In this reply to Paul Simmons, it is argued that while biblical scripture should be understood as the Christian's first and final authority, it is appropriate to draw on other writings as sources for moral reflection. Responsible biblical interpretation and theological reflection must include careful historical analysis. It is inaccurate and anachronistic to read into early Jewish and Christian thinkers a position much like the reigning secular philosophical-legal position on abortion, where fetal non-personhood and individual freedom results in (...) class='Hi'>abortion without legal constraints. Careful scholarship reveals that a theological community-based Christian ethic, which develops from first century reflections and biblical canonical authority, prohibits direct abortion as an option for the Christian community. (shrink)

Abortion is a controversial and divisive topic. The paper gives a short review of the main approaches throughout the history of European thinking to this complex problem. Moral concerns about abortion often turn on the questions of when human life can be said to has began and what is the moral status of human embryo and fetus. The paper gives also an outline of several scientific and religious attempts to solve the problem.

In 2018, Irish citizens voted overwhelmingly to repeal the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution to allow for the introduction of a more liberal abortion law. In this article, I develop a retrospective reading of the stubborn persistence of the denial of reproductive rights to women in Ireland over the decades. I argue that the ban’s severity and longevity is rooted in deep-seated, affective attachments that formed part of processes of postcolonial nation-building and relied on shame and the construction of (...) the Irish nation as a particular, gendered place. The article develops the notion of ‘gendered displacement’ to conceptualise abortion travel in the context of the history of women’s coercive confinement, and provides an affective, feminist reading of the interlinkages between place and nationhood. It also draws on three cases—the X, Y and Z cases—to illustrate the centrality of place and women’s occupation of space to the analysis of Ireland’s abortion ban, which should be read in the wider context of the legacy of what I term the ‘affective politics of place’. (shrink)

Introduction: bearing politics -- Abortion, sin, and the state -- A history of the abortion debate -- Conceiving the nation: representations of abortion in Thailand -- Corrupt girls, victims of men, desperate women: representations of women who abort -- 'A small sin': everyday acts -- 'The truth of our day by day lives': situational ethics -- Global debates, local dilemmas.

In this commentary, the core features of the Irish Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013 are outlined. This legislation provides, for the first time in the history of the Irish state, a framework for the provision of lawful abortion in Ireland. The paper will explain the background to the legislation, discuss its main features, and reflect on the likely impact that it will have on the availability of abortion in Ireland.

This article analyzes the comparative history of the law and practice of abortion and assisted reproduction in the United States to consider the interplay between medical paternalism and legal paternalism. It supplements existing critiques of paternalism as harmful to women's equality with the medical perspective, as revealed through the writings of Alan F. Guttmacher, to consider when legal regulation might be warranted.

The Issue of Abortion in America is an interactive multi-media CD-ROM created by the award winning Carnegie Mellon team that brought us A Right to Die?: The Dax Cowart Case. In this ground breaking CD-ROM, The Issue of Abortion in America gives users an opportunity to see and hear women and couples speak of the emotional struggles and moral dilemmas they face in their consideration of continuing or terminating a pregnancy. It also places the issue of abortion (...) in the larger social context of medical, legal, philosophical, and religious considerations. The information on the CD is presented in three student friendly sections: * Introduction: offers an introduction to the project as well as an overview of the program. * Case Histories: a set of interactive multimedia modules present situations in which women and couples describe their decisions to continue or terminate a pregnancy. * Resources: Reviews the background context that informs the discussion of the issue of abortion in America along with a summary section of the case histories. (shrink)

Our contention is that all of the major arguments for abortion are also arguments for permitting infanticide. One cannot distinguish the fetus from the infant in terms of a morally significant intrinsic property, nor are they morally discernible in terms of standing in different relationships to others. The logic of our position is that if such arguments justify abortion, then they also justify infanticide. If we are right that infanticide is not justified, then such arguments will fail to (...) justify abortion. We respond to those philosophers who accept infanticide by putting forth a novel account of how the mindless can be wronged which serves to distinguish morally significant potential from morally irrelevant potential. This allows our account to avoid the standard objection that many entities possess a potential for personhood which we are intuitively under no obligation to further or protect. (shrink)

