Perhaps the topic of acceptable risk never had a sexier and more succinct introduction than the one Edward Norton, playing an automobile company executive, gave it in Fight Club: “Take the number of vehicles in the field (A), multiply it by the probable rate of failure (B), and multiply the result by the average out of court settlement (C). A*B*C=X. If X is less than the cost of the recall, we don’t do one.” Of course, this dystopic scene (...) also gets to the heart of the issue in another way: acceptable risk deals with mathematical calculations about the value of life, injury, and emotional wreckage, making calculation a difficult matter ethically, politically, and economically. This entry will explore the history of this idea, focusing on its development alongside statistics into its wide importance today. (shrink)

Objectives To evaluate whether the requirement of “minimal risk and burden” for paediatric research without direct benefit to the subjects compromises the ability to obtain data necessary for improving paediatric care. To provide evidence-based reflections on the EU recommendation that allows for a higher level of risk. Design and setting Systematic analysis of the approval/rejection decisions made by the Dutch Central Committee on Research involving Human Subjects (CCMO). Review methods The analysis included 165 proposals for paediatric research without (...) direct benefit that were reviewed by the CCMO between January, 2000, and July, 2007. A separate, in-depth analysis of all drug studies included 18 early phase drug studies and nine other drug studies without direct benefit. Results 11 out of 165 studies were definitively rejected because the CCMO did not regard the risk and/or burden to be minimal. In three of these 11 cases (including two early phase drug studies) the requirement of minimal risk and burden was cited as the only reason for rejection. Four other early phase drug studies also involved risks and/or burdens that were not regarded to be minimal but were nevertheless approved. Conclusions The requirement of minimal risk and burden, aiming to protect research subjects, occasionally leads to rejection of protocols. Early phase drug studies relatively often do not comply with the requirement. Committees may find ways to approve important studies that formally should be rejected, but that is not a desirable solution. The regulatory framework should be revised to make such occasional exceptions to the requirement legitimate and transparent. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to propose an alternative account by which the ethical threshold of acceptable risk in paediatric research can be assessed. Three popular interpretations of the minimal risk threshold and the problems they raise when applied in the research context are presented. First, the “risks of daily life” standard and the “routine examinations” standard are addressed. It is argued here that neither of them can provide a satisfactory morally justified framework within which risks (...) during paediatric non-therapeutic research should be assessed. The alternative view of the “charitable participation” standard is then discussed and the argument advanced that despite its advantages, it generates unavoidable difficulties when considered in the context of medical research. Finally, the author argues that consideration of the risk to which parents are willing to expose their children in a vaccination programme in the case of an infectious disease, which does not constitute a significant threat to them, can facilitate the definition of this threshold. Although the proposed account shares some of its strong points with those already existing, it does not lead to inconsistencies when applied in research context. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a Capabilities -based Approach to the acceptability and the tolerability of risks posed by natural and man-made hazards. We argue that judgments about the acceptability and/or tolerability of such risks should be based on an evaluation of the likely societal impact of potential hazards, defined in terms of the expected changes in the capabilities of individuals. Capabilities refer to the functionings, or valuable doings and beings, individuals are able to achieve given available personal, material, and (...) social resources. The likely impact of a hazard on individuals’ capabilities should, we argue, be compared against two separate thresholds. The first threshold specifies the minimum level of capabilities attainment that is acceptable in principle for individuals to have in the aftermath of a hazard over any period of time. This threshold captures the level that individuals’ capabilities ideally should not fall below. A risk is acceptable if the probability that the attained capabilities will be less than the acceptable level is sufficiently small. In practice, it can be tolerable for some individuals to temporarily fall below the acceptable threshold, provided this situation of lower capabilities attainment is temporary, reversible, and the probability that capabilities will fall below a tolerability threshold is sufficiently small. This second, tolerable threshold delimits an absolute minimum level of capabilities attainment below which no individual in a society should ever fall, regardless of whether that level of capabilities attainment is temporary or reversible. In this paper, we describe and justify this Capabilities -based Approach to the acceptability and tolerability of risks. We argue that the proposed theoretical framework avoids the limitations in current approaches to acceptable risk. The proposed approach focuses the attention of risk analysts directly on what should be our primary concern when judging the acceptability and the tolerability of risks, namely, how risks impact the well-being of individuals in a society. Also, our Capabilities -based Approach offers a transparent, easily communicable way for determining the acceptability and the tolerability of risks. (shrink)

