Jean-François Lyotard é un dos filósofos franceses da segunda mitade do século XX que intentou darlle unha oportunidade á elaboración dun pensamento do acontecemento a partir da súa unión co motivo da diferenza. O punto de arranque é a consideración de que o coñecemento non pode reducir toda diferenza a identidade, ao quedar sempre marxes e restos que non se poden traducir dunha lingua a outra nin asimilar por un concepto unificador. Lyotard apostará por tratar de prefigurar o xurdimento da (...) novidade cun pensamento que vaia máis alá do homoxéneo. A diferenza pretenderá deixar sinalados os restos inasimilables e intraducibles, tamén os despropósitos, mentres, asemade, dá espazo e lugar a un discurso e unha comunicación aberta, aínda que desaxustada, que axude a que algo aconteza. (shrink)

La obra del filósofo y teólogo norteamericano John D. Caputo pivota alrededor de la tentativa de trasladar ciertos enfoques y aproximaciones de la filosofía postmoderna al ámbito de la religión y la temática de lo divino. En este sentido recupera la noción de debilidad, célebre en la obra de Gianni Vattimo, y la pone a trabajar al mismo tiempo con algunos de los motivos que se hicieron especialmente conocidos a partir de Jacques Derrida. Algunos ejemplos son el por-venir, los espectros (...) o la prioridad de lo otro. Todos ellos son deudores de la noción de acontecimiento, a partir de la cual Caputo propone una nueva forma de entender la divinidad, más en línea con la filosofía postmoderna y, muy especialmente, con la deconstrucción. (shrink)

El artículo explora la dimensión disruptiva y transformadora del encuentro con el Otro en la filosofía de Emmanuel Lévinas. A través de una crítica incisiva a la tradición filosófica occidental, Lévinas destaca la importancia de una ética basada en la alteridad radical y la responsabilidad infinita. En ella se vuelve fundamental el concepto de acontecimiento, que se manifiesta en el rostro del Otro, poniendo en cuestión la continuidad del ser y proponiendo una nueva forma de entender la subjetividad y la (...) trascendencia. Se examinan las ideas fundamentales de su obra, desde la crítica a la totalidad y la irrupción del infinito y la trascendencia, su análisis del hay impersonal que se presenta como rumor insistente, y su idea de creación. En este sentido, se comparan algunas de sus ideas con las de Derrida y Schelling, subrayando la originalidad y profundidad de su pensamiento. Además, se aborda la dimensión mesiánica de su filosofía, que invita a asumir una responsabilidad universal y a trabajar por una justicia que trasciende la reciprocidad y la simetría. La obra de Lévinas ofrece una reconfiguración profunda de la filosofía contemporánea, situando la ética y la responsabilidad en el centro del discurso filosófico. (shrink)

RESUMENEl concepto de acontecimiento tiene en la obra de Žižek una función predominantemente política, pese a que su realización es deudora de la ontología que el esloveno desarrolla. Una de sus finalidades fundamentales será dilucidar si se puede distinguir entre un acontecimiento y un acto. En caso afirmativo, este último pasaría aconsiderarse com o el modo mediante el cual una subjetividad se relaciona con el acontecimiento. El objetivo que persigue el pensador esloveno es ayudar con esta concepción al desarrollo de (...) una alternativa al capitalismo.PALABRAS CLAVEACTO, ACONTECIMIENTO, CAPITALISMO, FANTASMAABSTRACTThe concept of event has an ultimately political role in Žižek’s work despite its realization is indebted to the development of Žižek’s ontology. One of his main purposes will be to clarify whether it’s possible to differentiate event from act. If so, actwould become the means by which subjectivity relates to event. Žižek’s target is to use this concept to help develop an alternative to capitalism.KEYWORDSACT, EVENT, CAPITALISM, GHOST. (shrink)

Este estudio examina las conceptualizaciones de comunidad y acontecimiento en la obra de Jean-Luc Nancy, destacando cómo estos elementos permiten reinterpretar la libertad en términos de espacios de diferencia y ruptura. Nancy articula una noción de comunidad no como un ente homogéneo sino como un entrelazamiento de singularidades que emergen y existen a través de la fractura y la diferencia. A través del análisis textual y la comparativa con otros filósofos contemporáneos, este artículo ilustra cómo Nancy desplaza el foco desde (...) una ontología del ser hacia una ontología del ser-con, ofreciendo así nuevas vías para entender la política y la ética en nuestra era. Los hallazgos sugieren que la libertad, en el pensamiento de Nancy, se revela no como un atributo o estado, sino como un proceso dinámico de constante deconstrucción y relación con el otro. Este enfoque tiene implicaciones significativas para las teorías contemporáneas de la comunidad, desafiando las concepciones tradicionales de identidad y autonomía y reforzando la necesidad de un diálogo continuo en el espacio compartido de lo político. (shrink)

