No contexto da pandemia, vivemos a incerteza de quando a vida tornará a sua normalidade. Esse momento de incerteza nos impulsiona a reflexão sobre o atual cenário, os desafios e possibilidades dessa nova forma de viver. Pensando nisso, o presente estudo de cunho bibliográfico hermenêutico busca refletir acerca da prática pedagógica e do ensino de filosofia no atual contexto, atendo-se aos seguintes problemas: é possível uma prática pedagógica de qualidade em meio a esse cenário? De que modo o ensino de (...) filosofia pautado na reflexão pode ser possível na modalidade à distância? Para dar conta de tais questões, buscamos nas reflexões de Antunes Neto (2020) e Barreto; Rocha (2020), o diálogo acerca da possibilidade da prática pedagógica em tempos de pandemia, assim como a possibilidade do ensino de filosofia por meio da reflexão presente nos escritos de Trombetta (2013). (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta uma proposta de vivência da democracia na escola discutindo num primeiro momento a relação entre educação escolar e democracia a partir de Biesta e, num segundo momento, a proposta de educação formulada por Dewey em Democracia e educação. Em seguida, abordando a obra de Joseph Püig et al., Democracia e participação escolar, trata das características da escola democrática e de como elas podem efetivar-se no cotidiano escolar.

In romantic relationships, individual differences are determinant factors for relational quality. Specifically, romantic attachment and difficulties in emotional regulation influence each other and may have predictive potential for the perceived dyadic adjustment level. This paper aims to identify the developmental parallel between behavioral patterns built since childhood and the construction of the emotional regulation skills that characterize them. Our analysis was based on the attachment theory and the concepts of romantic relationship and DA. In this way, we sought to further (...) the understanding of relationship dynamics, beyond the usual focus on a single element and on associative relationships, and by exploring other effects among the different dimensions of relational functioning. In particular, we explored the predictive ability of emotional regulation patterns in discriminating between RA styles, and their impact on the quality of romantic relationships, in the anticipation of dyadic adjustment variations. (shrink)

This chapter argues that standard accounts of health are ill-suited to constructing a plausible theory of health justice, particularly a sufficientarian theory. The problem in these accounts is revealed by their treatment of disability. Theorists of health justice need to define “health” more narrowly to capture the legitimate claims of people with disabilities. Following Ronald Amundson and Peter Hucklenbroich, this chapter proposes such a definition. Health, as defined in this chapter, is the absence of conditions that directly cause, or threaten (...) to directly cause, certain kinds of bodily harm, such as pain and premature death. It is concluded that on a plausible sufficientarian theory of health justice, a society that achieves health justice is one that ensures that none of its members face too much of those kinds of bodily harm. (shrink)

Ao pesquisar a realidade educacional contemporânea é preciso conceber que os desafios que atingem a práxis pedagógica em sala de aula se apresentam de forma multifacetada e complexa. Pensar a atuação docente se mostra cada vez mais desafiadora e prescinde de problematizações que auxiliem no enfrentamento das dificuldades. Assim, a presente pesquisa trata da temática acerca do diálogo como um princípio ético na prática pedagógica em sala de aula, com ênfase na concepção dos docentes da Escola X. Tratando-se de uma (...) pesquisa de cunho analítico-hermenêutico, é adotada a metodologia da observação participante, realizada om observações diretas, em atividades cotidianas, na escola indicada, nas quais buscou-se evidenciar o conceito de diálogo de Paulo Freire (1981) e de sua função primordial na relação professor/aluno. Assim, o problema de pesquisa localizou-se na seguinte questão: é possível exercer o diálogo como um princípio ético na concepção dos docentes da Escola X? Assim, com justificativa no fomento ao debate acerca de princípios éticos na prática pedagógica, presentes nos escritos de Elli Benincá (2010) que devem ser assumidos pelos docentes em seu fazer diário, pode-se observar que embora desejável na teoria, o diálogo nem sempre é exercido na pratica cotidiana em sala de aula. No entanto, entendemos que sua compreensão conceitual e seu efetivo exercício por parte dos docentes, de forma a preservar princípios éticos, pode propiciar um sentimento de esperança ao crer no diálogo como possibilidade de superar o modelo "bancário" de educação, transformando a sala de aula em um lugar de troca de saberes e de emancipação individual e coletiva. (shrink)