Background: Thrombolytic drugs to treat an acute ischaemic stroke reduce the risk of death or major disability. The treatment is, however, also associated with an increased risk of potentially fatal intracranial bleeding. This confronts the patient with the dilemma of whether or not to take a risk of a serious side effect in order to increase the likelihood of a favourable outcome. Objective: To explore acute stroke patients’ perception of risk and willingness to accept risks associated (...) with thrombolytic drug treatment. Design: Eleven patients who had been informed about thrombolytic drug treatment and had been through the process of deciding whether or not to participate in a thrombolytic drug trial went through repeated qualitative, semistructured interviews. Results: Many patients showed a limited perception of the risks connected with thrombolytic drug treatment. Some perceived the risk as not relevant to them and were reluctant to accept that treatment could cause harm. Others seemed to be aware that treatment would mean exposure to risk. The patients’ willingness to take a risk also varied substantially. Several statements revealed ambiguity and confusion about being involved in a decision about treatment. The patients’ reasoning about risk was put into the context of their health-related experiences and life histories. Several patients wanted the doctor to be responsible for the decisions. Conclusion: Acute stroke patients’ difficulties in perceiving and processing information about risk may reduce their ability to be involved in clinical decisions where risks are involved. (shrink)

The primary aim of this article is to develop and defend a conceptual analysis of safety. The article begins by considering two previous analyses of safety in terms of risk acceptability. It is argued that these analyses fail because the notion of risk acceptability is more subjective than safety, as risk acceptability takes into account potential benefits in a way that safety does not. A distinction is then made between two different kinds of safety—safety qua cause and (...) safety qua recipient—and both are defined in terms of the probability of a loss of value, though the relationship between safety and the probability of loss varies in each case. It is then shown that although this analysis is less subjective than the previously considered analyses, subjectivity can still enter into judgments of safety via the notions of probability and value. In the final section of this article, it is argued that the difference between safety and risk acceptability is important because it corresponds in significant ways to the difference between consequentialist and deontological moral viewpoints. (shrink)

The argument from inductive risk attempts to show that practical and ethical costs of errors should influence standards of evidence for accepting scientific claims. A common objection charges that this argument presupposes a behavioral theory of acceptance that is inappropriate for science. I respond by showing that the argument from inductive risk is supported by a nonbehavioral theory of acceptance developed by Cohen, which defines acceptance in terms of premising. Moreover, I argue that theories designed to explain how (...) acceptance can be guided exclusively by epistemic values suffer from difficulties that do not afflict Cohen’s theory. (shrink)

The global public health threat posed by infectious disease is well recognised. The obligation to treat whilst exposed to risk, and its limits, is debated with each novel serious and communicable pathogen. Within national jurisdictions, different responses are forthcoming. Some, like France in 2009, give government the power to require healthcare staff to work, and even to requisition staff, including retired professionals. Others rely on notions of solidarity and professional duty, with scope for individual discretion. Our research with staff (...) in the West Midlands in 2008/2009– including non-professionals – suggested a strong correlation between feeling a duty to work and willingness to work during a pandemic. This was more influential than removing other barriers to working. Medical military personnel can already be ordered into risky situations. Our research in 2015/16 with those who worked in the Ebola treatment unit in Sierra Leone suggested that their concerns about risk were complex: the perceived magnitude of the risk was only one factor, even though tolerance was high. The type of risk and circumstances requiring that risk to be taken were also influential.Against this background, it will be argued, with caveats, that:military medical personnel should be willing to accept greater risk than civilian medical staff;and that to maintain national health services during a communicable disease emergency:civilian medical staff ought to accept greater risks than they currently appear willing to tolerate;conscription – from civilian or military populations – is permissible, even though it may elevate personal risk. (shrink)

Examining those risk and benefit perceptions utilised in the formation of attitudes and opinions about emerging technologies such as nanotechnology can be useful for both industry and policy makers involved in their development, implementation and regulation. A broad range of different socio-psychological and affective factors may influence consumer responses to different applications of nanotechnology, including ethical concerns. A useful approach to identifying relevant consumer concerns and innovation priorities is to develop predictive constructs which can be used to differentiate applications (...) of nanotechnology in a way which is meaningful to consumers. This requires elicitation of attitudinal constructs from consumers, rather than measuring attitudes assumed to be important by the researcher. Psychological factors influencing societal responses to 15 applications of nanotechnology drawn from different application areas were identified using repertory grid method in conjunction with generalised Procrustes analysis. The results suggested that people differentiate nanotechnology applications based on the extent to which they perceive them to be beneficial, useful, necessary and important. The benefits may be offset by perceived risks focusing on fear and ethical concerns. Compared to an earlier expert study on societal acceptance of nanotechnology, consumers emphasised ethical issues compared to experts but had less concern regarding potential physical contact with the product and time to market introduction. Consumers envisaged fewer issues with several applications compared to experts, in particular food applications. (shrink)

