The following text is a translation of Semyon Frank’s “L’intuition fondamentale de Bergson” published in Henri Bergson: Essais et témoignages inédits, edited by Albert Béguin and Pierre Thévenaz, Neuchâtel: Éditions de la Baconnière, 1941. In this article, Frank addresses Bergson’s notion of intuition, his anti-intellectualism, his mysticism, his closeness to Lebensphilosophie, the notion of lived experience, the distinction between intuition as pure contemplation and intuition as living knowledge, the distinction between cognition of the atemporal essence of reality and cognition (...) of the world of becoming, pragmatism, the disinterested and open intuitive spiritual attitude vs the utilitarian attitude of social groups closed in on themselves, the transrational vs the irrational, spiritual life, psychic life, the Absolute, and the temporal flux. The article contains criticisms of Bergson on the issues of time and intuition: the durée, the intuitive time, is incomprehensible without an atemporal foundation. Therefore, according to Frank, Plato was correct—contra Bergson—to define time as the moving image of eternity. And, if there is such an atemporal foundation, then, contrary to what Bergson seems to think, intuition as living knowledge cannot be the sole mode of intuition. Moreover, unlike what Bergson appears to think, an intuition of the Absolute would be an intuition of the transrational rather than of the irrational. The translation is preceded by an introduction tracing the genesis of the article, which was commissioned by the Swiss philosopher Pierre Thévenaz. (shrink)

In The Twentieth-Century Humanists from Spitzer to Frye, William Calin examines the contributions of eight scholar-critics who produced their most important work between the mid-1930s and the early 1960s, before the advent of contemporary critical theory. Five are from Continental Europe. Leo Spitzer, Robert Curtius and Erich Auerbach were German-language students of Romance literatures, while Albert Béguin and Jean Rousset, both speakers of French, were leading figures of the Geneva school. Calin also includes English-language scholars: the Oxford don C. (...) S. Lewis, the American F. O. Mathiessen, and the Canadian Northrop Frye. Calin's goal is threefold. He wants to draw distinctions between the mid-twentieth .. (shrink)

Presents a guide to the basics of quantum mechanics and measurement.

Once upon a time, the twentieth-century investigations of the behaviors of sub-atomic particles were thought to have established that there can be no such thing as an objective, observer-independent, scientifically realist, empirically adequate picture of the physical world.

In medical ethics, business ethics, and some branches of political philosophy (multi-culturalism, issues of just allocation, and equitable distribution) the literature increasingly combines insights from ethics and the social sciences. Some authors in medical ethics even speak of a new phase in the history of ethics, hailing "empirical ethics" as a logical next step in the development of practical ethics after the turn to "applied ethics." The name empirical ethics is ill-chosen because of its associations with "descriptive ethics." Unlike descriptive (...) ethics, however, empirical ethics aims to be both descriptive and normative. The first question on which I focus is what kind of empirical research is used by empirical ethics and for which purposes. I argue that the ultimate aim of all empirical ethics is to improve the context-sensitivity of ethics. The second question is whether empirical ethics is essentially connected with specific positions in meta-ethics. I show that in some kinds of meta-ethical theories, which I categorize as broad contextualist theories, there is an intrinsic need for connecting normative ethics with empirical social research. But context-sensitivity is a goal that can be aimed for from any meta-ethical position. (shrink)

From the author of Quantum Mechanics and Experience, a hugely influential book that challenged key assertions by Niels Bohr and other founders of quantum mechanics, A Guess at the Riddle provides a major metaphysical overhaul of one of physics' most intractable problems-the quest to bridge quantum and classical physics in order to understand the nature of reality.

