Résumé L’intérêt pour le café ne date pas d’aujourd’hui, mais les discours promotionnels sur ce breuvage mythique ne cessent de se multiplier depuis l’arrivée d’Internet. Pour mieux comprendre le domaine spécifique des récits gustatifs qui se construisent autour de la passion pour le café, nous avons privilégié une démarche innovante en sciences du langage, la sémiotique du goût. Le site internet de la marque Carte Noire, en misant sur l’expérience gustative euphorisante et la tautologie du désir, offre un corpus approprié (...) pour cette nouvelle approche. L’objectif de notre article est double : il consiste, d’une part, à appréhender le processus de construction des significations du récit passionnel en acte, et, d’autre part, à conceptualiser le sensible, l’imaginaire gustatif et l’hédonisme sur lesquels se basent les stratégies discursives publicitaires adjacentes. (shrink)

In most common expositions of Indian philosophy the two traditions: self and no-self - are taken to be mutually incompatible. The former, having its origin in the Upaniṣads, finds expression in all āstikadarśanas , though its clearest and most important exposition is found in Advaita Vedānta. The latter having its origin in the teachings of the Buddha finds varied expressions in different schools of Buddhism. The Advaita Vedānta accepts ātman and rejects anattā ; the Buddhists argue for anattā and reject (...) ātman . My exposition in this paper is based primarily on the teachings of the Gautama Buddha and Śaṃkara, the founders of Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta respectively. Accordingly, unless otherwise specified, my use of the terms “Buddhist” and “Advaitins” refers to the teachings of these founders rather than to the later philosophers of these two traditions. I will begin with an overview of Advaita Vedānta. (shrink)

Many contemporary authors argue that since certain Hindu texts and traditions claim that all living beings are fundamentally the same as Brahman (God), these texts and traditions provide the basis for an environmental ethic. I outline three common versions of this argument, and argue that each fails to meet at least one criterion for an environmental ethic. This doesn’t mean, however, that certain Hindu texts and traditions do not provide the basis for an environmental ethic. In the last section of (...) the paper I briefly outline and defend an alternative, according to which all plants and animals have intrinsic value and direct moral standing in virtue of having a good. (shrink)

Hindu religious and philosophical thought revolves around the basic metaphysical thesis that Atman, the individual self, is identical with Brahman, the Universal Self in which all things are sustained. With a few notable exceptions most Western philosophers have found this thesis too far removed from common sense to consider seriously. My purpose in this essay is to clarify and defend five theses about consciousness which, while formulated independently, have their closest collective affinities to the Advaita Vedanta view of consciousness.

I provide critical discussion of conception of and talk of psychic integration which I take to be both excessive and deficient; these viciously extreme positions are championed by the Apostle Paul and St. Augustine, and by Jacques Lacan and María Lugones, respectively. I suggest that we must negotiate a Buddhist-inspired understanding located between these extremes in endorsing any acceptable conception of the self, generally speaking—a conception which, contra the strong antirealist about selves, allows for the continued use of selfhood in (...) everyday discourse, but which, contra the strong realist about selves, does not fall into an unhealthy idealization of anything approximating perfect psychic wholeness. (shrink)

The central thesis of the philosophy of Advaita Vedānta is the doctrine of the identity of brahman and ātman. Brahman is essentially sat, being as such in the sense of the dimension of existence in which all worldly goings-on take place. The ātman is conceived as the “seer,” i.e., as the pure subject qua the to-whom of any experiential givenness; and this subject, in turn, is understood not as some entity that performs the seeing but as nothing but the very (...) seeing itself, i.e., as consciousness in the sense of the abiding presence-realm in which permanently changing experiential contents come to givenness. The Advaitic thesis is that this presence-realm—the seeing that takes place “in us”—is ultimately nothing other than the universal being-dimension—brahman—itself, modified by the mental contents of an innerworldly individual. This paper attempts to vindicate this doctrine by a series of reflections on the nature of the I and of reality as such. It argues that Advaita Vedānta can be viewed as a version of cosmopsychism in its idealist version which does not view consciousness as one of the features of the cosmos as a whole, but as its exclusive intrinsic nature, i.e., as the very essence of being as such. (shrink)