We present some techniques in c.c.c. forcing, and apply them to prove consistency results concerning the isomorphism and embeddability relations on the family of ℵ 1 -dense sets of real numbers. In this direction we continue the work of Baumgartner [2] who proved the axiom BA stating that every two ℵ 1 -dense subsets of R are isomorphic, is consistent. We e.g. prove Con). Let K H, be the set of order types of ℵ 1 -dense homogeneous subsets of R (...) with the relation of embeddability. We prove that for every finite model L, : Con iff L is a distributive lattice. We prove that it is consistent that the Magidor-Malitz language is not countably compact. We deal with the consistency of certain topological partition theorems. E.g. We prove that MA is consistent with the axiom OCA which says: “If X is a second countable space of power ℵ 1, and { U 0,\h.;, U n−1 } is a cover of D ▪ X x X -} x,x> ¦ x ϵ X } consisting of symmetric open sets, then X can be partitioned into { X i \brvbar; i ϵ ω } such that for every i ϵ ω there is l such that D ⊇ U l ”. We also prove that MA+OCA [xrArr] 2 ℵ 0 = ℵ 2. (shrink)

This article will cover the role of difference in the development of the concept of Ereignis. Despite Heidegger’s insistence on the supremacy identity has over difference, this piece will try and locate the persistent rumor that difference evokes in his works and its crystalization points in Ereignis, analyzing how Heidegger sometimes sees his very self living inside the disruption that difference implies.

En este artículo trato de desarrollar puntos de confluencia entre el pensamiento ontológico de Spinoza y su visión política, utilizando para ello ciertos aspectos de la ética, como la concepción del deseo. A pesar de las diversas interpretaciones al respecto y asumiendo la existencia de “varios Spinoza”, el que yo desarrollaré aquí será el de un pensador materialista con una fuerte tendencia hacia el inmanentismo, características que serán la base sobre la que se podrá sustentar en un paso posterior una (...) construcción política que busque la autonomía de un nuevo sujeto colectivo, la multitud. Quizás no sea del todo ineficaz en la época contemporánea tender puentes hacia autores con visiones políticas novedosas en su época, que lucharon contra la tendencia dominante de su tiempo, con el fin de comprobar si podemos aprender algo de ello para aplicarlo a nuestro momento histórico. (shrink)

Este trabajo iba a tratar sobre por qué el antropocentrismo es un problemairrelevante para las discusiones de bioética, y deberíamos prescindir de él.El argumento era que sostener una actitud antropocéntrica, tanto moderadacomo dura, tenía las mismas consecuencias a nivel práctico. Un antropocentristaapelará a la utilidad del medio ambiente y de las especies queen él habitan para la vida humana; y por ello sería importante que cuidaradel ecosistema para mantener dichos beneficios. Por otro lado un no-antropocentrista,apelará a que los animales y (...) el ecosistema cuentan con unasuerte de valor intrínseco y deberíamos cuidarlo apelando a dicho valor. Espor ello que las distinciones sólo podrían verse a un nivel teórico. (shrink)

Al principio este trabajo iba a tratar sobre por qué el antropocentrismo es un problema irrelevante para las discusiones de bioética y deberíamos prescindir de él. El argumento era que sostener una actitud antropocéntrica, tanto moderada como dura, tenía las mismas consecuencias a nivel práctico. Un antropocentrista apelará a la utilidad del medio ambiente y de las especies que en él habitan para la vida humana; y por ello sería importante que cuidara del ecosistema para mantener dichos beneficios. Por otro (...) lado, un no antropocentrista apelará a que los animales y el ecosistema cuentan con una suerte de valor intrínseco y deberíamos cuidarlos atendiendo a dicho valor. Es por ello que las distinciones sólo podrían verse a un nivel teórico. (shrink)

