Many intergovernmental organizations have recently established offices of internal oversight. Yet scandals have revealed serious flaws in the design of these institutions. This study argues that this is due, in great part, to the initial use of an imperfect domestic model.

This article relates two forms of political and cultural marginality and emancipation to a third one, which, in traditional patriarchal cultures, is the embodiment of marginality par excellence: that of the female self. It explores their similar positioning in the spatial and temporal economy of power relations in a detailed analysis of Irina Grigorescu Pana's novel Melbourne Sundays, a fictionallyrical account of the Romanian author's 11-year exile in Australia, read as a narrative counterpart of her critical approach to exile (...) in The Tomis Complex: Exile and Eros in Australian Literature. These two works describe an experience happening at the intersection between the author's national background – that of Romania – and the postcolonial one of her country of adoption – Australia – as they become relevant from her personal and professional experience as a woman writer. Exile is thus reflected in language, being spatially constructed by means of metaphors such as book, theatre, carnival, garden, which are also relevant for the process of identity formation. The argument mainly relies on Kristeva's theories, an approach motivated by Pana's own choice of the Kristevan discourse of love/hate in relation to the theme of exile in her fictional and critical works, since, as she remarks, exiles and lovers share a marginal, though at the same time essential, position in postcolonial cultures. (shrink)

We construct logical languages which allow one to represent a variety of possible types of changes affecting the information states of agents in a multi-agent setting. We formalize these changes by defining a notion of epistemic program. The languages are two-sorted sets that contain not only sentences but also actions or programs. This is as in dynamic logic, and indeed our languages are not significantly more complicated than dynamic logics. But the semantics is more complicated. In general, the semantics of (...) an epistemic program is what we call aprogram model. This is a Kripke model of ‘actions’,representing the agents' uncertainty about the current action in a similar way that Kripke models of ‘states’ are commonly used in epistemic logic to represent the agents' uncertainty about the current state of the system. Program models induce changes affecting agents' information, which we represent as changes of the state model, called epistemic updates. Formally, an update consists of two operations: the first is called the update map, and it takes every state model to another state model, called the updated model; the second gives, for each input state model, a transition relation between the states of that model and the states of the updated model. Each variety of epistemic actions, such as public announcements or completely private announcements to groups, gives what we call an action signature, and then each family of action signatures gives a logical language. The construction of these languages is the main topic of this paper. We also mention the systems that capture the valid sentences of our logics. But we defer to a separate paper the completeness proof. (shrink)

We study the learning power of iterated belief revision methods. Successful learning is understood as convergence to correct, i.e., true, beliefs. We focus on the issue of universality: whether or not a particular belief revision method is able to learn everything that in principle is learnable. We provide a general framework for interpreting belief revision policies as learning methods. We focus on three popular cases: conditioning, lexicographic revision, and minimal revision. Our main result is that conditioning and lexicographic revision can (...) drive a universal learning mechanism, provided that the observations include only and all true data, and provided that a non-standard, i.e., non-well-founded prior plausibility relation is allowed. We show that a standard, i.e., well-founded belief revision setting is in general too narrow to guarantee universality of any learning method based on belief revision. We also show that minimal revision is not universal. Finally, we consider situations in which observational errors may occur. Given a fairness condition, which says that only finitely many errors occur, and that every error is eventually corrected, we show that lexicographic revision is still universal in this setting, while the other two methods are not. (shrink)

Dreams are a complex phenomenon which the philosophical field knows very little about. However, scientists like Freud or Jung, were able to prove that dream interpretation brings different advantages to our lives. For that reason, the purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that dreams, when understood, can offer us a new life perspective, especially in difficult times. Therefore, with the help of an innovative phenomenological approach introduced by Maria Zambrano, which focuses on the form of the dream and its (...) relation with time perception, rather than the dream content, we are going to observe that people have many types of consciousness, as well as different forms of access to time which relate to multiple perception modes and emotional states. Applying this theory, Maria J. Neves, is able to demonstrate that a phenomenological dream analysis can produce significant changes in peoples’ lives. (shrink)

