During the pandemic, civil society organisations adjusted their purpose to provide support to the most vulnerable. In the midst of the first wave, Superbergamo, an initiative that grew out of local activist associations, provided groceries and medicine to the elderly, the infirm and at-risk groups during the lockdown in Bergamo, Italy. This research analyses a newspaper article from Corriere della Sera published almost two years after the event, which tells the story of Stefano ‘Kino’, one of the volunteers of Superbergamo. (...) Using Critical Discourse Analysis, we show how the mainstream media normalised the story of Superbergamo to transform a critical, radical, leftist mutual aid practice, into an example of charitable volunteering. By omitting and recontextualising central elements, the article inscribed the mutual aid practice in a catholic narrative, stripping it of any critical afflatus of the status quo. Reframed within the catholic vocabulary by the Corriere della Sera’s weekly insert ‘good news’, the story of Superbergamo becomes one that reinforces the common sensical model of catholic charitable volunteering. (shrink)

"In this highly original book, Ada Agada responds to the question of how a philosophy can be African and at the same time universally relevant by constructing an original philosophical system that is at once African and universal. Drawing on African forms of thought and conceptual schemes like ethnophilosophy, ubuntu, sage philosophy, négritude, ibuanyidanda philosophy, and ezumezu logic, the author introduces new concepts and conceptual schemes like mood and proto-panpsychism into philosophical vocabulary and weaves them into a coherent and original (...) system that promises to significantly impact contemporary African philosophy. Arguing for intercultural and comparative philosophy as a desirable mode of philosophising in a continually globalising and interconnected world, the book demonstrates the universal applicability of consolationism. This book will be of interest to scholars in the fields of African Studies, intercultural philosophy, philosophy of mind, and existentialism"--. (shrink)

After Plato's Forms, and Aristotle's substances, the Stoics posited the fundamental reality of lekta - the meanings of sentences, distinct from the sentences themselves. This volume analyses the resulting unique, complex, and consistent cosmic view in which lekta are the keystones of the structure of reality: they are all there is to say.

Traditional African societies tend to favor a theocentric and anthropocentric conception of the universe, with God at the top of the hierarchy of being, in which the human sphere is a major center of influence and meaning. God is sometimes conceived in the traditional theistic sense and attributed with superlative qualities of omnipotence, omniscience, and benevolence. On the other hand, a more critical study of oral sources of African traditional religious thought constrains the traditional theistic interpretation and presents the idea (...) of a limited God. This chapter will provide an overview of the issues and questions that have driven debates in African philosophy of religion. Specifically, this chapter will critically engage the question of the existence of God and the problem of evil from the perspective of African philosophical thought. This chapter will highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the approaches to the problem of evil adopted by African philosophers. In the process of reconciling the transcendental and immanent conceptions of God in African religious thought, this chapter will provide an outline of an African theodicy as a basis for further explorations of African theodicies formulated beyond the limit of traditional African thought. (shrink)

This paper explores the contradiction of positing the existence of a God who is at once omnipotent and not omnipotent in respect of his power that arises in the thought of two African philosophers of religion, John A.I. Bewaji and Ademola Kazeem Fayemi who accept the limitation thesis that projects a limited God and deny the legitimacy of the transcendence view in Yoruba and, by extension, African thought. I demonstrate in this paper that the contradiction arises from the fact that (...) while Bewaji and Fayemi explicitly deny the legitimacy of the transcendence view in Yoruba and, by extension, African thought, they implicitly accept the view and unwittingly and illegitimately attempt to reconcile the conflicting views through the analysis of the notions of God’s creatorship, co-creatorship, and controllership. I conclude by recommending that instead of attempting to reconcile the antinomy of God’s existence in African philosophy of religion, African philosophers should acknowledge the legitimacy of the two conflicting theses constituting the antinomy and, accordingly, sustain logical consistency by strictly thinking within either the framework of limitedness or the framework of transcendence. (shrink)