In January 2012, the Journal of Medical Ethics published online Giubilini and Minerva's paper, ‘After-birth abortion. Why should the baby live?’.1 The Journal publishes articles based on the quality of their argument, their contribution to the existing literature, and relevance to current medicine. This article met those criteria. It created unprecedented global outrage for a paper published in an academic medical ethics journal. In this special issue of the Journal, Giubilini and Minerva's paper comes to print along with 31 (...) articles from some of the best scholars in the world, from the broadest range of perspectives on abortion and infanticide, including those strongly critical of Giubilini and Minerva.The killing of a baby is among the most shocking of human practices. I am strongly opposed to the legalisation of infanticide along the lines discussed by Giubilini and Minerva. But I would like to explain why a journal of medical ethics published an article examining infanticide and now devotes a special issue to bringing a wide range of perspectives for further examination of these issues.Infanticide has been practised throughout human history for various reasons and continues to be practised today throughout the world. In rare cases, infanticide can be practised openly and legally—for example, as specified under the ‘Groningen Protocol’, in the Netherlands. The Groningen Protocol allows doctors to end the life of neonates at the request of their parents if the infant is experiencing hopeless and unbearable suffering.2But medical infanticide arguably occurs elsewhere other than in the Netherlands today.In neonatal intensive care, it is not uncommon for a doctor to withdraw artificial ventilation with the consequence that a baby dies.3 If anyone else performed that act, including the parents of the child, it would be viewed as an act of homicide, in some cases …. (shrink)

Most histories of livestock disease in Britain treat the development of control policy as a government responsibility, to which farmers made little constructive contribution. Similarly, farmers rarely appear in accounts of disease research. This paper uses the example of contagious abortion at the turn of the twentieth century to reveal that state-farming collaboration in research and policy did in fact occur, and that it operated in various ways, with often unexpected outcomes. The collaborative approach to contagious abortion is (...) partly attributed to its clinical and epidemiological features, which made it an unsuitable candidate for the existing, state-led policy of stamping out disease. It is claimed that such collaboration has been overlooked by historians on account of their focus upon diseases that were amenable to stamping out. This focus needs to change if history is to inform present-day disease governance in Britain, which is founded on the concept of ‘partnership’ between farmers and the state. (shrink)

Study of obstacles to creative thinking in science in developing countries - analyses the history of science in Europe; examines science and technology prior to colonialism, focusing on South Asia, and the spread and dominance of Western physical and social sciences in the Third World; considers the impact of social development and independence on scientific development and dependence, and the social implications of technology transfer, esp. Agricultural technology. Bibliography.

Sir Dugald Baird sketches the history of abortion legislation in Great Britain from the beginning of the century. In his views the 1967 Abortion Act has been one of the most important and beneficial pieces of social legislation enacted in Britain in the last 100 years. It has, however, brought problems both of administration in the hospitals and to individual doctors and nurses, particularly when the patients are young single women and even schoolgirls. One of the consequences of (...) the Abortion Act has been a fall in maternal mortality and perinatal mortality rates. Abortion does not seem to be followed by serious emotional sequelae. Nevertheless recent changes in sexual mores have introduced new and serious social problems which are discussed in relation to the role of the doctor in his relationship with patients seeking abortion. (shrink)

I argue that whether abortions are morally permissible depends on whether the fetus has a right to life, the only point of disagreement between the possible theories on this question--the Extreme Conservative, the Middle, and the Extreme Liberal--concerns the relevant temporal proximity to, or degree of probability of actualizing, some selected potential, there is in principle no non-arbitrary way of resolving this disagreement, and hence the problem of abortion is a pseudo-problem inasmuch as it is not theoretically capable of (...) being solved, and legislators should, in the light of this, act as if the Extreme Liberal Theory were true. (shrink)

January 2018, the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology issued a position statement opposing the punishment of women for self‐induced abortion. To those unfamiliar with emerging trends in abortion in the United States and worldwide, the need for the declaration might not be apparent. Several studies suggest that self‐induced abortion is on the rise in the United States. Simultaneously, prosecutions of pregnant women for behavior thought to harm the fetus are increasing. The ACOG statement responds to both (...) trends by urging doctors to honor the integrity and confidentiality inherent in the doctor‐patient relationship. Seen in the context of the larger battle over legal abortion, the statement has far broader implications. By acknowledging the role doctors play in enforcing pregnancy‐related crimes, the ACOG position statement wisely anticipates the ways in which doctors will be implicated should access to legal abortion be further restricted. To understand the need for the ACOG directive, you must first understand that the story of what will happen if abortion becomes a crime in the United States is not to be found in history books; it is staring at us across our southern border. (shrink)

McGovern, Kevin A recent move in Victoria to decriminalise abortion invites reflection on this issue. In this article, I review the history which has led to the present situation, and then offer four comments.

