In 1972, the young philosopher Peter Singer published "Famine, Affluence and Morality," which rapidly became one of the most widely discussed essays in applied ethics. Through this article, Singer presents his view that we have the same moral obligations to those far away as we do to those close to us. He argued that choosing not to send life-saving money to starving people on the other side of the earth is the moral equivalent of neglecting to save drowning children (...) because we prefer not to muddy our shoes. If we can help, we must--and any excuse is hypocrisy. Singer's extreme stand on our moral obligations to others became a powerful call to arms and continues to challenge people's attitudes towards extreme poverty. Today, it remains a central touchstone for those who argue we should all help others more than we do. As Bill and Melinda Gates observe in their foreword, in the age of today's global philanthropy, Singer's essay is as relevant now as it ever was. This attractively packaged, concise edition collects the original article, two of Singer's more recent popular writings on our obligations to others around the world, and a new introduction by Singer that discusses his current thinking. (shrink)

Many business practices focus on maximizing material affluence, or wealth, despite the fact that a growing empirical literature casts doubt on whether money can buy happiness. We therefore propose that businesses consider the possibility of "time affluence" as an alternative model for improving employee well-being and ethical business practice. Across four studies, results consistently showed that, even after controlling for material affluence, the experience of time affluence was positively related to subjective well-being. Studies 3 and 4 (...) further demonstrated that the experience of mindàulness and the satisfaction of psychological needs partially mediated the positive associations between time affluence and well-being. Future research directions and implications for ethical business practices are discussed. (shrink)

As I write this, in November 1971, people are dying in East Bengal from lack of food, shelter, and medical caxc. The suffering and death that are occurring there now axe not inevitable, 1101; unavoidable in any fatalistic sense of the term. Constant poverty, a cyclone, and a civil war have turned at least nine million people into destitute refugees; nevertheless, it is not beyond Lhe capacity of the richer nations to give enough assistance to reduce any further suffering to (...) very small proportions. The decisions arid actions of human beings can prevent this kind of suffering. Unfortunately, human beings have not made the necessary decisions. At the individual level, people have, with very few exceptions, not responded to the situation in any signihczmt way. Generally speaking, people have not given large sums to relief funds; they have not written t0 their parliamentaxy representatives demanding increased government assistance; they have not demonstrated in the streets, held symbolic fasts, or done anything else directed toward providing thc refugees with the means to satisfy their essential needs. At thc government level, no govcrmmcnt has given the sort of massive aid that would enable the refugees to survive fm: more than a few days. Britain, for instance, has given rather more than most countries. It has, to date, given £14,750,000. For comparative purposes, B1~itain’s share of thc nonreccverabla development costs of the Anglo-French Concorde project is already in excess of £275,000,000, and on present estimates will reach £440,000,¤00. The implication is that the British government values a supersonic transport more than thirty times as.. (shrink)

I argue that the debate concerning the nature of first-person moral judgment, namely, whether such moral judgments are inherently motivating or whether moral judgments can be made in the absence of motivation, may be founded on a faulty assumption: that moral judgments form a distinct kind that must have some shared, essential features in regards to motivation to act. I argue that there is little reason to suppose that first-person moral judgments form a homogenous class in this respect by considering (...) an ordinary case: student readers of Peter Singer’s “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”. Neither internalists nor externalists can provide a satisfying account as to why our students fail to act in this particular case, but are motivated to act by their moral judgments in most cases. I argue that the inability to provide a satisfying account is rooted in this shared assumption about the nature of moral judgments. Once we consider rejecting the notion that first-person moral decision- making forms a distinct kind in the way it is typically assumed, the internalist/externalist debate may be rendered moot. (shrink)

Cognition played a pivotal role in the acceleration of technological innovation during the Industrial Revolution. Growing affluence may have provided favourable environmental conditions for a boost in cognition, enabling individuals to tackle more complex problems. Dynamical systems thinking may provide useful tools to describe sudden transitions like the Industrial Revolution, by modelling the recursive feedback between psychology and environment.

A Marxist analysis of the role of politics in liberal democracies and fascist and socialist states.