We address the old question whether a logical understanding of Quantum Mechanics requires abandoning some of the principles of classical logic. Against Putnam and others (Among whom we may count or not E. W. Beth, depending on how we interpret some of his statements), our answer is a clear "no". Philosophically, our argument is based on combining a formal semantic approach, in the spirit of E. W. Beth's proposal of applying Tarski's semantical methods to the analysis of physical theories, with (...) an empirical-experimental approach to Logic, as advocated by both Beth and Putnam, but understood by us in the view of the operationalrealistic tradition of Jauch and Piron, i. e. as an investigation of "the logic of yes-no experiments" (or "questions"). Technically, we use the recently-developed setting of Quantum Dynamic Logic (Baltag and Smets 2005, 2008) to make explicit the operational meaning of quantum-mechanical concepts in our formal semantics. Based on our recent results (Baltag and Smets 2005), we show that the correct interpretation of quantum-logical connectives is dynamical, rather than purely propositional. We conclude that there is no contradiction between classical logic and (our dynamic reinterpretation of) quantum logic. Moreover, we argue that the Dynamic-Logical perspective leads to a better and deeper understanding of the "non-classicality" of quantum behavior than any perspective based on static Propositional Logic. (shrink)

The paper aims to clarify several key aspects of Alexandru Dragomir: his amazing “technique” of keeping his entire knowledge in perfect working condition, his exceptional precision of references and his continuous disregard concerning writing. The root of all these peculiarities is traced back to Plato’s cognitive and moral arguments against writing, as expressed in Phaedrus and Seventh Letter. Finally, the article brings to light what seems to be the lesson of Dragomir’s life as a thinker: to rely only on (...) the living thought, that which is written “inside the soul”. (shrink)

Ancien élève de Heidegger, Alexandru Dragomir (1916-2002) est une figure atypique de la philosophie. Abandonnant l'idée d'une carrière universitaire après la Seconde guerre mondiale, il navigua d'un métier à un autre, refusant catégoriquement d'être publié de son vivant. Il laisse aujourd'hui à nos curiosités ses Banalités métaphysiques, extraites des cahiers dans lesquels il griffonait des notes à sa propre intention. Banalités métaphysiques est la première publication de ce philosophe hors norme, tiré malgré lui de son retrait volontaire.

According to the social contract theory, in order to achieve justice, people grouped themselves in societies. Historically speaking, judges appeared long before the legislator which means that justice was the first element of the social life. Therefore, it expresses the social ethics of a particular time and requires a minimum of credibility. Excessive pragmatism and utilitarianism have kidnapped more and more of what is humane, superior and sacred in the act of justice, and “secularized” it. As Eliade said in The (...) Sacred and the Profane, the sacred is something which is totally different, a space of radical otherness which overshadows the physical territory. This shading manifests itself through limitation, sequencing, reiteration and keeping what is sacred there, even in a courtroom, through ritualization. (shrink)

In the present paper, I examine the possibility of doing phenomenology in a collaborative manner. Faced with the fading of the ethos of seeing for oneself and the predominance of meta-phenomenology passing for phenomenological work, Herbert Spiegelberg proposed the organization of phenomenology workshops. After offering an analysis of the method of philosophical workshops exemplified by a contemporary proponent of philosophical practice, Oscar Brenifier, I identify several problems such a workshop can face and several commitments that can help create the co-subjectivity (...) necessary for sym-phenomenologizing. (shrink)

Based on the transcript of a fragment from a philosophical practice session carried by Oscar Brenifier, I flesh out several aspects of this dialogical form of philosophical practice. First, it is a form of interaction grounded in the interlocutors’ interaffection. Second, the main mechanism of carrying through the dialogic interaction is the practitioner’s repeating the other’s words, writing them down, and then questioning them, thus extracting them from the other’s discursive flow and making them shared objects for an intersubjective gaze. (...) Third, this form of dialogue is asymmetrical: while the other is providing the “content”, the practitioner is responsible for explicating it. (shrink)

Résumé Des artistes roumains se rassemblent pour collaborer, dans leur pratique indissociablement artistique et politique, mais aussi bien au-delà. À travers leurs forces collectives, ils peuvent mieux résister contre le contrôle des forces de polices qui occupent tout espace d’organisation. Le collectif les aide aussi à voir en quoi l’amitié est aujourd’hui une valeur éminemment politique.

