This paper argues that besides the critical and historically informed genealogies of his later work, Nietzsche also sketched genealogies that are not historically situated and that display an under-appreciated affirmative aspect. The paper begins by looking at two early examples of such genealogies where datable historical origins are clearly not at issue, which raises the question of what kind of origins Nietzsche is after. It is argued that these genealogies inquire into practical origins—into the original point of certain conceptual practices (...) given certain needs, and that this reflects Nietzsche’s instrumentalism about concepts. It is then argued that this focus lends the genealogies an affirmative dimension, because they present their object as naturalistically intelligible and practically indispensable. Finally, it is shown how the nature and limits of this affirmative dimension can be tentatively sharpened by connecting it to Nietzsche’s later notion of the economic justification of morality. (shrink)

Affirmative action programs are not justified by compensatory justice. They place a disproportionate burden on white-male applicants. White-male applicants do not owe compensation because they committed a relevant wrongdoing or because they benefitted from another’s wrongdoing. They did not commit a relevant wrongdoing. Receipt of an unjust benefit, when unavoidable and mixed with hard work, does not justify a duty to compensate a victim of the injustice. Thus, the compensatory-justice argument for affirmative action fails.

Fashion are implemented with regard to social context through a variety of studies, including the examination of fashion style. The period between 2010 and 2019 was selected as the guiding time frame. The objective of this study is to present an implementation process of a fashion style in Indonesia, both in synchronic and diachronic perspectives. This qualitative research with a historical approach employs a variety of data source including literature data from journals, books, fashion magazines, interviews with fashion experts, and (...) focus group discussions. The study proposes four dominant styles of trend fashion in Indonesia between 2010 to 2019, namely: modest, an emerged particular theme in Indonesia; athleisure, a reflection view of health and well-being; informality, the roles of millennial as leadership changes; and traditional, that represented the traditional culture of Indonesia. The finding of this study can be summarized as follows: The acceptance process of the four dominant styles can be attributed to the reflection ideas among fashion consumers in Indonesia. Additionally, the shift and the acceptance of fashion styles from 2010 to 2019 was mainly influenced by the affirmation process between role models and followers. Furthermore, the pattern of fashion in Indonesia shows different indications compared to global fashion trends, because of the cultural aspects as distinctive characteristics of fashion styles based on traditional values and meanings. (shrink)

My paper addresses a topic--the implications of Rawls's justice as fairness for affirmative action--that has received remarkably little attention from Rawls's major interpreters. The only extended treatments of it that are in print are over a quarter-century old, and they bear scarcely any relationship to Rawls's own nonideal theorizing. Following Christine Korsgaard's lead, I work through the implications of Rawls's nonideal theory and show what it entails for affirmative action: viz. that under nonideal conditions, aggressive forms of formal equality of (...) opportunity (e.g., sensitivity training, outreach efforts, external monitoring and enforcement) and compensating support (e.g., special fellowship programs, childcare facilities, mentoring, co-op opportunities, etc.) can be justified, but that "hard" and even "soft" quotas are difficult to defend under any conditions. I conclude the paper by exploring the implications of these surprising results for contemporary liberalism more broadly and for constitutional law and public policy. (shrink)

Gender‐affirming care is almost exclusively discussed in connection with transgender medicine. However, this article argues that such care predominates among cisgender patients, people whose gender identity matches their sex assigned at birth. To advance this argument, we trace historical shifts in transgender medicine since the 1950s to identify central components of “gender‐affirming care” that distinguish it from previous therapeutic models, such as “sex reassignment.” Next, we sketch two historical cases—reconstructive mammoplasty and testicular implants—to show how cisgender patients offered justifications grounded (...) in authenticity and gender affirmation that closely mirror rationales supporting gender‐affirming care for transgender people. The comparison exposes significant disparities in contemporary health policy regarding care for cis and trans patients. We consider two possible objections to the analogy we draw, but ultimately argue that these disparities are rooted in “trans exceptionalism” that produces demonstrable harm.. (shrink)

A significant body of evidence shows that law schools and many elite colleges use large admissions preferences based on race, and other evidence strongly suggests that large preferences can undermine student achievement in law school and undergraduate science majors, thus producing highly counterproductive effects. This article draws on available evidence to examine the use of racial preferences in medical school admissions, and finds strong reasons for concern about the effects and effectiveness of current affirmative action efforts. The author calls for (...) better data and careful investigation of several identified patterns. (shrink)

Affirmations for Manifestation is an inspiring collection of daily affirmations that helps you shift your mindset, focus on positivity, and channel your inner power to create the changes you wish to see in the world around you. Touching on common goals for everyday life--from improving your career, to strengthening your relationships, to building your self-esteem--this book is a daily guide to manifesting change."--Provided by publisher.