This chapter will examine the themes of nihilism, pessimism, and optimism as they feature in the thought of the Nigerian philosophers, Innocent Asouzu and Ada Agada. While endorsing Asouzu’s basic optimistic vision of reality, I will, nevertheless, point out the inadequacy of an almost entirely optimistic theory of human existence in accounting for the phenomena of nihilism and pessimism. I will compare Asouzu’s ibuanyidanda philosophy with Agada’s consolation philosophy. I will show that consolation philosophy supplies a broader vision of the (...) world that attempts the reconciliation of the optimistic and pessimistic outlooks. Finally, I will sketch a theory of meaning in life, based on the submissions of ibuanyidanda and consolation philosophies and present this outline as promising much for the development of an African philosophy of life. The essay will adopt the method of analysis and evaluation. (shrink)

This paper examines Nietzsche’s conception of what persists, or occurs, as becoming in relation to Ramose’s reconceptualization of what persists, or occurs, as be-ing becoming with a view to showing how divergence and convergence of thought in the western and African contexts can inform cross-cultural philosophizing. Nietzsche radically subverts the traditional notion of an eternal immutable being that constitutes the ground of change and replaces it with the notion of becoming. Ramose’s notion of being, which is grounded in ubuntu philosophy, (...) integrates a dynamic perspective into a process view of reality. While Nietzsche seeks to abandon the categories of being, unity, and purpose altogether, Ramose ambiguously retains them and, in fact, endorses the category of unity. I highlight the dynamics of Nietzsche’s notion of becoming and articulate the basic principles of Ramose’s idea of being as be-ing becoming and argue that both thinkers’ struggle to subvert substance-based understanding of being invites us to question the intelligibility of the binary opposition of being with becoming and to regard both concepts as indicating different ways of understanding reality. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The concept of vital force in African philosophy received its first full articulation in Placide Tempels’s Bantu Philosophy and has evolved over time from the ontological dimension of a universal actuation and energizing principle to an element of mind, notably in the work of Kwame Gyekye. In this essay, I present the concept of vital force and trace its evolution from the time of its first full articulation by Tempels up to its identification with spirit, or mind, in Gyekye’s (...) thought. I try to defend the thesis that the concept of vital force can ground the notion of mood that takes a pivotal position in the twenty-first century philosophy of consolationism. I adopt an analytical and constructive method in this paper. (shrink)

In his 2015 Theoria article titled ‘A Rejection of Humanism in African Moral Tradition’, Motsamai Molefe argues that Kwasi Wiredu's humanistic interpretation of traditional Akan ethics cannot be the best account of African ethics because Wiredu overlooks the significant sentiment in traditional African thought that regards reality as a holistic totality of spiritual, social and environmental components. I point out that Molefe's rejection of Wiredu's humanism follows from the latter's de-emphasising of supernaturalism. I argue that Molefe overlooks the fact that (...) the displacement of God in this humanism is consistent with the limited God sentiment in traditional African thought, which confirms Wiredu's humanistic ethics as one rooted in traditional African worldviews. Adopting the method of philosophical exposition and analysis, I show how Wiredu's limited God framework motivates scepticism about the possibility of a supernaturalist ethics and renders a humanistic orientation a more attractive account of African moral tradition. (shrink)

Kwame Gyekye has been called a dualist to the extent that he accepts the ontological distinction between mind and matter, with both phenomena interacting with each other. I argue in this article that Gyekye’s presentation of the sunsum as a universal animating principle that is itself nonmaterial and irreducible to a material base warrants a second look at his philosophy of mind to determine whether he can be considered a pan-psychist and whether a pan-psychist reading can resolve the Gyekyean problem (...) of interaction. I assert that, while Gyekye’s interpretation of the Akan notion of sunsum invites a pan-psychist scrutiny, the interpretive difficulties surrounding the concept, as highlighted by Kwasi Wiredu and Safro Kwame, render a pan-psychist conclusion problematic even if persuasive. I recommend that the notion of sunsum as a nonmaterial principle that underlies material entities is significant enough to warrant further interrogation by African philosophers of mind. (shrink)

: Standing before one of Ada Medina's works in a museum recently, I knew myself to be in the company of a distinct presence. The exquisite form was so novel, yet its layers of organicity were deeply familiar. The piece effectively conveyed complex relationality, and pointed toward innovative forms of being, without resorting to didacticism, melodrama, or cliché. I had a strong urge to hug it. I needed to step back and figure it out.

