In this paper, I want to hold, first, that a treatment of Frege cases in terms of a difference in cognitive phenomenology of the involved experiential mental states is not viable. Second, I will put forward another treatment of such cases that appeals to a difference in intentional objects metaphysically conceived not as exotica, but as schematic objects, that is, as objects that have no metaphysical nature qua objects of thought. This allows their nature to be settled independently of their (...) being thought of, in particular as concrete entities in the sense of entities that may be spatiotemporal occupiers. Yet third, as to Frege cases, cognitive phenomenology may return from the back door. For the realization that, if correct, solves any such case cannot but have a proprietary, though neither distinctive nor individuative, phenomenology. In my account, this is the realization that the different schematic intentional objects involved are none other than the same entity. (shrink)

In this paper, we want to maintain that the puzzle of imaginative resistance is basically a pragmatic issue due to the failure of participative imagination, as involving a pre-semantic level relating to a wide context (the overall situation of discourse). Since the linguistic meanings of the relevant fiction-involving sentences violate some of our basic norms, what such sentences (fictionally) say cannot be participatively imagined. That failure leads one to refrain from ascribing such sentences the fictional truth-conditions they would have in (...) narrow fictional contexts (sets of fixed parameters) as determined by those meanings in those contexts. Yet one could still make that ascription, for one can cognitively imagine what such sentences would say in those contexts. As is proved by the fact that if one either adopts an alternative view on such norms or, for some reason, brackets them, one can again perform that ascription. (shrink)

We argue that, in certain circumstances, doctors might beprofessionallyjustified to provide abortions even in those jurisdictions where abortion is illegal. That it is at least professionally permissible does not mean that they have an all-things-considered ethical justification or obligation to provide illegal abortions or that professional obligations or professional permissibility trump legal obligations. It rather means that professional organisations should respect and indeed protect doctors’ positive claims of conscience to provide abortions if they plausibly track what is in the best (...) medical interests of their patients. It is the responsibility of state authorities to enforce the law, but it is the responsibility of professional organisations to uphold the highest standards of medical ethics, even when they conflict with the law. Whatever the legal sanctions in place, healthcare professionals should not be sanctioned by the professional bodies for providing abortions according to professional standards, even if illegally. Indeed, professional organisation should lobby to offer protection to such professionals. Our arguments have practical implications for what healthcare professionals and healthcare professional organisations may or should do in those jurisdictions that legally prohibit abortion, such as some US States after the reversal ofRoe v Wade. (shrink)

In this paper, I will first of all claim that once one takes proper names as indexicals of a particular sort, indexinames for short, one may account for some tensions that affect our desiderata regarding the use of such names in sentences directly or indirectly involving fiction. According to my proposal, a proper name “N.N.” is an indexical whose character is roughly expressed by the description “the individual called ‘N.N.’ (in context)”, where this description means “the individual one’s interlocutor’s attention (...) is called to by means of ‘N.N.’ (in context)”. This character is a partial function that maps narrow contexts onto referents. Such contexts are enriched narrow contexts, for they also include an ‘acquisition’ parameter, i.e., a parameter filled by a naming practice constituted by a dubbing, which consists in calling via the name one’s interlocutor’s attention to something (if any), and usually also by a certain transmission chain. I will also claim that such a proposal works independently of one’s ontological stance on fictional entities, that is, independently of whether one believes either that there are or that there are no such entities. Moreover, I will claim that such a proposal is better than similar indexicalist proposals such as the one put forward by Tiedke (2011), Finally, I will try to show how this proposal can deal with some objections one may raise against an indexicalist treatment of proper names. (shrink)

Although both belong to the domain of the nonexistent, there is an ontological distinction between ficta and possibilia. Ficta are a particular kind of abstract objects, namely constructed abstract objects which generically depend on authors for their subsistence. Moreover, they are essentially incomplete entities, in that they are correlates of finite sets of properties. - On the other hand, possibilia are concrete objects. Being a possible object is indeed being an entity that might have existed, that is, that might have (...) been involved in the causal order. Besides, as an object existent in this sense may legitimately be qualified as complete, the incompleteness which pertains to possible objects is contingent, in that it regards them only with respect to the possible worlds in which they do not exist. This ontological distinction has a semantic correlate: whereas names for possibilia are full-fledged directly referential terms, names for ficta are synonymous with de facto rigid descriptions of a complex sort. (shrink)