We present a logical calculus for reasoning about information flow in quantum programs. In particular we introduce a dynamic logic that is capable of dealing with quantum measurements, unitary evolutions and entanglements in compound quantum systems. We give a syntax and a relational semantics in which we abstract away from phases and probabilities. We present a sound proof system for this logic, and we show how to characterize by logical means various forms of entanglement (e.g. the Bell states) and various (...) linear operators. As an example we sketch an analysis of the teleportation protocol. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to present a collection of properties of the set of atoms and the set of finite injective tuples of atoms, as well as of the powersets of atoms in the framework of finitely supported structures. Some properties of atoms are obtained by translating classical Zermelo–Fraenkel results into the new framework, but several important properties are specific to finitely supported structures.

Stalnaker, 169–199 2006) introduced a combined epistemic-doxastic logic that can formally express a strong concept of belief, a concept of belief as ‘subjective certainty’. In this paper, we provide a topological semantics for belief, in particular, for Stalnaker’s notion of belief defined as ‘epistemic possibility of knowledge’, in terms of the closure of the interior operator on extremally disconnected spaces. This semantics extends the standard topological interpretation of knowledge with a new topological semantics for belief. We prove that the belief (...) logic KD45 is sound and complete with respect to the class of extremally disconnected spaces and we compare our approach to a different topological setting in which belief is interpreted in terms of the derived set operator. We also study belief revision as well as belief dynamics by providing a topological semantics for conditional belief and belief update modalities, respectively. Our setting based on extremally disconnected spaces, however, encounters problems when extended with dynamic updates. We then propose a solution consisting in interpreting belief in a similar way based on hereditarily extremally disconnected spaces, and axiomatize the belief logic of hereditarily extremally disconnected spaces. Finally, we provide a complete axiomatization of the logic of conditional belief and knowledge, as well as a complete axiomatization of the corresponding dynamic logic. (shrink)

In this article I aim to provide the first normative discussion of barter voting markets, namely markets which allow the trading of votes on issues/elections for votes on other issues/elections. The article is framed within the wider literature on the legal permissibility of vote buying, with a particular focus on the recent debate between Christopher Freiman and James Stacey Taylor. I argue that while Taylor's objections successfully defeat Freiman's case in favour of standard voting markets, they are unable to also (...) defeat the type of voting markets outlined here. Furthermore, I argue that there are at least two plausible prima facie reasons in favour of barter voting markets, grounded in their capacity to contribute to the alleviation of injustice for systematically disadvantaged socio‐economic groups and to their capacity to reduce one form of bad voting, i.e. voting from ignorance. (shrink)

In this annotated critical edition of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Lambda Stefan Alexandru draws upon many hitherto unexplored sources of the direct and indirect tradition, inter alia upon an independent Greek manuscript he has discovered in the Vatican Library.

This book is a puzzle inspired by the fresh, colourful rolling landscapes of Gruyère, where a wise man once asked me, “Does the castle over the mountain exist if nobody sees it?” “Yes,” I answered, “as we have all learned that what we know is not always what reality is.” We agree that theoretical ‘knowledge’ needs practical confirmation within reality. But what if we find reality in its very essence, intelligence or knowledge, as Neoplatonists did? The unknown would become unreal, (...) void. When investigating the existence of a cause of all things—the One origin—Damascius, the last head of Plato’s Academy (which closed in 529), writes about its complete ineffability: its lack of position and absence in relation to reality, whether intelligible or not. This void is further reversed into a theoretical framework that defines causality as a global, systemic condition of the world as a whole.About the author: Alexandru Pelin is a philosopher and cyber security professional. (shrink)

This paper presents a simple decidable logic of functional dependence LFD, based on an extension of classical propositional logic with dependence atoms plus dependence quantifiers treated as modalities, within the setting of generalized assignment semantics for first order logic. The expressive strength, complete proof calculus and meta-properties of LFD are explored. Various language extensions are presented as well, up to undecidable modal-style logics for independence and dynamic logics of changing dependence models. Finally, more concrete settings for dependence are discussed: continuous (...) dependence in topological models, linear dependence in vector spaces, and temporal dependence in dynamical systems and games. (shrink)