Normal 0 0 1 91 520 .. 4 1 638 11.1280 0 14 0 0 Moving among historical material and contemporary debates on xenophobia and war, this paper is an exploration of the self-representation “ Italiani Brava Gente ”, an image claiming the intrinsic goodness of the Italian people. Originated during the first Italian colonial enterprises, it has been used also for overcoming the horrors of Fascism and is evoked in contemporary Italy too for justifying traumatic and violent events. Functioning (...) as an ideological laundry for reformulating and then setting aside disquieting moments of national shame, “ Italiani Brava Gente ” is central to the construction of a modern Italian identity. (shrink)

In this paper I develop an account of member obligation: the obligations that fall on the members of an obligated collective in virtue of that collective obligation. I use this account to argue that unorganized collections of individuals can constitute obligated agents. I argue first that, to know when a collective obligation entails obligations on that collective’s members, we have to know not just what it would take for each member to do their part in satisfying the collective obligation, but (...) also what they should do if they cannot do their part because others will not do theirs. I go on to argue (contra recent proposals) that it is not good enough for members in this situation to reasonably believe that others will not do their part. Rather, for a member of an obligated collective to permissibly escape doing her part in a collective obligation, she must both reasonably doubt that others will do their part and stand ready to act in case others do as well. -/- This necessary condition for collective obligation points the way to plausible sufficient conditions – conditions that, I argue, allow unstructured collectives to bear obligations. For (a) if a collective’s members are individually obligated to be ready to do their part, in a given collective action, and (b) if that individual readiness makes it sufficiently likely that the collective will in fact act, then it is hard to see what could block an attribution of collective obligation. In particular, in that case there ought to be no additional objection that there is no existing, organized “agent” on which the obligation might fall. For agents are, simply, things that can act. To be able to act is just to be able to succeed by trying. Unstructured collectives try to do something, I argue, when each member acts on their willingness to do their part in that thing if others do theirs; sometimes they succeed, producing a collective action. Some unstructured collectives, therefore, can succeed by trying; therefore, they can act; therefore they are agents. (shrink)

What makes something a part of my body, for moral purposes? Is the body defined naturalistically: by biological relations, or psychological relations, or some combination of the two? This paper approaches this question by considering a borderline case: the status of prostheses. I argue that extant accounts of the body fail to capture prostheses as genuine body parts. Nor, however, do they provide plausible grounds for excluding prostheses, without excluding some paradigm organic parts in the process. I conclude by suggesting (...) that embodiment is moralized all the way down: to be a body part is to be the sort of thing that ought to be protected, in a certain way, by social practices. (shrink)

Toda e qualquer didática possui uma epistemologia subjacente e sua identificação ou taxionomia nos possibilita elaborar chaves de leitura para compreender certos tensionamentos produzidos na forma como ensinamos e/ou aprendemos. No presente estudo, de cunho hermenêutico , buscamos compreender a epistemologia da complexidade e as decorrências para os processos didáticos. Primeiramente, analisamos as limitações da epistemologia da simplificação, que caracteriza grande parte do pensamento didático moderno, e a emergência da epistemologia da complexidade. Posteriormente, exploramos os princípios da complexidade-sistêmico-organizacional, hologramático, organização (...) recursiva, dialógico, auto-eco-organização e a reintrodução do sujeito cognoscente –, analisando, por fim, as decorrências para a didática numa perspectiva complexa. (shrink)