Discussions of science and values in risk management have largely focused on how values enter into arguments about risks, that is, issues of acceptable risk. Instead this volume concentrates on how values enter into collecting, interpreting, communicating, and evaluating the evidence of risks, that is, issues of the acceptability of evidence of risk. By focusing on acceptable evidence, this volume avoids two barriers to progress. One barrier assumes that evidence of risk is largely a (...) matter of objective scientific data and therefore uncontroversial. The other assumes that evidence of risk, being "just" a matter of values, is not amenable to reasoned critique. Denying both extremes, this volume argues for a more constructive conclusion: understanding the interrelations of scientific and value issues enables a critical scrutiny of risk assessments and better public deliberation about social choices. The contributors, distinguished philosophers, policy analysts, and natural and social scientists, analyze environmental and medical controversies, and assumptions underlying views about risk assessment and the scientific and statistical models used in risk management. (shrink)

Beginning in the nineteenth century, social statistics inspired a vision of society as a population characterized by a certain distribution of risks. The introduction of the risk paradigm has deep implications for central concepts in Christian social ethics like distributive justice, with this vision leading to a new concept of distributive justice as the equal distribution of risk. This essay describes tensions that arise due to the risk paradigm in relation to distributive justice: risks can always be (...) further reduced, risk mitigation creates other risks, and there is no inherent rule of justice for balancing risks. While recognition of shared risk can create social cohesion, it also leads to interest groups struggling over which risks to confront. The essay illustrates these problems with two examples from health care: preventive health programs that manage disease risk through medication, and debates over school closures in respond to the Covid pandemic. Christian bioethics, as it wrestles with issues of justice, must address the problems created by the risk paradigm. (shrink)

Public acceptance is often seen as a key reason why water-recycling technology is rejected. A common assumption is that projects fail because the general public is unable to comprehend specialist information about risk and the belief that if the public were better informed, they would accept change more readily. This article suggests that rhetoric about acceptance is counterproductive in progressing sustainability as it does not address issues relating to institutional arrangements and reinforces a dichotomy between expert and lay groups. (...) Instead, it is argued that institutional change is needed to build opportunities for constructive public engagement. The failure to implement sustainable water use through recycling can be understood as the result of several factors including present cost structures for water, institutional conservatism, administrative fragmentation, and inadequate involvement of communities in planning. Achieving sustainable water use through recycling may require better coordination between agencies and integrated government policies. (shrink)

Mainstream moral theories deal with situations in which the outcome of each possible action is well-determined and knowable. In order to make ethics relevant for problems of risk and uncertainty, moral theories have to be extended so that they cover actions whose outcomes are not determinable beforehand. One approach to this extension problem is to develop methods for appraising probabilistic combinations of outcomes. This approach is investigated and shown not to solve the problem. An alternative approach is then developed. (...) Its starting-point is that everyone has a prima facie moral right not to be exposed to risk. However, this right can be overridden if the risk-exposure is part of an equitable system for risk-taking that works to the advantage of the individual risk-exposed person. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a Capabilities-based Approach to the acceptability and the tolerability of risks posed by natural and man-made hazards. We argue that judgments about the acceptability and/or tolerability of such risks should be based on an evaluation of the likely societal impact of potential hazards, defined in terms of the expected changes in the capabilities of individuals. Capabilities refer to the functionings, or valuable doings and beings, individuals are able to achieve given available personal, material, and social (...) resources. The likely impact of a hazard on individuals’ capabilities should, we argue, be compared against two separate thresholds. The first threshold specifies the minimum level of capabilities attainment that is acceptable in principle for individuals to have in the aftermath of a hazard over any period of time. This threshold captures the level that individuals’ capabilities ideally should not fall below. A risk is acceptable if the probability that the attained capabilities will be less than the acceptable level is sufficiently small. In practice, it can be tolerable for some individuals to temporarily fall below the acceptable threshold, provided this situation of lower capabilities attainment is temporary, reversible, and the probability that capabilities will fall below a tolerability threshold is sufficiently small. This second, tolerable threshold delimits an absolute minimum level of capabilities attainment below which no individual in a society should ever fall, regardless of whether that level of capabilities attainment is temporary or reversible. In this paper, we describe and justify this Capabilitiesbased Approach to the acceptability and tolerability of risks. We argue that the proposed theoretical framework avoids the limitations in current approaches to.. (shrink)