We show that the Abraham–Rubin–Shelah Open Coloring Axiom is consistent with a large continuum, in particular, consistent with [Formula: see text]. This answers one of the main open questions from [U. Abraham, M. Rubin and S. Shelah, On the consistency of some partition theorems for continuous colorings, and the structure of [Formula: see text]-dense real order types, Ann. Pure Appl. Logic 325(29) (1985) 123–206]. As in [U. Abraham, M. Rubin and S. Shelah, On the consistency of some (...) partition theorems for continuous colorings, and the structure of [Formula: see text]-dense real order types, Ann. Pure Appl. Logic 325(29) (1985) 123–206], we need to construct names for the so-called preassignments of colors in order to add the necessary homogeneous sets. However, the known constructions of preassignments (ours in particular) only work assuming the [Formula: see text]. In order to address this difficulty, we show how to construct such names with very strong symmetry conditions. This symmetry allows us to combine them in many different ways, using a new type of poset called a partition product. Partition products may be thought of as a restricted memory iteration with stringent isomorphism and coherent-overlap conditions on the memories. We finally construct, in [Formula: see text], the partition product which gives us a model of [Formula: see text] in which [Formula: see text]. (shrink)

What kind of thing is a reason for action? What is it to act for a reason? And what is the connection between acting for a reason and rationality? There is controversy about the many issues raised by these questions. In this paper I shall answer the first question with a conception of practical reasons that I call ‘Factualism’, which says that all reasons are facts. I defend this conception against its main rival, Psychologism, which says that practical reasons are (...) mental states or mental facts, and also against a variant of Factualism that says that some practical reasons are facts and others are false beliefs. I argue that the conception of practical reasons defended here provides plausible answers to the second and third questions above; and gives a more unified and satisfactory picture of practical reasons than those offered by its rivals. (shrink)

In this paper I propose a way of characterizing human agency in terms of the concept of a two‐way power. I outline this conception of agency, defend it against some objections, and briefly indicate how it relates to free agency and to moral praise‐ and blameworthiness.

In 1969 Harry Frankfurt published his hugely influential paper 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility' in which he claimed to present a counterexample to the so-called 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities' ('a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise'). The success of Frankfurt-style cases as counterexamples to the Principle has been much debated since. I present an objection to these cases that, in questioning their conceptual cogency, undercuts many of those debates. Such cases (...) all require a counterfactual mechanism that could cause an agent to perform an action that he cannot avoid performing. I argue that, given our concept of what it is for someone to act, this requirement is inconsistent. Frankfurt-style alleged counterexamples are cases where an agent is morally responsible for an action he performs even though, the claim goes, he could not have avoided performing that action. However, it has recently been argued, e.g. by John Fischer, that a counterexample to the Principle could be a 'Fischer-style case', i.e. a case where the agent can either perform the action or do nothing else. I argue that, although Fischer-style cases do not share the conceptual flaw common to all Frankfurt-style cases, they also fail as counterexamples to the Principle. The paper finishes with a brief discussion of the significance of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. (shrink)

Reasons can play a variety of roles in a variety of contexts. For instance, reasons can motivate and guide us in our actions (and omissions), in the sense that we often act in the light of reasons. And reasons can be grounds for beliefs, desires and emotions and can be used to evaluate, and sometimes to justify, all these. In addition, reasons are used in explanations: both in explanations of human actions, beliefs, desires, emotions, etc., and in explanations of a (...) wide range of phenomena involving all sorts of animate and inanimate substances. This diversity has encouraged the thought that the term 'reason' is ambiguous or has different senses in different contexts. Moreover, this view often goes hand in hand with the claim that reasons of these different kinds belong to different ontological categories: to facts (or something similar) in the case of normative/justifying reasons, and to mental states in the case of motivating/explanatory reasons. In this paper I shall explore some of the main roles that reasons play and, on that basis, I shall offer a classification of kinds of reasons. As will become clear, my classification of reasons is at odds with much of the literature in several respects: first, because of my views about how we should understand the claim that reasons are classified into different kinds; second, because of the kinds into which I think reasons should be classified; and, finally, because of the consequences I think this view has for the ontology of reasons. (shrink)

We discuss a dual of the Open Coloring Axiom introduced by Abraham et al. [U. Abraham, M. Rubin, S. Shelah, On the consistency of some partition theorems for continuous colorings, and the structure of 1-dense real order types, Ann. Pure Appl. Logic 29 123–206] and show that it follows from a statement about continuous colorings on Polish spaces that is known to be consistent. We mention some consequences of the new axiom and show that implies that all cardinal (...) invariants in Cichoń’s diagram are at least 2. (shrink)