Several recent papers have suggested that the pro-life view entails a radical, implausible thesis: that miscarriage is the biggest public health crisis in the history of our species and requires radical diversion of funds to combat. In this paper, I clarify the extent of the problem, showing that the number of miscarriages about which we can do anything morally significant is plausibly much lower than previously thought, then describing some of the work already being done on this topic. I then (...) briefly survey a range of reasons why abortion might be thought more serious and more worthy of prevention than miscarriage. Finally, I lay out my central argument: that reflection on the wrongness of killing reveals that the norms for ending life and failing to save life are different, in such a way that could justify the prioritization of anti-abortion advocacy over anti-miscarriage efforts. Such an account can also respond to similar problems posed to the pro-lifer, such as the question of whom to save in a “burning lab” type scenario. (shrink)

The 2006 trial of Suman Sood put criminal abortion on the public agenda for the first time in 25 years in NSW. Response to the case highlights tenacious myths about abortion law in Australia; namely that the common law “is an ass” that allows for abortion only by way of a lack of application of the law. By briefly explaining the history of abortion in Australia, I argue that the Sood case does not represent a general (...) failure of the common law to allow abortion, nor does it support the popular myth that abortion is “technically” illegal, or that doctors who perform abortions have historically been the target of the criminal law in Australia. I show that contrary to myths promoted particularly around the 1998 Western Australian reforms, abortion has long been lawful in Australia, and the common law has merit compared to other regulatory regimes. Hence, arguments for alternative abortion regimes should not depend on myths which are shown to be unrepresentative of the political and legal situation in Australia. (shrink)

Many believe strongly that states, even democratic states, commit serious moral harm by adopting policies that allow elective abortions. What avenues are available to citizens of those states who oppose such policies? In this paper I contest Nicholas Dixon’s claim that there is only a very limited scope for acts of civil disobedience in response to pro-abortion state policy. While acknowledging that a state policy of not allowing elective abortions imposes significant burdens on pregnant women, I contend that a (...) consistent political liberalism—committed to the idea of state neutrality—must recognize the validity of significant, even invasive, civil disobedience in response to states that follow a policy of allowing elective abortions. (shrink)

The Supreme Court decided Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky in 2019. Justice Clarence Thomas’s opinion in the case claimed there was a direct connection between the legalization of abortion, in the late 20th Century, and the beginnings of the birth control movement a full three quarters of a century earlier. “Many eugenicists,” Thomas argued, “supported legalizing abortion.”Justice Samuel Alito highlighted similar claims in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health, citing a brief entitled “The Eugenic Era Lives (...) on through the Abortion Movement.” That brief was an echo of Justice Thomas’ misguided attempt at history in the Box opinion. Similar claims reoccur in Judge Matthew Kacsmaryk’s opinion in the Texas mifepristone case, Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine v. U.S. Food and Drug Administration.These false claims are the focus of this article. There is no evidence that early leaders of the eugenics movement supported abortion as part of the movement for birth control. It is accurate to describe those leaders as anti-abortion, and their followers as people who condemned abortion for moral, legal, and medical reasons. (shrink)

This paper argues that, if we are committed to a Pro-choice stance with regard to selective abortion for disability, we will be unable to justify the prohibition of sex-selective abortion (SSA), for two reasons. First, familiar Pro-choice arguments in favour of a woman’s right to select against fetal impairment also support, by parity of reasoning, a right to choose SSA. Second, rejection of the criticisms of selective abortion for disability levelled by disability theorists also disposes, by implication, (...) of the key objections to SSA, as developed, most notably, by feminists. The paper, then, consists of a conditional defence of SSA, under which SSA should be available, and protected by a right, if selective abortion for disability is. Opponents of SSA might respond by conceding additional restrictions on selection against disabled fetuses. It should become clear throughout the paper, however, that any such new restrictions would be unacceptably onerous for women. (shrink)

St. Thomas is usually thought to have rejected abortion and euthanasia as murder (viz, the statement of The Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith "On Procured Abortion"). By going back to Aquinas' own words I show that this is mistaken: that he explicitly states abortion prior to a certain point of fetal development to be non-murderous and that his position, when consistently developed, allows for euthanasia under analogous circumstances. These claims are argued by presenting an (...) analytical expose of Aquinas’ metaphysics of man and of human ontogenesis. The implications of this for current bioethical concerns are sketched briefly. (shrink)