BackgroundThere is ambiguity with regard to what counts as an acceptable level of risk in clinical research in pregnant women and there is no input from stakeholders relative to such research risks. The aim of our paper was to explore what stakeholders who are actively involved in the conduct of clinical research in pregnant women deem an acceptable level of risk for pregnant women in clinical research. Accordingly, we used the APOSTEL VI study, a low-risk (...) obstetrical randomised controlled trial, as a case-study.MethodsWe conducted a prospective qualitative study using 35 in-depth semi-structured interviews and one focus group. We interviewed healthcare professionals, Research Ethics Committee members and regulators who are actively involved in the conduct of clinical research in pregnant women, in addition to pregnant women recruited for the APOSTEL VI case-study in the Netherlands.ResultsThree themes characterise the way stakeholders view risks in clinical research in pregnant women in general. Additionally, one theme characterises the way healthcare professionals and pregnant women view risks with respect to the case-study specifically. First, ideas on what constitutes an acceptable level of risk in general ranged from a preference for zero risk for the foetus up to minimal risk. Second, the desirability of clinical research in pregnant women in general was questioned altogether. Third, stakeholders proposed to establish an upper limit of risk in potentially beneficial clinical research in pregnant women in order to protect the foetus and the pregnant woman from harm. Fourth and finally, the case-study illustrates that healthcare professionals’ individual perception of risk may influence recruitment.ConclusionsHealthcare professionals, RECs, regulators and pregnant women are all risk adverse in practice, possibly explaining the continuing underrepresentation of pregnant women in clinical research. Determining the acceptable levels of risk on a universal level alone is insufficient, because the individual perception of risk also influences behaviour towards pregnant women in clinical research. Therefore, bioethicists and researchers might be interested in changing the perception of risk, which could be achieved by education and awareness about the actual benefits and harms of inclusion and exclusion of pregnant women. (shrink)

Existing ethical frameworks for public health provide insufficient guidance on how to evaluate the risks of public health programs that compromise the best clinical interests of present patients for the benefit of others. Given the relevant similarity of such programs to clinical research, we suggest that insights from the long‐standing debate about acceptable risk in clinical research can helpfully inform and guide the evaluation of risks posed by public health programs that compromise patients’ best clinical interests. We discuss (...) how lessons learned regarding the ethics of risk in one context can be fruitfully transferred to the other, using the example of a so‐called ‘rational antibiotic use’ guideline that limits antimicrobial prescribing in order to curb antimicrobial resistance. (shrink)

Parfit advertised the priority view as a new and fundamental theory in the ethics of distribution. He never discusses risk, and many writers follow suit when discussing the priority view. This article formalizes two popular arguments for a commonly accepted risk-free definition of the priority view. One is based on a direct attempt to define the priority view, the other is based on a contrast with utilitarianism and egalitarianism. But neither argument succeeds, and more generally, it is not (...) possible to make sense of the priority view in a risk-free framework. The article pays particular attention to the proper role of evaluative measurements in theorizing about the ethics of distribution. Despite appearances, approaching the priority view in terms of risk from the outset is argued to be quite natural. (shrink)

Risk management of nanotechnology is challenged by the enormous uncertainties about the risks, benefits, properties, and future direction of nanotechnology applications. Because of these uncertainties, traditional risk management principles such as acceptable risk, cost–benefit analysis, and feasibility are unworkable, as is the newest risk management principle, the precautionary principle. Yet, simply waiting for these uncertainties to be resolved before undertaking risk management efforts would not be prudent, in part because of the growing public concerns (...) about nanotechnology driven by risk perception heuristics such as affect and availability. A more reflexive, incremental, and cooperative risk management approach is required, which not only will help manage emerging risks from nanotechnology applications, but will also create a new risk management model for managing future emerging technologies. (shrink)

Objectives To investigate risk perception relating to living kidney donation, to compare the risk donors would accept with current practice and identify influential factors. Design An observational study consisting of questionnaires completed by previous living donors and the general public. Participants selected the risk they would accept from a list of options, in various scenarios. Risk communication was investigated by randomly dividing the sample and presenting risk differently. Setting Primary care (two centres) and secondary care (...) (one centre), London. Participants 175 questionnaires were sent to patients who had previously undergone living-donor nephrectomy and to members of the public consulting a general practitioner. The living-donor sample comprised 77 consecutive donors at Guy's Hospital from May 2003 to January 2005. The general-public sample was recruited from two London healthcare centres. Of the eventual 151 participants, 61 were living donors and 90 were from the general public. Main outcome measure The amount of risk a participant would accept to donate a kidney. Results 74% of participants were willing to accept a risk of death higher than 1/3000. The most commonly accepted risk was 1/2 (29%). Those presented with a ‘chance of survival’ accepted higher risks than those presented with a ‘risk of death’ (p<0.01). Greater risks were accepted when the recipient was closely related and, for some, when the recipient's prognosis was worse. No difference was observed between the living-donor and general-public groups. Conclusions Kidney donors will accept a higher risk of death than is currently quoted, especially if risks are presented in terms of chance of survival. (shrink)

When is it morally acceptable to expose others to risk? Most moral philosophers have had very little to say in answer to that question, but here is a moral philosopher who puts it at the centre of his investigations.