How do otherwise considerate human beings do cruel things and still live in peace with themselves? Drawing on his agentic theory, Dr. Bandura provides a definitive exposition of the psychosocial mechanism by which people selectively disengage their moral self-sanctions from their harmful conduct. They do so by sanctifying their harmful behavior as serving worthy causes; they absolve themselves of blame for the harm they cause by displacement and diffusion of responsibility; they minimize or deny the harmful effects of their actions; (...) and they dehumanize those they maltreat and blame them for bringing the suffering on themselves. Dr. Bandura's theory of moral disengagement is uniquely broad in scope. Theories of morality focus almost exclusively at the individual level. He insightfully extends the disengagement of morality to the social-system level through which large-scale inhumanities are perpetrated...Moral disengagement will transform your thinking about how otherwise considerate people can behave inhumanely and still feel good about themselves." -- Book jacket. (shrink)

In this article, we analyze and reject two versions of the content‐argument against animal beliefs, namely, the ontological argument from Davidson and the epistemological argument from Stich. One of the main defects of the strongest version of the argument is that it over‐intellectualizes belief ascriptions in humans and thus sets the comparative bar for belief ascriptions in animals too high. In the second part of the article, we develop a gradualist notion of belief which captures basic beliefs as well as (...) Davidsonian linguistic beliefs, and we specify the conditions under which belief ascriptions to nonlinguistic animals are justified. (shrink)

We develop a version of a direct perception account of emotion recognition on the basis of a metaphysical claim that emotions are individuated as patterns of characteristic features. On our account, emotion recognition relies on the same type of pattern recognition as is described for object recognition. The analogy allows us to distinguish two forms of directly perceiving emotions, namely perceiving an emotion in the absence of any top-down processes, and perceiving an emotion in a way that significantly involves some (...) top-down processes ; and, in addition, an inference-based evaluation of an emotion. Our model clarifies the epistemology of emotion recognition. (shrink)

Résumé L’article propose une étude de la conception hégélienne du fondement ( Grund ) telle que la présentent les textes de Hegel sur la logique. Son objectif est double : il s’agit de proposer une caractérisation du concept hégélien de fondement, et d’étudier, sur un cas précis, la manière dont la logique hégélienne produit une critique en acte de la métaphysique et de sa critique kantienne. Pour ce faire, l’analyse s’appuie non seulement sur les textes publiés par Hegel ( Science (...) de la logique et Encyclopédie ), mais aussi sur des cahiers d’auditeurs des Leçons sur la logique, récemment publiés et encore peu exploités. (shrink)

Cet article, dans une perspective sémiopragmatique, interroge la disposition graphique des textes comme élément d'interface avec le lecteur. Il s'agit plus précisément d'examiner comment les signes organisateursde l'écrit - cadres, bords et marges- interviennent dans l'acte de lecture.What does the graphic organization of texts have to do with the mental construction of the reader ? How do indexical signs give him a direction ? Between semiotics and psychology, they remind us that the body and perception are important even through the (...) use of codified social models. (shrink)

L’article propose une manière d’éclaircir le rapport de « disciple critique » que Marx déclare entretenir à l’égard de Hegel à l’époque où il rédige le Capital, en faisant porter l’attention sur le problème du statut des concepts et du discours théorique. En utilisant librement, à des fins herméneutiques, les trois modèles critiques élaborés par Marx au fil de la critique de la spéculation hégélienne qu’il déploie dans son manuscrit de 1843 sur la philosophie du droit, l’article tente d’éclairer le (...) contenu du « renversement » de la dialectique hégélienne revendiqué par Marx. Sur la base de la destitution de la philosophie entreprise dans les brouillons de 1845-1846, on montre que Marx identifie, au cœur même du discours philosophique hégélien, un rapport aliéné au concept, que l’on propose, à partir d’un parallèle avec l’analyse du fétichisme de la marchandise, de nommer « fétichisme du concept ». On analyse ensuite les stratégies mises en œuvre par Marx dans le Capital pour mettre au travail la « méthode » dialectique élaborée par Hegel sans retomber dans ce fétichisme du concept. De ce point de vue, Marx apparaît au terme de notre analyse comme un disciple de Hegel en ce qu’il reprend certaines de ses innovations conceptuelles et argumentatives, mais comme un critique de ce dernier au sens où il s’en sépare pour ce qui concerne le statut du discours théorique et des concepts au moyen desquels le théoricien tente de reconstruire et de rendre intelligible le concret qu’il s’attache à penser. (shrink)