Peter Singer has argued that the affluent have very extensive duties to the world’s poor. His argument has some important implications for procreation, most of which have not yet been acknowledged. These implications are explicated in this paper. First, the rich should desist from procreation and instead divert to the poor those resources that would have been used to rear the children that would otherwise have been produced. Second, the poor should desist from procreation because doing so can prevent the (...) very bad things that would otherwise have befallen the children they would have brought into existence. Third, the rich sometimes have a duty to prevent the poor from procreating. Fourth, the rich sometimes have a right to prevent the poor from reproducing. Although these implications may not amount to a categorical prohibition on all procreation, they do significantly restrict the permissibility of procreation. They are, in that sense, anti-natalist. (shrink)

Most affluent people do little to aid those living in severe poverty. In this paper, we consider the extent to which such people are blameworthy for their inaction. We argue for three main claims. First, we cannot convincingly appeal to the phenomenon of non-culpable moral ignorance to argue that the affluent are not seriously blameworthy for their inaction: affluent people are either not ignorant, or else they are culpably ignorant. Second, however, a parallel phenomenon of non-culpable lack of vivid awareness (...) does have some purchase in mitigating blame. Although this diminishes blame to some degree, significant blame is still appropriate, given that vivid awareness is to some extent under our control. Thirdly, there is good reason to believe that expressions of appropriate blame, which could alert us to moral wrongdoing, are systematically suppressed regarding global poverty. Therefore, the absence of blame doesn’t indicate the absence of blameworthy behaviour. (shrink)

Since the 1940s Americans and Britons have come to enjoy an era of rising material abundance. Yet this has been accompanied by a range of social and personal disorders, including family breakdown, addiction, mental instability, crime, obesity, inequality, economic insecurity, and declining trust.Avner Offer argues that well-being has lagged behind affluence in these societies, because they present an environment in which consistent choices are difficult to achieve over different time ranges and in which the capacity for personal and social (...) commitment is undermined by the flow of novelty. His approach draws on economics and social science, makes use of the latest cognitive research, and provides a detailed and reasoned critique of modern consumer society, especially the assumption that freedom of choice necessarily maximizes individual and social well-being.The book falls into three parts. Part one analyses the ways in which economic resources map on to human welfare, why choice is so intractable, and how commitment to people and institutions is sustained. It argues that choice is constrained by prior obligation and reciprocity. The second section then applies these conceptual arguments to comparative empirical studies of advertising, of eating and obesity, and of the production and acquisition of appliances and automobiles. Finally, in part three, Offer investigates social and personal relations in the USA and Britain, including inter-personal regard, the rewards and reversals of status, the social and psychological costs of inequality, and the challenges posed to heterosexual love and to parenthood by the rise of affluence. (shrink)

Moral relativists often defend their view as an inference to the best explanation of widespread and deep moral disagreement. Many philosophers have challenged this line of reasoning in recent years, arguing that moral objectivism provides us with ample resources to develop an equally or more plausible method of explanation. One of the most promising of these objectivist methods is what I call the self-interest explanation, the view that intractable moral diversity is due to the distorting effects of our interests. In (...) this paper I examine the self-interest explanation through the lens of the famine debate, a well-known disagreement over whether we have a moral obligation to donate most of our income to the global poor. I argue that objectivists should reduce their confidence that the persistence of the famine debate is due to the distorting influence of self-interest. If my argument is on target, then objectivists may need to supply a stronger explanation of moral disagreement to defend their view against the threat of moral relativism. (shrink)

Moral theorists like Singer and Greene argue that we should discount intuitions about ‘up-close-and-personal’ moral dilemmas because they are more likely than intuitions about ‘impersonal’ dilemmas to be artifacts of evolution. But by that reasoning, it seems we should ignore the evolved, ‘up-close-and-personal’ intuition to save a drowning child in light of the too-new-to-be-evolved, ‘impersonal’ intuition that we need not donate to international famine relief. This conclusion seems mistaken and horrifying, yet it cannot be the case both that ‘up-close-and-personal’ intuitions (...) are more reliable than ‘impersonal’ intuitions, and vice versa. Thus, Singer’s evolutionary debunking argument proves too much, and should not be taken seriously. However, Singer’s debunking argument is typical of an entire class of arguments that seeks to debunk normative principles by reference to evolution. This entire class of argument, I argue, therefore also proves too much to be taken seriously. (shrink)

I. Three Basic rights. This book is about the moral minimum--about the lower limits on tolerable human conduct, individual and institutional.

Thomas Aquinas famously held that (A) theft is always wrong, and also that (B) it is permissible for a starving man to take the bread he needs, openly or secretly, from another. He reconciled these two positions by claiming that (C) in cases of great need, it is not theft to take someone else’s property when she does not need it herself. On its face, (C) looks like a theoretically costly concession that Aquinas is forced into in order to reconcile (...) (A) and (B). Our first aim is to show that this is not so. We argue that (C) is in fact the only way to accommodate a set of intuitive norms of keeping and taking. Our second aim is to show that (C) has important implications for theories of property more generally: a plausible theory of property must acknowledge a foundational sense of "belong" on which things belong to those who need them. (shrink)

