Both Walter Kohan (2002) and Nancy Vansieleghem (2005) have questioned the aims of Philosophy for Children (P4C). It is the intention of this current paper to pursue the line of inquiry opened up by these authors, but from the standpoint of John Dewey’s pragmatism. Dewey’s philosophy shifts the focus from discovering the aim of P4C to aims in the particular contexts in which P4C operates. As such, aims in education (including P4C) are seen as: required (...) for intelligent education, inseparable from the means, contingent upon specific contexts, used for ethico-politico-aesthetic purposes, multiple and complementary, and internally generated from those engaged in the practice. (shrink)

My lecture is concerned with a presentation of the method of Deleuzian thought, which - I would like to contend - well represent the change that has taken place in postmodernist thought. Deleuze is unique in calling himself a "classical metaphysicist," i.e. a restorer of classical thought, albeit via the screen - thought which has managed to survive and overcome the obstacle of modernity. The Deleuzian unification of pre-modern thought and modernist critique with Nietzsche's theory of eternal repetition gives rise (...) to a method, whose utter meaning is an attempt to provide thinkers with sharp tools for successfully opposing later capitalism and globalization, something that stands at the very heart of Deleuzian metaphysics. This opposition, which in effect is also a new doctrine of moral aesthetics, lies at the core of this present lecture. I would like to present the special combative nature of Deleuzian thought, and through him to present a different radical angle of the post-modern paradigm. (shrink)

Between 1987 and 1997, Thailand experienced a bubble economy. When the bubble economy exploded in 1997, the country suddenly experienced an economic crisis: it was in heavy debt and became financially controlled by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The problem was caused by the country’s desire to rapidly change itself from an agricultural country to an industrial one, without considering its own comparative advantage in that its climate and resources are more suitable for agriculture. Thailand also wanted to become a (...) newly industrialized country and a inancial hub of Southeast Asia without considering its readiness. These ideas came to a halt after the bubble economy explosion. However, just after Thailand managed to solve its debt problem with the IMF, thegovernment once again declared its desire to turn the country into the ‘Detroit of Asia’, to develop the capital, Bangkok, into the region’s fashion hub and to launch a substantial number of mega-projects, albeit with the existence of a widening economic gap between the rural and urban areas. This economic trend became known as “Thaksinomics” with reference to the name of the Prime Minister at that time, Thaksin Shinawatra. On the other hand, there has been a great deal of criticism of such a trend, which has been seen as a capitalist move promoting the consumerist behaviour of Thai people. There is, therefore, a call for Thai society to review itself, especially in its social and economic development aspects, and a change to a new kind of development with an emphasis on self-reliance andmoderation. This call is based on a Buddhist belief which is reflected in the old Thai way of life. This kind of economy is called “Self-Sufficiency Economy” as opposed to a capitalist-consumerist economy. It is believed that this new direction will help lay a strong foundation for the Thai economy and provide it with a high level of immunity for progress towards a more stable and sustainable economy. (shrink)

La quête de repères identificatoires est probablement l'une des plus vieilles entreprises que l'humanité s'est donnée pour asseoir son histoire et construire sa mémoire. Toutes les sociétés, toutes les civilisations, fussent les pires totalitarismes, ont besoin d'une genèse héroïque — et donc exemplaire — pour fonder leurs origines. Une geste destinée à justifier leur présent ; un point de départ qui fixe un "avant" et un "après" et qui fait qu'à partir d'un événement créateur, selon la formule maintes fois annoncée, (...) toujours contredite : "rien ne sera plus jamais comme avant". On a tous besoin d'un père, tous besoin d'un géniteur, individuel ou collectif. Cette qualité peut naturellement se décliner sous différentes formes : le "père fondateur" est, selon les cas, un homme, une femme, un événement, un discours, un livre... Cet ouvrage se propose donc d'explorer ce concept, en croisant différentes approches : la linguistique, l'histoire, la philosophie, la littérature et le droit. (shrink)