ENTREVISTA COM PROFESSORAS (ES) DE FILOSOFIA DO ENSINO SUPERIOR DO CEARÁ – BLOCO ICom: Ada Beatriz Gallicchio Kroef, Vicente Thiago Freire Brazil, Roberta Liana Damasceno Costa, Elizabeth Bezerra FurtadoPor: Antônio Alex Pereira de Sousa, Paulo Willame Araújo de Lima.

In this paper I compare Kwame Gyekye’s transcendentalist interpretation of the Akan conception of God with Kwasi Wiredu’s immanentist interpretation. I highlight the tension between the two thinkers’ interpretations of Akan religious thought within the broader conflict between transcendence and immanence. Using the analytic, critical, and interpretative method, I show how the reconciliation of Gyekye and Wiredu’s divergent, yet paradoxically overlapping visions can be effected in the idea of panpsychism. In the process of effecting this reconciliation, I open up a (...) new area of research in African philosophy of religion that African philosophers will find rewarding to engage. (shrink)

This paper argues that the continued emphasis on ethno-philosophy and the relative absence of intellectual passion and curiosity are the greatest challenges facing African philosophy. The paper rejects the racist lamentation of scholars such as Olufemi Taiwo who blame the West for Africa’s absence from the stage of world philosophy. It highlights the link between L.S. Senghor’s doctrine of negritude, the philosophy of Innocent Asouzu, and the emerging synthesis of consolationism to underline the fact that African philosophy has made some (...) progress, although things could be much better. The paper concludes by urging African philosophers to be more radical and innovative in their thinking, as innovation and originality are the only conditions for the universal acceptance of, and interest in, African philosophy. (shrink)

On examinera la théorie stoïcienne des lekta en suivant les critiques formulées contre elle provenant de trois perspectives différentes : celle des Péripatéticiens, de Sextus Empiricus et celle formulée au sein même de l’école par Sénèque. Ces critiques se concentrent sur des questions relatives à une théorie du langage, mais une lecture minutieuse révèle que le cœur du problème réside dans un rejet profond de l’ontologie stoïcienne, constituée en partie, par les lekta. Les réactions des critiques tendent toutes à confirmer (...) leurs propres positions, soit en rejetant la possibilité de présence réelle des lekta, soit en considérant cette présence comme négligeable. Ces confirmations de la validité de ses propres convictions se font par le biais de déformations ou de raccourcis faits à la théorie stoïcienne. En dévoilant ces mécanismes d’escamotage, c’est pourtant bien l’importance de la théorie des lekta qui est percée à jour, et les sérieux défis qu’elle pose aux théories rivales, en remettant en question le contrôle supposé de l’homme sur ses pratiques linguistiques, et en complexifiant la relation de la logique à l’éthique. (shrink)

The religious right often aligns its patriarchal opposition to same-sex marriage with the defence of religious freedom. In this article, I identify resources for confronting such prejudicial religiosity by surveying two predominant feminist approaches to same-sex marriage that are often assumed to be at odds: discourse ethics and queer critical theory. This comparative analysis opens up to view commitments that may not be fully recognizable from within either feminist framework: commitments to ideals of selfhood, to specific conceptions of justice, and (...) to particular definitions of secularism. I conclude by examining the "postsecular" turn in feminism, suggesting that we can see the same-sex marriage debate not in terms of an impasse between differing feminist approaches, but in terms of shared existential and ethical affinities. (shrink)