형이상학적 자아의 존재를 부정하는 주류불교에 비해 여래장사상 계통의 경론은 자아라는 개념과 용어를 자유로이 게다가 긍정적으로 사용하고 있다. 이러한 여래장사상 계통의 태도는 인도 정통철학의 자아 개념을 승인하고 있다는 비판을 불러일으키기도 했다. 하지만 후대의 여래장사상가 뿐 아니라 『열반경』과 『보성론』 자체에서도 주류불교의 무아설과 통합시키는 방향으로 자아 개념에 대한 다양한 해석이 이루어지고 있음을 발견할 수 있다. 통합의 유형은 먼저, 자아 개념을 잠정적 의미(neyārtha)의 가르침이란 관점에서 해석하는 것이다. 이 경우 자아 개념은 외도나 중생의 교화를 위한 수단의 의미에 중점이 주어진다. 둘째, 외도나 중생이 집착하는 자아는 부정하되, (...) 여래장사상 계열에서 인정하는 자아는 궁극적 실재를 가리키는 것으로 긍정하는 유형이다. 전자가 부정되는 이유는 여래장사상에서 인정하는 자아 개념에 부합하지 않기 때문이다. 반면 후자는 여래, 불성, 여래장과 동일시되며, 자아라는 긍정적 언어로 서술된다. 셋째, 자아와 무아를 양자긍정의 방식으로 동일시하거나 양자부정의 방식으로 모두 부정하는 유형이다. 전자는 주로 궁극적 실재의 인식불가능성이나 난해성과 관련되어 있다. 후자의 경우는 아견과 무아견을 모두 개념적 다양성의 산물로 격하시키는 대신 궁극적 실재를 보다 고차원적인 것으로 드러내는 방식이다. 마지막으로 한역 『보성론』과 『불성론』에 인용된 『대승장엄경론』의 게송은 자아와 무아를 동일시하는 『보성론』의 입장과 궤를 같이 하고 있다. 하지만 그에 대한 산문주석과 무성 및 안혜의 복주에서는 자아 개념을 본질 개념으로 재해석하고 있다. 이는 여래장사상 계열에서는 거부했던 합리적 해석의 한 유형으로 보인다. (shrink)

아트만(ātman)과 힌두 전통에서 윤회의 주체를 구성하는 핵심적인 요소로 간주된다. 반면 푸루샤(puruṣa)는 상키야-요가 학파에서 아트만을 대체하는 용어로 사용되며 영아(靈我)ㆍ순수정신 등으로 번역된다. 아트만과 푸루샤는 상키야 학파 내외에서 동일한 개념으로 통용되었다. 본 논문의 목적은 상키야 학파가 힌두전통에서 일반적으로 사용되는 아트만이라는 용어 대신에 푸루샤라는 용어를 사용하게 된 경위를 소묘하는 데 있다. 특히 명상을 통해 지각되는 대상으로서의 아트만과 푸루샤의 묘사하는 서술들에 맞추었다. 아트만과 푸루샤가 명상의 대상으로 취급되면서 중요한 분기점을 맞는 것으로 생각되기 때문이다. 초기 우파니샤드에서는 심장의 빛을 아트만이라고 간주하는 계열이 있으며, 그 개념이 고전 요가 체계에도 (...) 통용되고 있다. 푸루샤와 아트만은 우파니샤드에서 서로 다른 개념으로도, 동일한 개념으로도 사용되는데, 그것은 생리학적 측면과 표현법의 측면이 각각 두 가지씩 분기점을 지닌다. 또한 수행론적인 측면에서도 상반되는 두 가지 실수론이 우파니샤드에서 공존한다. 마하바라타에서 나타난 푸루샤와 아트만에 관한 기술이 큰 개념적 차이 없이 사용된다. 다만 마하바라타에서 푸루샤와 아트만을 구분하는 맥락은 기본적으로 우파니샤드의 존재-인식 분류법과 동일하다. 그리고 마하바라타의 일부 구절에서는 고전 상키야와 거의 흡사하게 아트만과 푸루샤가 지각될 수 없는 존재라는 것을 명확하게 서술하는 부분이 있으며, 반면 요가를 통해서 지각할 수 있는 존재라고 설명하는 부분도 발견된다. 그리고 그것은 상키야와 요가와 구분되는 사정과 관련이 있으나, 고전 상키야에서 아트만이라는 용어를 폐기하고 푸루샤라는 사용한 경위와는 무관하다는 점을 확인할 수 있다. (shrink)

Xeroxed drafts. The originals are held in the University Library, University of Lund, Sweden.

Ātman (soul) and Nairātmya (no soul) are, for the Brahmanical schools and the Buddhists respectively, equally fundamental tenets which neither side can concede to the other. Among the 16 formulations presented by Uddyotakara, the fifteenth, which is a proof of Ātman and is originally an indirect proof ( avīta/āvīta ), is presented in a prasaṅga -style, and contains double negation ( na nairātmyam ) in the thesis. However, it is perhaps Dharmakīrti who first transformed it into a normal style ( (...) sātmakam ). He is well aware of the law of excluded middle, and insisits that the negation is paryudāsa . On the Nyāya side, Uddyotakara at least seems to be unaware of the law of the logical equivalence of contraposition concerning pervasion ( vyāpti ). After Uddyotakara, however, Vyoman (Vyomaśiva), Bhāsarvajña and Vācaspatimiśra, all seem to be well aware of it. Dharmakīrti, in his conter-argument against the proof of ātman , discusses the negative expressions ‘‘ nairātmya ” and ‘‘ a-nairātmya ” Dharmakīrti here uses two logical arguments skillfully and tactically. As a critic of both the authenticity of the Veda and the existence of ātman , he insists on the theory of dichotomy and the equivalence of anvaya and vyatireka , whereas as an apologist he denies the application of these theories to the relation between the existence of ātman and the concept of nairātmya , because for him as a Buddhist the latter is not a negative but essentially positive state of affairs. (shrink)

