In the development of governmental policy for artificial intelligence that is informed by ethics, one avenue currently pursued is that of drawing on “AI Ethics Principles”. However, these AI Ethics Principles often fail to be actioned in governmental policy. This paper proposes a novel framework for the development of ‘Actionable Principles for AI’. The approach acknowledges the relevance of AI Ethics Principles and homes in on methodological elements to increase their practical implementability in policy processes. As (...) a case study, elements are extracted from the development process of the Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI of the European Commission’s “High Level Expert Group on AI”. Subsequently, these elements are expanded on and evaluated in light of their ability to contribute to a prototype framework for the development of 'Actionable Principles for AI'. The paper proposes the following three propositions for the formation of such a prototype framework: preliminary landscape assessments; multi-stakeholder participation and cross-sectoral feedback; and, mechanisms to support implementation and operationalizability. (shrink)

Impurism says that practical factors encroach on knowledge. An important version of impurism is called ‘Threshold-Impurism,’ which says that practical factors encroach on the threshold that rational credence must pass in order for one to have knowledge. A prominent kind of argument for Threshold-Impurism is the so-called ‘principle-based argument,’ which relies on a principle of fallibilism and a knowledge-action principle. This paper offers a new challenge against Threshold-Impurism. I attempt to show that the two principles Threshold-Impurists are committed (...) to—KJ and Fallibilism—are jointly in tension with a widely-held principle of credence that’s called ‘Truth-Directedness,’ in the sense that the former two principles cannot both apply to those who know the third. This tension constitutes a serious challenge to Threshold-Impurists, because it leaves them two options, both of which are undesirable: denying Truth-Directedness, or accepting Truth-Directedness and accepting that whether KJ and Fallibilism apply to a person depends on whether she knows Truth-Directedness. (shrink)

Laws of motion given in terms of differential equations can not always be derived from an action principle, at least not without introducing auxiliary variables. By allowing auxiliary variables, e.g. in the form of Lagrange multipliers, an action is immediately obtained. Here, we consider some ways how this can be done, with illustrations from the literature, and apply this to Bohmian mechanics. We also discuss the possible metaphysical status of these auxiliary variables. A particularly interesting approach brings the (...) theory in the form of a gauge theory, with the auxiliary variables as gauge degrees of freedom. (shrink)

Schwinger's action principle is formulated for the quantum system which corresponds to the classical system described by the LagrangianL c( $\dot x$ , x)=(M/2)gij(x) $\dot x$ i $\dot x$ j−v(x). It is sufficient for the purpose of deriving the laws of quantum mechanics to consider onlyc-number variations of coordinates and time. The Euler-Lagrange equation, the canonical commutation relations, and the canonical equations of motion are derived from this principle in a consistent manner. Further, it is shown that an arbitrary (...) point transformation leaves the forms of the fundamental equations invariant. The judicious choice of the quantal Lagrangian is essential in our formulation. A quantum mechanical analog of Noether's theorem, which relates the invariance of the quantal action with a conservation law, is established. The ambiguities in the quantal Lagrangian are also discussed and it is pointed out that the requirement of invariance is not sufficient to determine uniquely the quantal Lagrangian and the Hamiltonian. (shrink)

Decision-making adhering to the “principle of autonomy" takes place within the wider context of decision-making processes in modern society. Within the medical area, as regards the decision through informed consent, the patient's intention assumes vital importance. The principle of autonomy is derived from the modern thought that the essence of human being is the reason. It becomes difficult, however, to rely on decision-making based on the principle of autonomy when a person’s intention is not clear and the opinions of those (...) who are involved differ from each other. Here, I think that the principle of consensus, which seeks the agreement of those who are concerned, becomes as important as the principle of autonomy. This paper examines the problems of certainty, reliability, andcreativity of medical action through the consideration of the principle of consensus. (shrink)

I address the question: “What is fixed on the boundary in the action principles of general relativity?” Four forms of the action are considered: the Einstein action, the Hilbert action, the first order action, and what may be called the cosmological action. The relationships and boundary data of these actions are described geometrically. Formal passage to the “Euclidean” forms of these actions is effected in detail.