Post–dualist philosophies of nursing acknowledge embodiment as a condition of human existence. Philosophical writing, however, remains abstract and disembodied. A philosophical framework that embraces embodiment needs to recover the materiality of language; its text needs to include language that is not only rational and clear but sensuous and ambiguous. I describe three cultural narratives of women's embodiment and compare them with an imaginative narrative, a nurse's poem about women in labour. I propose, not that philosophers become poets, but that they (...) abandon a dualist position in which language is either literal or metaphorical, adopting instead the poet's approach in which any word or object has unlimited meanings. I argue that, without fixed reference points, language embodies rather than escapes contingency. Finally, I discuss two forms of philosophical writing – irony and motet – that savour contingency, illustrating philosophy as endless redescription, aiming not for finality but for the grace of a dancer's deliberate fall. (shrink)

In Process and Reality Professor A. N. Whitehead formulates a Cosmology which embodies a resolute attempt to combine in one philosophical synthesis a scientific account of Concrescence with a metaphysical explanation thereof in terms of Creativity.

Recent books promote Alexander Humboldt as an environmental hero, dismissing Humboldt’s partner in exploration, the botanist Aimé Bonpland, in a few inaccurate phrases: left Europe, went native somewhere in South America, did some farming. Bonpland’s writings and his forty years of regional development, botanical research, ethno-pharmacology, and environmental conservation in Argentina and Brazil present a better model for an environmental ethics than Humboldt’s climb to fame in Europe.

Sanchez and Sanchez have selected, edited, translated, and introduced some of the most influential texts in Mexican philosophy, which constitute a unique and robust tradition that will challenge and complicate traditional conceptions of philosophy. The texts collected here are organized chronologically and represent a period of Mexican thought and culture that emerged from the Mexican Revolution of 1910 and which culminated in la filosofia de lo mexicano (the philosophy of Mexicanness). Though the selections reflect on a variety (...) of philosophical questions, collectively they represent a growing tendency to take seriously the question of Mexican national identity as a philosophical question--especially given the complexities of Mexico's indigenous and European ancestries, a history of colonialism, and a growing dependency on foreign money and culture. More than an attempt to describe the national character, however, the texts gathered here represent an optimistic period in Mexican philosophy that aimed to affirm Mexican culture and philosophy as a valuable, if not urgent, contribution to universal culture. (shrink)

This dissertation is a study of how methodological issues in psychology can have significant implications for philosophical accounts of interpretation, justification, and psychological explanation. In the first chapter, I analyze traditional philosophical accounts of interpretation with an eye to identifying the ways in which philosophers have used rationality as a methodological tool. I argue that these forms of methodological rationalism do not successfully cope with the challenge from the heuristics and biases research program which generally argues that human judgment is (...) irrational. In the second chapter, I trace cognitive psychology's disciplinary trend to study conditions that facilitate rational rather than irrational judgment. This trend suggests we should seek to make rational judgment an object of study rather than a default methodology for the process of studying psychological judgment. I argue that social and moral interests in promoting cognitive health motivate and justify the interest in discovering conditions that promote rational rather than irrational judgment. I call this normative account of applied cognitive psychology ecological rationalism. In the third chapter, I argue that psychology's disciplinary interest in creating valid questionnaires motivates discovering the conditions of successful communication. I discuss the methodological lessons that the Gricean turn in psychological research brings to questionnaire design: in particular, the Gricean turn imposes evidential requirements on psychological research about the conditions of successful versus unsuccessful communication for specific contexts and the conversational norms governing communication in experimental conditions. In the fourth chapter, I argue that some methodological critiques of the heuristics and biases research program have intimate connections to naturalized epistemology: in particular, the ways in which Gerd Gigerenzer thinks cognitive processes should be specified for the sake of explaining human judgment suggest that cognitive psychology and naturalized epistemology are disciplines with shared explanatory goals. I argue that both invoke cognitive processes to explain the psychological transformation of inputs to output-beliefs; and both seek to explain the epistemic status of output-beliefs by reference to the same cognitive process invoked to explain its production. To close, I make a few observations on how the shared explanatory goals between cognitive psychology and naturalized epistemology recasts traditional challenges facing reliabilism. (shrink)