One popular criticism of affirmative action is that it discriminates against those who would otherwise have been offered jobs without it. This objection must rely on the non- consequentialist distinction between what we do and what we merely allow to claim that doing nothing merely allows people to be harmed by the discrimination of others, while preferential programs actively harm those left out. It fails since the present effects of past discrimination result from social arrangements which result from actions of (...) ours. We can be responsible for the effects of past discrimination, even without having discriminated, if we are responsible for that discrimination having those effects. (shrink)

In his posthumously published Living Up to Death Paul Ricoeur left an impressive testimony on what it means to live at a high old age with death approaching. In this article I present him as a teacher who reminds us of valuable lessons taught by patients in palliative care and their caretakers who accompany them on their way to death, and also as a guide in our search for a modern ars moriendi, after—what many at least experience as—the breakdown of (...) traditional religious belief in a personal afterlife. These lessons can be summarized in the following theses. ‘Living up to death, one cannot experience one’s own death. Therefore, never consider someone dying as moribund’. ‘Though everybody is alone in dying, nobody should die alone.’ ‘The preparation for death is an affirmation of life’. ‘Life experienced as a gift can be given up’. The plausibility of the last thesis, however, may go beyond the confines of austere philosophical thinking. (shrink)

In light of many recent critiques of Western modernity and its conceptual foundations, the problem of adequately justifying our most basic moral and political values looms large. Without recourse to traditional ontological or metaphysical foundations, how can one affirm — or sustain — a commitment to fundamentals? The answer, according to Stephen White, lies in a turn to “weak” ontology, an approach that allows for ultimate commitments but at the same time acknowledges their historical, contestable character. This turn, White suggests, (...) is already underway. His book traces its emergence in a variety of quarters in political thought today and offers a clear and compelling account of what this might mean for our late modern self-understanding. (shrink)

Affirmative action is often implemented as a way of making redress to victims of past injustices. But critics of this practice have launched a three-pronged assault against it. Firstly, they point out that beneficiaries of preferential policies tend not to benefit to the same extent as they were harmed by past injustices. Secondly, when its defenders point to the wider benefits of affirmative action , critics maintain that such ends could never be sufficiently weighty to permit violating equal treatment. And, (...) thirdly, critics dispute whether the alleged benefits of affirmative action really ensue. I argue this three-pronged assault is flawed at the conceptual level. Firstly, it operates with an impoverished conception of redress. When X wrongs Y, X does not make exhaustive redress to Y by compensating Y for the harm Y suffered due to X’s wrong action. Redress also requires rectification of the wrong: X must put right the wrong done to Y by making adequate amends. While the means of compensation are determined by the extent of the harm for which compensation is due, the adequacy of amends for a wrong is less tightly controlled by the nature of the wrong. So, secondly, it is perfectly right that the choice of amends be informed by the prospect of wider benefits. Whether, thirdly, these benefits are in fact in prospect in the case of affirmative action is an empirical question which philosophy cannot answer. (shrink)

A travers une analyse des concepts d’affirmation originaire, d’attestation et de reconnaissance, cet article tente de reconstituer le sens et les motivations du cheminement réflexif qui conduit Ricœur de L’Homme faillible à Soi-même comme un autre et à Parcours de la reconnaissance . Pour ce faire, il s’efforce d’abord de montrer ce qui fait la continuité profonde, de problématique et de méthode, du projet anthropologique ricœurien; afin de dégager ensuite les difficultés centrales liées à l’idée d’une constitution poétique du (...) soi, qui conduisent Ricœur à réélaborer les concepts directeurs de son herméneutique du soi. A la lumière du dialogue constant de Ricœur avec la philosophie de Nabert, il tente enfin de montrer comment les concepts d’attestation et de reconnaissance trouvent, pour l’essentiel, leur genèse dans un approfondissement de la notion d’affirmation originaire, lui-même prolongé par une réflexion sur le témoignage.  . (shrink)

(2013). Affirming and Rethinking our Visions and Responsibilities as Social Foundations Scholars and Educators. Educational Studies: Vol. 49, Critical, Interpretive, and Normative Perspectives of Educational Foundations: Contributions for the 21st Century, pp. 101-103.