Dans les cinquante dernières années, les progrès de l’informatisation ont renforcé l’accessibilité de la jurisprudence via des bases de données juridiques, maintenant concurrencées par des plates-formes de diffusion du droit sur internet. La loi pour une République numérique du 7 octobre 2016 a prévu la généralisation de la diffusion des décisions des juges du fond au titre du processus d’ open data. Toutefois les obstacles sont nombreux : conceptuels, techniques, matériels. D’abord, un glissement s’est opéré d’une problématique d’anonymisation des décisions (...) juridictionnelles vers celle de leur pseudonymisation. Ensuite, la pseudonymisation pourrait constituer un frein au mouvement d’ open data judiciaire, du fait de la lourdeur technique nécessaire pour la réaliser. Juridiquement, sa mise en œuvre s’avère de surcroît délicate. Le renvoi législatif à la protection de la vie privée doit se combiner avec l’application du droit des données personnelles, au titre duquel il faut limiter le risque de réidentification des justiciables. Enfin, matériellement le curseur de la pseudonymisation est malaisé à placer. Quelles indications convient-il de masquer : celles relatives aux parties, ou plus largement aux personnes citées et professionnels du droit impliqués? (shrink)

Cet article prend acte de l’existence d’une pensée écologique chez Marx, consignée principalement dans les cahiers de notes consacrés à l’agriculture. Il propose de s’interroger sur les raisons pour lesquelles Marx en est venu, à partir de 1865, à prêter attention à la destruction des ressources naturelles entraînée par leur gestion capitaliste, alors qu’il ne s’était pas, jusqu’alors, montré sensible à cette question. L’hypothèse proposée, à partir d’une lecture attentive des extraits de Liebig recopiés dans le cahier de 1865-1866 consacré (...) à l’agriculture et récemment publié dans le tome IV/18 de la MEGA 2, est la suivante : la manière dont Liebig décrit l’exploitation des ressources naturelles par l’agriculture capitaliste offre un parallèle frappant avec la manière dont Marx analyse l’exploitation de la force de travail dans le procès de production capitaliste au fil des différentes rédactions de ce qui deviendra le livre I du Capital. L’article présente plusieurs preuves textuelles de ce parallèle, et soutient qu’il offre une explication plausible du soudain intérêt de Marx pour la question écologique. (shrink)

It is argued that certain recent advances in the construction of a theory of the collapses of Quantum Mechanical wave functions suggest the possibility of new and improved foundations for statistical mechanics, foundations in which epistemic considerations play no role.

In recent years, philosophers have developed accounts of cognitive and affective scaffolding to describe the contribution of environmental resources to the realization of mental abilities. However, an integrative account, which captures scaffolding relations in general terms and across domains, is currently lacking. To close this gap, this paper proposes a pattern theory of scaffolding. According to this theory, the functional and causal role of an environmental resource for an individual agent or a group of agents concerning a mental ability in (...) a situational context can be specified by multiple conditions that a scaffold can satisfy. On this view, scaffolds can be described in terms of patterns of relevance-weighted, gradually satisfied scaffolding conditions. The resulting theory will be applied to cases of mathematical cognition to demonstrate its plausibility and feasibility. The pattern theory of scaffolding, it will be shown, has important implications for research on embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive (4E) cognition. (shrink)

The debate about direct perception encompasses different topics, one of which concerns the richness of the contents of perceptual experiences. Can we directly perceive only low-level properties, like edges, colors etc., or can we perceive high-level properties and entities as well? The aim of the paper is to defend the claim that the content of our perceptual experience can include emotions and also person impressions. Using these examples, an argument is developed to defend a liberal-content view for core examples of (...) social cognition. This view is developed and contrasted with accounts which claim that in the case of registering another person’s emotion while seeing them, we have to describe the relevant content not as the content of a perceptual experience, but of a perceptual belief. The paper defends the view that perceptual experiences can have a rich content yet remain separable from beliefs formed on the basis of the experience. How liberal and enriched the content of a perceptual experience is will depend upon the expertise a person has developed in the field. This is supported by the argument that perceptual experiences can be systematically enriched by perceiving affordances of objects, by pattern recognition or by top-down processes, as analyzed by processes of cognitive penetration or predictive coding. (shrink)