Suppose we were to randomly pick out a book on Buddhism or Eastern Philosophy and turn to the section on 'no-self' (anatt?). On this central teaching, we would most likely learn that the Buddha rejected the Upanisadic notion of Self (?tman), maintaining that a person is no more than a bundle of impermanent, conditioned psycho-physical aggregates (khandhas). The rejection of ?tman is seen by many to separate the metaphysically 'extravagant' claims of Hinduism from the austere tenets of Buddhism. The status (...) quo has not, however, gone unchallenged. I shall join forces against this pernicious view, integrating some recent contributions into a sustained, two-pronged argument against no-?tman theories of anatt?. At the end it shall be suggested, in line with Thanissaro Bhikkhu, that anatt? is best understood as a practical strategy rather than as a metaphysical doctrine. (shrink)

What sort of a thing is society which the social scientist so avidly studies? Is it something completely independent of the way human beings think about it and conceive it to be? Or is it affected in its very being by the way men think about it and conceive it to be? Has it, so to say, an essence of its own which men have only to find and discover? Or is it something like what the existentialists say about man; (...) that is, something that has no essence of its own, but something which is made and created out of the infinite choices of diverse men? What we confront as society is, on this view, not something given by nature but rather that which was created by men in the past and that which is being made and remade by men in the present. It is like the habits of a man’s own character, created by choices made in the past, but now confronting him and others as something ‘given’, something to be taken as ‘datum’, something to be worked with or worked against, but in any case inevitably to be taken into account. In this context, the chapter discusses two approaches to society, socio-centric and Atman-centric, and helps us go beyond the contemporary logic of a priori sociological determinism. (shrink)

Winner of the 2021 Toshihide Numata Book Award in Buddhism The assertion that there is nothing in the constitution of any person that deserves to be considered the self (ātman)—a permanent, unchanging kernel of personal identity in this life and those to come—has been a cornerstone of Buddhist teaching from its inception. Whereas other Indian religious systems celebrated the search for and potential discovery of one’s “true self,” Buddhism taught about the futility of searching for anything in our experience that (...) is not transient and ephemeral. But a small yet influential set of Mahāyāna Buddhist texts, composed in India in the early centuries CE, taught that all sentient beings possess at all times, and across their successive lives, the enduring and superlatively precious nature of a Buddha. This was taught with reference to the enigmatic expression tathāgatagarbha—the “womb” or “chamber” for a Buddha—which some texts refer to as a person’s true self. The Buddhist Self is a methodical examination of Indian teaching about the tathāgatagarbha (otherwise the presence of one’s “Buddha-nature”) and the extent to which different Buddhist texts and authors articulated this in terms of the self. C. V. Jones attends to each of the Indian Buddhist works responsible for explaining what is meant by the expression tathāgatagarbha, and how far this should be understood or promoted using the language of selfhood. With close attention to these sources, Jones argues that the trajectory of Buddha-nature thought in India is also the history and legacy of a Buddhist account of what deserves to be called the self: an innovative attempt to equip Mahāyāna Buddhism with an affirmative response to wider Indian interest in the discovery of something precious or even divine in one’s own constitution. This argument is supplemented by critical consideration of other themes that run through this distinctive body of Mahāyānist literature: the relationship between Buddhist and non-Buddhist teachings about the self, the overlap between the tathāgatagarbha and the nature of the mind, and the originally radical position that the only means of becoming liberated from rebirth is to achieve the same exalted status as the Buddha. (shrink)

The Author and the Editor invite us to Discern (viveka) between Real and non-real, between atman (Self) and non-atman (non-Self), between Infinite and finite, between Life and death. In Svami Nikhilananda's words: -This work, which contains only forty-six sloka (verses) is an excellent vade mecum (handbook) for students of advanced courses in Advaita philosophy-. Both Readers and Scholars will welcome the truly Monumental Bibliography. SHANKARA, the Author, has been one of the greatest philosophers of India, and has profoundly influenced not (...) only India's philosophical development, but that of the entire world. RAPHAEL, the Editor, is an author and a Master in the Western Metaphysical Tradition as well as in Vedanta. (shrink)

Can the Âtman in its infinity and transcendence be made the basis for civil rights? Can we deduce the idea of civil rights and their number from the conception of the Âtman? Can historicity be preserved in the bosom of the Âtman? It has been said that only ideas like that of the dictatorship are possible on the basis of the Âtman as conceived by Indian thinkers. Individual freedom and initiative necessary for new scientific discoveries and inventions are taught by (...) Christ and other Israel-born religions, and the discovery of the atom bomb is due to such ideas. Long ago the late Prof. C.A. Moore of Hawaii urged me several times to handle such criticisms of Indian philosophy and religion. I tried to answer them in some early papers. The most important considerations are: As Kant said, from the highest metaphysical reality it is not logically possible to deduce anything particular or even lower; for instance, we cannot even deduce from “All men are mortal” whether Socrates is or is not mortal, unless we add “Socrates is a man,” which is an empirical statement. And If the Âtman is one and all-comprehensive, no democracy is said to be possible because individual men cannot be real then; but it is overlooked that then nothing is possible, not even trees and stones. Again, if there is only one personal God and if his will is supreme, will he not be a tyrant or a Louis XIV of the heavens, thundering his unquestionable commands? Where do democracy and freedom of the individual go then? On the other hand, if every one is the Supreme Âtman in essence, then everyone is free with all the initiative one can have by birth. Civil rights will then have a metaphysical foundation because every finite individual is inherently one with the Supreme Person and has the same rights and freedom as any king or emperor. But these arguments and counter-arguments cannot impress every one because to deduce anything from the highest Being leads only to antinomies and will be counter-productive in our search for truth. In metaphysics or ontology we can go only from the lower to the higher in logic or discursive thinking, but not vice versa. (shrink)