After nearly sixty years, the influence of Peter Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’ remains strong in discussions of moral responsibility. However, as the paper has become more remote in time and in intellectual climate, some of those influences have turned into amplifications of ideas and claims that are misinterpretations or distortions of the paper, while other notions have been projected onto it. I try to make the case for this charge specifically in relation to what has become accepted as Strawson’s ‘response-dependent’ (...) theory of moral responsibility and to an allegedly problematic conception of blame said to be at the centre of that theory. Against that background, I comment on the current philosophical project to ‘civilize’ blame. (shrink)

The literature addressing bias and fairness in AI models (fair-AI) is growing at a fast pace, making it difficult for novel researchers and practitioners to have a bird’s-eye view picture of the field. In particular, many policy initiatives, standards, and best practices in fair-AI have been proposed for setting principles, procedures, and knowledge bases to guide and operationalize the management of bias and fairness. The first objective of this paper is to concisely survey the state-of-the-art of fair-AI methods and resources, (...) and the main policies on bias in AI, with the aim of providing such a bird’s-eye guidance for both researchers and practitioners. The second objective of the paper is to contribute to the policy advice and best practices state-of-the-art by leveraging from the results of the NoBIAS research project. We present and discuss a few relevant topics organized around the NoBIAS architecture, which is made up of a Legal Layer, focusing on the European Union context, and a Bias Management Layer, focusing on understanding, mitigating, and accounting for bias. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Three Ovidian Tails PAUL BAROLSKY Kneeling at the edge of a pond in push-up position, a beautiful nude boy crowned with flowers gazes down at the water in which he beholds his reflection. In love, he is enthralled. Thus, the image of Narcissus rendered by the Florentine painter Alessandro Allori in a work that has been largely overlooked until recently. Datable to the second half of the sixteenth century, (...) it now hangs in the Turkish Embassy in Washington, DC. In the distant background of the picture we behold Echo, who extends an arm upward seemingly in a gesture of despair, since she is rejected by Narcissus. She stands before a mass of rock, her left leg beginning to turn to stone, the very stone into which she vanishes as only her voice remains when she echoes her beloved. The painting abounds in Alessandro Allori, Narcissus. Photograph © Patricia Rubin. arion 26.3 winter 2019 closely observed passages such as the little fish in the pond, one of which has captured a worm. There are other notable details such as the crab on a rock in the foreground, or the clusters of pendulous, ripe grapes, fruit of Bacchus, to whom androgynous Narcissus is likened in Ovid’s Metamorphoses. Allori also employs poetic simile in his picture, since the fingers of the youth’s left hand rhyme with the finger-like roots that emerge from the water. These roots are magnified in turn by their reflected image on the water’s surface. 136 three ovidian tails Abraham Janssens, Nymph and Pan Among the Reeds. AKG / Museen Böttcherstra ße. The apex of the picture, we might say, is baby Cupid who, hovering above, aims his dart at Narcissus and thus arouses the boy’s desire. The shape of Cupid’s bow echoes that of Narcissus ’s prominent buttocks which are framed by the attractive, bright golden drapery fluttering prominently around the youth’s posterior. One might well say that Allori features the buttocks of Narcissus’s body most provocatively in a kind of butt which recalls that of Cupid in the famous Venus, Cupid, Folly, and Time painted by the artist’s teacher, Bronzino. What Allori pictures is not exactly what Ovid writes. It is, however, how Allori imagines the Narcissus of Ovid’s tale. Allori is not alone among Ovidian artists in focusing on the backside of the human body. The posterior is especially prominent in another mythological picture, this one from the early seventeenth century, executed by a disciple of Rubens, Abraham Janssens. This work has found its way to Bremen, where it is now housed in the Ludwig Roselius Museum. It illustrates Pan’s pursuit of Syrinx, who is metamorphosed into reeds in a story told by Mercury in order to put Argus asleep. Ovid is Janssens’s point of departure. The artist depicts the moment when a muscular Pan with a ruddy, almost leathery face embraces Syrinx in her new form as a bunch of reeds. Janssens departs from Ovid with a most novel invention. He depicts a woman, seen from behind, who dominates the composition. With sharp contrasts of lights and darks, vestiges of Caravaggio, the painter emphasizes the female’s imposingly broad backside, which is framed by a billowing, bright, attention-grabbing red drapery that she seems to hold across the front of her body. Could it be that Janssens here alludes to the backside of Syrinx as Pan would have seen it when he chased her? It would seem that we are given not only a view of Pan embracing reeds, we are simultaneously given a Pan’s-eye view of Syrinx’s prominent and provocative backside before her metamorphosis. I wish to consider one final example of the derrière in Ovidian art, this one prominent in a picture painted well Paul Barolsky 137 over a hundred years after Janssens worked: Louis-JeanFran çois Lagrenée’s Abduction of Deianira by the Centaur Nessus, a work which is now in the Louvre. In Ovid’s story, Hercules arrives with his bride Deianira at the shore of the river Evenus where she is abducted by Nessus, who flees only to have Hercules shoot him with... (shrink)