This collection of essays examines the philosophical and cultural aspects of technology. The issues range widely - from quantum technology to problems of technology and culture in a developing country and contributors approach the issues from a variety of perspectives. The volume includes case-studies, and also more theoretical pieces which consider the fundamental question of whether technology should be perceived as a force for liberation or enslavement. The volume aims to stimulate debate about the relation between technology and (...) class='Hi'>philosophy and society in general, and to open a field of enquiry that has been relatively neglected. Written in an accessible style, the contributions are intended equally for philosophers exploring the novel problems arising in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, but also for technologists interested in the philosophical implications of their work. (shrink)

The main aim of this book is to enquire about the traditions, goals and future of Indian philosophy. The contributors are Indian scholars teaching in the universities in India itself and also in the United Kingdom, Canada and the United states. Seven of the contributors concern themselves primarily, though not exclusively, with the tradition of Indian philosophy; seven others deal with the modern approach to the Indian tradition and six contributors look at the future of Indian philosophy.

For three decades I have expounded and defended aim-oriented empiricism, a view of science which, l claim, solves a number of problems in the philosophy of science and has important implications for science itself and, when generalized, for the whole of academic inquiry, and for our capacity to solve our current global problems. Despite these claims, the view has received scant attention from philosophers of science. Recently, however, David Miller has criticized the view. Miller’s criticisms are, however, not valid.

Classical Philosophy is a comprehensive examination of early philosophy from the presocratics through to Aristotle. The aim of the book is to provide an explanation and analysis of the ideas that flourished at this time and considers their relevance both to the historical development of philosophy and to contemporary philosophy today. From these ideas we can see the roots of arguments in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and political philosophy. The book is arranged in four parts by (...) thinker and covers: The Presocratics Socrates Plato Aristotle Christopher Shields' style is inviting, refreshing and ideal for anyone coming to the subject for the first time. He provides a balanced account of the central topics and ideas that emerged from the period and includes helpful further reading and chapter overviews. (shrink)

In this meta-philosophical study I commence with an investigation of Wisdom. I then continue with an exploration of the institutionalization of the subject and the professionalization of those involved in it. This I contrast with original and creative philosophizing. In then sows that philosophizing resembles and attempts to do theorizing. The 9 questions, etc of the Socratic Method and details of the Philosophical Toolkit occur throughout different stages of theorizing as one level and one dimension of it. Linked books are (...) FREE for download. -/- 1 Seeking, development and realization of wisdom 4 2 Institutionalization, Professionalization of ‘philosophy’ 5 3 Original and Creative Thinking Philosophizing 37 4 Philosophizing resembles Theorizing 38 (i) Socratic Method 41 (ii) Philosophical Toolkit 145 -/- . (shrink)

A Platonic dialogue, an undergraduate lecture, an enquiry in philosophy for children (P4C): Are all three activities "philosophy"? Is there a difference between doing philosophy and studying philosophy? What is the importance of philosophy in each guise, and how might the different guises relate to the aims of "teaching" philosophy? Drawing on the work of Bernard Williams, I suggest that doing philosophy involves making sense of our lives, and that this requires a (...) wider knowledge base than traditionally taught in academic philosophy. I argue that both academic philosophy and P4C both involve philosophising, and that this is more valuable than an encyclopedic knowledge of the products of this process - the canon. (shrink)