The literature on the determination of death has often if not always assumed that the concept of human death should be defined in terms of the end of the human organism. I argue that this broadly biological conceptualization of human death cannot constitute a basis for agreement in a pluralistic society characterized by a variety of reasonable views on the nature of our existence as embodied beings. Rather, following Robert Veatch, I suggest that we must define death in moralized terms, (...) as the loss of an especially significant sort of moral standing. Departing from Veatch, however, I argue that we should not understand death in terms of the loss of all moral status whatsoever. Rather, I argue, what we should argue about, when we argue about death, is when and why people lose their rights-claims to the protection and promotion of their basic bodily functioning. (shrink)

This paper argues that disabled people can be healthy. I argue, first, following the well-known ‘social model of disability’, that we should prefer a usage of ‘disabled’ which does not imply any kind of impairment that is essentially inconsistent with health. This is because one can be disabled only because limited by false social perception of impairment and one can be, if impaired, disabled not because of the impairment but rather only because of the social response to it. Second, I (...) argue that it is often wrong to use the term ‘healthy’ in a way that makes health inconsistent with any degree whatsoever of health-relevant bodily dysfunction. Whether someone is ‘healthy’ properly-so-called depends on standards of health presupposed in conversational context. Sometimes, I argue, these standards are or ought to be lax enough to allow some people with some health deficits still to count as ‘healthy’ per se. Taking inspiration from David Lewis and Mary Kate Mcgowan, I go on to argue that denying that someone is ‘healthy’ in a context typically succeeds in shifting going presuppositions to require standards strict enough to make that denial acceptable. And this, I conclude by arguing, often constitutes an abuse of conversational power. (shrink)

Disconnecting a patient from artificial life support, on their request, is often if not always a matter of letting them die, not killing them—and sometimes, permissibly doing so. Stopping a patient’s heart on request, by contrast, is a kind of killing, and rarely if ever a permissible one. The difference seems to be that procedures of the first kind remove an unwanted external support for bodily functioning, rather than intervening in the body itself. What should we say, however, about cases (...) at the boundary—procedures involving items that seem bodily in some respects, but not others? When, for instance, does deactivating an implanted device like a pacemaker count as killing, and when as letting die? Contra existing proposals, I argue that the boundaries of the body for this purpose are not drawn at the boundaries of the self, or (if this is different) the human organism. Nor should we determine when we are killing and when we are letting die by deferring to existing practices for distinguishing ongoing from completed treatment. Rather, I argue that whether something (organic or inorganic) counts as body part for purposes of this distinction depends on the results of a normative analysis of the particular character of our rights in it—particularly, whether and in what way these rights ought to be alienable. I conclude by arguing that there are likely good reasons to recognize distinctively “bodily” rights and restrictions in at least some implantable devices. (shrink)

A Lei de Diretrizes e Bases 9.394/96 inseriu a Filosofia nos currículos do Ensino Médio com o indicativo de interdisciplinaridade, permanecendo em aberto questões acerca de como fazer com que a Filosofia potencialize a experiência interdisciplinar. Com o objetivo de correlacionar interdisciplinaridade e Filosofia, o artigo resulta de uma análise hermenêutica que confronta reflexões de Hannah Arendt sobre a crise na educação e a proposta da comunidade de investigação de Lipman. Parte da noção de que em meados do século XX, (...) a educação tradicional foi substituída pela pedagogia progressista e a educação passou a ser pensada como ciência do ensino em geral, a fim de atender à dinâmica do avanço científico e tecnológico. A visão analítica e linear das especialidades não responde satisfatoriamente às demandas atuais de uma ciência complexa, articulada e em rápida transformação. Diante do requisito interdisciplinar da ciência, o específico da Filosofia é a problematização e a sistematização do filosofar; de mediação entre as disciplinas, em virtude da dimensão holística de seus conteúdos, e de vigilância epistemológica como recurso de revisão e atualização dos saberes. Palavras-chave: Interdisciplinaridade. Filosofia. Ciência. Crise na educação. Comunidade de investigação. (shrink)