In this text, I discuss the role that a range of habits in affluent societies play in upholding as well as masking an unsustainable status quo. I show that enactivism, as a philosophical approach to the embodied and embedded mind, offers resources for bringing into focus and critically interrogating suchhabits of affluenceand the environments enabling them. I do this in the context of a critical theory ofthe unfelt in society: the systematic production of lacunae of emotive concern in social collectives. (...) The lack of proportionate affective and practical responses to the ecological crisis epitomizes this. The article starts with considerations on societal unfeeling, then reviews key elements of enactive approaches to habit, before a fuller picture of habits of affluence is developed, informed by Brand’s and Wissen’s concept of theimperial mode of living. Finally, two dimensions of habits of affluence are discussed in some detail, which will help flesh out a thematically expanded, politically engaged version of enactivism. (shrink)

Recently, most of the discussions in Confucian political theory have concentrated on whether Confucianism is compatible with local political practices, such as liberal democracy. The question of how Confucians view global distributive justice has not yet received critical attention. This essay aims to fill this gap. I will first describe a contractualist methodology, which aims at deriving substantial political principles from a formal conception of the person. Then I will discuss what conception of the person Confucianism assumes. Finally, I will (...) use the contractualist methodology to derive three principles of global distributive justice. These three principles form a distinctive conception based on ideas that are usually ignored in the current discussions of global justice, such as virtues, community, and rituals. (shrink)

Given that there is a forceful case for thinking that the affluent are morally required to devote a substantial proportion of what they have to helping the poor, Garrett Cullity examines, refines and defends an argument of this form. He then identifies its limits.

Why our most cherished political ideas are based on a certain conception of our relation to the environment - and one that can no longer be sustained.

It is widely known that Hegel's Philosophy of Right recognizes poverty as one of the central problems of modern civil society. What is much less well known, however, is that Hegel sees yet another structural problem at the opposite side of the economic spectrum: a problem of affluence. Indeed, as I show in this essay, Hegel's text contains a detailed—yet sometimes overlooked—discussion of the detrimental psychological and sociological effects of great wealth and how to counter them. By bringing this (...) discussion to the fore, we get a more complete picture of Hegel's theory of civil society and shed light on an aspect of Hegel's social philosophy that speaks to problems we face today. (shrink)

An expanded and updated edition of a classic work on human rights and global justice Since its original publication, Basic Rights has proven increasingly influential to those working in political philosophy, human rights, global justice, and the ethics of international relations and foreign policy, particularly in debates regarding foreign policy’s role in alleviating global poverty. Henry Shue asks: Which human rights ought to be the first honored and the last sacrificed? Shue argues that subsistence rights, along with security rights and (...) liberty rights, serve as the ground of all other human rights. This classic work, now available in a thoroughly updated fortieth-anniversary edition, includes a substantial new chapter by the author examining how the accelerating transformation of our climate progressively undermines the bases of subsistence like sufficient water, affordable food, and housing safe from forest-fires and sea-level rise. Climate change threatens basic rights. (shrink)

Effective efforts to protect the global environment will require the willing cooperation of the world's poor. Persuading them to join international environmental agreements and to choose environmentally sustainable development requires substantial concessions from the affluent industrialized countries, including additional financial assistance and technology transfers. The affluent countries ought to provide such assistance to the world's poor for ethical reasons. Doing so would promote transnational distributive justice, which is defined here as a fair and equitable distribution among countries of benefits, burdens, (...) and decision-making authority, in this case associated with transnational environmental relations. Conceptions of distributive justice examined include utilitarianism, human rights, causality/responsibility, impartiality, and principles derived from Kantian and Rawlsian ethics. (shrink)

In his 1972 work Famine, Affluence and Morality, Peter Singer presents an argument that we of the developed world, can and ought to do more for the developing nations to alleviate their poverty. Singer believes that his argument leads to the inescapable conclusion that we should keep giving to the poor until giving more, will harm us more than it will benefit them. -/- Singer’s conclusion is reached however, using a cost benefit analysis of absolute welfare to determine cost; (...) whereas by using a capabilities/freedoms approach combined with Pareto efficiency to determine cost, we reach a much more acceptable conclusion - a Pareto efficient conception of justice. This commits us to helping/aiding the poor, but only up until a level where we lose a capability of our own, a reduction not in relative terms but rather absolute terms. -/- In this paper, I outline this different conception of justice based on a Pareto Efficient Capabilities Approach. (shrink)

God loves to provide well for His people. But He understands human nature. He knows how attractive material things can be. The more people have, the greater their temptation to use more and more for selfish reasons. So God gives His people outlets for the excess. "Take heed, and beware of covetousness: for a man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth" (Luke 12:15). "Charge them that are rich-- that they be rich in good works, (...) ready to distribute,--laying up in store for themselves a good foundation" (1 Timothy 6:17-19). The real enjoyment of riches is the ability to give and share freely with others. That is one way we can lay up treasures in heaven.--Back cover. (shrink)

