Political theorists and feminist theorists alike have challenged accounts of political life that rest on an overcoming or separation from nature. They argue that such conceptions of political life divide between those who overcome their more natural existence to become political and those persons who are more closely associated with nature—women, workers, persons of color—and unable to be political (eg, Okin 1991, Pateman 1988, Mills 1997, Agamben 1998). Aristotle might be taken to offer an alternative conception of political community by (...) deeming it natural. Yet many commentators on Aristotle Politics maintain that even Aristotle’s πόλις is not really natural but made since it comes into being through the work of a legislator. On this view, human reason itself seems unnatural; any contribution from human beings would make political life unnatural. 1 I have elsewhere argued that Aristotle’s πόλις is natural, having a …. (shrink)

This reading of Aristotle's Politics builds on the insight that the history of political philosophy is a series of configurations of nature and reason. Aristotle's conceptualization of nature is unique because it is not opposed to or subordinated to reason. Adriel M. Trott uses Aristotle's definition of nature as an internal source of movement to argue that he viewed community as something that arises from the activity that forms it rather than being a form imposed on individuals. Using these (...) definitions, Trott develops readings of Aristotle's four arguments for the naturalness of the polis, interprets deliberation and the constitution in Politics as the form and final causes of the polis, and reconsiders Aristotle's treatment of slaves and women. Trott then argues that Aristotle is relevant for contemporary efforts to improve and encourage genuine democratic practices. (shrink)

Adriel M. Trott challenges the wholesale acceptance of the view that nature operates in Aristotle's work on a craft model, which implies that matter has no power of its own. Instead, she argues for a robust sense of matter in Aristotle in response to feminist critiques. She finds resources for thinking the female's contribution (and the female itself) on its own terms and not as the contrary to form, or the male. Using the image of a Möbius strip, Trott (...) considers how semen and menses flow through Aristotle's account of generation. She weaves together scholarship on matter, form and generation in Aristotle; on the mythological, Hippocratic and Pre-Socratic treatments of the feminine and the elemental; and on feminist readings of material. In doing so, she demonstrates the interdependence of form and matter in Aristotle's biology. (shrink)

This article responds to Dimitris Vardoulakis’s claim that Heidegger’s mistaken reading of phronēsis’s relation to the hou heneka, or that-for-the-sake-of-which, in Nicomachean Ethics VI at 1139a32–33, leads to an evacuation of ends from action. I argue that Heidegger is not wrong in his reading of Aristotle on phronēsis’s relation to the end. I offer a reading of the passage on which Vardoulakis focuses, which I believe is consistent with Heidegger’s, to show how Aristotle’s view of phronēsis’s role in action can (...) enable such judgment. I agree with Vardoulakis that on Heidegger’s reading, Aristotle does not view phronēsis as instrumental, but I show that this reading is borne out by the Nicomachean Ethics as a whole. I argue that the absence of instrumentality does not mean that phronēsis leaves action without an end; rather, the end of action is in the action itself. I argue in agreement with Heidegger [1997: 29, 34] and contra Vardoulakis that technē as a model of instrumentality does not capture the work of phronēsis in Aristotle (neither is it what is under critique when Heidegger criticizes modern technologizing). I argue in conclusion that Aristotle’s conception of phronēsis and the action to which it leads does allow for judgment: what can be judged is the person or the community as it shows itself in the action. (shrink)

In recent years, the growing number of persons to whom basic human rights have been explicitly denied—stateless persons, refugees, undocumented workers, sans papiers and unlawful combatants—has evidenced the logic of contemporary nation-state politics. According to this logic, the state defines itself by virtue of what it excludes while what is excluded is given no other recourse than the state for its protection. Hannah Arendt elucidates this logic when she observes that the stateless and the refugee can only be recognized as (...) human beings when they have already been recognized as citizens. Their appeal to human rights for protection was fruitless because they needed to have citizen rights, the recognition of a government, or of other citizens who can appeal to that government, in order to invoke these rights. In the terms Arendt uses to name political action, one needs to be seen and heard already, the privileges of those who are citizens, in order to appeal to be seen and heard. Just as political life (bios), in order to be free, was only possible once the necessities were accounted for in natural life (zoē), so citizenship is recognized to the exclusion of the non-citizen, that is, the merely human. -/- . (shrink)

I argue that the human being fits squarely within the natural world in Aristotle’s anthropology. Like other natural beings, we strive to fulfill our end from the potential within us to achieve that end. Logos does not make human beings unnatural but makes us responsible for our actualization. As rational, the human can never be reduced to mere living animal but is always already concerned with living well; yet, as natural, she is not separated from the animal world, a dangerous (...) distinction which inevitably leaves some persons reduced to mere animality. (shrink)