Clinical ethics consultation has become an integral part of healthcare, serving as a mechanism to navigate complex moral dilemmas that arise in medical practice. The critical dialogue method, as described by Delany et al 1, presents a structured approach that emphasises the role of dialogue in resolving ethical issues. This method is designed to enhance moral clarity and confidence among healthcare professionals, thus improving clinical decision-making. The following commentary delves into the practical application of the critical dialogue method’s seven facilitation (...) steps, analysing real-world cases to illustrate its effectiveness and identifying potential challenges, particularly in culturally diverse settings. The critical dialogue method is structured around seven facilitation steps that steer the ethical deliberation process. These steps are intended to foster a systematic and reflective discussion, prompting participants to consider diverse perspectives and work towards a consensus on ethical matters. The seven steps,1 initiation of dialogue,2 exploration of perspectives,3 identification of ethical principles,4 deliberation on options,5 consensus building, (6) implementation of the decision and (7) reflection and evaluation, are outlined in figure 1. Figure 1 The seven facilitation steps in practice by Delany et al.1 The critical dialogue method has the potential to significantly enhance clinical …. (shrink)

Insofar as the so-called new theory of reference has come to be acknowleged as the leading theoretical paradigm in semantic research, it has been widely accepted that proper names directly refer to their designation. In advancing some of the most convincing arguments in favour of this view of names, S. Kripke has however left somehow undecided what the role of context is in determining which is the direct referent for a name. According to one interpretation of his thought, context has (...) only an external task in allowing one to simultaneously select a name and a given referent for it. Although this interpretation is the most faithful to Kripke's own intentions, there is another possible interpretation of what he says, according to which context more significantly permits one to determine a given referent at a time for one and the same name1. This different interpretation of the role of context is not marginal for the purpose of semantics, since it generates two distinct theoretical conceptions of what a proper name is. According to the former, the 'idiosyncratic' conception, proper names are individuated (at least) by their form and bearer. According to the latter, the 'linguistic' conception, they are individuated by their morphology only: i.e., by their being (syntactically) unstructured strings of letters. The two conceptions prove to be substantially different when homonyms are called into play. Insofar as both the Greek philosopher and the famous shipowner are called "Aristotle", we have two distinct, albeit homonymous, names for the idiosyncratic conception but only one name (as applied to two distinct individuals) for the linguistic conception2. In what follows, I will first sketch one of the most recent attempts to support for the idiosyncratic view, namely the one which traces back to Kaplan [1990] theory of words, and recall its merits over its cognate idiosyncratic theories. I will then try to give an argument in favour of the linguistic conception, by pointing out how the latter.... (shrink)

In this paper, I want to claim that, in conformity with overall intuitions, there are some aesthetic properties that are perceivable. For they are high-level properties that are not only grasped immediately, but also attended to holistically—just like the grouping properties they depend on and that are responsible for the Gestalt effects or switches through which they are grasped. Yet, unlike such grouping properties, they are holistically attended to in a disinterested modality, where objects and their properties are regarded for (...) their own sake. (shrink)

In the old days of descriptivism, fictional reference and non-fictional reference with proper names were treated on a par. Descriptivism was not an intuitive theory, but it meritoriously provided a unitary semantic account of names, whether referentially full or empty. Then the revolution of the new theory of reference occurred. This new theory is definitely more intuitive than descriptivism, yet it comes with a drawback: the referentially full use and the referentially empty use, notably the fictional use, of names are (...) semantically no longer on the same footing. How the use of names from fiction is referentially empty has even been seen as a symptom of its not being a use at all. In this paper, I ask the following question: can one keep the merits of the new theory of reference and still provide a unitary account of both fictional and non-fictional reference with names? My answer is positive, provided that one conceives proper names as a special kind of indexicals. (shrink)

Notwithstanding Plato’s venerable opinion, many people nowadays claim either that mirrors are not pictures, or that, if they are such, they are just transparent pictures in Kendall Walton’s sense of a particular kind of picture. In this article, however, I want to argue that mirrors are bona fide pictures. For they are grasped via what, as I assume in the article, makes a picture a picture, that is, a representation with a figurative value, namely, a depiction; namely, a certain seeing-in (...) experience. This is the sui generis perceptual experience that Richard Wollheim originally appealed to. Once this experience is suitably reconceived, one can show how it successfully applies to mirrors as well, in order to prove that they are bona fide pictures. From an aesthetical point of view, this is an important result. For it shows that the class of pictures is broader than what people nowadays think and is closer to the original intuition sustaining Plato’s opinion. (shrink)