Standalone corporate social responsibility reports vary considerably in the content of information released due to their voluntary nature. In this study, we develop a disclosure score based on the tone, readability, length, and the numerical and horizon content of CSR report narratives, and examine the relationship between the CSR disclosure scores and analyst forecasts. We find that CSR reporters with high disclosure scores are associated with more accurate forecasts, whereas low score CSR reporters are not associated with more accurate forecasts (...) than firms who do not issue CSR reports. The findings are robust to controlling for firm characteristics including CSR activity ratings and financial narratives. The findings are driven by experienced CSR reporters rather than first-time CSR reporters. Together, our findings suggest that the content of CSR reports helps to improve analyst forecast accuracy, and this relationship is more pronounced for CSR reports with more substantial content. (shrink)

The literature on ethical decision-making is rooted in a cognitive perspective that emphasizes the role of moral judgment. Recent research in interpersonal dynamics, however, has suggested that ethics revolves around an individual’s perceptions and views of others. We draw from both literatures to propose and empirically examine a contingent model. We theorize that whether the individual relies on cognitions about the ethical issue or perceptions of others depends on the level of social consensus surrounding the issue. We test our hypotheses (...) in three studies. Results suggest that not only does social consensus determine whether an individual relies on ethical cognitions about the issue or perceptions of others, but also that an individual’s view of self is an important moderator in these relationships. We conclude by considering implications of this research for theory and practice. (shrink)

This paper addresses a family of issues surrounding the biological phenomenon of resistance and its representation in realist ontologies. The treatments of resistance terms in various existing ontologies are examined and found to be either overly narrow, internally inconsistent, or otherwise problematic. We propose a more coherent characterization of resistance in terms of what we shall call blocking dispositions, which are collections of mutually coordinated dispositions which are of such a sort that they cannot undergo simultaneous realization within a single (...) bearer. A definition of ‘protective resistance’ is proposed for use in the Infectious Disease Ontology (IDO) and we show how this definition can be used to characterize the antibiotic resistance in Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). The ontological relations between entities in our MRSA case study are used alongside a series of logical inference rules to illustrate logical reasoning about resistance. A description logic representation of blocking dispositions is also provided. We demonstrate that our characterization of resistance is sufficiently general to cover two other cases of resistance in the infectious disease domain involving HIV and malaria. (shrink)

We discuss two recent attempts two solve Schrodinger's cat paradox. One is the modal interpretation developed by Kochen, Healey, Dieks, and van Fraassen. It allows for an observable which pertains to a system to possess a value even when the system is not in an eigenstate of that observable. The other is a recent theory of the collapse of the wave function due to Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber. It posits a dynamics which has the effect of collapsing the state of (...) macroscopic systems. We argue that the modal interpretation cannot account for non-accurate measurements and that both accounts have the consequence that in ordinary measurement situations the observables that ends up well defined are not quite the ones that we want to be well defined. (shrink)

In my paper, I develop a phenomenological and pragmatist reflection on the fragility of liberal democracy’s moral foundations in times of war. Following Judith Shklar’s conception of the “liberalism of fear”, the legitimacy of the liberal-democratic order is seen as grounded in experiences of suffering caused by political violence. It is also assumed that the liberalism of fear delivers an adequate conception of the normative foundations of the European project. With the help of phenomenologists such as Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (...) and Michel Henry, the paper ants to philosophically deepen the liberalism of fear by outlining a theory of “pathic evidence” as a normative foundation and the concept of a common “flesh of the political” as a shared moral sensitivity that sets boundaries to political conflict as well as the political imaginary, excluding what I call the production of “monumental meaning”. It then examines the question which political conditions are needed for this evidence to become a shared, communal criteria of ethical thought, and considers inner and outer challenges to the transmission and reproduction of this evidence in time, drawing especially on John Dewey’s ideas of democratic communication and social intelligence. In the current war, the following problem appears as crucial for the “soul” of European democracies which are confronted with the need to respond to Russia’s attack: How can a political morality grounded in pathic evidence be sustained, once it is challenged by an aggressor who, out of cultural and political reasons, shows a higher level of toleration towards violence? Besides aggression from an external foe, there are also temporal dynamics that further the loss of the inhibiting force of pathic evidence from the inside. As it shall be argued, boredom can be such a factor. The paper concludes by drawing conclusions for the current war in Ukraine. (shrink)