Aristotle’s political theory is often dismissed as undemocratic due to his treatment of natural slavery and women and to his conception of political rule as rule by turns. The second reason presents no less serious challenges than the first for finding democracy in Aristotle’s political theory. This article argues that Aristotle’s account of ruling in turns hinges on a critique of master rule and an affirmation of political rule, which involves both the rulers and the ruled in the project of (...) ruling. Ruling in turns makes the rule shared, not merely an exchange of opportunities to rule as a despot. (shrink)

This article addresses Rancière’s critique of Aristotle’s political theory as parapolitics in order to show that Aristotle is a resource for developing an inclusionary notion of political community. Rancière argues that Aristotle attempts to cut off politics and merely police (maintain) the community by eliminating the political claim of the poor by including it. I respond to three critiques that Rancière makes of Aristotle: that he ends the political dispute by including the demos in the government; that he includes the (...) free masses only incidentally because, by chance, the rule is political, not based on mastery; and that he attempts to close off politics by determining in advance what speech counts as speech. I argue that Aristotle attempts to institute this contest by accepting the incommensurable claims of arithmetic and geometric equality. Aristotle puts this conflict at the root of political life in such a way that serves Rancière’s larger project of perpetuating politics. (shrink)

This paper argues that Aristotle challenges the view of Athenian democrats that all rule is master rule – the imposition of the will of the powerful on the powerless – by arguing that the politeuma, or government, should be identical with the politeia, understood both as the constitution and the collectivity of citizens. I examine Aristotle’s analysis and response to democrats’ skepticism of the law that the constitution embodies. Aristotle argues that democrats think law limits license even when the source (...) of law is the people themselves. The view of citizens as the source of law coupled with the view of the law as a commitment to collective determinations regarding the end makes law salvation rather than slavery. (shrink)

Departing from Aristotle's two-fold definition of anthrōpos (human) as having logos and being political, the argument of this article is that human beings are always fundamentally political for Aristotle. This position challenges the view that ethical life is prior to or beyond the scope of political life. Aristotle's conception of the political nature of the human is developed through a reading of the linguistic argument at Politics 1.2; a careful treatment of autos, or self, in Aristotle; and an examination of (...) the political nature of anthrōpos in the context of Aristotle's candidates for the best life in Politics VII.l-3 and Nicomachean Ethics X.6-8. From this consideration the compatibility between Aristotle's claims that anthrōpos is fundamentally political and that the highest end of the human is achieved in theoria is maintained, since even in pursuing the theoretic life, human beings take up the practical question of what the best life is. (shrink)

This article considers Plato’s view of philosophy depicted in his cave analogy in light of Arendt’s distinction between Socratic and Platonic philosophy. Arendt argues that philosophy functions, for Socrates, in an immanent world, characterized by examining and considering—in addition to refining opinions through persuasion about—the currency of politics, which thereby closely associates philosophy with politics. On her view, Plato makes philosophy transcend politics—the world of opinion—when Socrates fails to persuade the Athenians. The cave analogy seems to support Arendt’s view that (...) Plato disparages the immanent philosophical project she associates with Socrates. I argue that Plato depicts in the cave analogy particular difficulties in judging the assertion of the one who claims to have left, since, in the cave, that assertion becomes an opinion among opinions because it cannot be evaluated with reference to a transcendent truth by those in the cave. As a result, those in the cave cannot discern whether the one claiming to have left has the knowledge required to rule justly or is a tyrant claiming to have such knowledge in order to secure power. I conclude that Plato depicts the cave and its difficulties to invite the reader to engage in a philosophical project of judging for oneself, rather than accepting the rule of another who claims to know. (shrink)

Dans « Games and the Art of Agency » puis dans Games : Agency as Art, Thi Nguyen introduit l’inversion motivationnelle, un état motivationnel adopté par certain·e·s agent·e·s qui ne visent la victoire que pour éprouver les défis qui se présentent dans le cadre du jeu. Celleux-ci sont amené·e·s à considérer les objectifs largables du jeu comme des fins, bien qu’iels sachent ne désirer les rencontrer que dans une perspective instrumentale. Il s’agit ici de préciser la description de ce phénomène (...) et de la comparer aux perspectives prévalentes de la duperie de soi. Si j’insiste sur les ressemblances entre ces dernières et l’état d’inversion motivationnelle, je ne tente pas de le réduire à un cas d’irrationalité. Il semble cependant que la nécessité de préciser davantage le concept d’agentivité chez Thi Nguyen se dessine pour éviter de traiter l’inversion motivationnelle comme un simple cas de duperie de soi ainsi que certaines conséquences curieuses se dégageant de leurs ressemblances. (shrink)

This book collects the work of leading scholars on Alain Badiou and G.W.F. Hegel, creating a dialogue between, and a critical appraisal of, these two central figures in European philosophy.