We investigate the discrete (finite) case of the Popper–Renyi theory of conditional probability, introducing discrete conditional probabilistic models for knowledge and conditional belief, and comparing them with the more standard plausibility models. We also consider a related notion, that of safe belief, which is a weak (non-negatively introspective) type of “knowledge”. We develop a probabilistic version of this concept (“degree of safety”) and we analyze its role in games. We completely axiomatize the logic of conditional belief, knowledge and safe belief (...) over conditional probabilistic models. We develop a theory of probabilistic dynamic belief revision, introducing probabilistic “action models” and proposing a notion of probabilistic update product, that comes together with appropriate reduction laws. (shrink)

This book contains twelve engaging philosophical lectures given by Alexandru Dragomir, most of them given during Romania’s Communist regime. The lectures deal with a diverse range of topics, such as the function of the question, self-deception, banalities with a metaphysical dimension, and how the world we live in has been shaped by the intellect. Among the thinkers discussed in these lectures are Anaxagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and Nietzsche. Alexandru Dragomir was a Romanian philosopher born in 1916. After (...) studying law and philosophy at the University of Bucharest, he left Romania to study for a doctorate in philosophy in Freiburg, Germany, under Martin Heidegger. He stayed in Freiburg for two years, but before defending his dissertation he was called back to Romania for military service and sent to the front. After 1948, historical circumstances forced him to become a clandestine philosopher: he was known only within a very limited circle. He died in 2002 without ever publishing anything. It was only after his death that Dragomir's notebooks came to light. His work has been published posthumously in five volumes by Humanitas, Bucharest; the present volume is the first to appear in English translation. In 2009, the Alexandru Dragomir Institute for Philosophy was founded in Bucharest as an independent research institute under the auspices of the Romanian Society for Phenomenology. (shrink)

Intentionalism is the view that a demonstrative refers to something partly in virtue of the speaker intending it to refer to that thing. In recent work, Una Stojnić has argued that the natural interpretation of demonstratives in some discourses is that they do not refer to the objects intended by the speaker, and instead refer to other things. In this paper, I defend intentionalism against this charge. In particular, I argue that the data presented by Stojnić can be explained from (...) an intentionalist point of view. The explanations take two forms: either the audience’s reaction to the discourse does not concern reference, or the natural interpretation is wrong. This latter claim has been defended by Stojnić in other work as applied to word identifi cation and is neutral between intentionalism and Stojnić’s objectivism. It is also very plausible. But it takes away the import of the argument from natural interpretation, at least in the form discussed here. (shrink)

We take a logical approach to threshold models, used to study the diffusion of opinions, new technologies, infections, or behaviors in social networks. Threshold models consist of a network graph of agents connected by a social relationship and a threshold value which regulates the diffusion process. Agents adopt a new behavior/product/opinion when the proportion of their neighbors who have already adopted it meets the threshold. Under this diffusion policy, threshold models develop dynamically towards a guaranteed fixed point. We construct a (...) minimal dynamic propositional logic to describe the threshold dynamics and show that the logic is sound and complete. We then extend this framework with an epistemic dimension and investigate how information about more distant neighbors’ behavior allows agents to anticipate changes in behavior of their closer neighbors. Overall, our logical formalism captures the interplay between the epistemic and social dimensions in social networks. (shrink)

The article conveys the portrait of a man for whom understanding was a matter of the highest spiritual intimacy, a man who continuously disregarded his possible engagement in the public life as a philosopher, finally a man whom we find, in the twilight of his life, concerned with the intricate tension between the “muteness” of philosophy (as being able “only” to double life by means of rational discourse) and religion. Alexandru Dragomir’s portrait is portrayed in comparison to another important (...) Romanian philosopher, Constantin Noica. The comparison is not accidental, since they both come to represent two paradigmatic ways of making philosophy: traditional ontology (centered around Descartes – Kant – Hegel) vs. modern phenomenology (centered around Husserl – Heidegger). (shrink)