Hainan, is the only free trade port that also exudes quintessence of the culture of China. Tourism is one of Hainan's most lucrative industries. On the one hand, the regional economy is flourishing and on the other hand, the economy is facing unprecedented impacts from the COVID-19 pandemic. In response to the affected global market environment, this study investigates Hainan residents' acceptance intentions, or tolerance, of tourists. Here, based on the theory of reasoned action, which includes “subjective norm” combined with (...) “trust,” “perceived risk,” and “perceived value.” Using “resident attitude” as a mediator, theoretical research frameworks were developed. A total of 447 valid responses were collected using online and paper-copy questionnaires distributed to Hainan residents from 15 July 2021 to 10 November 2021. The data from the questionnaires were used for three analyses namely, descriptive statistical analysis, measurement model verification, and structural equation modeling analysis. Findings show a positive effect of trust on residents' attitudes in Hainan; perceived value and subjective norm showed a positive effect on resident acceptance intentions for tourism; the perceived risk of residents showed a more negative effect on attitudes toward tourists, but the influence was small. Finally, through the results of the study, theoretical and practical implications in a post-pandemic era are discussed. (shrink)

Only ten to twelve percent of Americans would voluntarily live within a mile of a nuclear plant or hazardous waste facility. But industry spokespersons claim that such risk aversion represents ignorance and paranoia, and they lament that citizen protests have delayed valuable projects and increased their costs. Who is right? In _Risk and Rationality_, Kristin Shrader-Frechette argues that neither charges of irresponsible endangerment nor countercharges of scientific illiteracy frame the issues properly. She examines the debate over methodological norms for (...) risk evaluation and finds analysts arrayed in a spectrum. Points of view extend from cultural relativists who believe that any risk can be justified to naive positivists who believe that risk evaluation can be objective, neutral, and value free. Both camps, she argues, are wrong, because risk evaluation as a social process is rational and objective, even though all risk-evaluation rules are value-laden. Shrader-Frechette defends a middle position called "scientific proceduralism." She shows why extremist views are unreliable, reveals misconceptions underlying current risk-evaluation methods and strategies, and sketches the reforms needed to set hazard assessment and risk evaluation on a publicly defensible foundation. These reforms involve mathematical, economic, ethical, and legal procedures. They constitute a new paradigm for assessment when acceptance of public hazards is rational, recognizing that laypersons are often more rational in their evaluation of societal risks than either experts or governments have acknowledged. Such reforms would provide citizens with more influence in risk decisions and focus on mediating ethical conflicts, rather than seeking to impose the will of experts. Science, she argues, need not preclude democracy. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence technology has been widely applied in many fields. AI-assisted learning environments have been implemented in classrooms to facilitate the innovation of pedagogical models. However, college students' willingness to accept AI-assisted learning environments has been ignored. Exploring the factors that influence college students' willingness to use AI can promote AI technology application in higher education. Based on the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology and the theory of perceived risk, this study identified six factors that influence (...) students' willingness to use AI to analyze their relationships with WTA AI-assisted learning environments. A model including six hypotheses was constructed to test the factors affecting students' WTA. The results indicated that college students showed “weak rejection” of the construction of AI-assisted learning environments. Effort expectancy, performance expectancy, and social influence were all positively related to college students' WTA AI-assisted learning environments. Psychological risk significantly negatively influenced students' WTA. The findings of this study will be helpful for carrying out risk communication, which can promote the construction of AI-assisted learning environments. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to examine the factors influencing ethical business decision-making on environmental issues, among employees of SMEs. To do so, a survey study was performed with 394 top managers of SMEs in the UAE using a questionnaire, and the data was statistically evaluated using SmartPLS 3.0. The results suggest that prior technology use has significant positive relationships with ethical decision-making and the level of risk acceptance. Furthermore, perceived competitive pressure has significant positive relationships with ethical (...) decision-making and confidence level. In comparison, the level of risk acceptance and confidence level have significant positive relationships with ethical decision-making. Results also demonstrate that the level of risk acceptance mediates the relationship between prior technology use and ethical decision-making. There is also a significant and positive association between perceived competitive pressure and ethical decision-making with a mediating impact of the confidence level. (shrink)