In this paper I consider whether it is possible to cause an event by letting it happen.

Wittgenstein's views on action and the will changed throughout his philosophical writings, although there are common themes to be found within this evolution. This chapter concerns his later views on action and the will, as expressed in remarks on these topics mainly in Philosophical Investigations. It explores some core themes in those remarks and examines how some of these were taken up and developed by Wittgenstein's student Elizabeth Anscombe, in her influential monograph Intention. Wittgenstein was concerned with offering a characterization (...) of the concepts of voluntary and intentional action that escaped certain familiar philosophical temptations. In the Investigations, Wittgenstein wrote: “When people talk about the possibility of foreknowledge of the future they always forget the fact of the prediction of one's own voluntary movements”. A common thread in their discussion is a conviction in “the uselessness of an introspective explanation of intention”, of the idea that an intention is “a particular feeling, an inner experience”. (shrink)

Desde la crítica feminista a John Rawls y la teoría del reconocimiento de Axel Honneth, se propone ampliar la noción liberal de justicia social para que las relaciones de amor y cuidado recuperen su papel vital. Se examina en qué medida y sentido la vida familiar constituye una esfera de justicia para mostrar cómo, además de la regulación externa, es necesaria una mirada valorativa de sus relaciones internas, sin olvidar que en la familia intervienen virtudes que exceden a la justicia.

It seems natural to think that there are aesthetic reasons for action and that an artist must be guided by such reasons as he or she begins work on the canvas or poem or symphony or marble. This latter supposition seems at odds, however, not only with classical inspiration theory but also with the views of one of the last century’s most important philosophers of art, R. G. Collingwood. We propose an account of acting for an aesthetic reason inspired by (...) G. E. M. Anscombe’s Intention, specifically by her concept of ‘practical knowledge’, which we believe can accommodate Collingwood’s reservations about the sort of knowledge of their ends, and of the means to those ends, which artists have as they engage in their creative activity. (shrink)

En la siguiente contribución buscamos explorar la lectura “furtiva” que hace Michel de Certeau de la noción de episteme de Michel Foucault en su relación con el acontecimiento, para pensar la revolución. A partir de su —a la vez— sintonía y distancia con dicha categoría, Certeau avanza y elabora la noción de “Formalidad de las prácticas” (Formalité des pratiques) que le permitirá una lectura más compleja y problematizada de la modernidad y de la secularización, que lo que le ofrecía Foucault (...) en _Les mots et les choses_. (shrink)

The negative impacts of agriculture on the environment and the inequity that limits access to healthy food for the entire population impede sustainable development. This article reflects contributions to food security and alternatives for transitioning to sustainable food systems. It is concluded that food, as a human right, is a complex and transdisciplinary issue, which must be integrated as a transversal axis in the economic, social, environmental, governance, and cultural dimensions to contribute to sustainable development and therefore the convenience of (...) making the transition from the concept of food security to that of food sustainability. (shrink)

Smart grids are designed to revolutionize the energy sector by creating a smarter, more efficient and reliable power supply network. The rise of smart grids is a response to the need for a more comprehensive and sophisticated energy system that caters to the needs of homes and businesses. Key features of smart grids include the integration of renewable energy sources, decentralized generation and advanced distribution networks. At the heart of smart grids is a sophisticated metering system, consisting of intelligent electronic (...) devices that measure energy consumption and enable two-way communication between the utility company and the consumer. The information exchanged via these devices is critical, as it includes sensitive data such as energy consumption patterns and billing information. With the rise of the Internet of Things (IoT) and Industry 4.0, the security of this information is of utmost importance. This paper delves into the security challenges faced by advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) and highlights the crucial role played by cryptography in ensuring the secure exchange of sensitive information. Cryptographic protocols such as encryption, authentication and digital signatures are essential components of a secure smart grid infrastructure. These protocols work together to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of the information exchanged between the utility company and the consumer. (shrink)