We show that the formulations of non-relativistic quantum mechanics can be derived from an extended least action principle. The principle can be considered as an extension of the least action principle from classical mechanics by factoring in two assumptions. First, the Planck constant defines the minimal amount of action a physical system needs to exhibit during its dynamics in order to be observable. Second, there is constant vacuum fluctuation along a classical trajectory. A novel method is introduced (...) to define the information metrics to measure additional observability due to vacuum fluctuations, which is then converted to an additional action through the first assumption. Applying the variational principle to minimize the total actions allows us to recover the basic quantum formulations including the uncertainty relation and the Schrödinger equation in the position representation. In the momentum representation, the same method can be applied to obtain the Schrödinger equation for a free particle while further investigation is still needed for a particle with an external potential. Furthermore, the principle brings in new results on two fronts. At the conceptual level, we find that the information metrics for vacuum fluctuations are responsible for the origin of the Bohm quantum potential. Even though the Bohm potential for a bipartite system is inseparable, the underlying vacuum fluctuations are local. Thus, inseparability of the Bohm potential does not justify a non-local causal relation between the two subsystems. At the mathematical level, quantifying the information metrics for vacuum fluctuations using more general definitions of relative entropy results in a generalized Schrödinger equation that depends on the order of relative entropy. The extended least action principle is a new mathematical tool. It can be applied to derive other quantum formalisms such as quantum scalar field theory. (shrink)

This work deals with obstacles hindering a metaphysics of laws of nature in terms of dispositions, i.e., of fundamental properties that are causal powers. A recent analysis of the principle of least action has put into question the viability of dispositionalism in the case of classical mechanics, generally seen as the physical theory most easily amenable to a dispositional ontology. Here, a proper consideration of the framework role played by the least action principle within the classical image of (...) the world allows us to build a consistent metaphysics of dispositions as charges of interactions. In doing so we develop a general approach that opens the way towards an ontology of dispositions for fundamental physics also beyond classical mechanics. (shrink)

Starting from the earlier notions of stationary action principles, these tutorial notes shows how Schwinger's Quantum Action Principle descended from Dirac's formulation, which independently led Feynman to his path-integral formulation of quantum mechanics. Part I brings out in more detail the connection between the two formulations, and applications are discussed. Then, the Keldysh-Schwinger time-cycle method of extracting matrix elements is described. Part II will discuss the variational formulation of quantum electrodynamics and the development of source theory.

Global challenge-led research seeks to contribute to solution-generation for complex problems. Multicultural, multidisciplinary, and multisectoral teams must be capable of operating in highly demanding contexts. This brings with it a swathe of ethical conflicts that require quick and effective solutions that respect both international conventions and cultural diversity. The objective of this article is to describe the process of creating a toolkit designed to support global researchers in navigating these ethical challenges. The process of creating the toolkit embodied the model (...) of ethical research practice that it advocates. Specifically, at the heart of ethical decision-making is consideration of the following: Place, solutions must be relevant to the context in which they are to be used; People, those impacted by the outcomes must be partners in co-creation; Principles, ethical projects must be guided by clear values; and Precedent, the existing evidence-base should guide the project and, in turn, the project should extend the evidence-base. It is the thesis underlying the toolkit that consideration of these 4Ps provides a strong basis for understanding ethical conflicts and allows for the generation of potential solutions. This toolkit has been designed in two phases of collaborative work. More than 200 researchers participated from more than 30 countries and more than 60 different disciplines. This allowed us to develop a model for contextual, dynamic analysis of ethical conflicts in global research that is complementary to traditional codes of ethics. It emphasizes the need to consider ethical analysis as an iterative, reflective, process relevant at all stages of the research journey, including, ultimately, in evaluating the legacy of a project. The toolkit is presented as an open access website to promote universal access. A downloadable “pocket guide” version is also now available in 11 languages. (shrink)

The mathematical framework of Relativistic Schrödinger Theory (RST) is generalized in order to include the self-interactions of the particles as an integral part of the theory (i.e. in a non-perturbative way). The extended theory admits a Lagrangean formulation where the Noether theorems confirm the existence of the conservation laws for charge and energy–momentum which were originally deduced directly from the dynamical equations. The generalized RST dynamics is applied to the case of some heavy helium-like ions, ranging from germanium (Z=32) to (...) bismuth (Z=83), in order to compute the interaction energy of the two electrons in their ground-state. The present inclusion of the electron self-energies into RST yields a better agreement of the theoretical predictions with the experimental data. (shrink)

My aim is to argue for the incompatibility of one of the central principles of physics, namely the principle of least action (PLA), with the increasingly popular view that the world is, ultimately, merely something like a con- glomerate of objects and irreducible dispositions. First, I argue that the essentialist implications many suppose this view has are not compatible with the PLA. Second, I argue that, irrespective of whether this view has any essentialist implications, it is not compatible (...) with the kind of explanation that the PLA affords. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt’s conception of politics has long invited criticism for potentially turning political action into an exercise in hollow dramatics, both ethically unrestrained and restricted in its practical import. This essay offers a new response to these criticisms while attempting to honor Arendt’s commitment to a form of theorizing that engages politics on its own terms instead of legislating for politics from a perspective of moral philosophy. It does so by explicating an underappreciated aspect of Arendt’s political theory: her (...) claim that action is always inspired and guided by “principles.” Although Arendt fails to offer a sustained account of the significance of principles for politics, I argue that her numerous shorter discussions of principles together yield a robust political ethics and a more nuanced conception of action than many readings of her thought allow. Having reconstructed a fuller account of Arendt’s principles of action, I then examine how she understands these principles to be historically regenerated. (shrink)

The tragedies of the past decade have led to an identity crisis among humanitarians. Respecting traditional principles of neutrality and impartiality and operating procedures based on consent has created as many problems as it has solved.