I defend impact-based accounts of institutional racism against the criticism that they are over-inclusive. If having a negative impact on non-whites suffices to make an institution racist, too many institutions (including institutions whose affirmative action policies inadvertently harm its intended beneficiaries) would count as racist. To address this challenge, I consider a further necessary condition for these institutions to count as racist—they must stand in a particular relation to racist ideology. I argue that, on the impact-based model, institutions are racist (...) if they have a negative racial impact AND this impact is legitimized by racist ideology. Racist ideologies limit social criticism of and collective action against institutions that have a negative racial impact, and in so doing, lend stability to systems of racial domination. (shrink)

Admissions to upper-tier universities have become increasingly competitive. The erosion of gains made during the Civil Rights Era is evidenced by recent legal actions at the University of Michigan. In this paper I argue that affirmative action programs remain a necessary means for achieving social justice. Further, I argue that more than mere affirmative action, what is also required is Nancy Fraser’s “Transformative Action.” To reach these conclusions, the paper is divided into three parts: (1) The continued assault on Affirmative (...) Action; (2) the SAT and race; and (3) transformative action. (shrink)

Several uncorroborated, false, or misinterpreted conceptions have for years been widely distributed in academic publications, thus becoming scientific myths. How can such misconceptions persist and proliferate within the inimical environment of academic criticism? Examining 613 articles we demonstrate that the reception of three myth-exposing publications is skewed by an ‘affirmative citation bias’: The vast majority of articles citing the critical article will affirm the idea criticized. 468 affirmed the myth, 105 were neutral, while 40 took a negative stance. Once misconceptions (...) proliferate wide and long enough, criticizing them not only becomes increasingly difficult, efforts may even contribute to the continued spreading of the myths. (shrink)

In the Ethics, Spinoza advances two apparently irreconcilable construals of will [voluntas]. Initially, he presents will as a shorthand way of referring to the volitions that all ideas involve, namely affirmations and negations. But just a few propositions later, he defines it as striving when it is “related only to the mind” (3p9s). It is difficult to see how these two construals can be reconciled, since to affirm or assent to some content is to adopt an attitude with a cognitive (...) (mind-to-world) direction of fit, while to strive to persevere in one’s being would seem to be to adopt an attitude with a conative (world-to-mind) direction of fit. Attempting to achieve consistency by taking striving under the attribute of thought to consist in affirming only pushes the equivocation problem onto the concept of affirmation (Lin 2019). It would seem, then, that Spinoza equivocates on the concepts of will, affirmation, or perhaps both. I defend the univocity of Spinoza’s accounts of will and affirmation, showing that it comports with established accounts of affirmation in early modern philosophy and yields a clear, uniform account of what it means to strive under the attribute of thought, preserving the systematicity of Spinoza’s account of mind in ways that other interpretations do not. (shrink)

Our purpose in this paper is to argue how the idea of affirmation of life embodies the practice of the art of life. The yes-saying attitude towards life can provide an enormous support for the self-formation practices. Our attempt, then, consists of demonstrating the subjective character of the aesthetic marked by pleasure, and especially a new approach to the relationship between “I” and the other. We comprehend that this sort of life is individually relative or subjective. Meanwhile, there is (...) a political reconfiguration of “I” and the other which ends in freedom. Politics becomes possible in a simultaneous caring for I and the other through the practices of self-constitution. In order to clarify our discussion further, this challenge is accompanied by a presentation of three real lives that are exemplary for us in the art of life; a way of being that stands for a political affirmation of life. (shrink)

This book develops a new methodological approach to infinite otherness that explains how the affirmation of this otherness, despite our best intentions, tends to create a conflictual aspect in social values.

‘IB was one of the great affirmers of our time.’ John Banville, New York Review of Books The title of this final volume of Isaiah Berlin’s letters is echoed by John Banville’s verdict in his review of its predecessor, Building: Letters 1960–75, which saw Berlin publish some of his most important work, and create, in Oxford’s Wolfson College, an institutional and architectural legacy. In the period covered by this new volume (1975–97) he consolidates his intellectual legacy with a series of (...) essay collections. These generate many requests for clarification from his readers, and stimulate him to reaffirm and sometimes refine his ideas, throwing substantive new light on his thought as he grapples with human issues of enduring importance. Berlin’s comments on world affairs, especially the continuing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, and the collapse of Communism, are characteristically acute. This is also the era of the Northern Ireland Troubles, the Iranian revolution, the rise of Solidarity in Poland, the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the fall of the Berlin Wall, Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa against Salman Rushdie, the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, and wars in the Falkland Islands, the Persian Gulf and the Balkans. Berlin scrutinises the leading politicians of the day, including Reagan, Thatcher and Gorbachev, and draws illuminating sketches of public figures, notably contrasting the personas of Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Andrey Sakharov. He declines a peerage, is awarded the Agnelli Prize for ethics, campaigns against philistine architecture in London and Jerusalem, helps run the National Gallery and Covent Garden, and talks at length to his biographer. He reflects on the ideas for which he is famous – especially liberty and pluralism – and there is a generous leavening of the conversational brilliance for which he is also renowned, as he corresponds with friends about politics, the academic world, music and musicians, art and artists, and writers and their work, always displaying a Shakespearean fascination with the variety of humankind. Affirming is the crowning achievement both of Berlin’s epistolary life and of the widely acclaimed edition of his letters whose first volume appeared in 2004. (shrink)