What exactly do we do when we try to make sense of other people e.g. by ascribing mental states like beliefs and desires to them? After a short criticism of Theory-Theory, Interaction Theory and the Narrative Theory of understanding others as well as an extended criticism of the Simulation Theory in Goldman's recent version (2006), we suggest an alternative approach: the Person Model Theory . Person models are the basis for our ability to register and evaluate persons having mental as (...) well as physical properties. We argue that there are two kinds of person models, nonconceptual person schemata and conceptual person images , and both types of models can be developed for individuals as well as for groups. (shrink)

In this paper we study proofs of some general forms of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. These forms conform to the Feferman format, where the proof predicate is fixed and the representation of the set of axioms varies. We extend the Feferman framework in one important point: we allow the interpretation of number theory to vary.

In this paper we study essential hereditary undecidability. Theories with this property are a convenient tool to prove undecidability of other theories. The paper develops the basic facts concerning essentially hereditary undecidability and provides salient examples, like a construction of essentially hereditarily undecidable theories due to Hanf and an example of a rather natural essentially hereditarily undecidable theory strictly below. We discuss the (non-)interaction of essential hereditary undecidability with recursive boolean isomorphism. We develop a reduction relation essential tolerance, or, in (...) the converse direction, lax interpretability that interacts in a good way with essential hereditary undecidability. We introduce the class of $$\Sigma ^0_1$$ Σ 1 0 -friendly theories and show that $$\Sigma ^0_1$$ Σ 1 0 -friendliness is sufficient but not necessary for essential hereditary undecidability. Finally, we adapt an argument due to Pakhomov, Murwanashyaka and Visser to show that there is no interpretability minimal essentially hereditarily undecidable theory. (shrink)

In this paper we study the idea of theories with containers, like sets, pairs, sequences. We provide a modest framework to study such theories. We prove two concrete results. First, we show that first-order theories of finite signature that have functional non-surjective ordered pairing are definitionally equivalent to extensions in the same language of the basic theory of non-surjective ordered pairing. Second, we show that a first-order theory of finite signature is sequential (is a theory of sequences) iff it is (...) definitionally equivalent to an extension in the same language of a system of weak set theory called WS. (shrink)

When producing a description of a target referent in a visual context, speakers need to choose a set of properties that distinguish it from its distractors. Computational models of language production/generation usually model this as a search process and predict that the time taken will increase both with the number of distractors in a scene and with the number of properties required to distinguish the target. These predictions are reminiscent of classic findings in visual search; however, unlike models of reference (...) production, visual search models also predict that search can become very efficient under certain conditions, something that reference production models do not consider. This paper investigates the predictions of these models empirically. In two experiments, we show that the time taken to plan a referring expression—as reflected by speech onset latencies—is influenced by distractor set size and by the number of properties required, but this crucially depends on the discriminability of the properties under consideration. We discuss the implications for current models of reference production and recent work on the role of salience in visual search. (shrink)

This paper focuses on coherence and consistency as elements of moral integrity, arguing that several kinds of—mostly second-order—virtues contribute to establishing coherence and consistency in a person's judgements and behaviour. The virtues relevant for integrity always accompany other, substantive virtues, and their associated values, principles and rules. In moral education we teach children all kinds of substantive virtues with integrity as our goal. Nevertheless, many adults do not attain moral integrity, although they are clearly not immoral. What precisely are they (...) lacking? Education for moral integrity should focus on strengthening motivational self-sufficiency, furthering critical and imaginative thinking and promoting moral unity. (shrink)