This paper is a defence of the view that action explanation deploys (relatively) a priori principles. The argument is that this is so because action explanation succeeds, Not just through revealing regularity, But through exhibiting the presence of an expected and privileged pattern. Its job is to 'normalise' action, Not just 'regularise' it.

In 1969 Harry Frankfurt published his hugely influential paper 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility' in which he claimed to present a counterexample to the so-called 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities' ('a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise'). The success of Frankfurt-style cases as counterexamples to the Principle has been much debated since. I present an objection to these cases that, in questioning their conceptual cogency, undercuts many of those debates. Such cases (...) all require a counterfactual mechanism that could cause an agent to perform an action that he cannot avoid performing. I argue that, given our concept of what it is for someone to act, this requirement is inconsistent. Frankfurt-style alleged counterexamples are cases where an agent is morally responsible for an action he performs even though, the claim goes, he could not have avoided performing that action. However, it has recently been argued, e.g. by John Fischer, that a counterexample to the Principle could be a 'Fischer-style case', i.e. a case where the agent can either perform the action or do nothing else. I argue that, although Fischer-style cases do not share the conceptual flaw common to all Frankfurt-style cases, they also fail as counterexamples to the Principle. The paper finishes with a brief discussion of the significance of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. (shrink)

The term action of consciousness is used to refer to an influence, such as psychokinesis or free will, that produces an effect on matter that is correlated to mental intention, but not completely determined by physical conditions. Such an action could not conserve energy. But in that case, one wonders why, when highly accurate measurements are done, occasions of non-conserved energy (generated perhaps by unconscious PK) are not detected. A possible explanation is that actions of consciousness take place (...) within the limits of the uncertainty principle. Two models are reviewed that, using the latter assumption, propose that consciousness can originate an action potential in the brain. One (that of Eccles) uses the latter assumption only, and the other (that of Burns) additionally assumes that consciousness acts, within those limits, by ordering quantum fluctuations. (shrink)

Despite the importance of the variational principles of physics, there have been relatively few attempts to consider them for a realistic framework. In addition to the old teleological question, this paper continues the recent discussion regarding the modal involvement of the principle of least action and its relations with the Humean view of the laws of nature. The reality of possible paths in the principle of least action is examined from the perspectives of the contemporary metaphysics of (...) modality and Leibniz's concept of essences or possibles striving for existence. I elaborate a modal interpretation of the principle of least action that replaces a classical representation of a system's motion along a single history in the actual modality by simultaneous motions along an infinite set of all possible histories in the possible modality. This model is based on an intuition that deep ontological connections exist between the possible paths in the principle of least action and possible quantum histories in the Feynman path integral. I interpret the action as a physical measure of the essence of every possible history. Therefore only one actual history has the highest degree of the essence and minimal action. To address the issue of necessity, I assume that the principle of least action has a general physical necessity and lies between the laws of motion with a limited physical necessity and certain laws with a metaphysical necessity. (shrink)

In this paper, we take issue with the belief–desire model of second- and third-person action interpretation as it is presented by both theory theories and cognitivist versions of simulation theory. These accounts take action interpretation to consist in the (tacit) attribution of proper belief–desire pairs that mirror the structure of formally valid practical inferences. We argue that the belief–desire model rests on the unwarranted assumption that the interpreter can only reach the agent's practical context of action through (...) inference. This assumption betrays a deep-seated bias toward disengaged, observational interpretation strategies. On our alternative picture, the interpreter can start off on the assumption of a shared practical context and proceed to reason discourse in those cases in which this assumption runs aground. Following Brandom's non-formalist account of reason discourse, we suggest that interpreting other people's actions in terms of reasons is not a matter of following the principles of formally valid practical syllogisms, but of endorsing practical material inferences that are correct in virtue of a shared practical world. (shrink)