A number of recent writers have expressed scepticism about the viability of a specifically moral concept of obligation, and some of the considerations offered have been interesting and persuasive. This is a scepticism that has its roots in Nietzsche, even if he is mentioned only rather rarely in the debate. More proximately, the scepticism in question receives seminal expression in Elizabeth Anscombe's 1958 essay, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, a piece that is often paid lip-service to, but—like Nietzsche's work—has only rarely been (...) taken seriously by those wishing to defend the conception of obligation under attack. This is regrettable. Anscombe's essay is powerful and direct, and it makes a forthright case for the claim that, in the absence of a divine law conception of ethics, any specifically moral concept of obligation must be redundant, and that the best that can be hoped for in a secular age is some sort of neo-Aristotelianism. Anscombe is right about this, we think. And, among those who disagree, one of the very few to have taken her on at all explicitly is Christine Korsgaard, whose Kantianism of course commits her to the view that the concept of moral obligation is central, with or without God. Here, we try to show that Korsgaard loses the argument. (shrink)

En este artículo se emplea la epistemología del testimonio kantiana para analizar el concepto de _akrasia _epistémica (es decir, creer que p cuando se tienen motivos de orden epistémico para sostener que ¬p) en el caso de las teorías conspirativas. Se señala que las personas suelen mantener esa clase de discursos por motivos sociales (e.g. Pertenecer a un grupo que comparte esas ideas) antes que por una genuina incomprensión de la evidencia como tal, de modo que el problema es fundamentalmente (...) moral. Ante esto, se indica que la akrasia epistémica es primeramente una forma de akrasia moral que explica a través del autoengaño, en tanto que ningún agente moral quiere tenerse a sí mismo como malo. Por consiguiente, se puede afirmar que, desde el punto de vista de la audiencia, el sostener un testimonio que contenga teorías conspirativas en un asunto ético en principio, aunque con consecuencias epistémicas evidentes. _Palabras clave: akrasia epistémica, testimonio, teorías conspirativas, epistemología kantiana, autoengaño. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo se pretende reconstruir la noción de imaginación expuesta por Kant en la "Crítica de la razón pura", en su primera edición, y en la "Crítica del juicio" con el fin de poder dilucidar un posible papel de este concepto en el marco de la ética kantiana. -/- .

En este artículo se argumenta que el procedimentalismo epistémico de Estlund, en tanto que modelo democrático, requiere de disposiciones éticas mínimas que no son explicitadas en la propuesta. Para mostrar este punto, aborda la propuesta de Estlund desde la noción de modelo democrático de Macpherson. Con esto, se advierte que las disposiciones éticas mínimas que configurarían una base ética implícita en el procedimentalismo epistémico serían tres: una disposición frente al conocimiento que involucra el proceso; otra frente al procedimiento democrático mismo; (...) y, finalmente, una frente al reconocimiento de la legitimidad de los resultados. (shrink)

Sobre la sabiduría existe una extensa producción bibliográfica proveniente de la filosofía y la antropología. Recientemente, ha surgido un interés por develar los fenómenos psicológicos característicos de un agente que toma decisiones con sabiduría. Este artículo se inscribe en este interés desde una perspectiva pragmática y naturalista. La tesis que defiendo, en este contexto específico, es la siguiente: la sabiduría, como metaheurística moral que se expresa en la acción como un ethos reflexivo amplio, es una forma particular de saber cómo (...) o conocimiento tácito; en concreto, es un saber hacer de tercer orden que permite el reconocimiento de nuestra naturaleza tribal, que se expresa en el comportamiento moral, y una visión panorámica de las ecologías morales en juego para tomar al menos una decisión colectiva de forma satisfactoria. En síntesis, la sabiduría como saber hacer de tercer orden es un recurso de elección entre el posible conflicto de ecologías morales diversas. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Active Powers Active Powers, Human Agency, and Liberty Agent Causation and Volitionism Conclusion: Agent Causation References Further reading.