Peirce calls philosophy “cenoscopy”, that is, a view of the general. By that, he means that its aim is to provide a general view of the positive facts of human life and experience. Thus, cenoscopy begins its inquiries scrutinizing everything; experience shows us that is universal and pervasive, general and evident. The method of cenoscopic inquiry, as its very name says, rests upon the careful observation of all manifestations of usual and common experience, limiting itself to what can be (...) inferred from it: our common-sense experiences constitute the positum of philosophical inquiry. So, the biggest difficulty in philosophical inquiry is to cope with the certainties of common-sense, which are extremely vague and general, such certainties as expressed in propositions such as “fire burns”. Such experiences inform our world view, before any scientific world view, and as such it does not occur to us we can doubt them – they acquire the indubitable status of instinctive beliefs. In fact, common-sense beliefs are the very ground of our rational certainties, thus constituting the inevitable hic et nunc from where to start any philosophical and scientific inquiry. This paper aims at presenting Peirce’s main tenets of common-sense in relation to his conception of philosophy. (shrink)

Philosophy is an ambitious, speculative practice, aimed at finding out what wisdom is and how to attain it, in so far as that can be done by explicit discussion and argument. A likely pitfall of any such enterprise is that it loses touch with concerns in human life outside itself and becomes scholastic, in the pejorative sense. Academic institutions which encourage wide and outward-looking intellectual sympathies, and which do not reward narrow point-scoring specialism, are helpful in resisting the tendency (...) to scholasticism. The Moral Sciences Tripos at Cambridge might have provided some of the elements of such a setting, by framing an academic structure in which philosophy was studied in conjunction with other subjects in the humanities and social sciences. As things actually developed, that possibility was not realised. Nevertheless, philosophy at Cambridge maintained vigour and significance, through the intellectual freedom and encouragement it provided to some notable individual philosophers. (shrink)

The aim of this volume is to consider connections among issues in metaphilosophy, historiographical method, and the formation of philosophical canons. Here I consider an ancient metaphilosophical position very different from anything accepted in mainstream academic philosophy today, but which, I believe, merits revival in a form appropriate to our era. I call this position “metaphilosophical eudaimonism” because it takes human flourishing to be the ultimate goal of philosophy. I first explain the position before considering its implications for (...) philosophy’s relationship to its history, for the historiography of philosophy, and for the role of canons in philosophy. Along the way, I develop a perspective on the possibility of trans-historical knowledge grounded in a Husserlian analysis of the act of consciousness. (shrink)

Wittgenstein writes in the preface to the Philosophical Investigations: ‘I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own.’ In the following I argue that this indicates something essential about Wittgenstein’s approach. In order to remain true to his conception of philosophy without theses, he could not, for example, aim to instruct his reader about about grammar or put forward prescriptions about grammar, logic or (...) language use. Thus, there is an essential connection between the aim of stimulating the reader to thoughts of their own, and philosophizing without theses. In order to clarify this I will discuss both Wittgenstein’s early and later account of philosophy without theses, his later rejection of philosophical foundations and the hierarchical organization of philosophy, such as assumed in his early philosophy, the notion of agreement in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, and certain remarks from the Nachlass on the composition of his book, eventually published as the Philosophical Investigations. (shrink)

Philosophy in Action with Dysfunctional Adolescents: Strengthening Resistance, Preparing Resilience Using Michel Tozzi’s Teaching Matrix. Our contribution is based on research conducted with dysfunctional teenagers, prevented from thinking, in a praxis of resilience assisted by philosophical discussion according to the method of Michel Tozzi. A good distance from a process of modelling thought, it’s question of articulating the process of accompaniment the young person’s by Michel Tozzi didactic model. Based on anthropologically situated discussions in the interrogations of adolescents put (...) into play by means of written materials according to Mathew Lipman’s recommendations, the philosophical discussions method’s that we submit is intended to guide educators to explore the process that hinder the activity of thinking and to engage teenagers in a process of rebounding from their own arguments. We present our method which aims at equipping teenagers with the proper tools of resistance to adversity and resiliency in the face of harmful experiences. (shrink)