We propose a new model for forming and revising beliefs about unknown probabilities. To go beyond what is known with certainty and represent the agent’s beliefs about probability, we consider a plausibility map, associating to each possible distribution a plausibility ranking. Beliefs are defined as in Belief Revision Theory, in terms of truth in the most plausible worlds. We consider two forms of conditioning or belief update, corresponding to the acquisition of two types of information: learning observable evidence obtained by (...) repeated sampling from the unknown distribution; and learning higher-order information about the distribution. The first changes only the plausibility map, but leaves the given set of possible distributions essentially unchanged; the second rules out some distributions, thus shrinking the set of possibilities, without changing their plausibility ordering.. We look at stability of beliefs under either of these types of learning, defining two related notions, as well as a measure of the verisimilitude of a given plausibility model. We prove a number of convergence results, showing how our agent’s beliefs track the true probability after repeated sampling, and how she eventually gains in a sense knowledge of that true probability. Finally, we sketch the contours of a dynamic doxastic logic for statistical learning. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to define and study the notion of infinity in the framework of finitely supported structures, presenting new properties of infinite cardinalities. Some of these properties are extended from the non-atomic Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory to the world of atomic objects with finite support, while other properties are specific to finitely supported structures. We compare alternative definitions for infinity in the world of finitely supported sets, and provide relevant examples of atomic sets which satisfy some forms (...) of infinity, while do not satisfy others. Finally, we provide a characterization of finitely supported countable sets. (shrink)

The present article represents an attempt to argue in the favor of the thesis that, in the First Meditation, in the fragment where the problem of madness is spoken of, Descartes’ view aims to exclude the possibility that the knowing subject, the Cogito, could be insane, and not only to avoid the problem of madness because of various reasons or to replace the madness-example with a dreaming-example. In other words, this research aims to expose and to argue for Michel Foucault’s (...) point of view regarding the Cartesian problem of madness, and also to argue against Jacques Derrida’s view on the same issue. More broadly speaking, beyond the highlight of a possible different approach to Descartes’ text or the analysis of the Derrida-Foucault controversy, the main aim of this article is to emphasize a problem maybe less discussed of the act of knowing: beyond the proper usage of a wrong method, the misusage of a correct method or the poor practice of some spiritual exercises, the errors in the act of knowledge could as well follow from a deficiency in the knowing subject itself. (shrink)

Even if the theoretical prestige of the notion of ecology is recent, an ecological writing has already been racticed, without receiving this name, by Roland Barthes. On several occasions, progressively after Writing Degree zero, Roland Barthes envisaged writing as a multifaceted practice, the most suitable for overturning the only order worth to be revolutionized, the symbolic order. We will take a fresh look at Barthes' writing as a theoretical concept in the early 1950s, along a shift that takes the term (...) first to the name of a technique. Finally, in the mid-1970s, writing comes to be defined by Barthes as a practice that ignores the dichotomy between matter or body and mind or idea, and which arrives, in a spiral return movement, at an inclusive conception that recovers both the concept and the practice. This is where writing meets, in Barthes' work, the act that Latour calls "greening" and which he defines above all as a new relationship between facts and values. In the light of the latest research in "Barthesian studies" we would like to show that the future of "theory", if it is ecology today, lies in the practice and ecological commitment of writing, as a mediator of meaning, a tool of "charitable fiction", at the confines of spirit and matter. (shrink)

In the following lines, we consider the current debate concerning the origin, the specificity and evolution of analytical philosophy. We will try to motivate the idea that the origins and evolution of analytical philosophy are not entirely due to the British philosophers; in fact, this problem cannot be properly explained in terms of a single tradition, which would come true by the removal of another one. Regarding the evolution of analytic philosophy, we identify aspects of the German tradition, the British (...) tradition as well as some new elements generated by the interaction between positivism and American pragmatism. (shrink)

In this article I aim to offer a first critical assessment of the most prominent arguments in favour of restricting the voting rights of senior citizens. The first argument discussed, most thoroughly articulated by van Parijs, maintains that intergenerational justice would be improved under schemes which restrict the voting rights of senior citizens, thereby diminishing their overall electoral weight. The second argument, reconstructed from Lau's defence of child enfranchisement, maintains that the cognitive decline associated with the process of aging should (...) lead us to treat children and senior citizens identically in respect to electoral rights; thus, if we agree that children should not have the right to vote, consistency dictates that senior citizens should be disenfranchised as well. I respond to these arguments with several objections, arguing that the former relies on a number of faulty empirical premises and has deeply unattractive implications for enfranchisement once consistently applied, and that the latter fails to make empirically salient distinctions between children and senior citizens when it comes to the political domain. (shrink)