El presente artículo analiza la crítica de Axel Honneth a la distinción habermasiana entre sistema y mundo de la vida como una ficción teórica que acarrea un déficit explicativo de la dinámica social y una rebaja del propio enfoque comunicativo del autor. Se vincula esta crítica con la que han realizado otros teóricos y se valora su pertinencia a la luz de la réplica que el propio Habermas brindó. A partir de allí, se intenta mostrar cómo este distanciamiento de Honneth (...) habilita una nueva forma –aunque no explorada por el autor- de conceptualizar el carácter y rol de la sociedad civil.This article provides an analysis of Honneth’s objection to Habermas’s distinction between System and Lebenswelt. Honneth postulates it’s a theorical fiction that leads to misunderstand social dynamics and weakens his communicative perspective. Honneth’s objection is linked to other critical reviews of the distinction, and I conclude its relevance, also considering Habermas’s reply. From there, I try to show how Honneth objection opens a new way to think about civil society. (shrink)

For this open issue of the _Etikk i Praksis: Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics_, we put together a broad mix of different articles tackling current important issues in the field.

Background: Recent studies on public attitudes toward life extension technologies show a mix of ambivalence toward and support for extending the human lifespan. Attitudes toward genetic modification of organisms and technological enhancements may be used to categorize individuals according to political or ideological orientation such as technoprogressive or conservative and it could be easy to assume that these categories are related to more general categorizations related to culture, e.g. between Traditional and Secular-rational values in the World Values Survey. This paper (...) discusses how attitudes toward aspects of radical life extension may be related to cultural values as revealed in an online deliberative survey among university students conducted between January 2012 to January 2013. Survey results suggest that attitudes toward radical life extension tend to be mixed among groups categorized as Traditional, Secular-rational, Survivalist, and Self-expressionist. The study explored the relation between responses of 326 university students to 5 key questions on radical life extension and the cultural values they tend to favor as indicated by their response to 20 statements from the World Values Survey.Design and Method: The survey consisted of 3 stages: an online pre-discussion survey, face-to-face discussion, and post-discussion survey. After completing the 5 main survey questions in stage 1, participants were presented two additional questionnaires: one on cultural attitudes using 20 statements from the 2004-2008 World Values Survey and another on health attitudes with 12 statements from Dutta-Bergman’s 2004 study. In stage 2, participants were engaged in a face-to-face discussion in class focusing on their responses to the five key questions. After the discussion, they were invited to reconsider the choices and reasons they posted in stage 1 in the light of the face-to-face class discussion in stage 2.Results: Responses to the five survey questions showed that there tended to be more individuals across groups who disagreed with adopting technologies that radically extend the human lifespan beyond the current limit of 120 years. Attitudes toward radical life extension did not correspond to cultural attitudes indicated by responses to the WVS questions. The proportion of agreement/disagreement to statements presented in each of the five questions varied across cultural groups and there tended to be more individuals who disagreed with radical life extension in all groups. Changes in responses after the discussion stage were not significant and most respondents maintained their prior views.Discussion: Cultural attitudes associated with familiar technologies may not correspond with attitudes toward newer technologies since beliefs and values may need to be adapted to new imagined situations that the new technologies elicit. Moral understandings associated with familiar technological habits and beliefs are not necessarily carried over to new technologies. (shrink)

Young children, in general, appear to have a strong drive to explore the environment in ways that reveal its underlying causal structure. But are they really attuned specifically to casual information in this quest for understanding, or do they show equal interest in other types of non-obvious information about the world? To answer this question, we introduced 20 three-year-old children to two puppets who were anxious to tell the child about a set of novel artifacts and animals. One puppet consistently (...) described causal properties of the items while the other puppet consistently described carefully matched non-causal properties of the same items. After a familiarization period in which children learned which type of information to expect from each informant, children were given the opportunity to choose which they wanted to hear describe each of eight pictured test items. On average, children chose to hear from the informant that provided causal descriptions on 72% of the trials. This preference for causal information has important implications for explaining the role of conceptual information in supporting early learning and may suggest means for maximizing interest and motivation in young children. (shrink)

Our chapter interrogates the conditions that give rise to the possibility of the Event and proposes a Lacanian-Badiouian perspective to think through conditions for the truth procedures of love and politics. First, we situate the Event, Possibility and Truth in both Badiou and Lacan, which brings forward conceptual tensions between truth and knowledge as presented in the psychoanalytic act. We propose with Badiou and Lacan that the emergence of possibility follows a logic that rupture compulsive repetition and whose effect is (...) precisely the Event which results in knowledge of a savoir faire, of transmissible quality, that grant re-inscription (a new writing of the necessary) and/or a partial inscription of the impossible. The notion of love as beyond narcissism, allows us to discuss how to reimagine politics anew, including approaching it through the problem of ecology. (shrink)