This volume of essays offers direct comparisons of historic Western and Buddhist perspectives on ethics and metaphysics, tracing parallels and contrasts all the way from Plato to the Stoics, Spinoza to Hume, and Schopenhauer through to contemporary ethicists such as Arne Naess, Charles Taylor and Derek Parfit. It compares and contrasts each Western philosopher with a particular strand in the Buddhist tradition, in some chapters represented by individual writers such as Nagarjuna, Vasubandhu, Santideva or Tsong Khapa. It does so in (...) light of both analytic concerns and themes from the existentialist and phenomenological traditions, and often in an ecumenical spirit that bridges both analytic and continentalist approaches. Some of the deepest questions in ethics, dealing with the scope of agency, value-laden notions of personhood and the nature of value in general, are intertwined with questions in metaphysics. One set of questions addresses how varying conceptions of selfhood relate to moral values ; another set of questions addresses how a conception of oneself or one’s selves should or should not affect how one thinks of happiness, or eudaimonia, or – in classical Indian terms – artha, sukha or nirvana. Western philosophy has featured discussion of both, but some would argue that certain traditions of Asian philosophy have offered a more sustained and even treatment of both sets of questions. The Buddhist tradition in particular has not only featured much discussion on both fronts, but has attracted many contemporary philosophers to its distinctive spectrum of approaches, and to what is – from many ‘Western’ points of view – a seemingly subversive analysis of ego, selfhood and personhood, whether in metaphysical, phenomenological or other incarnations. (shrink)

희곡에는 극중극(劇中劇)이 있다. 셰익스피어 희곡의 경우, 그것은 두 역할을 한다. 첫째, 반복을 통한 주제 부각의 효과이고 둘째, 마주 보고 있는 두 개의 거울처럼, 두 개의 틀로 관객에게 혼동을 야기하는 것이다. 산스크리트 서사시와 희곡에서도 다양한 극중극이 발견되지만, 철학적 논서에서도 유사한 방식으로 독자에게 혼동을 야기하는 경우가 있다. 그것은 저자가 대론자의 이론을 비판하는 중간에 핵심 주제에서 벗어난 논쟁을 삽입하는 것으로, 논쟁 속의 논쟁(論中論)이라 할 수 있다. 자얀타의 『니야야만자리』의 『니야야수트라』 1.1.10에 대한 주석에서 사용된 열변용(熱變容)과 관련된 논쟁도 논중론의 일종이다. 그는 신체가 욕구 등의 기체라는 차르바카의 (...) 주장을 논파하기 위해 열변용 이론을 사용하면서, 열변용과 관련된 두 이론(피루와 피타라) 사이의 논쟁을 소개한다. 그의 주석에서 열변용 이론 부분은 “① 신체의 소멸을 주장하는 제1단계 논증 → ② 열변용 논쟁 I → ③ 신체의 소멸을 주장하는 제2단계 논증 → ④ 열변용 논쟁 II → ⑤ 신체의 소멸을 주장하는 제3단계 논증”으로 도식화 될 수 있다. 그러나 이 도식에서 ②와 ④를 제외한 “① 제1단계 논증 → ③ 제2단계 논증 → ⑤ 제3단계 논증” 만을 연결해서 읽어도 논증의 내용은 크게 바뀌지 않는다. 따라서 ②와 ④는 분량 상으로 전체 논증의 반 정도를 차지하지만, 내용상 주제 논쟁에서 벗어난 부연설명이라고 할 수 있다. 그것은 열변용과 관련된 피루와 피타라 이론에 대한 학술정보를 제공해주는 순기능도 갖지만, 난해하고 복잡한 이론 소개는 논리학에 정통하지 않은 독자를 당혹하게 만드는 역기능도 지닌다. 따라서 열변용과 관련된 논쟁은 셰익스피어의 극중극과 유사한 기능을 하는 논중론(論中論)이라고 할 수 있다. (shrink)

Commentary of the verse work with English explanation on the Atman and self-realization; includes text.