Social decision-making involving risks ideally results in obligations to avoid expected harms or keep them within acceptable limits. Ambitious goals aimed at avoiding or greatly reducing risks might not be feasible, forcing the acceptance of higher degrees of risk (i.e. unrealistic levels of risk reduction are revised to comport with beliefs regarding abilities). In this paper, the philosophical princi- ple ‘ought implies can’ is applied to the management of complex risks, exempli- fied by the risks associated with (...) climate change. In its common interpretation, the principle states that we cannot expect an agent to perform something that lies beyond his or her abilities. However, it is here argued that this principle requires setting thresholds for legitimate claims of inabilities that justify the waiving of normative demands. This paper discuss three claims: (1) that caution is required before revising a risk-reducing goal that is perhaps exceedingly ambitious; (2) that claims on abilities are not only descriptive, but also value-laden; and (3) that the function of a goal has to be clarified before risk-reducing goals are revised. Risk-reducing goals that initially seem unrealistic arguably serve performance- enhancing purposes in risk management. Neglecting such goals could lead to choosing less desirable, but certainly feasible, risk-reducing goals. (shrink)

One of the key ethical requirements for biomedical research is that it have an acceptable risk-benefit profile (Emanuel, Wendler, and Grady 2000). The International Conference of Harmonization guidelines mandate that clinical trials should be initiated and continued only if “the anticipated benefits justify the risks” (1996). Guidelines from the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences state that biomedical research is acceptable only if the “potential benefits and risks are reasonably balanced” (2002). U.S. federal regulations require that (...) the “risks to subjects” be “reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects and the importance of the knowledge” to be gained from the .. (shrink)

In this paper I present my reflections on the ethics of science as described by Merton and as actually practiced by scientists and technologists. This ethics was the subject of Kuipers' paper "'Default norms' in Research Ethics" (Kuipers 2001). There is an implicit assumption in this ethics, notably in Merton's norm of communism, that knowledge is always, or unconditionally good, and hence that scientific research, and the dissemination of its results, is unconditionally good. I will give here reasons why scientists (...) are not permitted to proceed, as they actually do, on the basis of this assumption. There is no factual or other binding justification for this assumption, and the activities it gives rise to frequently conflict with the broadly accepted ethical principle of restricted liberty. A recent discussion on the risks and hazards of science and on the issue of relinquishment is presented. What is shown in this paper is that the scientists and technologists participating in this discussion frequently violate core values of science relating to logical and empirical scrutiny and systematic criticism, as mentioned in Merton's norms of universalism, organized skepticism, and disinterestedness. It is concluded that, in order to live up to these values and in order to operate in agreement with broader ethical principles, science should stimulate open and critical discussion on the hazards and negative effects of science and technology, and on the present failure on the part of law and politics to control those hazards and negative effects. Science should also take the possibility of relinquishing certain themes of research seriously as long as such flaws in the systems of law and political decision-making persist. (shrink)

Cryptocurrency could redefine the interplay of Internet-connected world markets by eliminating constraints set by traditional local currencies and exchange rates. It has the potential to revolutionise digital markets through the use of duty-free trading. This study investigates the factors which influence the behavioural intention to use cryptocurrency based on the Technology Acceptance Model 3 (TAM 3) during the COVID-19 (SARS-COV-2) pandemic. Data were collected through a cross-sectional questionnaire from 357 Pakistani business-educated adults, including investors who had a rudimentary understanding of (...) the technology and financial instruments. Partial least square (PLS)-based structural equation modeling (SEM) was used to test the developed theoretical framework based on the Technology acceptance model 3. The PLS model has explained 72.1% of what constitutes the behavioural intention to use cryptocurrency. Surprisingly, risk was not a major consideration. This might be due to the fact that the majority of respondents thought working with cryptocurrency was hazardous. Willingness to handle cryptocurrency risk, on the other hand, might be a stumbling block to acceptance. The most essential aspect of a cryptocurrency's success was the perceived usefulness. Moreover, the moderating role of experience was not substantiated in this study. However, perceived usefulness was identified as a partial mediator of subjective norm and the perceived ease to use. This study contributed to the literature through the application of TAM 3 (an extension of the technology acceptance models) to investigate the fundamental qualities a cryptocurrency should have in order to influence investor's behavioural intention to use it. These findings provide revolutionary insights for the present and future market players for investment planning and for improved cryptocurrencies development. (shrink)

