The Concept of Disability

What exactly is it to be a social constructivist in Metaphysics? In this brief note I try to introduce a few acclamatory distinctions that I have identified as having generated a lot of confusion in recent literature as well as serving to better frame current debates within metaphysical social constructivism. I also illustrate it with an example from the ontology of disability/.

Christian theology looks forward to a consummation of all things in which hope, justice, and flourishing will finally prevail. All creation will be perfectly united to God as its Creator, and all shall be well. But what does this mean for disabled people? The typical Christian answer through history has been that disability will not exist in the world to come. The advent of disability theology has given us reasons to doubt this answer, but until now no extended treatment of (...) disability and eschatology has existed. In response, this book gathers together essays from established and emerging scholars alike to provide an extensive look at what it might mean to imagine disability as a part of humanity’s ultimate ends. Across its pages we aim to advance conversations in disability theology through rigorously creative work, including on the much neglected topic of psychiatric disability. As such, our contributors ask and answer questions like “how can one’s well-being be high if they are disabled?,” “how do our beauty standards limit our eschatological thinking?,” “what does dissociative identity disorder mean for the afterlife?,” and more. -/- Contributors include Eleonore Stump (Saint Louis), Harvey Cawdron (St Andrews), Jessica Coblentz (Saint Mary's College), Erin Raffety and Emma Worrall (Princeton Seminary), Derek Estes (Pepperdine), Samuel Youngs (Bryan College), Maja Whitaker (Laidlaw College), and the editors. (shrink)

The most common theoretical approaches to defining mental disorder are naturalism, normativism, and hybridism. Naturalism and normativism are often portrayed as diametrically opposed, with naturalism grounded in objective science and normativism grounded in social convention and values. Hybridism is seen as a way of combining the two. However, all three approaches share a common feature in that they conceive of mental disorders as deviations from norms. Naturalism concerns biological norms; normativism concerns social norms; and hybridism, both biological and social norms. (...) This raises the following two questions: (a) Are biological and social norms the only sorts of norms that are relevant to considerations of mental disorder? (b) Should addressing norm deviations continue to be a major focus of mental healthcare? This paper introduces several norms that are relevant to mental disorder beyond the biological and social. I argue that mental disorders often deviate from individual, well-being, and regulatory norms. I also consider approaches which question mental healthcare’s focus on addressing norm deviations in the first place, including the neurodiversity paradigm, social model of disability, and Mad discourse. Utilizing these critical approaches, I contend that whether mental health intervention is justified depends, in part, on the type of norm deviation being intervened upon. (shrink)

This volume proposes a novel approach to engaging philosophically with disability studies, providing insight into situated, lived experiences of disability in articulation with prominent existential philosophers in addition to historical and theoretical perspectives.

In this paper I propose a model of disability which synthesizes Amos Yong’s disability theology with Elizabeth Barnes’s “value-neutral model” of disability and then draws Sarah Coakley’s account of ante-mortem/post-mortem bodily fluidity in with both. To construct this model, I first outline Yong’s thought and then introduce Barnes’s work to it as a pivot point around which its eschatological imagery can turn. I then address Coakley’s work on bodily fluidity regarding gender and apply it to disability to reveal the model’s (...) capacity to hold theological clarity and mystery in tension successfully. (shrink)

The picture theory of disability shows how the irremediable impediment to daily living tasks or goals can be ‘pictured’, and how a linguistic analysis of that picture can be used to represent the experience of disability. Technically constituting a species of ‘relational approach’ due to its consideration of the interplay between an individual and their environment, the theory differs from other relational accounts by focusing on the nature of the experience rather than the function of the relationship. The main deviation (...) from other theories of disability is in the conceptual shift away from a ‘nounal’ interpretation of disability in which disability is that which is caused or embodied, to an ‘adverbial’ description in which disability is experienced as a personally irremediable impediment to daily living tasks or goals. This chapter overviews the picture theory of disability, positions it within a broader disability theory context, and critically analyses it. (shrink)

The picture theory of disability shows how the irremediable impediment to daily living tasks or goals can be ‘pictured’, and how a linguistic analysis of that picture can be used to represent the experience of disability. Technically constituting a species of ‘relational approach’ due to its consideration of the interplay between an individual and their environment, the theory differs from other relational accounts by focusing on the nature of the experience rather than the function of the relationship. The main deviation (...) from other theories of disability is in the conceptual shift away from a ‘nounal’ interpretation of disability in which disability is that which is caused or embodied, to an ‘adverbial’ description in which disability is experienced as a personally irremediable impediment to daily living tasks or goals. This chapter overviews the picture theory of disability, positions it within a broader disability theory context, and critically analyses it. (shrink)