Johan Huizinga u svojoj knjizi Homo ludens tvrdi kako civilizacija proizlazi i razvija se u igri i kao igra. Ona jest jedna od ljudskih karakteristika, ljudski obred, a služi za rekreaciju, zabavu, ali i učenje. Može li se onda dobro usmjerenom igrom razvijati ljudsko mišljenje? Cilj programa filozofije za djecu jest uvježbavanje multidimenzioniranog mišljenja. Po Mathew Lipmanu multidimenzionirano mišljenje jest cjelina koja se sastoji od kritičkog, kreativnog i skrbnog mišljenja. Program filozofije za djecu usmjeren je i prema predškolskoj i osnovnoškolskoj (...) populaciji. Radi toga je u programu neizbježna igra kao put k razvitku multidimenzioniranog mišljenja. U radu ćemo prikazati i nekoliko igara usmjerenih k uvježbavanju umnih sposobnosti koje se koriste u programu filozofije za djecu.Johan Huizinga, in his book Homo ludens, claims that civilization arises and develops through play and as a play. Playing is a characteristic of humans, a human ritual and yet it is for recreation, fun, but also for learning. Can it be then that well-directed play leads to a development of human thinking? The aim of philosophy for children programme is practising multidimensional thinking. According to Mathew Lipman, multidimensional thinking is the entirety consisted of critical, creative and caring thinking. Philosophy for children programme is directed towards pre-school as well as towards elementary-school population. For that reason this programme considers play as an inevitable way into the development of multidimensional thinking. In this paper we will also present a few games which are being used in philosophy for children programme, and which are also directed towards practising intellectual abilities. (shrink)

This article is dedicated to the memory of Peter Kemp (1937–2018), whose extraordinary influence since the 1960s as an academic scholar and public intellectual transformed the Scandinavian philosophical scene in the post-analytic period. His contributions are viewed in the light of a rich biographical context, from his 1973 doctoral defense and his unflagging commitment as a teacher and author to his continued critique of narrow philosophical perspectives. I emphasize the unparalleled success of Kemp in addressing and challenging both the broader (...) society and its constituent elements of political leadership, public administration, and the business community. Finally, I show the impact of his personal life on his aim to link critical thinking and conviction in developing a philosophical commitment. In this way, as in general, Peter Kemp not only followed in the footsteps of, but also continued, Paul Ricoeur’s project. (shrink)

Does it matter morally whether a bomber who kills civilians in a raid intends to do so as a means to weakening the enemy or merely foresees he will do so in his attempt to destroy a munitions factory? Does it matter morally whether a nurse who gives a terminally ill patient a lethal dose of painkiller intends to do so as a means to ending the patient's life or merely foresees she will do so in her attempt to alleviate (...) the patient's pain? Those who answer affirmatively rest moral weight on the notion of intending to do something as a means. But giving an adequate analysis of this notion has proved difficult. In ‘Intending as a Means,’ Kwong-Loi Shun criticizes two attempts at analyzing this notion, one which he attributes to Jonathan Bennett and the other which he attributes to Thomas Nagel. Shun thinks both Bennett's and Nagel's analyses identify intending to bring about S as a means with aiming at S and offers examples which he believes show ‘an agent need not aim at what he intends to bring about.’ In making his objection to Bennett and Nagel, Shun introduces his own criterion for intending as a means. (shrink)

This chapter outlines improvements and developments made to aim-oriented empiricism since "From Knowledge to Wisdom" was first published in 1984. It argues that aim-oriented empiricism enables us to solve three fundamental problems in the philosophy of science: the problems of induction and verisimilitude, and the problem of what it means to say of a physical theory that it is unified.