Figner, Mackinlay, Wilkening, and Weber (2009) developed the Columbia Card Task (CCT) to measure risk-taking attitudes. This tool consists of two versions: in the COLD version the decision maker needs to state in advance how many cards (out of 32) they want to turn over (so called static risk taking), in the HOT version they have the possibility of turning over all 32 cards one-by-one until they decide to finish (dynamic risk taking). We argue that the HOT (...) version confounds an individual’s willingness to accept risk with their beliefs in trend continuation vs. trend reversal in a prognostic task. In two experimental studies we show that people believing in trend continuation (momentum subjects) turn over more cards than those believing in trend reversal (contrarians) in the HOT version of the task. However, this is not the case in the COLD version. Thus, we provide evidence that, when considered as a dynamic risk propensity measure, the number of turned over cards in the HOT version of the CCT is a contaminated measure and reflects two phenomena: (1) risk preference and (2) the decision-maker’s belief in trend continuation. We speculate that other dynamic risk taking measures can also be biased by a momentum strategy. (shrink)

Dual-track assessment directs research ethics committees to assess the risks of research interventions based on the unclear distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic interventions. The net risks test, in contrast, relies on the clinically familiar method of assessing the risks and benefits of interventions in comparison to the available alternatives and also focuses attention of the RECs on the central challenge of protecting research participants.Research guidelines around the world recognise that clinical research is ethical only when the risks to participants are (...) reasonable.1 Appropriate implementation of this requirement is vital to protecting research participants and allowing research to proceed when it poses acceptable risks. Unfortunately, as the US National Bioethics Advisory Commission notes: “current regulations do not further elaborate how risks and potential benefits are to be assessed, and little additional guidance is available to IRBs.”1The NBAC, as well as numerous commentators, recommend that research ethics committees , ethics review committees and institutional review boards should adopt what may be called dual-track risk assessment.2–5 Yet, dual-track assessment unnecessarily divides research interventions into two different categories before assessing their risks and relies on the unclear distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic interventions. As a result, dual-track assessment provides RECs with confusing guidance and has the potential to block valuable research that poses acceptable risks. This paper describes one alternative, the net risks test, and argues that this approach offers a better method for assessing research risks, one that puts RECs in a position to protect participants without blocking appropriate research studies.BACKGROUNDClinical research exposes participants to interventions and procedures to gather systematic data that may be used to improve overall health and well-being. To ensure that research is ethical, RECs must ensure that the risks and burdens to participants are not excessive and that …. (shrink)

IntroductionGratitude is commonly known as a positive emotion, but it can also be understood as a disposition—one’s inherent quality that includes being grateful for the positive aspects of one’s life and appreciating altruistic gifts. A growing body of research suggests that having a disposition of gratitude is positively related to wellbeing and psychological adjustment. The present study examined the extent to which acceptance of illness—a measure of adjustment to a distressing condition—mediated relationships between dispositional gratitude and wellbeing among women who (...) had elevated levels of depressive symptoms.MethodsParticipants were 131 women who, based on scores on the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression scale, were at-risk for experiencing clinical depression. Thirty-five of these participants had been diagnosed as depressed at some point in their lives and 96 had not. Participants completed measures of dispositional gratitude, wellbeing, anxiety, and acceptance of illness.ResultsDispositional gratitude was positively correlated with wellbeing and was negatively correlated with depression and anxiety. Dispositional gratitude was also positively correlated with acceptance of illness. Mediational analyses found that acceptance of illness mediated relationships between dispositional gratitude and wellbeing, between dispositional gratitude and anxiety, and between dispositional gratitude and depression. Moreover, such mediation varied as a function of whether women had ever been diagnosed as depressed. Acceptance of illness was related more strongly to wellbeing for women who had been diagnosed as depressed at some time in their lives than it was for women who had never been diagnosed as depressed.ConclusionWomen with elevated depressive symptoms who were more grateful were more accepting of their condition, which was related to increased wellbeing and decreased feelings of depression and anxiety. (shrink)

Is there any number of people you should save from paralysis rather than saving one person from death? Is there any number of people you should save from a migraine rather than saving one person from death? Many people answer “yes” and “no,” respectively. The aim of partially aggregative moral views is to capture and justify combinations of intuitions like these. In this article, I develop a risk-based reductio argument that shows that there can be no adequate partially aggregative (...) view. I then argue that the only plausible response to this reductio is to accept a fully aggregative view. (shrink)

I try to show that agent responsibility is an inadequate basis for the attribution of liability, by discrediting the Risk Argument and showing how the Responsibility Argument in fact collapses into the Risk Argument. I have concentrated on undermining these as philosophical theories of self-defense, although I at times note that our theory of self-defense should not be predicated on assumptions that are inapplicable to the context of war. The potential combatant, I conclude, should not look to the (...) agency view to ease his conscience about the killing he will do in war. If he is to fight without violating rights, then he will need a different theory of self-defense; if there are no more defensible theories, then he must either accept pacifism—which I think is a live possibility—or seek to identify stronger countervailing reasons, which can override the great force of his victims’ rights to life. (shrink)