In 1975, the death of dictator Francisco Franco opened the door to a turbulent period known as the “Spanish Transition.” In the wake of the 1973 oil crisis, national politics, political violence and social demands were interwoven with international shifts in science and technology and global debates on “energy transitions.” In close dialogue with foreign environmental groups, the anti-nuclear movement in Spain deployed a large repertoire of collective action; it ranged from pleasant activities to violent direct actions against nuclear technologies, (...) but also included the making of technological alternatives. Counter-culture activists and counter-experts opposed nuclear energy and promoted renewable energy as two sides of the same coin. This paper explores the pioneering (and networked) initiatives of an anarchist-oriented group called Self-Managed Radical Alternative Technologies, created in 1976, and a group of young engineers who founded the cooperative Ecotècnia, which was behind the construction of the first commercial wind turbine in Catalonia in 1984. The paper focuses on the transnational circulation of grassroots knowledge, the epistemics of resistance, and the development of wind energy technologies as “technologies of protest.” Technologies of protest illuminate how the social construction of technology is intertwined with what I call the “social destruction of technology.”. (shrink)

George Rupp's Beyond Existentialism and Zen, in its typological-structural analysis and model of religious pluralism, proffers an alternative to the dominant Kantian models (e.g., by John Hicks and Sarvepalli Radhakrish nan). The question for Rupp is not which religion is true and how to decide that issue-answered in the Kantian approach in terms of an unknowable Ding an sich that all religions, albeit imperfectly, try to approximate or conceptualize (i.e., God or the Transcendent)-but rather how do religions represent, at least (...) in principle, a structural possibility for salvation or human flourishing, however different and incompatible their distinct prima facie truth claims might be. Although the potential for a radically relativistic model is implicit in Rupp's approach, it is argued here that his Hegelian assumptions lead him to accept relativism only in a provisional ("critical") way; for Rupp, under ideal epistemic conditions (e.g., the Peircian "end of inquiry"), one final conceptualization of ultimate reality will emerge as absolute truth. In the final part of this essay a version of the relativistic model implicit in Rupp's approach is defended against both the Kantian model of Hicks et al. and Rupp's Hegelian-Peircian model, which, it is argued, is incompatible certainly with the spirit of his own typological-structural analysis, if not with the letter. In challenging what Rupp calls the truth of Zen, it is further argued that not only is more than one salvific structural possibility available to us through the different world religions but also that realizing these possibilities is principally a human responsibility, and that the cosmos is quite indifferent to and compatible with several possibilities, from the most destructive to the most conducive to human well being and flourishing. (shrink)

El Problema de la Adopción afirma que ciertas leyes lógicas no pueden ser adoptadas. El argumento constituye un desafío al antiexcepcionalismo lógico, en la medida en que este último debe poder justificar su afirmación de que la teoría lógica en ejercicio puede revisarse. El propósito de este artículo es responder al desafío, utilizando como unidad de análisis el concepto de Taxonomía Lexical propuesto por Kuhn. Como mostraremos, una visión sociológicamente enriquecida de las teorías científicas y la naturaleza de sus cambios (...) permite dar cuenta de un antiexcepcionalismo lógico que evita el Problema de la Adopción. (shrink)

This article tries to unravel some of the main clues provided by Ortega on his understanding of philosophy. The thesis we defend is that the Spanish philosopher maintains two slightly different answers concerning the question what is philosophy, though Ortega does not acknowledge them in the explicit narrative of his thinking. This, we believe, creates tensions in his late second philosophical model, as he does not fully break away from certain “adherence” or “mannerisms” associated to his early model. In this (...) respect, Ortega would be a thinker who lives between two philosophical worlds, someone who sees, narrates and interprets the philosophical shock wave occurring at his time, but does not quite let go of the old intellectual constructions. To support our thesis, we will compare two texts, his 1929 lectures What is Philosophy?, and his Notes on Thinking, from 1941. In the period between these two works, Ortega seems to move from a more “traditional,” “universalistic,” “transcendental,” in short, Husserlian phenomenological understanding of philosophy, to a more historicist, hermeneutical, and pragmatic one, which lays the emphasis on the plurality of discourses on the sense, the contingency of the philosophical narrative itself, and even the very possibility of its ending, at least in its more “metaphysical” and classical form. (shrink)