My writing is simply a set of experiments in life—an endeavour to see what our thought and emotion may be capable of—what stores of motive, actual or hinted as possible, give promise of a better after which we may strive—what gains from past revelations and discipline we must strive to keep hold of as something more than shifting theory. I became more and more timid—with less daring to adopt any formula which does not get itself clothed for me in some (...) human figure and individual experience, and perhaps that is a sign that if I help others to see at all it must be through the medium of art. George Eliot. In his inaugural lecture, given in Birkbeck College in 1987, Roger Scruton, who has done as much as anyone else in recent years to bring the importance of art in general and literature in particular to the attention of philosophers, contends that ‘philosophy severed from literary criticism is as monstrous a thing as literary criticism severed from philosophy’. The first, he argues, aims to be science: strives after theoretical truth which it can never attain; and results in banality clothed in pseudo-scientific technicalities: while the second is liable to find consolation in the kind of nonsense which pretends that in the study of literature we are confronted with nothing other than an author-less, unreadable, ‘text’. Philosophy, he maintains, ‘must return aesthetics to the place that Kant and Hegel made for it: a place at the centre of the subject, the paradigm of philosophy and the true test of all its claims’. (shrink)

This dissertation is an attempt to defend two founders of quantum theories, Niels Bohr and Wolfgang Pauli, against various anti-realist readings. These readings claim that Bohr's and Pauli's interpretations of quantum mechanics are based on a denial of the reality of the external world, and that their debates with Albert Einstein are over realism. But I argue that the differences between their views and Einstein's are neither about the reality of the external world, nor about the reality of theoretical entities (...) in general. Rather, the differences are about the reality of this or that particular theoretical entity and the viability of this or that particular idea of physics. Although in 1972 Clifford Hooker gave an adequate and then-comprehensive discussion of Bohr's ideas countering anti-realist readings, his work has been forgotten by a new generation of interpreters such as Arthur Fine and Mara Beller who read anti-realism into Bohr's ideas. One aim of this dissertation is to revive Hooker's defense of Bohr and to counter such misreadings. ;A second contribution this dissertation makes consists in an elaboration of Pauli's views. Pauli wrote extensively on many philosophical issues, and made important contributions to the debates between Einstein, Bohr and himself. However, his views are unfairly ignored by most philosophers of quantum mechanics, and when considered, are at best quickly dismissed as anti-realist. In my dissertation, I discuss Pauli's rich ideas on physics and philosophy and show that Pauli is not an anti-realist. In particular, Bohr's and Pauli's views on a problem introduced in a paper by Einstein, Boris Podolsky, and Nathan Rosen are discussed in detail. The close examination of Bohr's and Pauli's views also shows that there are significant differences between them, suggesting the inadequacy of the generic term "the Copenhagen school," often used to refer indiscriminately to their views. Through my studies of Bohr's and Pauli's ideas, I hope to show the inadequacy of using metaphysical doctrines such as realism and anti-realism to gain either a full understanding of general problems in physics, or an understanding of the ideas of these working physicists in particular. (shrink)

Charles Taylor has been one of the most original and influential figures in contemporary philosophy: his 'philosophical anthropology' spans an unusually wide range of theoretical interests and draws creatively on both Anglo-American and Continental traditions in philosophy. A selection of his published papers is presented here in two volumes, structured to indicate the direction and essential unity of the work. He starts from a polemical concern with behaviourism and other reductionist theories (particularly in psychology and the philosophy (...) of language) which aim to model the study of man on the natural sciences. This leads to a general critique of naturalism, its historical development and its importance for modern culture and consciousness; and that in turn points, forward to a positive account of human agency and the self, the constitutive role of language and value, and the scope of practical reason. The volumes jointly present some two decades of work on these fundamental themes, and convey strongly the tenacity, verve and versatility of the author in grappling with them. They will interest a very wide range of philosophers and students of the human sciences. (shrink)