Introduction: Despite being considered as a contravention under some countries’ legislation, the therapeutic use of Cannabis sativa has been growing in Brazil, due to the promising results observed in many pathologies. Such a scenario has fostered the need to deepen discussions on the subject and possibly revise legislation governing the substance use and access. Objectives: Identify the types of stigma related to the therapeutic use of Cannabis and describe the strategies people use to overcome stigma. Methods: This integrative review was (...) carried out in the databases PubMed, Scopus, CINAHL, MEDLINE, PsycINFO, Web of Science, and Cochrane Library, with 565 articles being retrieved. Triads’ cross-check were done, first maintaining the “cannabis” and “therapeutic use” pair, added by “stigma,” “bioethics,” “ethics,” “social consequences,” and “legal consequences.” The final selection resulted in six articles. Ethical Consideration: However, the ethical issues that pervade and regulate decisions on this subject must be considered. Results: Different dimensions and types of stigma related to the therapeutic use of Cannabis have been identified. The bioethical principle of autonomy was an expression of citizenship and human rights, mitigating internal conflicts related to self-stigma and the effects of external stigma on the person’s life. Conclusion: It was possible to identify the types of stigma related to the therapeutic use of Cannabis is an internal dimension represented (self-stigma) and an external dimension, represented (social and structural stigmas) and to identify strategies adopted to face this stigma: skills training group for users, elaboration of laws and specific programs to clarify the therapeutic use of Cannabis with a greater social scope, and support for family members. Thus, contributing to the building of people’s autonomy in a broader context of decision-making autonomy and executive autonomy will provide the development of people’s capacity to perform complex tasks of self-management and, consequently, to continue promoting and preserving their decision-making process and their capacity to plan and perform tasks associated with managing their lives and their treatments. (shrink)

In her “Saving the Appearances in Plato’s Cave,” Dr. Adriel M. Trott argues that “the philosopher’s claim to true knowledge always operates within the realm of the cave.” In order to probe her claim, I challenge her to make sense of “politics in the cave,” namely the status and practices of two categories of people in the cave: “woke” cave dwellers (namely, those who recognize shadows as shadows but have not left the cave) and “woke” puppeteers (namely, philosophers ruling (...) within the cave). (shrink)

This is a fresh, substantial, and engaging contribution to the ongoing Aristotle revival in political philosophy and theory. Trott’s project, like that of other works in this newish tradition, is not simply to interpret Aristotle but to advance an interpretation that has practical significance, one that employs Aristotle-interpretation as a starting point for calling into question key elements of the modern Western political imaginary. The book is as much a contribution to democratic theory as it is to Greek philosophy. This (...) is not at all to say that Trott’s approach to the Greek texts lacks rigor. To the contrary, she presents an interpretation of the Politics based on careful close reading.. (shrink)

In her “Saving the Appearances of Plato’s Cave,” Dr. Adriel M. Trott argues that “the philosopher’s claim to true knowledge always operates within the realm of the cave.” In order to probe her claim, I challenge her to make sense of “politics in the cave,” namely, the status and practices of two categories of people in the cave: “woke” cave-dwellers and “woke” puppeteers.

Pierre Pellegrin has devoted his scholarly life to the understanding of Aristotle the political philosopher, Aristotle the life-scientist, and—perhaps most importantly—Aristotle the analyst of life-science who is also a political philosopher. Like D. M. Balme, Allan Gotthelf, and James Lennox—Pellegrin is one of the foremost scholars who has sought to understand Aristotle’s biological writings in a philosophically and philologically sophisticated fashion. Pellegrin is also one of the foremost scholars who has sought to understand the intersection between Aristotle’s biological studies and (...) his other works, especially the ethical/political writings, like current scholars such as Sophia Connell, Mariska Leunissen, and Adriel M. Trott. The volume under-review, Anthony Preus’ translation of Pellegrin’s L'Excellence menacée: Sur la philosophie politique d'Aristote (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2017, reviewed by J.J. Mulhern for BMCR) is especially welcome because it brings together in one volume—ably rendered into English by Preus—analytical threads that Pellegrin has pursued in a number of independent essays on topics such as natural teleology and the Politics, slavery, the composition of the Politics, the nature of political friendship, and the structure and diversity of Aristotelian constitutions. (shrink)

Aristotle's Politics claims that the polis or city-state "exists by nature" (Pol. 1.2.1252630). Thinkers as diverse as Marsilius of Padua, Thomas Hobbes, and Martha Nussbaum have struggled with how to interpret such a claim-some finding in it a salutary alternative to existing political theories, others finding in it the basis of deeply wrong-headed political thinking. In Aristotle on the Nature of Community, Adriel Trott seeks both to elucidate and to defend Aristotle's claim about the naturalness of the polis by (...) interpreting nature in the Politics through the notion of nature as an internal principle of motion ( a notion central to the understanding of natural things articulated in his treatise thereupon, viz. Physics2.1). (shrink)