Affirmative action is standardly pursued in relation to admissions to prestigious universities, in hiring for prestigious jobs, and when it comes to being elected to parliament. Central to these forms of affirmative action is that they have to do with competitive goods. A good is competitive when, if we improve A’s chances of getting the good, we reduce B’s chances of obtaining the good. I call this Competitive Affirmative Action. I distinguish this from Non-competitive Affirmative Action. The latter has to (...) do with non-competitive goods, e.g., being granted early parole or freedom from arbitrary arrest. I argue that some of the most prominent objections against affirmative action—in particular, the reverse discrimination objection and the merit objection—speak less against Non-competitive Affirmative Action. And that some of the most prominent arguments in favor of affirmative action, insofar as they justify Competitive Affirmative Action, also justify Non-competitive Affirmative Action. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called 'affirming a disjunct' (AAD). It presents a few examples of fallacies in arguments caused by an ambiguity in the English word or. Because context makes the meaning clear in everyday usage, we might never have thought about this ambiguity before, but we actually use the word or in two very distinct ways. One type of or is known as “inclusive”, and the other type is known as “exclusive”. (...) AAD occurs when someone mistakenly believes that an inclusive or is an exclusive or. Importantly, not every or statement can fall prey to AAD. The argument known as a disjunctive syllogism sets out two possibilities that are mutually exclusive. When someone is dead, she/he is not alive, and when someone is alive, she/he is not dead. (shrink)

Affirming the consequent is an inferential pattern in which one infers the antecedent of a given conditional from its consequent. Abductive inference is structurally similar: given some evidence, one infers a hypothesis that explains the evidence. I show that a Bayesian analysis of affirming the consequent helps us understand under which conditions abduction may be justified. This provides a Bayesian vindication of explanatory inference.

Little is known about how researchers view ethically salient aspects of human studies. As part of a National Institutes of Mental Health-funded study, the authors performed a confidential written survey to assess the attitudes, views, and experiences of researchers with institutional review board approved protocols at the University of New Mexico. A total of 363 researchers (57% response rate) participated. Investigators overall held favorable views of general ethical aspects of research and ethics-based safeguards, and they identified a positive role of (...) ethics training. Investigators with more experience encountering ethical problems (p < .001), more ethics training (p = .001), and a PhD or MD/PhD (p = .003) held more favorable general ethical perspectives. Women investigators (p < .03), nonphysician investigators (p < .001), those whose training had been helpful in resolving ethical dilemmas (p = .006), and those for whom spirituality is important (p = .008) more strongly endorsed ethical safeguards. Investigators perceive the scientific and ethical aspects of their work as valuable and linked, and they affirm the role of safeguards in human studies. Formal ethics preparation and training initiatives were also viewed positively by investigators. (shrink)

Au renouveau indéniable de la théologie de la création, ne semble pas correspondre, dans l’expérience d’un bon nombre de chrétiens de notre temps, un intérêt égal pour l’affirmation de la création du monde ou de Dieu créateur. Comment expliquer cette disparité ? La croyance à la création revêt deux formes, l’une faible, celle du théisme, l’autre forte, celle de la foi scripturaire liée à l’Alliance, et il semble que la seconde cherche à assumer la première comme une voie sapientielle (...) de portée universelle ; mais la foi de nombreux chrétiens ne paraît même pas impliquer cette croyance faible. Cet oubli appauvrit sans doute leur foi, mais peut s’expliquer : la sécularisation a produit un effacement de la notion de création, qui a perdu son évidence culturelle, la question de l’origine est laissée à la science, le croyant trouve Dieu dans la proximité du présent et ne le cherche plus dans l’espace originaire, et des attitudes croyantes, autrefois liées à cette notion, s’expriment aujourd’hui autrement sans altération de la foi. La théologie aurait avantage à analyser le lien de la création à la culture, et à expliciter le rôle qu’y joue l’Esprit Saint dans une perspective mystique d’anéantissement ou de « décréation ».Despite an undeniable renewal of creation theology, a good number of contemporaneous Christians do not seem to have the same interest in affirming the world’s creation or a God creator. How can this disparity be explained ? Belief in creation takes on two forms : a weak one of theism and a strong one of scriptural faith tied to the Covenant. It seems that the second tries to assume the first as a sapiential way with universal import. The faith of numerous Christians, however, does not seem to even imply this weak belief. Without doubt, this omission impoverishes their faith but can be explained : secularization wiped out the idea of creation when it lost its cultural importance. The question of origins is left to science, ; the believer finds God in the proximity of the present and no longer looks for the original space. It is also true that believing attitudes, which were tied to this notion in the past, express themselves today in another way, without changing the faith. Theology would be better off if it analysed the connection of creation to culture and make explicit the role that the Holy Spirit plays in the mystical perspective of annihilation or of “de-creation”. (shrink)