Broadly speaking, exclusion for disabled people can be understood as a general lack of social and political integration within a society. Inequalities arising from the multi-dimensional causes of exclusion not only include poverty, but more fundamental aspects of societal membership such as social participation, financial autonomy, friendship, sexual citizenship, and accessibility. The articles of this thesis offer insight to the nature of the experience of exclusion for disabled people by considering specific examples of exclusion (such as the exclusion from sexual (...) citizenship, discussed in Articles I and II), and a new theoretical approach to disability (advanced in Article III). -/- Analysis of the nature of exclusion for disabled people reveals a unique set of multi-dimensional problems, and despite efforts from the disability rights community and an increased academic interest in disability studies, there has been a limited incorporation of holistic or transdisciplinary approaches to the phenomenon in works of praxis and in governmental policy. Seeking to highlight and ameliorate the experience of exclusion for disabled people, disability rights organisations advocate for greater societal integration and inclusion into the social fabric of society by offering revisionary theoretical interpretations of disability in an effort to steer social change — a devoir to which the works of this thesis contribute academically. -/- Focussing on the interplay between the nature of exclusion, rights, and basic needs, this thesis investigates the limits of the welfare state’s obligations to afford disabled people a life of eu zen, argues for greater obligations in areas such as sexual citizenship, inclusion, and presents an alternate theory of disability. The Introduction situates the articles of this thesis within a wider theoretical context that highlights the importance of social context, and focusses on the nature of exclusion and inclusion for disabled people as a complex set of societal and political disadvantages which go beyond simple poverty and social disenfranchisement. The main claim of this thesis is that the experience of exclusion for disabled people constitutes a multi-faceted and interconnected set of disadvantages and barriers that constitute a greater and more substantive set of exclusions than those experienced by other excluded groups. (shrink)

In recent years, multiple authors have voiced discontent with the theoretical and practical neglect of the concept of ability. This includes, but is not limited to, philosophers of disability who have long assailed the implausible accounts of ability utilized by most social and political philosophers. Historically, most philosophers took it for granted that the meaning of ability will come easily, or is even a given, when higher-order questions are addressed. The aim of this chapter is to animate discussions about ability (...) trouble, which is to say, to animate (i) concern over the lack of philosophical inquiry that takes the concept of ability seriously as a problem in its own right and to animate (ii) novel interest in and further research on the concept of ability—and, correlatively, disability. We first analyze a famous argument concerning moral status that exemplifies how treating the concept of ability as a mere matter of common sense can lead philosophical inquiry awry. We then turn to the role of the concept of ability in an account that does, at least prima facie, take the concept seriously: Sen and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. While better than common-sense approaches, we draw a cautionary tale, suggesting that even there the concept is simplified in theoretically and practically problematic ways. We conclude with a number of open questions offered in the hope of inspiring future non-ideal research on the topic. (shrink)

Ethical debates about liberal eugenics frequently focus on the supposed unnaturalness of its means and possible harm to autonomy. I present a Nietzsche-inspired critique focusing on intention rather than means and harm to abilities rather than to autonomy. I first critique subjective eugenics, the selection of extrinsically valuable traits, drawing on Nietzsche’s notion of ‘slavish’ values reducible to the negation of another’s good. Subjective eugenics slavishly evaluates traits relative to a negatively evaluated norm (eg, above-average intelligence), disguising a harmful intention (...) to diminish the relative value of that norm. I then argue there is no objective form of eugenics on the Nietzschean ground that abilities are not valuable intrinsically; they are valuable only if one possesses the relative power to exercise them. Abilities frustrated by conflict with other abilities or environment are harmful, while disabilities that empower one’s other abilities are beneficial. Consequently, all forms of eugenics are subject to the prior ethical critique of subjective eugenics. (shrink)

Drawing upon the life and work of S. Kay Toombs, I explore the impact and import of phenomenological accounts of disability for the existentialist tradition. Through the case of multiple sclerosis, a noncongenital, late-onset, and degenerative disability, I show how the general structures that emerge from its lived experience largely support a mere-difference view of disability and highlight the need for an equitably habitable world. I further argue that phenomenological accounts of disability demonstrate accessibility to be the defining feature of (...) what it means to be embodied as we are. I conclude with a discussion of the more general philosophical relationship between disability, embodiment, and existentialism. (shrink)