In some peripheral parts of Europe, prehistoric menhirs, dolmens, henges, and other megalithic constructions made such strong marks on the terrain that they became integral to the landscape. In the Middle Ages, such monuments were often used as landmarks or boundary markers and, indeed, ended up in coeval descriptions of the territory. In some instances, prehistoric monuments were Christianized to promote the conversion of “pagan” populations; in other cases, they stimulated the creation of stone artifacts - stelae, crosses, standing stones (...) - that might have been used as well as instruments of conversion. The investigation in this article revolves around analysis of the landscape of Sardinia, medieval descriptions of Sardinia’s terrain, and examination of some early medieval stone artifacts there. Parallels found in similar contexts in the British Isles are also considered. (shrink)

According to H-N. Castañeda, a guise - the very thin individual which lies at the bottom of the ontological furniture of the world - is indifferent to existence in a Meinongian way, in the sense that it remains the same whether it exists or not. Moreover, its existence does not alter its intentional character, as it is the very same individual which is thought of regardless of its being real or not1. In what follows, I will attempt to show that (...) with regards to guises both theses are illegitimate, unless one introduces the notion of an existentially-conditioned property as a counterfactual property which a guise has prior to its actual existence. To do so means to work out an amendment to Castañeda's Guise Theory, as the doctrine which supports his main ontological assumptions. (shrink)

In questo paper cercherò di mostrare che la visione tradizionale del mutamento da parte di Russell della sua teoria delle descrizioni definite negli anni che vanno dai Principles of Mathematics del 1903 a «On Denoting» del 1905, visione secondo cui Russell produce una nuova teoria delle descrizioni (anche) per liberarsi dagli impegni ontologici manifesti di stampo meinonghiano ad entità inesistenti connessi alla sua precedente teoria delle descrizioni, non è convincente, perché le due teorie...

In svariate occasioni (1973, 1990, 2002) Kendall Walton ha sostenuto una teoria della raffigurazione basata sul concetto di far finta: P raffigura (almeno) solo se per il fatto di avere un’esperienza percettiva di P, si fa finta che tale esperienza sia l’esperienza percettiva del soggetto rappresentato da P. Una conseguenza di questa teoria è che, se un individuo non sa far finta, allora ciò con cui si confronta direttamente nella percezione non è una raffigurazione per lui. Ci sono però molt...

Shortly before and during World War II many European psychoanalysts found refuge in South America, concentrated in Buenos Aires. Here, together with local professionals, they created a strong, creative and productive psychoanalytic movement that in turn gave birth to theoretical and clinical contributions that transformed psychoanalysis, psychology, medicine and culture in South America. _The Pioneers of Psychoanalysis in South America_ is a collection of those pioneers’ papers, and introduces the reader to a body of ideas and advancements, many of which (...) have had limited and piecemeal exposure within the psychoanalytic community in the rest of the world until now. The editors Nydia Lisman-Pieczanski and Alberto Pieczanski present original papers and essays, many of which have never before been published in English; those that have been translated were rarely presented in context. Each one of the chapters is accompanied by a scholarly introduction written by psychoanalysts, many of whom personally knew the pioneers and their oeuvres in depth, tracing the roots of their ideas in the European analytic schools. _The Pioneers of Psychoanalysis in South America _is divided into six main sections: Psychoanalytic process Psychoanalytic technique Metapsychology Psychoanalysis of children Culture and society Psychosomatic medicine. Nydia Lisman-Pieczanski and Alberto Pieczanski provide a coherent guide to the seminal ideas and practices of the South American psychoanalysts who have made major theoretical and clinical contributions to the advancement of the psychoanalytic discipline. The chapters present the material in a way that is accessible to psychoanalysts from across the globe and will enable them to incorporate the ideas and practices outlined here into their everyday psychoanalytic work. It will also be of interest to psychoanalytic psychotherapists, academics interested in the history and development of psychoanalytic ideas and psychoanalysis, and advanced students. The following link leads to an video interview featuring Nydia Lisman-Pieczanski and Alberto Pieczanski by the Washington Center for Psychoanalysis for the History Project, where they open up about their stories, their marriage, and their new book: https://www.routledge.com/posts/8996. (shrink)