For the students, while the numbers are up,… the problem that minorities face – and it is persistent – is that there is still too much of a patronizing air in the professional schools. And there's still too much of the notion that if you're here it must be because someone gave you a break and you're different and you really don't belong here. And indeed when my son went off to school four years ago… I really wanted to warn (...) him about the atmosphere that you see on all too many campuses, diat if you're black and walking on campus, that all too many people look at you and say, “You must be an affirmative action product,” whatever that means to them. “You're here only at our good grace.” And no one's looking at the individual. Thinking about it in retrospect, I guess, in some ways I enjoyed an advantage in being [the only black in my law school class]. It was a terrible disadvantage in a lot of ways, but, because I was the only black, the one thing I never faced was anyone ever challenging my intellectual capability. The way they brought this off was to say, “Well, you're different. You're black but you're not really black.” I think it's a lot worse now…. Professional schools are hard enough as it is, and to constantly have the pressure of what others are thinking about you and wondering whether you really belong, that really is a difficult burden. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to explore the worth of a materialist/posthumanist approach to ethics, specifically affirmative ethics, within the field of education. I work empirical material that ‘does’ this ethics in classrooms and draw on Deleuze’s ethically guided materialism as taken up by Braidotti, to gain purchase on it. Defined as a relational matter of human and non-human powers of acting in pursuit of affirmative values, affirmative ethics focuses up relations, forces and affects. It poses considerable challenges to (...) a normalised construction of ethics as located solely within a constituted human subject with moral intentionality as its core. Affirmative ethics presents empirically as an emergent property of relational assemblages of human and more than human elements that bring ethical subjectivity into effect. Pedagogy and curriculum perform a constitutive role in these assemblages, as does pedagogic affect, showing how this ethics can be activated. A materialist affirmative ethics makes for a multi-faceted and generative practice of ethics. Oriented to collectivity and with relationality ‘built-in’, it has the potential to play a significant role in the reconstitution of individualised subjectivity which neoliberal modes of governance continue to advance in education. (shrink)

Gender affirming hormone treatment is an important part of the care of trans adolescents which enables them to develop the secondary sexual characteristics congruent with their identified genders. There is an increasing amount of empirical evidence showing the benefits of gender affirming hormone treatment for psychological health and social well-being in this population. However, in several countries, access to gender affirming hormone treatment for trans adolescents has recently been severely restricted. While much of the opposition to gender affirming hormone treatment (...) for trans adolescents has in part been ideologically motivated, it also reflects a debate about whether there are harms that outweigh the benefits of the treatment. Accordingly, a systematic and comprehensive philosophical analysis of the ethics of gender affirming hormone treatment for trans adolescents is needed. Herein, I offer such an analysis that draws on the four principles of biomedical ethics by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress. Based on the considerations of beneficence, nonmaleficence, autonomy, and justice, I argue that the provision of access to gender affirming hormone treatment for consenting trans adolescents is ethically required and that the current restrictions to such treatment are ethically wrong. (shrink)

Affirmative action refers to positive steps taken to hire persons from groups previously and presently discriminated against. Considerable evidence indicates that this discrimination is intractable and cannot be eliminated by the enforcement of laws. Numerical goals and quotas are justified if and only if they are necessary to overcome the discriminatory effects that could not otherwise be eliminated with reasonable efficiency. Many past as well as present policies are justified in this way.

In the context of state educational institutions, young white males are owed a duty to respect their interest or desert tokens. Not all white males have waived this duty since many white males have not performed the relevant types of culpable wrongdoing. Merely having benefitted from an unjust injury act or being a member of a community that owe a debt of compensation to racial minorities and women are not sufficient grounds to override the duty owed to the white male. (...) Since the three most plausible attempts to provide a compensatory justice justification for strong affirmative action programs at state educational institutions fail, I conclude that the following is false. (1) Other things being equal, a state educational institution may choose to hire a less qualified candidate over a more qualified candidate because the weight given to the race or gender of the less qualified candidate relates to the elimination of a debt of compensatory justice. Hence, unless strong affirmative action programs at state educational institutions can be justified by reference to some other value, such as the value of diversity, the state ought to eliminate such programs. (shrink)