This piece lays out the framework for a special issue on the topic of "Fits and Misfits," published as volume 7, issue 1 of Puncta: A Journal of Critical Phenomenology. We discuss the relationship between the concept of misfitting, coined by Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, and debility, coined by Jasbir Puar, in relationship to scholarship on Merleau-Ponty. We then introduce each of the eight articles in the special issue: Rosemarie Garland-Thomson's "What Misfitting Makes," Susan Bredlau's "Conversational Accessibility: Healthcare, Community, and the Ethics (...) of Everyday Encounters," Helen A. Fielding's "Being Touched by Wellness: Merleau-Ponty, Nancy, and the Intensive Care Unit," Ann Murphy's "The Spirited Interworld: Caregiving and the Liminal Phenomenology of Dementia," Rachel Elliott's "Sharing Time with Misfits: We-Experience across Bodily Difference," David Morris's "An-Archic Time: Melting the Clock as Hypernorm of the I Can -- and Philosophy," Rebecca Longtin's "Merleau-Ponty's Cézanne as Misfit Artist," and, finally, Laura McMahon's "The Politics of Vulnerability and the School for Peace: Insights from Butler, Merleau-Ponty, and Family Systems Theory.". (shrink)

Philosophical anthropology aims to discover what makes us human, but it has produced accounts that exclude some members of our species. It relies often on a non-naturalistic “philosophy of consciousness” and locates humanity in the cognitive capacity to objectively represent things, to reason teleologically and use tools, to use symbols and language, or to be self-conscious and question existence. This work pursues an alternative, thoroughly naturalistic philosophical anthropology in the tradition of Arnold Gehlen. Combining Gehlen’s theory of our behaviorally-detached and (...) culturally-determined impulses with Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s views on intersubjectivity, affect, sexuality, and social institutions, the present work locates the human within the unique structure of human feeling. This produces a truly inclusive account of “the human as the other” or Homo alter. The human is deeply and thoroughly dependent on affective, bodily, communicative bonds, in which others appear as sources of meaning, norms, pleasure, and approbation and disapprobation. This socio-biological account of the human makes institutionality central to our form of life but rejects any political anthropology that attempts to use human nature to prescribe a necessary form to institutions such as the home. Such a social and affective account of the human produces a novel approach to the affect of shame as the feeling of institutional rejection. Ultimately, this work uses philosophical anthropology to combat dehumanization. Our unique form of dependency on others and institutions is present, for example, in infants and the severely disabled who may not possess the forms of consciousness and cognition that traditionally are identified with being human. (shrink)

In this article, I aim to demonstrate that moral responsibility theory produces, legitimates, and even magnifies the considerable social injustice that accrues to disabled people insofar as it implicitly and explicitly promotes a depoliticized ontology of disability that construes disability as a naturally disadvantageous personal characteristic or deleterious property of individuals rather than identifies it as an effect of power, an apparatus. In particular, I argue that the methodological tools of “analytic” philosophy that philosophers of moral responsibility theory employ to (...) establish the philosophical domain in which they engage have distinctly detrimental effects on disabled people. (shrink)

The leading models of disability struggle to fully encompass all aspects of “disability.” This difficulty arises, the author argues, because the models fundamentally misunderstand the nature of disability. Current theoretical approaches to disability can be understood as “nounal,” in that they understand disability as a thing that is caused or embodied. In contrast, this paper presents an adverbial perspective on disability, which shows that disability is experienced as a personally irremediable impediment to daily-living tasks or goals-like-ours. The picture theory of (...) disability technically constitutes a species of relational approach because its analysis references the interplay between an individual and their environment; it differs from other relational accounts, however, by interpreting disability as a certain kind of negative experience—rather than a function of that relationship. This purely descriptive theory makes no normative claims about disability and operates as both a mechanism for the evaluation of the experience of disability and a heuristic device for the proper interpretation of disability. When disability is reframed in this way, the theory offers a particularist perspective which shows if, when, where, and how disability is experienced. (shrink)

This paper assesses how views of disability and enhancement can combine. It is hard to maintain that disabilities and enhancements are both undesirable. Disability-positive views can combine with support for or opposition to enhancement, but not with the view that enhanced traits reliably increase well-being. It is consistent to hold that disability is bad and enhancement good; the plausibility of this combination depends on whether it is better to have more options and fewer limitations. Understanding these combined positions makes it (...) easier to check for consistency by evaluating positions on disability and enhancement against each other. (shrink)

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has made explicit what many of us already knew and some of us are constantly made to feel: good health and the abilities of our bodies & minds1 are fluid and uncertain. We can only ever hold them precariously (Butler, 2004; Scully, 2014). In the end, we are all vulnerable beings. And, yet, vulnerability, perhaps especially in times of crisis, can never be fully universalised, nor is it distributed equally: the value and definition of what our (...) bodies & minds can do, what they mean, and how they are expected – and often pushed – to function, are intrinsically unstable, as they depend on the socio-cultural, political, and economic context. This is perfectly echoed by the title Rosi Braidotti (2020) gave to one of her recent articles on the ongoing COVID-19 crisis and the current posthuman predicament: ‘“We” Are in This Together, But We Are Not One and the Same’. (shrink)