En el curso de 1929-1930, Los conceptos fundamentales de la metafísica, Heidegger presentó una famosa y controvertida tesis: la piedra es sin mundo, el animal es pobre de mundo y el ser humano es configurador de mundo. Durante mucho tiempo, en medio de diversas críticas e interpretaciones, ésta pasó como la palabra definitiva del pensador alemán respecto al problema de los animales y la vida. Sin embargo, cerca de una década después, en los Cuadernos negros, se presenta una reformulación crítica (...) de la conocida tesis, la cual había sido calificada por Heidegger como insuficiente. Este artículo tiene por objetivo analizar las diferencias entre ambas versiones, para evaluar sus implicaciones dentro del pensamiento heideggeriano y para las posibles críticas e interpretaciones; por ejemplo, la que en su momento ofreció Jacques Derrida. (shrink)

Para Vico la matemática es la única ciencia de la que el hombre es capaz, ya que él mismo produce su objeto. Ni la realidad natural ni la realidad social pueden constituirse en objetos científicos. La primera porque es obra de Dios; la segunda porque el carácter azaroso de los asuntos humanos impiden que puedan ser subsumidos bajo leyes universales y necesarias. Siendo tan restringida la facultad de conocimiento, cobra relevancia la praxis social, aprehensible sólo mediante prudentia. En De ratione (...) se niega la posibilidad de una ciencia del mundo civil y, a la vez, se plantean las condiciones que la harán posible.Mathematics are for Vico the only science man can cultivate since it produces its own object. Therefore neither the natural reality nor the social one can be subtect of scientific consideration, since the first one is a divine product and the second, showing the hazardous character of human affairs, does not allow to explain them through universal scientific laws. The human faculty of knowledge being so restricted, makes social praxis became relevant and it can only grasped by means of prudentia. De Ratione denies the possibility of a scientific approach to the public and civil world, but at the same time, the conditions of posibility of such a knowledge are there posed. (shrink)

Antonio Rosmini-Serbati was one of the first natural law scholars to bring natural law thinking into a conversation with the market economic order that was beginning to emerge in Europe in the 19th century. His reflections on matters such as the origin, nature, and limits of private property, the role of the state, and the nature of human reason show him to be a unique, innovative thinker who nonetheless was determined to work within the parameters of Catholic doctrine. Many of (...) these ideas are concretized in his seminal work The Constitution Under Social Justice, a text that has profound instights to offer those today seeking to integrate theology, philosophy, and economics into their conceptions of a social order that aspires to be both free and just. (shrink)

A Political Life is the compelling autobiography of Norberto Bobbio, one of the foremost political thinkers in postwar Italy. In dramatic and lively prose, Bobbio guides us through some of the most significant events of the twentieth century, charting their influence on his life and work. Born in 1909, Norberto Bobbio's early life was marked by the experience of growing up in Mussolini's Italy - an experience that helped to shape his passionate commitment to the anti-fascist cause. As a result (...) of these early experiences, Bobbio has tirelessly emphasized the fundamental, unassailable importance of democratic rights in the modern state. He has been a voice of reason and moderation in a political context where democratic values have often been threatened by extremes. This masterly autobiography traces the development of Bobbio's political thought, providing a penetrating analysis of the changing political landscape of Italy. At the same time, it represents an intimate account of Bobbio's personal experiences, giving a rare insight into the life and work of this distinguished thinker.A Political Life will be of great interest to students and scholars of social and political theory and of Italian politics, as well as to a general readership interested in political biography and contemporary politics. (shrink)

El texto presenta los fundamentos filosóficos con los cuales configurar una filosofía latinoamericana que apuntale un proyecto de filosofía de la educación desde la educación popular. Esto se hace a partir del examen de la reflexión filosófica de Leopoldo Zea y Amado Osorio. Para ello, se desarrolla en torno a la presunta existencia de una filosofía latinoamericana, pensamiento filosófico latinoamericano, un presunto acuerdo sobre filosofía, una filosofía de la educación en América Latina y una filosofía de la educación como baluarte (...) de una educación filosófica en América Latina. El texto concluye, además, que una filosofía latinoamericana no tiene por qué tener como condición su ruptura con el pensar del hombre genérico; solo se trata de reconocer sus problemas vitales para aportar claridad reflexiva y actuar sobre ellos con respuestas, incluso, inspiradoras para otros pueblos. (shrink)

No presente artigo examina-se aposição do franciscano Pedro de João Olivi ante a Filosofia. Seu texto De perlegendisphilosophorum libris' serve de guia. Constata-seque a critica de Olivi não se volta para o uso emsi dos textos filosóficos pagãos, mas para o modocom que eles podem ser lidos e comentados nomundo cristão, ignorando a subordinação dosaber mundano à sabedoria da revelação.