In order to dismantle the racial and social hierarchy that is the legacy of apartheid, South Africa has followed the lead of Western liberal democracies andappropriated the discourse of affirmative action. This paper argues that current affirmative action policy fails in significant ways because it paradoxically ignores the concrete social and historical conditions of race and racism in South Africa and simply aims to normalize competition among abstract individuals by using a principle of racial neutrality The author argues that social (...) justice will only be achieved in South Africa in a context of deliberative democracy, where effective affirmative action aims at social cooperation, full participation of non-whites in decision-making, and the elimination of race as a relevant social category. (shrink)

The following reflections are intended as a preliminary to a more extended and in-depth series of case studies, focused analyses of actual artworks, and the issues arising from their particularity within what will be described here as a Heideggerian post-aesthetic aesthetics. The essay is not written from the perspective of a professional or academic philosopher or of a practising artist (even though I am one), neither fields of which have sufficiently engaged with the existential and aesthetic predicament sketched out below. (...) Thus, the attraction of both Heidegger and Blanchot is not just related to their well-known discussions of inbetween-ness, but, more essentially, to the peculiarly in-between location of their own thought and trajectory of thinking: Heidegger from "out of" philosophy "drawn" towards art; Blanchot from within the space ofliterature towards the exteriority of ontological thinking. The intention is to identify similarities and differences in their thought, but this is only perceived as relevant to the extent that it allows an initial reassessment of a de-subjectivized existential and aesthetic mode of thinking that has been largely abandoned by academic philosophy and art practice alike (albeit for very different reasons). If nothing else, the hope is that a different voice might be heard in the clamorous exchange between philosopher and artists, one that is sensitive to the complex predicament of the artist in a post-Heidegerrian world, and which above all remains faithful to the project of the artist and the artwork in the face of the philosophical valorization of "Art". Las siguientes reflexiones se presentan como preliminares a una serie de estudios de caso mas extensos y profundos, analisis focalizados de obras de artes reales, y los temas que surgen de sus particularidades dentro de lo que se describira aqui como una estetica heideggeriana post-estetica. El ensayo no esta escrito desde la perspectiva de un filosofo profesional o academico ni de un artista operante (aunque yo lo soy), ninguno de cuyos campos se ha comprometido suficientemente con el dilema bosquejado mas adelante. Asi pues, la atraccion de Heidegger y Blanchot no solo tiene que ver con sus bien conocidas discusiones sobre la inbetween-ness, sino, mas esencialmente, con la ubicacion particularmente in-between de su propio pensamiento y trayectoria del pensar: Heidegger desde "fuera de" la filosofia "sacado" hacia el arte; Blanchot desde dentro del espacio de la literatura hacia la exterioridad del pensar ontologico. La intencion es identificar similitudes y diferencias en su pensamiento, pero esto solo es percibido como relevante en la medida en que permite una reevaluacion de un modo de pensar existencial y estetico des-subjetivado, que ha sido ampliamente abando-nado por la filosofia academica y la practica del arte (aunque por razones distintas). Sin mas pretensiones, la esperanza es que se pueda escuchar una voz diferente en el intercambio clamoroso entre el filosofo y los artistas; voz que es sensible al complejo dilema del artista en un mundo post-heideggeriano, y que sobre todo permanece fiel al proyecto del artista y a la obra de arte frente a la valorizacion filosofica del "Arte". (shrink)

Posthuman affirmative ethics relies upon a fluid, nomadic conception of the ethical subject who develops affective, material and immaterial connections to multiple others. Our purpose in this paper is to consider what posthuman affirmative business ethics would look like, and to reflect on the shift in thinking and practice this would involve. The need for a revised understanding of human–animal relations in business ethics is amplified by crises such as climate change and pandemics that are related to ecologically destructive business (...) practices such as factory farming. In this analysis, we use feminist speculative fiction as a resource for reimagination and posthuman ethical thinking. By focusing on three ethical movements experienced by a central character named Toby in Margaret Atwood’s MaddAddam trilogy, we show how she is continually becoming through affective, embodied encounters with human and nonhuman others. In the discussion, we consider the vulnerability that arises from openness to affect which engenders heightened response-ability to and with, rather than for, multiple others. This expanded concept of subjectivity enables a more relational understanding of equality that is urgently needed in order to respond affirmatively to posthuman futures. (shrink)

I defend affirmative action on the ground that it increases certain people’s ability to exercise their basic liberties, rather than because it rectifies injustice in the narrow context of educational admission procedures. I present this justification using a Rawlsian contractualist framework to forge a “nonideal principle of justice.” Drawing on social science, I argue that this principle supports affirmative-action policies like those in the contemporary U.S., and blocks the objection that such policies are unfair. In closing, I show how my (...) account can be used to refine some features of contemporary affirmative-action policies, and I reflect more generally on the value of nonideal principles of justice for tackling exigent topics. (shrink)