The impact of classical thought on Renaissance philosophy is the subject of this volume. In the first part Dr Kraye deals with the interpretations of ancient philosophy put forward by various thinkers of the Italian Renaissance, including the humanist Angelo Poliziano and the Platonist Marsilio Ficino; in the second, she examines the central role of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics within Renaissance moral philosophy and considers the influence of other classical treatises on ethics, especially the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius. (...) The final section explores controversies concerning the authenticity of works in the Aristotelian canon, together with the early printing history of Aristotle. All the articles aim to locate philosophical questions within the historical and cultural context of the Renaissance, and particular attention is paid to the importance of philological scholarship within philosophical debates. The collection includes an essay on Philipp Melanchthon's ethical commentaries and textbooks which has previously appeared only in German translation. (shrink)

This is the first lesson of the MA level 1 course in Ethics, which spans the European and Asian traditions. This lesson consists of three main components: Part 2 concerns the discipline of philosophy – its scope and aim. Part 3 is an elaboration of philosophy, the discipline, as an exploration of the GOOD and the RIGHT. This is called “ethics” or “moral philosophy.” In Sanskrit, these explorations fall under the heading of dharma. In Part 4 we (...) shall address some basic concerns about understanding ethics internationally. Part 5 is a brief conclusion. (shrink)

The question whether art is of any epistemic value is an old question in the philosophy of art. Whereas many contemporary artists, art-critics, and art-historians answer this question affirmatively, many contemporary philosophers remain skeptical. If art is of epistemic significance, they maintain, then it has to contribute to our quest of achieving our most basic epistemic aim, namely knowledge.Unfortunately, recent and widely accepted analyses of knowledge make it very hard to see how art might significantly contribute to the quest (...) of achieving this aim. Hence, by the lights of recent epistemology, it is questionable whether art is of any epistemic value. In order to hold on to the epistemic value of art, one has three options: (a) reject the recent analyses of knowledge that make the epistemic value of art questionable, (b) accept the recent analyses of knowledge but argue that they are compatible with the epistemic value of art, or (c) find another epistemic aim (besides knowledge) and show that art is of significant help in achieving this aim. In this paper I will argue that, at least with respect to pictorial art, option (c) seems promising. By reconsidering some basic insights and ideas from Nelson Goodman we can identify (objective) understanding as an epistemic aim to which pictorial art makes a significant contribution. (shrink)

La métaphysique forestienne de l'être est une métaphysique de la présence. Être est plus qu'exister et c'est mieux qu'un simple fait, c'est un acte, c'est-à-dire une présence. Forest pense l'être dans sa corrélation à l'esprit qui le pense, comme une présence qui l'enveloppe et le constitue, plus encore qu'une substance que l'on infère à partir de ses propriétés. L'esprit révèle sans constituer, il manifeste ce qui est. L'être est plus intérieur à l'esprit que constitué par le sujet qui le pense. (...) C'est dans et par le consentement, comme disposition radicale de l'âme et pure activité spirituelle, au-delà de toute détermination mesurable, que se révèle l'être comme pure présence. L'itinéraire réflexif de l'être à l'absolu qui le fonde est corrélativement révélation de l'intériorité de l'esprit. Aimé Forest propose une philosophie méditante, une métaphysique de l'expérience intérieure, au-delà des clivages scolaires, parfois simplistes, du réalisme et de l'idéalisme."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

The _Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie_ is the most comprehensive history of philosophy ever published in any language. Since the publication the initial volume in 1863 it has been the aim of this vast scholarly undertaking to elucidate philosophical systems and schools of thought as completely and objectively as possible. Thanks to these merits the _GGPh_ has become the standard work of reference on the history of philosophy for entire generations of scholars, teachers and students of all academic (...) domains. While the first editions had only three volumes, the completely revised new edition published by Schwabe Verlag in Basel, Switzerland, since 1988 is going to comprise of more than 30 volumes. Applying highest scholarly standards, the editors aim at balanced, well-informed presentations of of highest objectivity of individual philosophers, traditions of thought and of philosophical debates. (shrink)