African philosophy of mind is still a developing area of African philosophy. The main issues driving debates in the field include the essential components of the human being (whether this being is wholly physical or partly physical and partly non-material), the relation of the body with the mind or consciousness, whether there is a unifying principle that grounds both body (matter) and consciousness, and whether there is an aspect of the human being that survives biological death. Physicalist theories such as (...) sense-phenomenalism, equi-phenomenalism, and quasi-physicalism have been proposed by some African philosophers as theoretical frameworks for thinking and rethinking the relation of the body with consciousness in the African universe. This chapter examines the plausibility of the three frameworks and argues that the persistence of the quality of subjective experience and the seeming independence of the subjective sphere require a recourse to panpsychism as a theoretical framework that better accounts for the fact of subjective experience. The chapter proposes a moderate version of panpsychism labelled proto-panpsychism as a metaphysical framework that adequately accounts for the phenomenon of consciousness while unifying the African universe of material and non-material entities. (shrink)

Business Ethics, the Environment &Responsibility, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 217-240, April 2024.

An original and constructive African though system with universal reach. Existence and consolation transcends the ethno-philosophies the dominated in the post-colonial period. While the African experience might lead one to say human life is pointless, the author argues that meaning comes in the form of consolation and is rooted in mood.

:Recent attempts to engage and develop modes of ethological practice that avoid deterministic and mechanistic accounts of animal action have often relied on affect as a way of articulating how animal bodies affect and are in turn affected by the animate and inanimate bodies around them. In this context affect has often functioned as an instigating site of change that opens up the experience of a particular animal to new possibilities for action and relation. This paper seeks to bring the (...) significant role that affect has played in opening up new directions in ethological theory and practice in contact with a discussion of two currents in affect theory – one shaped by the genealogy of philosophical thought that stretches from Spinoza, through Gilles Deleuze, to contemporary thinkers such as Brian Massumi, and the other emerging from the reception of the American psychologist and cybernetics thinker Silvan Tomkins, in the context of queer theory, through the work of Eve Sedgwick and Adam Frank. The locus of intersection for these different modes of theoretical practice is the site-specific case study of monk parakeets who have drawn on and incorporated the ornamental elaborations of human architecture into their own complex architectural nest constructions at Brooklyn's Green-Wood Cemetery. (shrink)

This article provides a brief overview of the efforts to develop and refine the Critical thinking Assessment Test and its potential for improving the design of classroom assessments. The CAT instrument was designed to help faculty understand their students’ strengths and weaknesses using a short answer essay format. The instrument assesses a broad collection of critical thinking skills that transcend most disciplines. The questions were deliberately designed around real-world scenarios that did not require specialized knowledge from any particular discipline. Various (...) faculty who collaborated in the national dissemination of the CAT instrument found that it was a helpful model for designing better course assessments to grade student work. Classroom assessments modeled on the CAT emphasize more critical thinking within the discipline and less rote retention of factual information. We describe the ongoing work to help faculty successfully adapt the CAT to applications that can be used in each discipline’s courses to evaluate and encourage students’ critical thinking. (shrink)

Increasingly, feminist theorists, such as Alison Martin and Ellen T. Armour, are attending to the numerous religious allusions within texts by Luce Irigaray. Engaging with this scholarship, this paper focuses on the problematic of evil that is elaborated within Irigarayan texts. Mobilizing the work of Catherine Malabou, the paper argues that Malabou's methodology of reading, which she identifies as "plastic," illuminates the logic at work within Irigaray's deployment of sacred stories.