In 2004, Garrett Cullity made a significant contribution to the literature on what the world’s relatively affluent owe to the world’s relatively poor through the publishing of The Moral Demands of Affluence. In this discussion note, I draw attention to a logical problem in Cullity’s master argument in favor of the view that affluent individuals are justified in spending monetary resources on themselves at a level that lies well above what Peter Singer finds justified. The proposition I defend is (...) that the premises leading to Cullity’s conclusion about the moderate, and not extremely demanding, nature of his position are inconsistent. These premises license any conclusion, including the negation of the one preferred by Cullity. (shrink)

Peter Singer’s famous and influential article is criticised in three main ways that can be considered libertarian, although many non-libertarians could also accept them: 1) the relevant moral principle is more plausibly about upholding an implicit contract rather than globalising a moral intuition that had local evolutionary origins; 2) its principle of the immorality of not stopping bad things is paradoxical, as it overlooks the converse aspect that would be the positive morality of not starting bad things and also thereby (...) conceptually eliminates innocence; and 3) free markets—especially international free trade—have been cogently explained to be the real solution to the global “major evils” of “poverty” and “pollution”, while “overpopulation” does not exist in free-market frameworks; hence charity is a relatively minor alleviant to the problem of insufficiently free markets. There are also various subsidiary arguments throughout. (shrink)

Markovic draws upon the Zagreb school of Marx-interpretation, as well as on the data of the historical development of socialism in Yugoslavia in his attempt to develop a critical social theory. He constantly opposes the use of Marxian theory as an ideological orthodoxy simply legitimating political practice. And he points out how Marxian social thought may be a means of critically comprehending social processes, as well as a self-critical theory developing in relation to the historical data at whose evaluation it (...) is directed. Markovic insists that critical social theory must take as its subject matter a range of data comprised of contemporary phenomena, the history of such phenomena, and the human evaluations and aspirations which the historical situation engenders. This points up the importance of a theory of man for a critical social theory. Only an adequate theory of man enables social theory to comprehend and evaluate the goals arising from specific social processes. Markovic outlines elements of such a theory of man, as discoverable in Marx. With these guiding ideas, he examines specific themes such as economics and human values, technology, politics as a professional institution, and revolution. Markovic’s examinations valuably illustrate a balanced Marxian approach to social questions. It is argued, for example, that technological innovations must be analyzed in relation both to the concrete economic processes of given societies, and to the human needs operative in those societies. Markovic draws upon the Yugoslav experience to show the concrete nature of such an analysis. The viability of the professional political institution is discussed, with reference to specific productive relations in societies, and the political possibilities thereof. And in the context of a distinction between political and social revolution, he writes with sensitivity and discernment on the concept of revolution in Marx. Problematically, the precise status of a theory of man in a social theory of the Marxian variety remains unanswered herein. But the work stands as highly useful to those interested in non-ideological developments of Marxian social theory.—M.J.D. (shrink)

So far, most ethical consumerism research has been contained within Western countries, thus limiting our understanding of the concept in emerging markets. Given the call for extending empirical-based knowledge for a better understanding of peculiarities, dynamics and country-level variations (i.e. social, cultural) in the context of ethical consumerism in emerging markets, this research cross-examines the interactive nature of individual- and country-level predictors of ethical consumerism in emerging and developed markets, employing a multilevel approach. At the individual level, we posit that (...) ethical consumerism is motivated by social and cultural capital. In contrast, at the contextual level, we choose country-level affluence as an influential factor that might impact the relationship between socio-cultural capital and ethical consumerism. The study uses the International Social Survey Programme’s (ISSP) 2014 citizenship module data set (including 34 countries) for investigating individual-level predictors (of social and cultural capital). The GDP per capita data from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Economic Outlook database was used to examine the cross-level interactions between individual-level predictors and country-level affluence. The findings suggest that social and cultural capitals positively influence ethical consumerism in emerging and developed markets. Further, country-level affluence moderates the relationship between socio-cultural capital and ethical consumerism for both markets. However, cultural capital proved to be a stronger predictor of ethical consumerism as country-level affluence increases. The research findings highlight meaningful cross-country-level interactions that help further understand the basis of ethical consumerism from a global perspective. (shrink)

What impelled the Industrial Revolution's spectacular economic growth? Life History Theory, Baumard argues, explains how England's world-supreme affluence psychologically fostered innovation; moreover, wherever similar affluence abounds, a “civilizing process” bringing enlightenment and democracy is apt to evolve. Baumard insightfully analyzes a “constellation of affluence” but proffers somewhat whiggish history given England's prior and unique proto-capitalist culture of economic liberty and individualism.

Book reviewed in this article: Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy. By Henry Shue Morality and Population Policy. By Michael D. Bayles.