The culturally pervasive tendency to identify aspects of the body as aesthetically imperfect harms individuals and scaffolds injustice related to disability, race, gender, LGBTQ+ identities, and fatness. But abandoning the notion of imperfection may not respect people’s reasonable understandings of their own bodies. I examine the prospects for a practice of aesthetic assessment grounded in a notion of the body’s function. I argue that functional aesthetic assessment, to be respectful, requires understanding the body’s functions as complex, malleable, and determined by (...) the projects and interests of the person whose body it is. Aesthetically relevant functions, on this account, are determined neither by the body’s status as organism nor by cultural assumptions about how bodies should function or be used. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend a version of the medical model of disability, which defines disability as an enduring biological dysfunction that causes its bearer a significant degree of impairment. We should accept the medical model, I argue, because it succeeds in capturing our judgments about what conditions do and do not qualify as disabilities, because it offers a compelling explanation for what makes a condition count as a disability, and because it justifies why the federal government should spend hundreds (...) of billions of dollars, annually, on aid and accommodations for disabled people. After responding to a pair of objections Elizabeth Barnes has raised against the medical model, I contrast it with Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu's welfarist account of disability, and with Barnes's own mere-difference view. Both of these accounts face serious challenges, although elements of Barnes's view can—and, in my opinion, should—be adopted by proponents of the medical model. (shrink)

A review of Elizabeth Barnes' The Minority Body.

It is widely known that Black people are significantly more likely to be killed by the police in the United States of America than white people. What is less widely known is that nearly half of all people killed by the police are disabled people. The aim of this paper is to better understand the intersection of racism and ableism in the USA. Contributing to the growing literature at the intersection of philosophy of disability and critical philosophy of race, I (...) argue that theories concerning white supremacy should take more seriously the ways in which it functions as a process and apparatus of making abled and disabled. I conclude by discussing how understanding white supremacy in this manner is a valuable coalitional tool in fights for social justice. (shrink)

The Life Worth Living investigates the exclusion of and discrimination against disabled people across the history of Western moral philosophy. -/- Table of Contents: Introduction: The Ableist Conflation. Part I: Pain. 1. Theories of Pain. 2. A Phenomenology of Chronic Pain. Part II: Disability. 3. Theories of Disability. 4. A Phenomenology of Multiple Sclerosis. Part III: Ability. 5. Theories of Ability. 6. A Phenomenology of Ability. Conclusion: An Anti-Ableist Future.

[This piece is written for those working in social gerontology and aging studies, with the aim of bringing insights from disability studies and philosophy of disability to bear on enduring debates in those fields.] The guiding question of humanistic age-studies—What does it mean to grow old?—cannot be answered without reflecting on disability. This is not simply because growing old invariably means becoming impaired in various ways, but also because the discriminations and stigmas involved in ageism are often rooted in ableism. (...) We here draw on research in the philosophy of disability as well as the interdisciplinary field of disability studies to explore the relationship between ageism and ableism. (shrink)

This paper begins by saying enough about eugenics to explain why disability is central to eugenics (section 2), then elaborates on why cognitive disability has played and continues to play a special role in eugenics and in thinking about moral status (section 3) before identifying three reasons why eugenics remains a live issue in contemporary bioethics (section 4). After a reminder of the connections between Nazi eugenics, medicine, and bioethics (section 5), it returns to take up two more specific clusters (...) of issues at the intersection of eugenics, disability, and bioethics. These concern questions of life, death, and reproductive value (section 6) and the value of standpoint theory and epistemology for understanding some of the tensions between bioethics and disability in light of a shared eugenic past (section 7). (shrink)

What exactly do we mean when we refer to disability as a social construction? How viable are the justifications for this? These questions are explored in this paper. To this end, various theories that are influential in German-language disability studies are examined and criticised. These include Oliver's social model, furthermore the "Thomas theorem", Berger and Luckmann's sociology of knowledge, Foucault's discourse theory and Waldschmidt's theory. Subsequently, social constructivist approaches of Watzlawick and Gergen and Gergen are discussed. It is shown that (...) a relativistic understanding of social construction can be used to deny facticity and thus undermines the foundations of scientific knowledge. This danger must be taken seriously when defending the scientificity of disability studies. (shrink)

In this project I am concerned with the extent to which conceptual engineering happens in domains outside of philosophy, and if so, what that might look like. Specifically, I’ll argue that...