The concept of self-interest is core to modern understandings of individual desire and need. It is also central in the concept of homo economicus and, in a variety of forms, underpins economic science. The critical discussion of the notion of self-interest in William Hazlitt, An Essay on the Principles of Human Action ([1805] 1969), remains unknown in sociology and economics even though it resolves a number of key problems associated with the concept and makes an original, indeed, unique (...) contribution to action theory. In particular, Hazlitt shows that the basis on which an individual pursues their own interest is identical with their sympathy with the interests of others. Hazlitt shows that a clear distinction between self and other cannot be sustained, and that an individual is as remote from their future self as they are from any other person. Even the `sexual appetite' Hazlitt shows cannot be understood in terms of simple self-interest as it is stimulated and consummated through mental and reciprocal capacities. These and related aspects of Hazlitt's Principles are set out below, and their relevance for an understanding of self-interested action and self-formation is demonstrated. (shrink)

This essay offers seven intersectional feminist principles for equitable and actionable COVID-19 data, drawing from the authors' prior work on data feminism. Our book, Data Feminism, offers seven principles which suggest possible points of entry for challenging and changing power imbalances in data science. In this essay, we offer seven sets of examples, one inspired by each of our principles, for both identifying existing power imbalances with respect to the impact of the novel coronavirus and its response, (...) and for beginning the work of change. (shrink)

Across a wide range of legal contexts, E. Thomas Sullivan and Richard S. Frase identify three basic ways that government measures and private remedies have been ...

Reconstructing Popper's research programme for the Human Sciences, Noretta Koertge (Inquiry, Vol. 18 [1975]) has given a deductive?nomological account of explanations of actions by means of a Rationality Principle. It is argued here that such a Rationality Principle is fundamentally redundant. Neither is it logically necessary in order to deduce a cognitive action?explanandum, nor can it be given a semantic non?empty interpretation, at least not within Koertge's own syllogism. Any attempt to save the Rationality Principle as unfalsifiablc but nevertheless (...) indispensable for action explanations is rejected in the light of possible alternative action explanations by empirical and therefore in principle falsifiable psychological laws. (shrink)

The present paper investigates why logical empiricists remained silent about one of the most philosophy-laden matters of theoretical physics of their day, the principle of least action (PLA). In the two decades around 1900, the PLA enjoyed a remarkable renaissance as a formal unification of mechanics, electrodynamics, thermodynamics, and relativity theory. Taking Ernst Mach's historico-critical stance, it could be liberated from much of its physico-theological dross. Variational calculus, the mathematical discipline on which the PLA was based, obtained a new (...) rigorous basis. These three developments prompted Max Planck to consider the PLA as formal embodiment of his convergent realist methodology. Typically rejecting ontological reductionism, David Hilbert took the PLA as the key concept in his axiomatizations of physical theories. It served one of the main goals of the axiomatic method: ''deepening the foundations.'' Although Moritz Schlick was a student of Planck's, and Hans Hahn and Philipp Frank enjoyed close ties to Gottingen, the PLA became a veritable Shibboleth to them. Rather than being worried by its historical connections with teleology and determinism, they erroneously identified Hilbert's axiomatic method tout court with Planck's metaphysical realism. Logical empiricists' strict containment policy against metaphysics required so strict a separation between physics and mathematics to exclude even those features of the PLA and the axiomatic method not tainted with metaphysics. (shrink)

The principle of least action (PLA) has often been cited as a counterexample to the dominant mode of causal explanation in physics. In particular, PLA seems to involve an appeal to final causes or some other teleological ideology. However, Ben-Menahem (Causation in science, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2018) argues that such implications no longer apply given that PLA can be recovered as limiting case from quantum theory. In this paper, I argue that the metaphysical implications of PLA-based explanations are (...) not undermined by its status as derivative. However, I contend that PLA functions as a diachronic constraint that licenses explanations by constraint (Lange, Because without cause: non-casual explanations in science and mathematics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016). PLA-based explanations, on this account, are non-causal but also differ from familiar cases of teleological explanations in several respects. (shrink)

This article examines the application of the ought‐implies‐can principle in the legal domain, especially in the relationship between obligations and responsibility. It addresses the challenge of cases in which an agent cannot do what is required of her, and yet it seems plausible to say that she has an obligation. To deal with these cases, two parallel distinctions are made: between rules of conduct and rules of imputation, and between doings and things done. It is proposed that these distinctions show (...) that the principle operates in two different but complementary ways: as part of prescriptive relations and as part of responsibility practices. (shrink)

Some time ago, Joel Katzav and Brian Ellis debated the compatibility of dispositional essentialism with the principle of least action. Surprisingly, very little has been said on the matter since, even by the most naturalistically inclined metaphysicians. Here, we revisit the Katzav–Ellis arguments of 2004–05. We outline the two problems for the dispositionalist identified Katzav in his 2004 , and claim they are not as problematic for the dispositional essentialist at it first seems – but not for the reasons (...) espoused by Ellis. (shrink)