This adhyatma gyana is also a part of Ayurveda because it is related to human health especially with mental health; A group of diseases is described independently in Sushruta as adhyatmika dukha. Contemporary books also mention adhyatmika dukha and adhyatma has been described in details. The subject matter of adhyatma has been mentioned from different point of view, but in fact the adhyatma is related to atman, as it is knowledge of atman and its related subjects are the knowledgeable materials (...) of adhyatma. Here in thispaper is a brief review of adhyatma ,terminology and its different prospects in ayurveda. (shrink)

Classical Indian debates about ātman—self—concern a minimal or core entity rather than richer notions of personal identity. These debates recognise that there is phenomenal unity across time; but is a core self required to explain it? Contemporary phenomenologists foreground the importance of a phenomenally unitary self, and Udayana's position is interpreted in this context as a classical Indian approach to this issue. Udayana seems to dismiss the body as the candidate for phenomenal identity in a way similar to some Western (...) philosophers. He also provides some inkling of how alternative ways of defending phenomenal unity without self fail. A criticism of some Western phenomenological theories of self is that they do not explain how unity is provided by the ‘mineness’ of cognition. Udayana's suggestion that a sort of agency provides such an explanation can be developed as an original argument for a phenomenally unitary self. (shrink)

Buddhism enthusiasts that the tathAgatagarbha sources were themselves aware of the criticism that they simply taught an Atman in the same way that non- Buddhists did, and they rejected this accusation and defended themselves against the ...

본고는 의학서임에도 불구하고 윤회를 인정하고 있는 아유르베다의 윤회관을 CS에 의거하여 고찰함으로써, 아유르베다의 독자적인 윤회관 과 그와 연관성을 지니고 있는 상키야학파의 비교를 통해 의의를 정립 하고자 한다. CS에서는 윤회할 때 필요한 요소를 ātman, 5대에서 ākaśa(空)를 제 외한 4대 그리고 이들을 연결시켜주는 역할을 하는 sattva(마음)로 분류 하고 있다. 이들은 불가분의 관계를 지니고 있다. 한편, 윤회의 원인으 로는 정신적 도샤라 일컫는 rajas, tamas와 업이 존재하는데 이들 모두 는 질병으로 연결되어 다음 생에도 병을 지속하게 한다. SK에서는 업의 개념을 담당하고 있는 buddhi(統覺)와 미세신의 이전 을 (...) 통해 윤회가 진행된다. SK의 경우, buddhi의 정신적 기능인 8정태에 따라서 다음 생의 세계가 결정이 되고 CS의 경우, sattva(마음)의 유형 에 따라 다음 생의 세계를 분류하는데 이러한 방식은 CS만의 독자적인 윤회관을 반영하는 것으로 마음이 CS에서 얼마나 중요한 위치를 차지 하고 있는가를 보여준다. 윤회에 있어서 SK에서는 buddhi가, CS에서는 마음이 중대한 원리로 작용을 하고 있다. 양자의 연관성을 미루어 연대적으로 볼 때, CS에서 마음의 기능이 고전 상키야에 이르러 buddhi의 다양한 기능으로 전환ᆞ확대되어 SK에 반영되었음을 유추할 수 있다. (shrink)

I welcome the invitation of Eugene Freeman to contribute a paper on the subject of self, giving my own views. I have been devoted to comparative philosophy all my life, and I am naturally greatly influenced by Indian and Western thought. But I should warn both the Indian and Western readers against equating my views in their entirety with any of the past philosophies. It is also not possible to given an exhaustive theory of the self in a paper of (...) the present size. What is not given here may place my view in a wrong light and the reader may draw wrong conclusions. (shrink)

On the concept of Atman in Hindu philosophy.

The concept of the mahant- ātman-, or “vast self”, found in some of the Early and Middle Upaniṣads, has, at least since the days of Hermann Oldenberg, been explored by a number of scholars, most notably by van Buitenen :103–114, 1964). These studies have usually emphasized the cosmic implications of this concept; the vast ātman- being the non-individualized spirit that brings forth and pervades the universe, then enters the bodies of all created beings as their animating principle. As such it (...) precedes the mahān, or mahat, of the Sāṃkhya philosophy. The present paper argues that the concept of a mahant- puruṣa- or “vast person”, appearing parallel to the vast ātman in these texts, is in fact older, being traceable to Middle Vedic texts; the emergence of the Upaniṣadic ātman doctrine has eventually led to its replacement by the mahān ātmā. Originally, it is argued, the adjective mahant- stressed the difference between this “vast” puruṣa, who is said to dwell in the sun, and the minute puruṣa within man, who is seen as the tiny “person” in one’s pupil, or resides in the heart, having the size of a thumb. In contradistinction to the ātman, the puruṣa is a thoroughly anthropomorphic soul-concept, a “person” within the person. The ultimate identity between this tiny soul-person and the puruṣa in the sun is a recurring, but little studied, motif in the micro-macrocosmic speculations of the Brāhmaṇa texts. This “vast”, solar puruṣa is sometimes identified with the Puruṣa or primeval man of Ṛgveda 10.90, from whose body the universe was formed, and much of the imagery surrounding the vast puruṣa of Middle and Late Vedic literature seems to derive from this hymn. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a close comparative reading of a creation myth from chapter 1 of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad, which opens with the startling statement “ātmaivedam agra āsīt”, “in the beginning there was the self (ātman)”. I read this classical text with Śaṅkara, its foremost commentator, in dialogue with an ensemble of Indologists (Wilhelm Halbfass, Greg Bailey and Frederick Smith) and theorists (Walter Benjamin, Ramchandra Gandhi and Hélène Cixous), and vis-à-vis, the creation myth narrated in chapter 1 of the Book (...) of Genesis. My aim is to decipher the intrinsic relation between identity, difference and diversity underlying the Upaniṣadic myth, and the ambivalent relationship (fear and desire) between self and other depicted here. The Upaniṣad presents a narrative of “the self first”, and implied is the aspiration to retrieve and rediscover this first self, the ātman, which precedes and encompasses everything else. I challenge this narrative drawing on Mukund Lath’s paper (J World Philos 4:6–23, 2003/2018). According to Lath, being is becoming, and change is a precondition of identity-formation. Identity, he argues, does not only accommodate but also invites change and plurality. Identity for Lath is a matter of creation, not restoration. It is pregnant with the future, not obsessed with premordiality. Lath’s unique case study for his counter-Upaniṣadic discussion of identity and self is classical Indian music, rāga music. (shrink)