In this paper, we highlight some problems for accounts of disability and enhancement that have not been sufficiently addressed in the literature. The reason, we contend, is that contemporary debates that seek to define, characterise or explain the normative valence of disability and enhancement do not pay sufficient attention to a wide range of cases, and the transition between one state and another. In section one, we provide seven cases that might count as disability or enhancement. We explain why each (...) case might count, and on what basis, and why it is been neglected. Each case is explained as a transition in what we call capacity space. We then argue that no definition of disability or enhancement addresses all of these cases, except for strict welfarist accounts of disability that do not rely on a depiction of any particular capacity. We argue further, however, that this is a serious deficiency of welfarist conceptions of disability. We then address objections to our account. (shrink)

One challenge in providing an adequate definition of physical disability is unifying the heterogeneous bodily conditions that count as disabilities. We examine recent proposals by Elizabeth Barnes (2016), and Dana Howard and Sean Aas (2018), and show how this debate has reached an impasse. Barnes’ account struggles to deliver principled unification of the category of disability, whilst Howard and Aas’ account risks inappropriately sidelining the body. We argue that this impasse can be broken using a novel concept: marginalised functioning. Marginalised (...) functioning concerns the relationship between a person’s bodily capacities and their social world: specifically, their ability to function in line with the default norms about how people can typically physically function that influence the structuring of social space. We argue that attending to marginalised functioning allows us to develop, not one, but three different models of disability, all of which—whilst having different strengths and weaknesses—unify the category of disability without sidelining the body. (shrink)

Luck egalitarianism’s commitment to neutralizing brute luck inequalities is thought to imply that the elimination of disabilities is an appropriate way to eliminate the unchosen disadvantage that often accompanies disabilities. This implication is not only intuitively objectionable to some, especially those concerned with disability justice, but is subject to objections from relational egalitarians that should be taken seriously. This paper defends the claim that disability elimination is not a natural implication of luck egalitarian theories of justice and that luck egalitarians (...) can avoid the related relational egalitarian objections. I take this to be the case because luck egalitarians can consistently endorse three commitments that, together, take disability elimination off the menu of possible ways to redress the disadvantage of persons with disabilities. These three commitments are: i) the rejection of the view that disability intrinsically makes a person worse off; ii) the endorsement of the fundamental equality of all persons; and iii) the view that luck egalitarianism advances a theory about the arrangement of social institutions. (shrink)

Since the completion of the human genome project in 2003, genomic sequencing, analysis, and interpretation have become staples of research in medicine and the life sciences more generally. While much ink has been spilled concerning genomics’ precipitous rise, there is little agreement among scholars concerning its meaning, both in general and with respect to our current moment. Some claim genomics is neither new, nor noteworthy; others claim it is a novel and worrisome instrument of newgenics. Contrary to the approaches of (...) Foucault scholars in both camps, in this paper I utilize research in philosophy of disability to argue that genomics is indeed noteworthy as a unique form of biopower and that its primary function is to precisify impairments in contradistinction to disability. I call the force at play in this process genopower. (shrink)

Most interpreters of Heidegger’s reflections on the body maintain that—whether early, middle, or late in the Gesamtausgabe—Dasein’s or the mortal’s openness to being/beyng is the ground of the fleshly or bodily (das Leibliche), but not the reverse. In this paper, I argue that there is evidence from Heidegger’s own oeuvre demonstrating that this relationship is instead mutually reciprocal. That is to say, I contend that corporeal variability is constitutive of Dasein’s openness to being just as Dasein’s openness to being is (...) constitutive of its corporeal variability. Understood in this way, Heidegger’s thinking puts forward what I call a corpoietic understanding of the body and of the meaning of ability. I show that, despite the ableist assumptions at play in much of Heidegger’s work, such an understanding is nevertheless grounded in the idea of access, a central concept in philosophy of disability and disability studies. After developing this idea of ability as access, I close by addressing the larger political stakes of using Heidegger’s work to think about embodiment and disability given the Third Reich’s mass slaughter of people with disabilities. (shrink)

The social model of disability claims that disadvantage from disability is primarily a result of the social response to bodily difference. Social modellers typically draw two normative conclusions: first, that society has a responsibility to address disability disadvantage as a matter of justice, not charity; second, that the appropriate way of addressing this disadvantage is to change social institutions themselves, to better fit for bodily difference, rather than to normalize bodies to fit existing institutions. This paper offers a qualified defense (...) of both inferences. Social institutions have reasons of justice to fix disability disadvantage, because the choice of institutions that contingently favor those whose bodies are statistically typical incurs responsibilities to compensate those who disfavored, in that choice. Among other things, this responsibility implies that societies should not simultaneously materially disadvantage disabled people, and also withhold symbolic resources, by demanding a presumption in favor of personal transformation – thereby, undermining the social conditions for disability pride. (shrink)