Since the times of Plato and Aristotle, the relation of poetry to philosophy has been controversial. For certain scholars, poetry should in no way be confused with philosophy. For others, poetry is at the heart of the possibility of thinking itself. In _Affirmation of Poetry_, Judith Balso defends the significance of poetry as a necessary practice for thinking. For Balso, if reading poetry properly has become an obscure task, poetry itself still carries with it a power of thinking: the efforts (...) of the poets must continue. In analyzing the affirmation of thought found within the work of such poets as Osip Mandelstam, Wallace Stevens, Alberto Caeiro, and Giacomo Leopardi, Balso reestablishes poetry’s place as a site of thought. (shrink)

Though the common sense defense of affirmative action (or employment equity) appeals to principles of restitution, philosophers have tried to defend it in other ways. In contrast, I defend it by appealing to the notion of restitution, arguing (1) that alternative attempts to justify affirmative action fail; and (2) that ordinary affirmative action programs need to be supplemented and amended in keeping with the principles this suggests.

Affirmative action as a state policy is one of the powerful ways of empowering the underprivileged in the society. While such a policy is aimed at lifting the economic and social condition of the underprivileged, this comes with acts that are discriminatory and exclusionary. Yet these acts are termed as positive discrimination. Certain sections of the society are excluded from having access to economic resources and opportunities, while these privileges are earmarked for another section of the society considered marginalized and (...) underprivileged. This is being done guided by the principle of distributive justice. While the principle carries sound moral basis, conceptualizing the deprived and mode of empowerment varies with states and society, thus throws up several challenges. Indian experience draws challenges of negotiating the dual presence of individual and collective in the theorizing—idea of empowerment is directed to an individual, but the identity of the individual is based on his/her social identity. The dual challenge of uplifting a caste/community through empowering an individual belonging to the group has raised several questions in terms of achieving the goal of distributive justice. While the principle of distributive justice aims at empowering the least privileged within an underprivileged group/community, this has not been an easy task. After seventy years of reservation policy a lot more initiative is still called for. There is perhaps need for deeper philosophical deliberation on the nature of empowerment, distributive justice, and the underlying moral foundations. Meaningful policy intervention must be built on well thought out theoretical deliberations. (shrink)

In this article, I examine the moral dimensions of gender affirmation. I argue that the moral value of gender affirmation is rooted in what Iris Murdoch called loving attention. Loving attention is central to the moral value of gender affirmation because such affirmation is otherwise too fragile or insincere to have such value. Moral reasons to engage in acts that gender affirm derive from the commitment to give and express loving attention to trans people as a (...) way of challenging their marginalization. In the latter part of the paper, I will discuss how my arguments bear on recent arguments by Robin Dembroff and Daniel Wodak (2018) on the use of gender-neutral language. They argue that we have a duty not to use gender-specific pronouns for anyone. Their conclusion turns, in part, on a rejection of gender affirmation as a moral duty. The value of gender affirmation, rooted in our moral perception of trans people, should make us skeptical of this conclusion, in favor of a more nuanced and pluralistic approach to the ethics of gendering. (shrink)

This is an important, curious book that is worth the effort it takes to get through it. It makes a distinctive case for the centrality of Nietzsche's grappling with nihilism, giving content to his notoriously thin notion of "affirming life," and it offers a nuanced account of "will to power," specifically in relation to Schopenhauer's "will to live." Among its curiosities are its method of extensive reliance on the collection of notes published as The Will to Power and its characterization (...) of a paradox at the core of Nietzsche's project: affirming life turns on embracing the idea that "will to power requires pain as one of the conditions of its satisfaction" . Only the second of these can be discussed here. And while the writing style tediously resembles a form of scholasticism that gets in the way of understanding what exactly Reginster is arguing, the book repays the reader's forbearance by offering some genuinely provocative ideas.Reginster's main project is to show how nihilism and its solution are central to Nietzsche's thinking about the "affirmation of life." This hinges on revaluing suffering as intrinsic to satisfying an ultimate desire to overcome resistance. In a nutshell, that is Nietzsche's "doctrine of the will to power," and it leads Reginster to claim that the. (shrink)

Tragedy is a founding theme in disability studies. Critical disability studies have, since their inception, argued that understandings of disability as tragedy obscure the political dimensions of disability and are a barrier facing disabled persons in society. In this paper, we propose an affirmative understanding of tragedy, employing the philosophical works of Nietzsche, Spinoza and Hasana Sharp. Tragedy is not, we argue, something to be opposed by disability politics; we can affirm life within it. To make our case, we look (...) to an ongoing ethnography of two Canadian children’s rehabilitation clinics. Looking to the clinical experience of Canadian boys and young men diagnosed with Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy and those of their families, we show how this affirmative understanding of tragedy allows us to pursue the themes of disability politics within tragedy. Contrary to an optimism that would eschew tragedy at all costs or a pessimistic approach that declines to act in the face of tragic circumstance, we argue that a revised understanding of tragedy allows us to situate the occasionally-tragic clinical experience of disability in a philosophy of life. Both disability and tragedy point us to the shared entanglements that make life what it is. (shrink)