Many scientists, businessmen, and government regulators believe that the criteria for acceptable societal risk are too stringent. Those who subscribe to this belief often accept the view which I call the probability-threshold position. Proponents of this stance maintain that society ought to ignore very small risks, i.e., those causing an average annual probability of fatality of less than 10–6.After examining the three major views in the risk-evaluation debate, viz., the probability-threshold position, the zero-risk position, and the (...) weighted-risk position, I focus on the arguments for the first of these views, since it is the position which currently undergirds most public policy (especially in the U.S.) regarding acceptable risk. After analyzing Arrow's argument from decision theory, Comar's and Gibson's argument from ontology, and Starr's and Whipple's argument from epistemology, I conclude that these defenses of the probability-threshold position err in a variety of ways. Most commonly, they fail because they tacitly accept the assumption that magnitude of probability, alone, provides a sufficient condition for judging the acceptability of a given risk. In the light of these errors, I suggest that it might be more desirable for risk assessors, decision theorists, and policymakers to weight various risk-cost-benefit parameters according to alternative ethical criteria, rather than to evaluate risks solely in terms of mathematical considerations. (shrink)

Advances in genetic research have created the need to inform consumers. Yet, the communication of hereditary risk and of the options for how to deal with it is a difficult task. Due to the abstract nature of genetics, people tend to overestimate or underestimate their risk. This paper addresses the issue of how to communicate risk information on hereditary breast and ovarian cancer through an online application. The core of the paper illustrates the design of OPERA, a (...) risk assessment instrument that applies the UK National Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence's guidelines on the basis of (i) the number of relatives on the same side of the family with the same cancer or cancers that are known to run together; (ii) the ages of these relatives at diagnosis and (iii) the closeness of the family relationship with the person who is doing the assessment. By relying on the argumentation theory, we explain how the communication strategy that OPERA implements is essentially based on Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's deductive argumentation by association. By using as premises “facts” (propositions about reality that can be assumed without further justification) and “truths” (propositions that make connections about facts), OPERA delivers its claims with an ex auctoritate causal link aimed at transferring the audience's acceptance of the cause to the effect. Overall, the design of OPERA rests on its capacity to induce users' active processing of risk information through an appeal to their reasoning faculty. In the conclusion, we present some results from a pilot evaluation of users' acceptance of OPERA. (shrink)

Can it be rational to be risk-averse? It seems plausible that the answer is yes—that normative decision theory should accommodate risk aversion. But there is a seemingly compelling class of arguments against our most promising methods of doing so. These long-run arguments point out that, in practice, each decision an agent makes is just one in a very long sequence of such decisions. Given this form of dynamic choice situation, and the (Strong) Law of Large Numbers, they conclude (...) that those theories which accommodate risk aversion end up delivering the same verdicts as risk-neutral theories in nearly all practical cases. If so, why not just accept a simpler, risk-neutral theory? The resulting practical verdicts seem to be much the same. In this paper, I show that these arguments do not in fact condemn those risk-aversion-accommodating theories. Risk aversion can indeed survive the long run. (shrink)

Net‐risk pediatric research encompasses interventions and studies that pose risks and do not offer a compensating potential for clinical benefit. These interventions and studies are central to efforts to improve pediatric clinical care. Yet critics argue that it is unethical to expose children to research risks for the benefit of unrelated others. While a number of ethical justifications have been proposed, none have received widespread acceptance. This leaves funders with uncertainty over whether they should support and institutional review boards (...) with uncertainty over whether they should approve net‐risk pediatric research. To try to answer these questions, this article describes a justification that I previously proposed and considers two objections to it. This analysis reveals that the opportunity to contribute to a valuable project can justify exposing children to risks even though some trials turn out to be valueless and others turn out to be harmful. It follows that, to protect pediatric participants, institutional review boards need to assess whether trials have the potential to collect socially valuable information and whether they are likely to enroll and retain a sufficient number of participants. (shrink)

Several factors related to fetal risk render it more or less acceptable in justifying constraints on the behavior of pregnant women. Risk is an unavoidable part of pregnancy and childbirth, one that women must balance against other vital personal and family interests. Two particular issues relate to the fairness of claims that pregnant women are never entitled to put their fetuses at risk: relative risks and relatives' risks. The former have been used—often spuriously—to advance arguments against (...) activities, such as home birth, that may incur risk; the latter implicate the nature of relationships in determining the acceptability of coercing or precluding activities. Motivated reasoning by clinicians and judges leads to inaccurate risk assessments, and judgments based on false claims to objectivity. Such judgments undermine the moral and legal standing of pregnant women and do not advance the interests of fetuses, pregnant women, families, or states. (shrink)