Walter Benjamin fala da experiência como sendo o tipo de sabedoria que resulta do encontro de práticas individuais com o horizonte de sentido fornecido pela vida comunitária. Mas esse encontro tem se tornado mais difícil a partir do desenvolvimento da sociedade capitalista moderna. As novas dinâmicas de trabalho, somadas ao ritmo acelerado da vida urbana, favorecem o isolamento dos indivíduos e deturpam sua capacidade de filtrar, significativamente, os eventos que se acumulam no cotidiano. Muitas coisas acontecem, mas muito pouco permanece (...) desses acontecimentos. A experiência dá lugar, assim, à mera vivência. Diferentemente da experiência, que se articula a partir do fundo significativo de uma comunidade e se torna significativa em relação a ela, a vivência se constitui como um momento privado. A vivência não conecta os indivíduos à vida da comunidade, à tradição, e nisso reside sua pobreza. Pobreza de experiência é, portanto, pobreza cultural, carência de perspectivas mais amplas que possam apoiar uma avaliação significativa das vivências; em suma, incapacidade de aprender. Diante desse contexto, o presente ensaio busca enfatizar o impacto negativo da pobreza de experiência à constituição da subjetividade do indivíduo contemporâneo e assinalar a possibilidade de fazer frente a esse quadro de empobrecimento a partir de uma ideia de educação voltada à formação integral, que, mesmo diante do apelo crescente do conhecimento técnico-científico especializado, não abra mão do ensino das humanidades. Nessa linha, defende-se a tese de que as disciplinas de formação humanística, como Artes, Literatura, Filosofia, cumprem um papel de destaque no desenvolvimento das condições necessárias à realização de experiências, no sentido específico descrito por Benjamin. O ensaio, de cunho bibliográfico-hermenêutico, se apresenta como uma contribuição para pensar nos atuais desafios educacionais. Palavras-chave: Experiência. Pobreza de experiência. Walter Benjamin. Educação. Educação humanística. (shrink)

Technological measures meant to change sexual orientation are, we have argued elsewhere, deeply alarming, even and indeed especially if they are safe and effective. Here we point out that this in part because they produce a distinctive kind of ‘clinical collective action problem’, a sort of dilemma for individual clinicians and researchers: a treatment which evidently relieves the suffering of particular patients, but in the process contributes to a practice that substantially worsens the conditions that produce this suffering in the (...) first place. We argue that the role obligations of clinicians to relieve the suffering of their patients put them in a poor position to solve this problem, though they can take measures to avoid complicity in the harms that would result from widespread use of individually safe and effective reorientation biotechnology. But in the end the medical community as a whole still seems obligated to provide these measures, if they become technologically feasible. Medical researchers are in a better position to prevent the harms that would result if reorientation techniques were safe, effective and widely available. We argue that the harms attendant on the development of safe and effective re-orientation techniques give researchers reason to avoid ‘applied‘ research aimed at developing these techniques, and to be careful in the conduct of basic orientation research which might be applied in this way. (shrink)

This article asks whether personal ventilators should be redistributed to maximize lives saved in emergency condition, like the COVID-19 pandemic. It begins by examining extant claims that items like ventilators are literally parts of their user’s bodies. Arguments in favor of incorporation for ventilators fail to show that they meet valid sufficient conditions to be body parts, but arguments against incorporation also fail to show that they fail to meet clearly valid necessary conditions. Further progress on this issue awaits clarification (...) of difficult normative, conceptual, and metaphysical questions about the possible boundaries of a person’s body. Rather than relying solely on incorporation arguments, we propose an argument against reallocation from widely accepted anti-discrimination principles. Possession of a personal ventilator is an obvious marker of disability identity; thus, reallocating ventilators from those that already possess them discriminates on the basis of a stigmatized trait – a paradigm case of presumptively wrongful discrimination. This discrimination claim, taken together with uncertainty about the bodily status of ventilators, yields a strong presumption against personal ventilator reallocation. (shrink)