Disability and enhancement are often treated as opposing concepts. To become disabled in some respect is to move away from those who are enhanced in that same respect; to become enhanced is to move away from the corresponding state of disability. This chapter examines how best to understand the concepts of disability and enhancement in this symmetrical way. After considering various candidates, two types of accounts are identified as the most promising: welfarist accounts and typical-functioning accounts. The authors ultimately defend (...) a complex typical-functioning account as the best way to achieve a symmetrical understanding of disability and enhancement. (shrink)

The privation theory of evil (PTE) states that evil is the absence of some good that is supposed to be present. For example, if vision is an intrinsic good, and if human beings are supposed to have vision, then PTE implies that a human being’s lacking vision is an evil, or a bad state of affairs. The mere-difference view of disability (MDD) states that disabilities like blindness are not inherently bad. Therefore, it would seem that lacking sight is not a (...) bad state of affairs. Thus PTE and MDD seem to be in tension. This essay discusses that apparent tension and explains how it might be resolved without doing violence to either view. Given the prominence of PTE in the history of Christian theology, and the wide support for MDD among disability theorists, it is worth finding a way to harmonize these two views. (shrink)

This article experiments with multimedia storytelling to re-vision difference outside biomedical and humanistic frames by generating new understandings of living dis/artfully with illness. We present and analyze seven short videos created by women and trans people living with illness as part of an arts-based research project that aimed to speak back to hegemonic concepts of disability that create barriers to healthcare.1 We call for a welcoming in of disability studies’ disruptive and re-imaginative orientations to bodily difference to unsettle medicine’s humanistic (...) accounts. In turn, we advance medical post-humanistic approaches that call on disability studies to re-embody its theories and approaches. (shrink)

If we were to write down all those things that we ordinarily categorise as disabilities, the resulting list might appear to be extremely heterogeneous. What do disabilities have in common? In this paper I defend the view that disabilities should be understood as particular kinds of inability. I show how we should formulate this view, and in the process defend the view from various objections. For example, I show how the view can allow that common kinds of inability are not (...) disabilities, can allow that minor kinds of inability are rightly not described as disabilities, and can allow that socially imposed inabilities need not be disabilities. In the second half of the paper, I show that this theory is superior to rival theories. I criticize the wellbeing theory of disability (Kahane and Savulescu 2009, Savulescu and Kahane 2011, Harris 2001) and conventionalist theories of disability (e.g. Barnes 2016). Finally, I show how the inability theory is consistent with the best versions of the social model of disability. (shrink)

I review Elizabeth Barnes, The Minority Body very favorably. I argue as well that the substance of the work applies not only to minority bodies but also to “minority minds”. I also argue that the “dis” in disability should be understood as the precarious of maintaining a good life, not to the ability to have a good life. This may be due to both social and medical concerns.

One way to determine whether a mental condition should be considered a disorder is to first give necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be a disorder and then see if it meets these conditions. But this approach has been criticized for begging normative questions. Concerning autism (and other conditions), a neurodiversity movement has arisen with essentially two aims: (1) advocate for the rights and interests of individuals with autism, and (2) de-pathologize autism. We argue that denying autism’s disorder status (...) could undermine autism’s exculpatory role in cases where individuals with autism are charged with a crime. Our argument raises a dilemma for the neurodiversity movement: advocating for the rights and interests of individuals with autism may require viewing autism as a condition that can be inherently disabling (at least for some individuals). If this is right, autism’s disorder status might be maintained (again, at least for some individuals) without deriving this result from any general account of disorder. (shrink)

As reproductive genetic technologies advance, families have more options to choose what sort of child they want to have. Using preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), for example, allows parents to evaluate several existing embryos before selecting which to implant via in vitro fertilization (IVF). One of the traits PGD can identify is genetic deafness, and hearing embryos are now preferentially selected around the globe using this method. Importantly, some Deaf families desire a deaf child, and PGD–IVF is also an option for (...) them. Selection for genetic deafness, however, encounters widespread disapproval in the hearing community, including mainstream philosophy and bioethics. In this paper I apply Elizabeth Barnes’ value-neutral model of disability as mere-difference to the case of selecting for deafness. I draw on evidence from Deaf Studies and Disability Studies to build an understanding of deafness, the Deaf community, and the circumstances relevant to reproductive choices that may obtain for some Deaf families. Selection for deafness, with deafness understood as mere-difference and valued for its cultural identity, need not necessitate impermissible moral harms. I thus advocate that it is sometimes morally permissible to select for deafness in one’s child. (shrink)