Written collaboratively by two undergraduate students and one professor, this article explores what it would mean to teach existentialism “existentially.” We conducted a survey of how Existentialism is currently taught in universities across North America, concluding that, while existentialism courses tend to resemble other undergraduate philosophy courses, existentialist texts challenge us to rethink conventional teaching practices. Looking to thinkers like Kierkegaard, Beauvoir and Arendt for insights into the nature of pedagogy, as well as recent work by Gert Biesta, we lay (...) out the four qualities that we propose characterize “existentialist” teaching practices: an emphasis on teaching over learning and on the “how” over the what; the cultivation of newness as well as capacities for resistance. Reflecting on the significance of existentialism for classroom dynamics, we conclude by examining the tensions between existentialist commitments to freedom and prevailing trends in higher education. This essay raises questions about the emancipatory potential of existentialist philosophies, especially in the context of undergraduate classrooms. (shrink)

In the 2019 work “A Sense-Phenomenal Look at the Problem of Personal Identity,” Jonathan O. Chimakonam articulates an intriguing and novel body-only perspective of personal identity that has a direct implication for our understanding of consciousness. In this article, I focus on the aspect of the work that adopts a seemingly eliminativist stance on the hard problem of consciousness. Chimakonam’s version of physicalism rejects the reality of consciousness or experience while accepting that humans have sensations. Having transferred the location of (...) sensation from the mind (the within), and even the brain, to the sense organs (the outside) without eliminating the category of mind, Chimakonam unwittingly raises the question of whether his philosophy of mind represents an eliminativist stance or a reductive physicalist stance. In this article, I argue that while a reductive physicalist reading of Chimakonam is a plausible interpretation of his stance, the non-rejection of the category of mind and the seeming distinction between mind and brain supports the claim that sense-phenomenalism does not radically overcome the hard problem of consciousness. (shrink)

Kwame Gyekye’s interpretation of traditional Akan religious thought leads him to the conception of God as a being that possesses the properties of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence. Adopting an analytical and hermeneutical method, I argue in this article that Gyekye’s understanding of God as the direct source of the sunsum, or spirit, in the context of his presentation of the sunsum as a wholly immaterial and ubiquitous principle introduces a clear panpsychist dimension to his commitment to theism. I point out (...) that just as Gyekye’s account of the sunsum raises the question of its nature, so does his description of God as the direct source of the sunsum raise the question of God’s nature, whether he is indeed a wholly immaterial entity or not. I explore possible ways that Gyekye can defend the claim that a God who distributes sunsum in the physical world is wholly immaterial, and conclude that the claim cannot be sustained on account of the interpretive difficulty that the idea of sunsum raises. (shrink)

Wiredu has argued that traditional Akan (African) ethics is humanistic in orientation and that human welfare, rather than God’s will, is the basis of morality. In response, Motsamai Molefe asserts that Wiredu’s conclusion overlooks the supernaturalist dimension of traditional African ontology which presents God as the apex being in the universe and the ultimate ground of reality. According to Molefe, a vitalistic conception of God supports the claim that an African supernaturalist ethics is possible. He proceeds to develop an intriguing (...) supernaturalist vitality-based ethics that makes God the foundation of morality. I argue in this article that while Molefe indeed succeeds in demonstrating the possibility of an African supernaturalist ethics, Wiredu’s humanistic framework has a practical advantage over Molefe’s supernaturalist framework to the extent that the problem of revelation in African Traditional Religion forces Molefe’s supernaturalist ethics to assume a speculative aspect. I point out that a vitalistic God who acts intentionally may well define morality in terms of a divine property like knowledge rather than vitality. (shrink)

The evidence of human wickedness in the world is so transparent that no rational person can dispute its reality. This paper approaches the question of the human person from an African philosophical perspective and explores the relation between the apparently free-acting human being and God conceived as the creator of the world and the ultimate cause of the human being. The paper will proffer answers to the following question: to what extent can the human being be absolved of blame for (...) the evil they perpetrate in a world conceived in African traditional religion and thought as the creation of a high deity who could have foreseen the negative bent of human nature and should have made human nature inclined to goodness all of the time? The paper will make novel contributions to the debate about human nature in African philosophical discourse by recasting the human being as a homo melancholicus, or melancholy being, whose evil inclination in the world can best be understood in the context of a tragic vision of reality. (shrink)