The social model of disability claims that disadvantage from disability is primarily a result of the social response to bodily difference. Social modellers typically draw two normative conclusions: first, that society has a responsibility to address disability disadvantage as a matter of justice, not charity; second, that the appropriate way of addressing this disadvantage is to change social institutions themselves, to better fit for bodily difference, rather than to normalize bodies to fit existing institutions. This paper offers a qualified defense (...) of both inferences. Social institutions have reasons of justice to fix disability disadvantage, because the choice of institutions that contingently favor those whose bodies are statistically typical incurs responsibilities to compensate those who disfavored, in that choice. Among other things, this responsibility implies that societies should not simultaneously materially disadvantage disabled people, and also withhold symbolic resources, by demanding a presumption in favor of personal transformation – thereby, undermining the social conditions for disability pride. (shrink)

I argue here that our rights in our bodies are not well explained by self-ownership – and thus, also, that we cannot infer any further distributive implications of self-ownership from intuitions about body rights via inference to the best explanation. And I sketch an alternative view, on which we do indeed own our bodies, but not because we own ourselves. Self-ownership, I argue, provides a satisfying explanation only if we take it seriously: not as a mere metaphor, but as an (...) expression of a literal, reflexive ownership relation between me and myself, whatever I myself am. I go on to canvas the most prominent theories of what human beings like me literally are, arguing that each of these theories makes it hard to see how our self-ownership can ground our rights in our bodies. In the second half I consider and refine alternative, interest-based, explanations of our rights in our bodies, drawing on suggestions in this direction from Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen and Alan Wertheimer. I show how it is possible in principle to affirm that body ownership rights remain (in a sense) natural rights, even on the sort of interest-based view of ownership that many (including myself) take to preclude all or most fully natural property rights. I argue that many body rights can be grounded prefiguratively, in facts about the possible emergence of sufficiently just authority-assigning practices, rather than (as with most property rights) in their actual existence. Finally, I return to the distributive issues that motivated much interest in self-ownership in the first place – particularly, the question of whether and in what way our rights in our bodies generate rights in other things, by labor or otherwise. Without actually answering this question, I show how the account developed here would proceed in doing so: not by positing body rights as a methodologically prior constraint on rights of other kinds, but rather by considering the implications entire systems of rights and duties have for the interests of those who possess and are bound by them. (shrink)

This paper argues for Serious Distributive Egalitarianism – the view that some material inequalities are seriously objectionable as such; not merely, say, because such inequalities tend to generate inequalities in status. Social justice requires equality, I argue, because basic social institutions produce important goods and are produced in turn by the relevantly equal contributions of all those that comply with them. E.g., basic social institutions make it much easier to produce cooperatively than it would be in their absence; therefore, these (...) institutions produce, among other things, opportunities to participate in particular productive enterprises. But basic social institutions are themselves produced, in large part, by the compliance of those subject to them; these subjects, therefore, contribute to the production of the goods that basic institutions produce. This gives (at least) every compliant subject of basic social institutions a claim on these goods. And, I argue that, though some do contribute more to the maintenance of basic institutions than others, those who contribute more are too responsible for the fact that others contribute less to point to the consequences of this difference as a reason they should get greater returns. I conclude that all subjects of basic social institutions have equally forceful and forcefully equal claims on the goods these institutions produce; claims that render inequalities in the Distribution of these goods Seriously objectionable as such. (shrink)

Bioethics: 50 Puzzles, Problems, and Thought Experiments collects 50 cases—both real and imaginary—that have been, or should be, of special interest and importance to philosophical bioethics. Cases are collected together under topical headings in a natural order for an introductory course in bioethics. Each case is described in a few pages, which includes bioethical context, a concise narrative of the case itself, and a discussion of its importance, both for broader philosophical issues and for practical problems in clinical ethics and (...) health policy. Each entry also contains a brief, annotated, list of suggested readings. In addition to the classic cases in bioethics, the book contains discussion of cases that involve several emerging bioethical issues: especially, issues around disability, social justice, and the practice of medicine in a diverse and globalized world. (shrink)