In this paper, perhaps the first of its kind, an attempt is made to elucidate and examine the Vedantic theory of soul constructed on the basis of the experience of dreamless sleep which, being radically and qualitatively different from waking and dreaming states, is considered by the Vedantins as a state of temporarily purified individual soul (atman), a state of pure substantial consciousness. They take the experience of dreamless sleep as a model experience of the soul's final liberation from the (...) body and its internal as well as external faculties. The ultimate liberation, according to the Vedantins, is a state of total identification of the individual soul with the Universal Soul (Brahman), the summum bonum of every Vedantin. The paper also includes a critique of the Vedantic soul theory by the Buddhists who vehemently deny any autonomous and substantial soul whose essence is unchangingly permanent, pure consciousness and self-illuminating knowledge. The soul is instead interpreted by the Buddhists as a product of the functioning of a person's psycho-physical organism and a mere subject of knowing, thinking, desiring, etc. The analysis further shows that the Vedanta, especially the Advaita Vedanta, metaphysics of soul is inadequate in many respects and mainly based on a priori and scriptural arguments and emotive appeals, whereas the Buddhists deny any kind of autonomous and permanent agent of knowing, thinking and desiring by successfully reducing substantial consciousness to mere acts of knowing. (shrink)

With regards the crucial issue of the existence of the self, within canonical texts of the Buddhist Abhidharma schools we find passages that are frequently at odds with one another. Sometimes the Buddha defends or respects the belief in the self and in personal continuity; at other times he seems to deny that beyond the psycho-physical factors to which our existential experience can be reduced there is an ātman that contains, owns or controls these same factors; in further cases still, (...) he states that the use of the metaphysical categories of “being” and “non-being” must be avoided – thus, about the self (or everything else), it is inappropriate to say that it exists or that it does not exist. Faced with these divergences (or contradictions) within contemporary Buddhist studies, we can detect two main tendencies. Some scholars start from the assumption that the Buddha’s teaching is or should be coherent and univocal, and, therefore, propose readings of his original message that are supposed to iron out or conciliate any inconsistencies. Others believe that the inconsistencies are actually irreconcilable and, therefore, maintain that the Abhidharma canons are a composite and stratified redaction in which the opposite views of different writers overlap and intersect. Against these historiographical approaches, the purpose of the present paper is to show that the three aforementioned modes of the Buddha’s teaching are, in fact, both alternative and irreconcilable. This, however, far from presenting a puzzle to be solved or explained (by resorting to suppositions of which, in the canons, we have no explicit confirmation), is nothing more than a feature of the Buddha’s Dharma, which appears to be a teaching that develops different pedagogical/soteriological modes for different purposes, and which is conceived for the spiritual growth of followers with different intellectual and psychological profiles. (shrink)

tad aikṣata, bahu syām prajāyeyetiIt thought, May I be many, may I grow forth.rūpaṁrūpaṁ pratirūpo babhūva tadasya rūpam praticakṣanāyaThe prototype has assumed various forms, and such is its form as that which it adopts for its manifestation.prathamaṁ śūnyatābodhiṁ dvitīyaṁ bījasaṁgrahṁ tṛtīyaṁ bimba niṣpattiṁ caturthannyāsamakṣaraṁFirst is the void; second the seed; third the emanation of the image; fourth the articulation of the syllable.… rest and play alternate in the divine perfection as they must. … Ātman-Brahman must also be conceived not as (...) resting but playing in and as the thought.The aim of this article is to meditate philosophically on the very nature and significance of the trinitarian conceptions of.. (shrink)