Este artículo perteneciente a la sección de Bioética en Práctica de la revista Persona y Bioética 24, fue publicado originalmente en El Mundo, el primero de abril de 2019. La columna puede consultarse en esta URL https://www.elmundo.com/noticia/ Diagnosticospresupuestos-y-mercados/376170. Así mismo, el texto se dejó tal y como aparece en el publicado. El autor autorizó la publicación en esta revista y por ser una publicación para El Mundo, los derechos de autor no están bajo la licencia Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0 Internacional (...) de la Revista. (shrink)

: In Cognitive penetrability and the epistemic role of perception Athanasios Raftopoulos provides a new defense of the thesis that, unlike early vision, late vision is cognitively penetrable, in accordance with a new definition of cognitive penetrability that is centered on the ideas of direct influence of cognition upon perception and of the epistemic role of perception. This new definition allows him to maintain that late vision is a genuinely perceptive stage of the perceptual process. In this paper, I try (...) to discuss not only whether this new definition has plausible consequences that allow only late vision to be cognitively penetrable but also whether the claim that late vision is genuinely perceptual allows it to have the kind of hybrid content, half nonconceptual and half conceptual, that Raftopoulos now wants to ascribe to it. Keywords: Cognitive Penetrability, weak, strong, and superstrong; Early and Late Vision; Nonconceptual Content Penetralibità cognitiva e visione secondaria Riassunto: In Cognitive penetrability and the epistemic role of perception Athanasios Raftopoulos dà una nuova difesa della tesi secondo cui, a differenza della visione primaria, la visione secondaria è penetrabile cognitivamente, secondo una nuova definizione della nozione di penetrabilità cognitiva centrata sulle idee di influenza diretta della cognizione sulla percezione e di ruolo epistemico della percezione. Questa nuova definizione gli consente di sostenere che la visione secondaria è una fase genuinamente percettiva del processo percettivo. Nell’articolo, provo a discutere non solo se la nuova definizione ha conseguenze plausibili che consentono solo alla visione secondaria di essere penetrabile cognitivamente, ma anche se l’idea che la visione secondaria sia genuinamente percettiva consente ad essa di avere il contenuto ibrido, in parte nonconcettuale e in parte concettuale, che Raftopoulos vuole ora ascriverle. Parole chiave: Penetrabilità cognitiva debole, forte e superforte; Visione primaria e secondaria; Contenuto nonconcettuale. (shrink)

Estudio bibliográfico y crítico de / A bibliographical and critical study of: Francesco Botturi, Tempo, linguagio e azione. Le strutture vichiane della "storia ideale eterna", Guida editori, Nápoles, 1996, pp. 194.

This book identifies a new methodological strategy for the interpretation of film philosophizing. Many recent works in film philosophy, adopting the approach identified with the term film as philosophy, have considered film as capable of doing philosophy. Focused on the basic relationship between film and filmgoer, the proposed method is founded on the concept of the film world. Combining Merleau-Ponty's and Ricœur's philosophies, and reconsidering Goodman's theory of worldmaking, the film world becomes the hermeneutic horizon from which film philosophical thought (...) can emerge. The book shows how Ricœurian methodology has the potential to provide a valuable resource for film studies by inviting scholars to consider film interpretation in terms of film world hermeneutics. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose we replace the anthropocentric paradigm with an ethoanthropological one that can account for the fact that the human being is just a part of the world and of “nature”. Theoretical reflection and recent findings in the natural sciences confirm that ancient anthropocentric dualisms – the ancient body/soul, and res extensa/res cogitans divide – are obsolete. Here I argue that the human being is a bodymind continuum, comprising action, experience, nurture, and culture. To develop a broader (...) and at the same time more specific science of man is possible only on the condition that we give up the anthropocentric view and replace it with an ethoanthropology. This would also provide compelling reasons to forego harmful experimentation and exploitation of other animal species, including animal biotechnology. Keywords: Anthropology; Biotechnology; Ethology; Nurture; Culture Per una etoantropologia Riassunto: In questo articolo si avanza la proposta di rimpiazzare il paradigma antropocentrico con un paradigma etoantropologico rivolto a ricomprendere dell’essere umano all’interno del mondo e all’interno della “natura”. La riflessione teorica e le scienze naturali confermano che l’antico dualismo antropocentrico – l’antico dualismo tra corpo e mente, tra res extensa e res cogitans – è semplicemente obsoleto. L’essere umano è un continuum di corpomente, azione, esperienza, educazione e cultura. Sviluppare una scienza dell’uomo che sia più ampia ed al contempo più precisa è possibile a patto di superare il provincialismo antropocentrico e di sostituirlo con una etnoantropologia. Questa potrebbe fornirci delle ragioni forti per rinunciare alle pratiche più distruttive operate sugli animali, comprese quelle biotecnologiche. Parole chiave: Antropologia; Biotecnologia; Etologia; Educazione; Cultura. (shrink)