St. Thomas is usually thought to have rejected abortion and euthanasia as murder (viz, the statement of The Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith "On Procured Abortion"). By going back to Aquinas' own words I show that this is mistaken: that he explicitly states abortion prior to a certain point of fetal development to be non-murderous and that his position, when consistently developed, allows for euthanasia under analogous circumstances. These claims are argued by presenting an (...) analytical expose of Aquinas’ metaphysics of man and of human ontogenesis. The implications of this for current bioethical concerns are sketched briefly. (shrink)

Taking Poland as a case study, this article examines the sociological and historical-institutional factors that determine the relationship between the process of medical professionalisation and reproductive rights in transitional societies. Focusing on three periods in Polish history, (a) Partition era (1772–1918), (b) the Second Polish Republic (1918–1939), and (c) the post-war period (1945–1989), it identifies ruptures and continuities that have shaped the development of the Polish medical profession and its attitude towards abortion care today. Using insights from feminist historical (...) institutionalism, abortion studies, and the sociology of professions, the article applies the concept of ‘dialectical transformations’ to explain institutional and policy reproduction and change over time. It shows how professional and legal institutions are often transferred from one systemic context to another by individuals or organisations whose positions move from opposition to dominance. Understanding such processes is especially important in light of the retrenchment of reproductive rights across the globe. (shrink)

McGovern, Kevin When a girl or woman has an unplanned pregnancy, her choices are to keep the child, to give the child for adoption, or to have an abortion. The best outcome is any situation which allows her to keep and successfully raise the child. When this is not possible, this article argues that modern open adoption is a better outcome for both the woman and her child than abortion. In making this argument, this article reviews the complex (...) social history of adoption in Australia. (shrink)

In ‘An Almost Absolute Value in History’ John T. Noonan criticizes several attempts to provide a criterion for when an entity deserves rights. These criteria, he argues are either arbitrary or lead to absurd consequence. Noonan proposes human conception as the criterion of rights, and justifies it by appeal to the sharp shift in probability, at conception, of becoming a being possessed of human reason. Conception, then, is when abortion becomes immoral.The article has an historical and a philosophical goal. (...) The historical goal is to carefully present the probability argument in a charitable manner. The philosophical goal is to offer a unique criticism of Noonan's probability argument against abortion. I argue that, even on a very charitable reading of Noonan's argument for the conception criterion, this criterion is also susceptible to charges of arbitrariness and absurdity. Noonan's claim that probability shifts have anything to do with the moral rights of fetuses cannot be made coherent. I also show that there are problems with Noonan's assumptions about moral rights and the potential to become a being possessed of human reason. (shrink)

In the 1970s, both Denmark and Norway passed abortion legislation that is still the basis for the regulation of abortion in these countries. The legislation was fairly liberal with abortion on demand until 12 weeks of gestation and a permission system for later abortions. This article provides a brief history of the developments leading up to these political compromises and an analysis of the reasons why they have proved remarkably stable. It ends by looking at some factors (...) that may now destabilize 50 years of stable compromise about abortion. (shrink)

Abortion prohibitions in some states include carve-outs based on the medical condition of either the mother or the fetus. These carve-outs, however, may be couched in limiting language structured by legislators rather than in language understandable in the context of medical care. In circumstances where legislative bodies fail to adequately incorporate medical professionals in the drafting of medical laws, the resulting vagueness or ambiguity may lead to a lack of utility or viability. This paper considers the consequences of such (...) legislative misreading of medicine. It does so with a particular example, Utah’s abortion trigger law, 2020 Senate Bill 174 (S.B. 174). S.B. 174 was enacted in 2020 (currently enjoined pending the outcome of _Planned Parenthood Association of Utah v. State of Utah_) and includes an exception for serious fetal anomaly—in other words, disability. While Utah is not alone in its inclusion of a disability exception for abortion, S.B. 174 is unique in the language it uses to carve out this exception: the law requires that the fetus has a “uniformly diagnosable and uniformly lethal” defect. This article explores the medical-legal mismatch in S.B. 174 through an analysis of the statute’s legislative history and its language, an academic and legal database review, and an application of the statutory language to multiple serious genetic diagnoses. In doing so, this paper unpacks just how mismatched these terms are and reveals the massive gap the law will leave between the legal consequences and the medical realities of abortion. (shrink)