Im Folgenden wird der Versuch unternommen, ausgehend von John Deweys Kunst als Erfahrung ein Verständnis des Kitsches als ästhetischer Untugend zu entwickeln. Dabei wird der leitenden Frage des Bandes, ob Kunst moralisch sein muss, in der Weise begegnet, dass nach der spezifischen moralischen Wirkungsweise von Kunstwerken gefragt wird. Nachdem entgegen einer Dichotomisierung von Kunst und Moral die Leistung moderner Literatur und Kunst darin erkannt wird, die Grenzen lebensleitender moralischer Begriffe und Werte anschaulich zu machen und damit Lern- und Reflexionsprozesse auszulösen, (...) wird Kitsch als Umkehr dieser Wirkungsweise von Kunst aufgearbeitet. Kitsch stabilisiert demnach moralische Überzeugungen, Wertvorstellungen und Lebensmodelle, indem er eine sinnliche Welt vor Augen führt, die einen stetigen Resonanzraum letzterer darstellt. Vom Befund ausgehend, dass sein ideologischer Gebrauch in der Natur des Kitsches angelegt ist, wird schließlich Krieg – und insbesondere der gegenwärtige Krieg in Europa – als ein Anlass betrachtet, der die Untugend der Kunst zum Gedeihen bringt. -/- The following paper aims at developing an understanding of Kitsch as an aesthetic vice, drawing mainly upon John Dewey’s Art as Experience. Does art have to be moral? - the guiding question of this volume is addressed by reflecting on the specific operativity of art in moral terms. The genuine force of modern art and literature lies, contrary to a dichotomic view of the relation of morality and the arts, in showing the limits of concepts and values guiding the recipient and therefore activating processes of learning and reflection. It is then argued that Kitsch is the inversion of such an activity. Kitsch stabilizes moral convictions, value orientations and thus ways of life by creating an image of the world that resonates with the latter. Following the observation that Kitsch has a manifest affinity to be used for ideological purposes, war – with focus on the current war in Europe – is considered a primal occasion for the thriving of the aesthetic vice. (shrink)

The narrow-the-scope proposal for defining racism posits that a narrow definition is preferable to a wide definition because the former better facilitates interracial dialogue. Important critiques of the narrow-the-scope proposal have so far focused on the content of narrow definitions. This paper argues that it is important to critique the use of narrow definitions, as well. An examination of white uses of the term “racism” reveals that narrow definitions tend to be interchangeable with individualist definitions, as individualism is an effective (...) framework for white co-optation in the service of white interests. Consequently, philosophers interested in theorizing racism for racial justice purposes ought to reject the narrow-the-scope proposal. Individualist forms of racism should be accommodated within a wide conception of racism that centers the phenomenon of white racism. (shrink)

I distinguish between two conceptually different kinds of physical space: a space of ordinary material bodies, which is the space of points at which I could imaginably place the tip of my finger, or the center of a billiard-ball, and a space of elementary physical determinables, which is the smallest space of points such that stipulating what is happening at each one of those points, at every time, amounts to an exhaustive physical history of the universe. In all classical physical (...) theories, these two spaces happen to coincide – and what we mean by calling a theory “classical”, and all we mean by calling a theory “classical”, is precisely that these two spaces coincide. But once the distinction between these two spaces in on the table, it becomes clear that there is no logical or conceptual reason why they must coincide – and it turns out that a very simple way of pulling them apart from one another gives us quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Most models of lexical access assume that bilingual speakers activate their two languages even when they are in a context in which only one language is used. A critical piece of evidence used to support this notion is the observation that a given word automatically activates its translation equivalent in the other language. Here, we argue that these findings are compatible with a different account, in which bilinguals “carry over” the structure of their native language to the non-native language during (...) learning, and where there is no activation of translation equivalents. To demonstrate this, we describe a model in which language learning involves mapping native language phonological relationships to the non-native language, and we show how it can explain the results attributed to automatic activation of translation equivalents. (shrink)

In this paper I examine parallels between C.S. Peirce's most mature account of signs and contemporary philosophy of language. I do this by first introducing a summary of Peirce's final account of Signs. I then use that account of signs to reconstruct Peircian answers to two puzzles of reference: The Problem of Cognitive Significance, or Frege's Puzzle; and The Same-Saying Phenomenon for Indexicals. Finally, a comparison of these Peircian answers with both Fregean and Direct Referentialist approaches to the puzzles highlights (...) interesting parallels and important differences between Peirce's final account of signs, and the concepts used in analytic philosophy of language. (shrink)

In this paper we show how to interpret Robinson’s arithmetic Q and the theory R of Tarski, Mostowski, and Robinson as theories of cardinals in very weak theories of relations over a domain.