Molte ossessioni individuali, arcaismi culturali, nichilismi teoretici hanno in comune il tentativo di negare il tempo. E invece dal tempo non è possibile uscire se non cessando di vivere. Vita significa esattamente tempo vissuto, tempo consapevole di sé, tempo che scorre nel corpo, che è il corpo. Ego, vita e mondo costituiscono una radicale unità ontologica intessuta di tempo, il quale non è dunque un concetto, tanto meno è una forma logica o una metafora. Il tempo è il corpo stesso (...) che produce significati come il ragno fila la sua tela. La fenomenologia è il tempo che diventa consapevole di sé in una coscienza che lo sa. Il presente contributo articola tale unità di temporalità e semantica in un percorso che va dalla psicologia all’ontologia del tempo. (shrink)

Papers of the international conference "Franz von Baader: Philosophie und Theologie im Spannungsfeld von Technik, Naturwissenschaft und Geschichte" held Oct. 3-6, 2013 in Dresden.

En Muerte y alteridad (2002), de reciente publicación en lengua española (2018), Byung-Chul Han analiza una trayectoria filosófica que atraviesa el pensamiento de Kant, Heidegger y Lévinas para señalar la que identifica como una postura caracterizada por la interioridad, desde la cual se entiende al yo como positividad unitaria frente a la negatividad de lo heterogéneo, la alteridad y la muerte. Estas premisas incurrirían en solipsismos, aporías y contradicciones que nos proponemos examinar, a fin de afinar y valorar críticamente la (...) caracterización llevada a cabo por Han. Tanto el heroísmo del yo como del amor constituirían, concluye el filósofo de origen coreano, respuestas equivocadas al hecho de la muerte, proponiendo a este respecto una apertura a la exterioridad de rasgos budistas que implicaría un vaciamiento del yo. Esta alternativa, de ecos religiosos, invita a una reflexión sobre la naturaleza de su proyecto filosófico, no solo con respecto al afrontamiento de la muerte, sino como respuesta a las problemáticas de la modernidad. (shrink)

This article considers Edward W. Said’s proposals on ‘imaginative geographies’ as suggested in his leading work Orientalism as a tool to analyse the ideological circumstances that shape geographical spaces in the Bible. My purpose is to discuss how these imaginative geographies are present in the patriarchal narratives of Genesis and how they have left their mark on the history of the interpretation of these texts and on the not always easy relations between members of the religious traditions inherited from the (...) Bible (Hebrews, Muslims and Christians). I propose four types of ‘imaginative geographies’: (1) ‘Equalness’ is the way to represent what is considered as sharing the own identity. The geography of ‘Equalness’ defines the spaces of Isaac, Jacob and their families. (2) ‘Otherness’ is the way to represent the ‘Other’ as opposite or juxtaposed to one’s own identity. A common border is shared, thus kinship relationships can be established. It defines the spaces of Ishmael, Esau/Edom, Lot (Ammon and Moab) and Laban. (3) ‘Foreignness’ is the way to define what is strange, odd or exotic considered as external to the own identity, in a space set beyond even the space of the ‘Other’. Egypt is in Genesis a land of ‘Foreignness’. (4) ‘Delendness’ encompasses whatever claims our same space and therefore threatens our survival and must be destroyed ( delendum ). As such, processes of annihilation and dominion of Israel on Canaanites and Sichemites are justified. Contribution: The article applies Said’s ‘imaginative geographies’ as an identity mechanism for the creation of biblical literary spaces. A quadripartite classification (‘Equal’/‘Other’/‘Foreigner’/‘Delendum’) instead of the usual bipartite one (‘Equal’ vs. ‘Other’) is proposed and the consequences for the current coexistence between religious identities inherited from Abraham are shown. (shrink)