The view that it is better for life to be created free of disability is pervasive in both common sense and philosophy. We cast doubt on this view by focusing on an influential line of thinking that manifests it. That thinking begins with a widely-discussed principle, Procreative Beneficence, and draws conclusions about parental choice and disability. After reconstructing two versions of this argument, we critique the first by exploring the relationship between different understandings of well-being and disability, and the second (...) by more briefly focusing on the idea of a significant reason. By placing these results against the broader historical and ongoing contexts in which the lives of those with disabilities have been deemed of inferior quality, we conclude with a call for greater humility about disability and well-being in thought and practice. (shrink)

Does life have meaning? What is flourishing? How do we attain the good life? Philosophers, and many others of us, have explored these questions for centuries. As Eva Feder Kittay points out, however, there is a flaw in the essential premise of these questions: they seem oblivious to the very nature of the ways in which humans live, omitting a world of co-dependency, and of the fact that we live in and through our bodies, whether they are fully abled or (...) disabled. Our dependent, vulnerable, messy, changeable, and embodied experience colors everything about our lives both on the surface and when it comes to deeper concepts, but we tend to leave aside the body for the mind when it comes to philosophical matters. Disability offers a powerful challenge to long-held philosophical views about the nature of the good life, what provides meaning in our lives, and the centrality of reason, as well as questions of justice, dignity, and personhood. These concepts need not be distant and idealized; the answers are right before us, in the way humans interact with one another, care for one another, and need one another--whether they possess full mental capacities or have cognitive limitations. We need to revise our concepts of things like dignity and personhood in light of this important correction, Kittay argues. This is the first of two books in which Kittay will grapple with just how we need to revisit core philosophical ideas in light of disabled people's experience and way of being in the world. Kittay, an award-winning philosopher who is also the mother to a multiply-disabled daughter, interweaves the personal voice with the philosophical as a critical method of philosophical investigation. Here, she addresses why cognitive disability can reorient us to what truly matters, and questions the centrality of normalcy as part of a good life. With profound sensitivity and insight, Kittay examines other difficult topics: How can we look at the ethical questions regarding prenatal testing in light of a new appreciation of the personhood of disabled people? What do new possibilities in genetic testing imply for understanding disability, the family, and bioethics? How can we reconsider the importance of care, and how does it work best? In the process of pursuing these questions, Kittay articulates an ethic of care, which is the ethical theory most useful for claiming full rights for disabled people and providing the opportunities for everyone to live joyful and fulfilling lives. She applies the lessons of care to the controversial alteration of severely cognitively disabled children known as the Ashley Treatment, whereby a child's growth is halted with extensive estrogen treatment and related bodily interventions are justified. This book both imparts lessons that advocate on behalf of those with significant disabilities, and constructs a moral theory grounded on our ability to give, receive, and share care and love. Above all, it aims to adjust social attitudes and misconceptions about life with disability. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: In his A Conceptual Investigation of Justice, Kyle Johannsen suggests a theory of disability that holds that to have a disability just is to be worse off, sometimes referred to as the ‘medical’ or ‘individual’ model of disability. I argue that Johannsen’s understanding of disability might force some of his key claims into an uncomfortable position. In particular, for his theory to avoid the thrust of Elizabeth Anderson’s criticisms of luck egalitarianism, the assumption of the medical model of disability (...) must be dropped, but this comes at the cost of his criticism of John Rawls’ difference principle. -/- RÉSUMÉ : Dans son livre, A Conceptual Investigation of Justice, Kyle Johannsen semble invoquer une théorie du handicap selon laquelle le fait d’avoir un handicap, c’est être pire qu’une autre personne, un modèle parfois appelé le modèle de handicap «médical» ou «individuel». Je soutiens que la compréhension de Johannsen en matière d’invalidité peut mettre sa theorie dans une position difficile. En particulier, pour que sa théorie évite les critiques d’Elizabeth Anderson sur l’égalitarisme de la chance, l’hypothèse du modèle médical du handicap doit être abandonnée. Cependant, cela se fait au détriment de la critique du principe de différence de John Rawls formulée par Johannsen. (shrink)

This short encyclopedia entry defines the concept of the normate.