A syncretic yogic instruction in Carakasanhita : Śārīrasthāna 1.137–155, contained in Book 4 of the Ćarakasaṃhitā, is a short treatise on yoga presented for āyurvedic purposes. In its yogic interpretation, the work comprises the Upaniṣads, the Mahābhārata, some Sāṃkhya’s and Vaiśeṣika’s notions as well as the meditative interpretation present in the Buddhist tradition. The ŚS gives a threefold path leading to mokṣa, the state of supreme brahman with which the conscious being, bhūtātman, becomes one : yoga, smṛti, and sāṃkhya. The (...) path to liberation is based on yoga, which is the reinforcement of the manas in the ātman and the stopping of suffering by breaking the connection between the erroneous identification of ātman with manas and the senses. On the path of yoga, a powerful eight-fold magical power is created through which the yogi is able to overcome external adversities. In the next step, the recognition of the one’s true identity — according to the sāṃkhya — is made through buddhi by the power of jñāna. However, in order for this recognition to be realized, the state of purity of sattva must first appear, induced by the practice of the eight-step smṛti realized by eighteen perfections. (shrink)

In henadological Platonism, the significance of “the One” is understood to lie, not in an eminent singular entity, but in the modes of unity and the ways of being a unit. The science of units qua units is a systematic ground and counterweight to substance-based ontology, and manifests an organic bond with theology as the science of relation to supra-essential individuals or Gods. Because of the basic nature of unity relative to being, doctrines respecting unity tend to situate themselves as (...) critiques of ontology; they exhibit both an analytical and a soteriological value. For its part, bhakti is not a mere sectarian movement but rather an inquiry at once speculative and practical into the nature of the relationship between the human and the divine. It bridges the diverse genres of ancient Indian thought (including the theophanic/cultic, the epic, along with diverse philosophical perspectives) and displays key commonalities with henadological Platonism. This paper begins the process of identifying these common themes with particular reference to the Bhagavadgītā. Chief among its themes is the distinction between structuring cause and structured mixture, which runs through Platonism from the Phaedo to the doctrine of principles, and which parallels the account of action in the Gītā as freedom independent of result, insofar as the latter pertains to the solidarity of worldly causality heteronomous to the agency of the ātman. (shrink)

Advaita vedanta a great tradition in metaphysical-Religious thought offers connected solutions of important logico-Epistemological and ethico-Religious problems. Its key concept is atman defined as pure awareness and identified with ultimate spiritual reality brahman. Metaphysically atman is light of awareness constituting core of experience. Ideal investigator as also religious saint approximates to the state of pure spectator or detached observer. Vedanta upholds ideal of jivanmukti making spiritual fulfillment amenable to verification and control in terms of actual lived experience.

This paper questions the nature and existence of the ego and I from a Western and Eastern viewpoint, which has been a question for 2,500 years when the Buddha rejected the Brahman idea of ātman. The answer for an ego depends partly on the state of consciousness; the existence of the Western objectifying ego is undeniable in ordinary consciousness, but not in extraordinary consciousness with no objectifying. The subtle question remains about the existence of an I that is distinct from (...) the ego and that is best represented by most meditative or contemplative states. Here a subjectified, witnessing, consciousness-maintaining I still seems to exist. This may be called the "High-I," which appears to provide for all states of consciousness a constancy and awareness not provided by the ego. This finding has implications for psychology and religion as well as philosophy. (shrink)

This essay examines the unique conception of self (atman) developed by Utpaladeva, one of the greatest philosophers of the Kashmir Saiva Recognition (Pratyabhijña) school, in polemics with Buddhist no-self theorists and rival Hindu schools. The central question that fueled philosophical debate between Hinduism and Buddhism for centuries is whether a continuous stable entity, which is either consciousness itself or serves as the ground of consciousness, is required to sustain all the experienced features of embodied physical and mental activity, and, in (...) the context of the conceptualization of the world as saṃsara, whether such a self persists between rebirths and in liberation. Utpaladeva argues contra Buddhists and contra other atmavadins not only that differentiation and unity or change and continuity are compatible, but that a coherent account of our experience requires a continuous dynamic substratum that accommodates both. The Pratyabhijña's atman is opposed to that of Nyaya, Vaiseṣika, and Mimaṣs;a insofar as it is de-individuated, which makes it close to Advaita's Brahman, also a universal consciousness, from which it differs, however, insofar as it is theological and acts as the contentbearer by taking on forms, as opposed to being impersonal and passive. When compared with theologies, both from within and outside the wider domain of Hindu thought, the Pratyabhijña proves to be unique in that it gives a philosophically nuanced account of God, who stands in a nondual relationship to the individual self. This essay also compares the Pratyabhijña's theological account of self with the theological idealism of Berkeley and Bradley, finding it closer to the latter. Comparing the Pratyabhijña with its nearest Western philosophical counterparts should make it more accessible and intelligible from the standpoint of the Western academy and pave the way for involving its rich and distinctive conception of self in the fledgling cross-cultural philosophical dialogue on questions concerning self and consciousness. (shrink)