The ongoing debate among African philosophers on the relation of the individual and the community has spawned radical, moderate, and limited communitarian views. In this paper we will insert the question of interpersonal communication into the individual-community conundrum and raise the discourse to the level of cross-cultural engagement. We will highlight the dominant perspectives in Afro-communitarianism with particular emphasis on the Ghanaian philosopher Kwame Gyekye and the Nigerian philosopher Ifeanyi Menkiti. Expanding the discourse into the domain of intercultural/comparative philosophy, this (...) paper will engage Gyekye and Menkiti’s Afro-communitarianism and Jean-Paul Sartre’s radical individualism and the resulting conflictual presentation of interpersonal relation. The paper adopts the conversational method. Keywords: Ifeanyi Menkiti, Kwame Gyekye, Afro-communitarianism, community, individual, Jean-Paul Sartre. (shrink)

In this article, I locate Okot p’Bitek’s evaluation of African traditional religion and his critique of the traditional African theistic stance in the broader African limited God tradition. I argue that while p’Bitek’s claim is plausible that traditional African societies do not believe in a supreme being that possesses the omni-properties in the context of commitment to the limitation thesis, the other claim, that these societies are atheistic because they merely acknowledge the reality of mystical forces and powers rather than (...) God or gods, constitutes a hasty, unsustainable generalisation. Adopting the method of philosophical exposition and argumentation, I point out that in purporting to make a cultural statement in favour of atheism, p’Bitek fails to reckon with the existence of two culturally rooted but conflicting views of God in African traditional religion and traditional African thought. One view endorses traditional theism while the other, for the most part, proposes that God is limited in power, knowledge and goodness. I argue that both views are damaging to p’Bitek’s second claim. (shrink)

The notion of love is one of the fascinating concepts available to humans. Love is perhaps the most powerful emotion a human being can experience. Love is immediately recognized as a feeling. It is only after observing human conduct that it dawns on us that there is a rational dimension of love. In this paper I will discuss the Idoma-African concept of ihotu, or love. Since the very idea of an Idoma philosophy of love is an entirely novel idea, with (...) no prior identifiable research in this field, I will rely heavily on my knowledge of Idoma culture and conversations with Ihonde Ameh of Ochobo community who has an in-depth knowledge of Idoma value-system. I will proceed to show how the consolationist theory of love is a systematization of the basic ethnophilosophical data supplied by Idoma traditional thought. With consolation philosophy transcending the basic intuition of the African collective, in this particular case the Idoma of Central Nigeria, I will argue for the rationality of love by pointing out its indispensability in the formation and expression of what we consider right or moral behaviour. I will argue that a greater part of the conduct we approve of as ethical is founded on our emotional experience and that this emotional experience is to a large extent determined by the urgings of pity or empathy. I will attempt to exhibit the philosophical grounds of empathy from the African perspective of consolationism and, in the process, delve into philosophical psychology from the African place. In achieving these objectives, I will have recourse to the metaphysics and epistemology of love from the consolationist perspective. The methodology adopted here is the analytical, conversational, and evaluative methodology. Key words: Love, Ihotu, reason, consolationism, emotion, empathy. (shrink)

While advancing the idea that morality is a universal human phenomenon, Kwasi Wiredu suggests that human reason, rather than the will of God, grounds morality and determines what is good in traditional Akan society. I note in this chapter that while Wiredu’s rationalism deviates from the traditional African theistic view that God is the source of morality, his appeal to reason rather than divine authority is consistent with his religious philosophy. This religious philosophy accommodates what I call the limited God (...) view in the African philosophy of religion. I compare Wiredu’s humanistic moral framework with the moral framework sustained by traditional African theism and argue that from a practical standpoint, both moral frameworks are attractive, as they enhance the dignity of the human being. (shrink)