Don Marquis’s “future-like-ours” argument against the moral permissibility of abortion is widely considered the strongest anti-abortion argument in the philosophical literature. In this paper, I address the issue of whether the argument relies upon controversial metaphysical premises. It is widely thought that future-like-ours argument indeed relies upon controversial metaphysics, in that it must reject the psychological theory of personal identity. I argue that that thought is mistaken—the future-like-ours argument does not depend upon the rejection of such a theory. (...) I suggest, however, that given a widely-accepted view about contraception and abstinence, the argument is committed to contentious metaphysics after all, as it relies upon a highly controversial assumption about mereology. This commitment is not only relevant for those who are inclined to endorse the argument but reject the mereological view in question, but in addition entails dialectical and epistemological liabilities for the argument, which on some views will be fatal to the argument’s overall success. (shrink)

Ethics: History, Theory, and Contemporary Issues, Fifth Edition, features sixty-nine selections organized into three parts, providing instructors with great flexibility in designing and teaching a variety of courses in moral philosophy. Spanning 2,500 years of ethical theory, the first part, Historical Sources, ranges from ancient Greece to the twentieth century. It moves from classical thought through medieval views to modern theories, culminating with leading nineteenth- and twentieth-century thinkers. The second part, Modern Ethical Theory, includes many of the most important essays (...) of the past century. The discussion of utilitarianism, Kantianism, egoism, and relativism continues in the work of major contemporary philosophers, while landmark selections reflect concern with moral language and the justification of morality. The concepts of duty, justice, and rights are explored, as well as recent views on cultural relativism and an ethic influenced by feminist concerns. In the third part, Contemporary Moral Problems, the readings present the current debates over abortion, euthanasia, famine relief, animal rights, environmentalism, and the use of torture in interrogations, as well as essays on death and the meaning of life. Wherever possible, each reading is printed in its entirety. The fifth edition features new readings from Cicero, Barbara Herman, and Judith Jarvis Thomson; an expanded selection from Joseph Butler's Fifteen Sermons; and a new translation of Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. In addition, the book is supplemented for the first time by a robust support package. An Instructor's Resource CD contains reading summaries, essay questions, multiple-choice and true/false questions, PowerPoint-based lecture outlines, and relevant website links. A Companion Website at www.oup.com/us/cahn provides most of the material from the Instructor's Resource CD along with student resources including interactive self-quizzes, questions for discussion, and helpful links. (shrink)

The first history of American medical ethics published in more than a half century, Before Bioethics tracks the evolution of American medical ethics from colonial midwives and physicians' oaths to current bioethical controversies over abortion, AIDS, animal rights, and physician-assisted suicide.

Confronted with an article defending conclusions that many people judge problematic, philosophers are interested, first of all, in clarifying exactly what arguments are being offered for the views in question, and then, second, in carefully and dispassionately examining those arguments, to determine whether or not they are sound. As a philosopher, then, that is how I would naturally approach the article ‘After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?’, by Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva. Very few philosophical publications, however, have (...) evoked either more widespread attention, or emotionally more heated reactions, than this article has. Because of that, I am going to proceed, initially, in a different fashion, and rather than focusing upon the specific arguments that Giubilini and Minerva offer for their conclusions, I am going to suggest that there are crucial background issues that need to be placed on the table, that any thoughtful reader needs to consider. I shall then go on to discuss how philosophers approach the topic of abortion, and attempt to arrive at sound conclusions concerning its moral status. Finally, I shall offer my assessment of the article by Giubilini and Minerva.What is philosophy? Philosophy and the Socratic challengeMany philosophy journals, because of their focus on intellectual questions that are quite remote from central human concerns, and also likely to involve, sooner or later, some difficult technical issues, have a readership that consists almost entirely of professional philosophers. This is not so, however, in the case of journals concerned with ethical questions, and especially issues of an applied sort, such as are addressed in ‘After-birth abortion’, where interested readers will include, for instance, professional philosophers, and individuals who work in the healthcare and legal professions, and whose philosophical training may well have been very limited. I want to begin, therefore, with some discussion of the nature of philosophy. The importance of …. (shrink)