The historical origins of the Kyoto School of Philosophy of modern Japan, represented by Kitaro Nishida and Hajime Tanabe, may be derived from both the ancient Chinese idea of Change and the ancient Indian Upanishadic idea of the mutual identity of Brahman and Atman. The ancient Chinese idea of Change signifies change as well as non-change, and even their dialectical unification. Both origins are structured by the self-identity of the opposed in logic, and these historical prototypes have been developed into (...) the various forms of Confucian, Taoist, and Buddhist philosophy. The notion of Nothingness or Emptiness rather than Being has been set up as the fundamental principle. The principle of Nothingness as ultimate reality has been connected with the logic of self-identity of theopposed, and this is evident in Nishida’s concept of the self-identity in absolute contradistinction that is equivalent to the Place of Absolute Nothingness. Even though Nishida’s idea of Place is directly and explicitly influenced by the ancient Greek idea of Topos, it has indirectly and implicitly been affected by the traditional agricultural society as well, in which the land is regarded as the self-identical substratum despite the cyclic time of the four-seasons change. The ancient Chinese idea of Change also reflects the agricultural society in which the cyclic time plays an important role on the basis of the unchanging self-identical land as the underlying substratum. Nishida succeeds in establishing the new logical expression of Eastern traditional thought, deeply hidden in consciousness, in relation toWestern philosophy. The uniqueness of Nishida’s idea of Place may have its main source in the traditional agricultural background, and in this sense his way of thinking may be rural in character. On the other hand, Tanabe, though following Nishida at first, turns to making criticism of the mentor with the establishment of the triadic logic of species as the dialectic, which is characterized by the perpetual self-negating conversion in action. In contrast to Nishida, Tanabe represents the urban type of thinking, which is in pursuit of transforming in life. While Nishida’s idea of Absolute Nothingness has an affinity with the ancient Chinese philosopher Laotzu’s idea of Nothingness from and into which every entity comes and goes, Tanabe’s concept of Absolute Nothingness as the principle ofconversion is more closed to the Buddhist idea of sunyata, i.e., Emptiness, which is devoid of any substance in itself. As regards evil, the difference between them is obvious in that for Nishida evil and time or history disappear into the ultimate horizon or place of Nothingness with the tendency toward a kind of monism of goodness, whereas for Tanabe evil copes with goodness and retains its own status throughout, never being reduced to the opposed. Even if so, both of them, however, fail to construct a philosophy of history from the epochal or durational viewpoint, compared to Heidegger and Jaspers. (shrink)

The great eleventh-century figure, Rāmānuja, belonged to the Śrīvaiṣṇava community that worshiped the divine as Viṣṇu-with-Śrī, the Lord-and-Consort. But he also embarked on a project to develop an interpretation of the first-century Vedāntasūtra, which presented the supposedly core teachings of the major Upaniṣads, traditionally the last segment of the sacred corpus of the Vedas. Rāmānuja sought to reconcile the devotional commitments of Śrīvaiṣṇavism—which was built on the human yearning for the divine that was incomprehensibly Other while graciously accessible—with the conceptual (...) demands of the Vedānta in which a profound identity between the individual self (ātman) and the impersonal, ultimate explanatory principle (brahman) was taught. This reconciliation of difference and identity came to be called “Qualified Nondualism.” In his earliest work, the Vedārthasaṃgraha, one of the ways Rāmānuja points to reconciliation is through identifying a single state of consciousness as both cognition of nonduality (the Vedāntic project) and the emotionally valent experience of happiness (the supreme expression of the human encounter with the divine). It does not seem that he systematically pursues this conception of how a state can be both cognitive and affective, and such an analysis will require independent philosophical analysis. Thus, this article argues that if a state of consciousness were indeed both cognitive and affective in this way, we would have a full explanation for how the devotional approach of a human being to Viṣṇu-with-Śrī can also be the self’s realization of identity with brahman. (shrink)

Countering the general reading of Confucian ethics as a form of virtue ethics or humanistic ethics, this essay reads Confucian ethics as a form of ethical personalism. Doing so, it examines the ethical orientations in the Confucian classics, The Analects, Da Xue, and others, pointing out that the touchstone concept of Confucian ethics taught in these classics is the person, recalling the Confucian motto of ethical cultivation, ?inner sagehood and outer kinghood?. It demonstrates that only the name of personalism describes (...) well the substance of Confucian ethics and captures its essence. It indicates that Confucian personalism is characterized by its starting not from the concept of the person or personhood as a divinely or naturally given, something akin to the Hindu Atman, but from the concept of the person or personhood that must be substantialized in ethical cultivation, e.g., cultivating a personhood after the image of the sage. (shrink)

In the second decade of the new millennium, artificial intelligence (AI) became a catchword among senior politicians and the military officers of India. Indian military officers have raised concerns about the potential use of AI-enabled weapon systems by China and by insurgents supported by Pakistan in the subcontinent. This article portrays the complex interlinkages between AI, strategic planning about future warfare and the role of ethics in India. The article, divided into three sections, deals with the role of AI and (...) ethics in India’s grand strategy, in military strategy and in command culture. Finally, the article also offers some policy recommendations. For cultural reasons, India follows a defensive strategy. India is attempting to integrate the AI weapons within its dharmayuddha (just war) format. Indian military strategy emphasises that on no account should these intelligent machines be autonomous. Atman (self-consciousness) must not be subordinated to yantras (machines). (shrink)