that help to integrate the models of embodied and extended cognition. He not only provides convincing responses to all of the main objections that have been made against these approaches, he also puts flesh on the integrated model by incorporating concepts such as epistemic action, by expanding the discussion to include a Peircean view of representation, by demonstrating its evolutionary roots, and by exploring its implications for language and cognition. This is one of those books that takes us forward a number of giant steps. Menary makes it comprehensive and comprehensible.” . (shrink)

This book describes a novel methodology for studying algorithmic skills, intended as cognitive activities related to rule-based symbolic transformation, and argues that some human computational abilities may be interpreted and analyzed as genuine examples of extended cognition. It shows that the performance of these abilities relies not only on innate neurocognitive systems or language-related skills, but also on external tools and general agent–environment interactions. Further, it asserts that a low-level analysis, based on a set of core neurocognitive systems linking (...) numbers and language, is not sufficient to explain some specific forms of high-level numerical skills, like those involved in algorithm execution. To this end, it reports on the design of a cognitive architecture for modeling all the relevant features involved in the execution of algorithmic strategies, including external tools, such as paper and pencils. The first part of the book discusses the philosophical premises for endorsing and justifying a position in philosophy of mind that links a modified form of computationalism with some recent theoretical and scientific developments, like those introduced by the so-called dynamical approach to cognition. The second part is dedicated to the description of a Turing-machine-inspired cognitive architecture, expressly designed to formalize all kinds of algorithmic strategies. (shrink)

Perception purports to help you gain knowledge of the world even if the world is not the way you expected it to be. Perception also purports to be an independent tribunal against which you can test your beliefs. It is natural to think that in order to serve these and other central functions, perceptual representations must not causally depend on your prior beliefs and expectations. In this paper, I clarify and then argue against the natural thought above. All perceptual systems (...) must solve an under-determination problem: the sensory data they receive could be caused by indefinitely many arrangements of distal objects and properties. Using a Bayesian approach to perceptual processing, I argue that in order to solve the under-determination problem, perceptual capacities must rely on prior beliefs or expectations of some kind. I then argue that perceptual states or processes can help ground knowledge of the world whether the ‘beliefs’ necessary for perceptual processing are encoded as sub-personal states within a perceptual system or cognitive states, such as person-level beliefs. My argument has two main parts. First, I give a preliminary argument that cognitive influence on perception can be appropriate, and I respond to three lines of objection. Second, I argue that cognitively influenced perceptual states can be instances of seeing that p, which makes the relevant states well suited to help ground knowledge that p. I conclude that a cognitively penetrated perceptual state or process can help ground knowledge under some circumstances. (shrink)

"This book provides a representative survey of early and more recent concerns in cognitively inspired lexical semantics.

Robotic and Autonomous Agricultural Technologies (RAAT) are increasingly available yet may fail to be adopted. This paper focusses specifically on cognitive factors that affect adoption including: inability to generate trust, loss of farming knowledge and reduced social cognition. It is recommended that agriculture develops its own framework for the performance and safety of RAAT drawing on human factors research in aerospace engineering including human inputs (individual variance in knowledge, skills, abilities, preferences, needs and traits), trust, situational awareness and cognitive (...) load. The kinds of cognitive impacts depend on the RAATs level of autonomy, ie whether it has automatic, partial autonomy and autonomous functionality and stage of adoption, ie adoption, initial use or post-adoptive use. The more autonomous a system is, the less a human needs to know to operate it and the less the cognitive load, but it also means farmers have less situational awareness about on farm activities that in turn may affect strategic decision-making about their enterprise. Some cognitive factors may be hidden when RAAT is first adopted but play a greater role during prolonged or intense post-adoptive use. Systems with partial autonomy need intuitive user interfaces, engaging system information, and clear signaling to be trusted with low level tasks; and to compliment and augment high order decision-making on farm. (shrink)

This paper examines two paths by which F. A. Hayek’s work has influenced the cognitive theory of institutions: cognition and cultural evolution. It argues that there is a relationship between the sensory order and the social order. The explanation of social order begins with the human mind. This is illustrated with ideas relating to understanding culture from a cognitive viewpoint. Human cognition makes cultural evolution an endogenous process. The paper draws on ideas of co-evolution of individuals’ mental models (...) and their actions. Mental models can be modified by feedback from altered perceived reality as a consequence of peoples’ altered actions. A key to understanding cultural evolution is an understanding of how individuals modify their mental models. (shrink)

Nurses practising in mental health are faced with challenging decisions concerning confidentiality if a patient is deemed a potential risk to self or others, because releasing pertinent information pertaining to the patient may be necessary to circumvent harm. However, decisions to withhold or disclose confidential information that are inappropriately made may lead to adverse outcomes for stakeholders, including nurses and their patients. Nonetheless, there is a dearth of contemporary research literature to advise nurses in these circumstances. Cognitive Continuum Theory presents (...) a single‐system intuitive‐analytical approach to examining and understanding nurse cognition, analogous to the recommended single‐system approach to decision‐making in mental health known as structured clinical judgement. Both approaches incorporate cognitive poles of wholly intuition and analysis and a dynamic continuum characterised by a ‘common sense’ blending of intuitive and analytical cognition, whereby cues presented to a decision‐maker for judgement tasks are weighed and assessed for relevance. Furthermore, Cognitive Continuum Theory promotes the importance of determining pattern recognition and functional relations strategies, which can be used to understand the operationalisation of nurse cognition. (shrink)