Medical professionals routinely offer prenatal genetic testing services to their expecting patients. In theory, this testing helps expecting parents better prepare for the birth of their child: e.g., if the child will have a disability. In practice, however, such testing often leads to the termination of pregnancies that would produce a child who has a disability. Some bioethicists believe that in light of our society’s history of poor treatment of people who have disabilities, when expecting parents use prenatal testing for (...) selective abortion and when medical professionals promote the use of such testing, they express a disparaging message to and about extant disabled people: e.g., that disabled people’s lives are... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Proof and Persuasion in the Philosophical Debate about AbortionChris KaposyPhilosophers involved in debating the abortion issue often assume that the arguments they provide can offer decisive resolution.1 Arguments on the prolife side of the debate, for example, usually imply that it is rationally mandatory to view the fetus as having a right to life, or full moral standing.2 Such an account assumes that philosophical argument can compel the (...) reader to see the fetus in a certain way and that dissent risks irrationality.I wish to question this image of the use of philosophical argument in the abortion debate. I focus on the question of fetal moral standing, which is one of the subproblems in the debate. I am especially concerned with prolife arguments for fetal moral standing, since the prolife side must argue for a position that is compulsory. The prochoice side, in contrast, typically holds that people are entitled to believe what they want about the fetus’s moral standing.My position is that philosophical arguments should be understood as tools for persuasion in the abortion debate rather than as a method for discovering decisive proofs about the morality of abortion. I argue that because any one position on the moral standing of fetuses cannot be established decisively, law and policy should favour the prochoice position. In support of these conclusions, I present two common argumentative strategies used to suggest that the prolife view of the fetus is rationally [End Page 139] mandatory, and I illustrate why arguments involving these strategies do not compel us to view the fetus as having full moral standing.Framing the IssueIn order to show that abortion is wrong (in cases in which it is considered wrong), one must first establish that fetuses have full moral standing.3 It is a serious moral wrong to take the life of someone with full moral standing—this is part of what it means to have this status. The possessor of full moral standing is entitled to have his or her life protected. If abortion is wrong, then the fetus must have full moral standing, because without such standing, killing a fetus could be justified by the pregnant woman’s strong interest in ending an unwanted pregnancy. Those arguing against the moral permissibility of abortion must show that it is mandatory (in some way) to view the fetus as having full moral standing. There are a range of positions one could take with regard to the fetus’s status, from viewing the fetus as an incipient organism with no moral standing to seeing the fetus as gaining moral standing as the pregnancy progresses. But if it is mandatory to view the fetus as having full moral standing, all other positions must then be mistaken, incorrect, or somehow unjustified.This paper analyzes why philosophers opposed to abortion think it is mandatory to attribute full moral standing to fetuses. There are two popular argumentative strategies offering different accounts of the source of this obligation. The first strategy suggests that fetal full moral standing derives from morally relevant facts about the fetus. According to this line of argument, we are rationally obligated to view the fetus as having full moral standing because we cannot deny (without courting irrationality) that there are properties, characteristics, or attributes of the fetus that entitle it to this status.The second strategy is to claim that the fetus has full moral standing because this position is most consistent with our intuitions in cases unrelated to abortion. Philosophers taking this approach are fond of analogies comparing fetuses to comatose adults or to people at the end of life, for example. This strategy of appealing to your interlocutor’s sense of consistency I call the “shared-value” strategy.The two strategies map very well onto the distinction some have made between argumentum ad rem and argumentum ad hominem. The philosopher of rhetoric Henry Johnstone Jr. draws this distinction in very clear terms, and others in the history of philosophy make note of the difference [End Page 140] between these two types of arguments as well.4 The appeal to the facts (or argumentum ad rem) seeks to establish the truth of its... (shrink)

Jesudason and Weitz's article examines two public policy debates in California, where both sides of the debate used similar language that had the potential to be detrimental to women. Specifically, they show how anti-abortion crusaders in California used similar language to describe why women's rights should be curtailed as pro-choice advocates use when fighting for more choice and privacy for women's reproductive decisions. This commentary builds upon their article by demonstrating the harm that such co-opting causes to women's rights (...) using the example of sex selective abortion. By examining the legislative history of state and national bills to ban sex-selective abortion, this commentary demonstrates how the anti-abortion lobby has adopted the language of pro-choice advocates quite effectively. Although the framing of this issue as being “woman-protective” is strategic and insincere, such political framing is powerful, as Jesudason and Weitz have noted. Anti-abortion activists have convinced lawmakers in many states that sex-selective abortion is a dire issue in their state and that they must restrict it in order to protect women. In fact, there is no evidence that sex selective abortion is a problem in the United States, yet these frames have been very effective in weakening women's privacy rights. Whenever woman-protective framings are invoked for self-serving purposes, women's rights advocates must work hard to uncover the truth behind these discourses to prevent successful legislative efforts that curtail women's reproductive freedom. (shrink)