In this essay I explore the nature of Deleuze’s commitment to an affirmative naturalism that is based on certain Epicurean principles and insights. The essay is divided into two main parts. In the first part I bring to light some of the key features of Lucretius’s great poem on the nature of things, and I do so with the aid of Bergson and his reading of the teaching as fundamentally melancholic. In the second part I switch my attention to Deleuze (...) and show how he links together physics and ethics as a way of providing an emancipatory and affirmative philosophy of life and one that aims to defeat sadness. In the conclusion I return to the question of melancholy and indicate how the problem might be best negotiated. (shrink)

A common concern regarding affirmative action is that it sanctions the selection of candidates whose qualifications are not the best overall and that this is inefficient or unjust or both. I argue that this concern is misguided, since there is no independent concern regarding qualifications with respect to the moral status of affirmative action. The only sense in which qualifications are not morally arbitrary—and the only sense in which there is a reason to select the most qualified candidate—is purely instrumental (...) to the promotion of moral values whose fundamental concern is not qualifications. (shrink)

Affirmative action has been a particularly contentious policy issue that has polarised contributions to the debate. Over recent times in most western countries, support for affirmative action has, however, been largely snuffed out or beaten into retreat and replaced by the concept of ‹diversity management’. Thus, any contemporary study that examines the development of affirmative action would suggest that its opponents have won the battle. Nonetheless, this article argues that because the battle has been won on dubious ethical grounds it (...) is important that we do not allow affirmative action to sink unnoticed. This article explores and challenges the ethical and philosophical underpinnings of opponents’ views and finds their cases against affirmative action are not ethically sound. The article concludes there are strong ethical grounds for those organisations which seek to do well, to reassert affirmative action programmes in the global efforts to eradicate systemic discrimination and disadvantage. (shrink)

The “diversity” framework the Supreme Court has imposed on affirmative action weakens its justice import in theory and practice. The increasing alignment of wealth with attendance at selective institutions betokens a diminishing quality of student at those institutions. So some of the perceived advantages of affirmative action rely on an increasingly false sense of the quality differences between more and less highly-ranked institutions. Aligning those rankings with the quality of student (and quality of instruction at the different kinds of institution) (...) would have the net effect of benefiting black and Latino students as a group. More generally, improving the quality of education and the standing of less selective higher education institutions is an urgent racial educational justice challenge of the current moment, from which affirmative action diverts attention. (shrink)

Racial preferences are among the most contentious issues in our society, touching on fundamental questions of fairness and the proper role of racial categories in government action. Now two contemporary philosophers, in a lively debate, lay out the arguments on each side. Carl Cohen, a key figure in the University of Michigan Supreme Court cases, argues that racial preferences are morally wrong--forbidden by the 14th Amendment to the Constitution, and explicitly banned by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. He also (...) contends that such preferences harm society in general, damage the universities that use them, and undermine the minorities they were intended to serve. James P. Sterba counters that, far from being banned by the Constitution and the civil rights acts, affirmative action is actually mandated by law in the pursuit of a society that is racially and sexually just. The same Congress that adopted the 14th Amendment, he notes, passed race-specific laws that extended aid to blacks. Indeed, there are various kinds of affirmative action--compensation for past discrimination, remedial measures aimed at current discrimination, the guarantee of diversity--and Sterba reviews the Supreme Court cases that build a constitutional foundation for each. Affirmative action, he argues, favors qualified minority candidates, not unqualified ones. Both authors offer concluding comment on the University of Michigan cases decided in 2003. Half a century after Brown v. Board of Education, issues pertaining to racial discrimination continue to grip American society. Ideal for courses in political, social, ethical, and legal philosophy, this penetrating debate explores the philosophical and legal arguments on all sides of affirmative action, but also reveals the passions that drive the issue to the forefront of public life. (shrink)

Since the times of Plato and Aristotle, the relation of poetry to philosophy has been controversial. For certain scholars, poetry should in no way be confused with philosophy. For others, poetry is at the heart of the possibility of thinking itself. In Affirmation of Poetry, Judith Balso defends the significance of poetry as a necessary practice for thinking. For Balso, if reading poetry properly has become an obscure task, poetry itself still carries with it a power of thinking: the (...) efforts of the poets must continue. In analyzing the affirmation of thought found within the work of such poets as Osip Mandelstam, Wallace Stevens, Alberto Caeiro, and Giacomo Leopardi, Balso reestablishes poetry's place as a site of thought. (shrink)