Disability has been a topic in multiple areas of philosophical scholarship for decades. However, it is only in the last ten to fifteen years that philosophy of disability has increasingly become recognized as a distinct field. Engaging a range of canonical texts across the Western intellectual tradition, I argue that the foundational question of continental philosophy of disability is the question of the meaning of ability. I then explore three pathways toward this question: the verdict of bodies, the bind of (...) bodies and worth, and the dogma of individual ability. I contend that unlike the question of the meaning of being, the question of the meaning of ability is not simply a problem of forgetting but instead primarily a problem of dehumanization. (shrink)

With regard to recent historical developments, the Social Model has been of enormous emancipatory significance, chiefly as a counter-agent against rigid definitions of dis-/ability and the traditional role (marked by misfortune) imposed on disabled people. Based on underdetermined notions of “social construction”, this model presently threatens to unduly narrow reflections on the existential conditions of disabled agents, and to obscure crucial questions facing just social orders of the future. These notions imply an overemphasis on linguistic/mental and cultural acts in the (...) shaping of life courses, whereas physical, practical and existential pre-conditions of life come to be disregarded as purportedly freely available, (natural) features. Conversely, this argumentation sketch – a contribution to DisKo18 – works towards a reconceptualisation of disability rooted in external realism, assuming partially autonomous agents. The paper asks: What is the place of disabled people in the world, given that the elementary conditions and problems of life are not primarily of human origin, but arise out of a complex interaction with elements of external reality? What space remains to them in view of extant impairment-related restrictions? Based on a critique of constructionist tenets, possibilities for a just social order are discussed, considering (a) disabilities vs. (b) external, pre-social factors that limit the range of possible social solutions, with special regard to available resources. This approach is exemplified by placing disability in contexts of ecological sustainability. (Paper in German, short version). (shrink)

In recent history, the Social Model has crucially contributed to an emancipatory perspective on disability, not least as a rebuttal to deficit oriented views focused on suffering. Several overstated notions of “social construction“ this family of models relies on, however, presently threaten to unduly narrow reflections on “disability”-situations and the self-reflection of disabled people. These notions tend to obscure social and ecological issues an emerging just social order will need to address. The roots of any sociocultural formation in external (physical) (...) reality thus remain underrecognised. -/- This paper adumbrates an alternative approach rooted in (External) Realism. The argument is based on a critique of social constructivist notions employed in models of disability overemphasising sociocultural elements, and capitalises on work by T. Shakespeare and S. Vehmas.. Implications of the proposed approach for debates on 1.) social issues and issues of human(e) interaction, especially personal assistance- relationships and 2.) ecological issues and human dealings with nature, are briefly explored. -/- (Paper in German, long version with examples from two domains and additional explanations. Originally presented at DisKo18.). (shrink)

In "Disabilities and First-Person Testimony: A Case of Defeat?" Hilary Yancey argues that in at least some cases we have “no significant reason to distrust” the evidential value of first-person testimony concerning the impact of a physical disability on that individual’s well-being. Her argument is premised on a defeasible principle of trust: One should trust the testimony of others regarding p whenever one recognizes that the testifier is in a position to know p. Since the subjective component of wellbeing is (...) fist-person privileged, that is, ordinarily the subject herself is in the best position to know, an audience to such testimony must be aware of a defeater in order to shift the burden of proof and block the testimony from counting as evidence. In the body of the paper Yancey argues that 1) conflicting first-person testimony does not constitute an inescapable content defeater and 2) neither irrational adaptive preferences nor low life expectations inescapably undercuts the reliability of these testifiers regarding matters of their own subjective well-being. The burden of proof is not globally shifted by either kind of defeater, Yancey argues, so at least some first-person testimony about disability must inform our beliefs about the nature of disabilities. In my comment I ask and attempt to answer three questions on Yancy’s behalf, then invite her to set me straight if I have it wrong. I go Kantian along the way. 1. Whence arises the worry, and why focus on these defeaters? 2. How common is PNT, anyway, and why does it matter? 3. On what grounds should we distrust PNT in particular cases? (shrink)

The argument for vegetarianism from overlapping species goes like this. Every individual who is the subject of a life has a right to life. Some humans—e.g., the severely congenitally cognitively limited—lack language, rationality, autonomy, and self-consciousness, and yet they are subjects of a life. Severely congenitally cognitively limited humans have a right to life. Some animals—e.g., all mammals—lack language, rationality, autonomy, and self-consciousness, and yet they are subjects of a life. We ought to treat like cases alike. The cases of (...) some humans are like the cases of some animals. Therefore, some animals have a right to life. -/- The argument seems not to have moved many people to change their diets. The reason, I suggest, is not because the argument is unsound but because our ability to change our dietary practices is difficult and we lack the imaginative resources to see the world from a nonhuman perspective. -/- I suggest that creative artists are of great value here, and I provide an example by referring to the work of the American novelist, Cormac McCarthy. (shrink)