El ensayo encuentra su sentido en la proximidad que tiene con el acontecimiento, la experiencia formativa y “con lo provisorio de la vida misma.” Surge de la reflexión de la práctica como docente universitario, en la vivencia del educador, en su actuar pedagógico reflexivo. Situado en la dinámica generativa: método/camino/ensayo/travesía/búsqueda/estrategia, se aproxima por medio de la observación y conceptualización a lo efímero, lo contingente, la novedad, la multiplicidad; fundamentado en principios métodológicos que dan cuenta de una iniciación en el pensar (...) complejo. Asumiendo los principios del pensamiento complejo a manera de conceptos sensibilizadores, se busca comprender la interacción educativa. Por último, se desarrollan temáticas emergentes, que pueden ser asumidas en próximas reflexiones e investigaciones sobre las múltiples y diferenciadas experiencias y acontecimientos formativos universitarios. (shrink)

The Critique of Pure Reason—Kant’s First Critique—is one of the most studied texts in intellectual history, but as Alfredo Ferrarin points out in this radically original book, most of that study has focused only on very select parts. Likewise, Kant’s oeuvre as a whole has been compartmentalized, the three Critiques held in rigid isolation from one another. Working against the standard reading of Kant that such compartmentalization has produced, The Powers of Pure Reason explores forgotten parts of the First (...) Critique in order to find an exciting, new, and ultimately central set of concerns by which to read all of Kant’s works. Ferrarin blows the dust off of two egregiously overlooked sections of the First Critique—the Transcendental Dialectic and the Doctrine of Method. There he discovers what he argues is the Critique’s greatest achievement: a conception of the unity of reason and an exploration of the powers it has to reach beyond itself and legislate over the world. With this in mind, Ferrarin dismantles the common vision of Kant as a philosopher writing separately on epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics and natural teleology, showing that the three Critiques are united by this underlying theme: the autonomy and teleology of reason, its power and ends. The result is a refreshing new view of Kant, and of reason itself. (shrink)

This text is an interview given by Prof. Dr. Alfredo Pereira Jr. to Leonardo Ferreira Almada, on the occasion of the call for publication of interviews with different Brazilian philosophers. In response to the goal of the Trans/Form/Ação journal call, we sought to carry out an interview in which a PhD professor with an established career presents some elements of his personal and academic stories, as well as clarifies important points of his research, some of his theses and vision (...) of the world based on questions asked by another professor, a historical research partner, and in-depth knowledge of the interviewee’s career. (shrink)

Philosophers of perception frequently assume that we see actual states of affairs, or facts. Call this claim factualism. In his book, William Fish suggests that factualism is supported by phenomenological observation as well as by experimental studies on multiple object tracking and dynamic feature-object integration. In this paper, I examine the alleged evidence for factualism, focusing mainly on object detection and tracking. I argue that there is no scientific evidence for factualism. This conclusion has implications for studies on the phenomenology (...) and epistemology of visual perception. (shrink)

Hegel is, arguably, the most difficult of all philosophers. To find a way into his thought interpreters have usually approached him as though he were developing Kantian and Fichtean themes. This book demonstrates in a systematic way that it makes much more sense to view Hegel's idealism in relation to the metaphysical and epistemological tradition stemming from Aristotle. The book offers an account of Hegel's idealism in light of his interpretation, discussion, assimilation and critique of Aristotle's philosophy. There are explorations (...) of Hegelian and Aristotelian views of system and history; being, metaphysics, logic, and truth; nature and subjectivity; spirit, knowledge, and self-knowledge; ethics and politics. No serious student of Hegel can afford to ignore this major interpretation. It will also be of interest in such fields as political science and the history of ideas. (shrink)

The sensorimotor theory of vision and visual consciousness is often described as a radical alternative to the computational and connectionist orthodoxy in the study of visual perception. However, it is far from clear whether the theory represents a significant departure from orthodox approaches or whether it is an enrichment of it. In this study, I tackle this issue by focusing on the explanatory structure of the sensorimotor theory. I argue that the standard formulation of the theory subscribes to the same (...) theses of the dynamical hypothesis and that it affords covering-law explanations. This however exposes the theory to the mere description worry and generates a puzzle about the role of representations. I then argue that the sensorimotor theory is compatible with a mechanistic framework, and show how this can overcome the mere description worry and solve the problem of the explanatory role of representations. By doing so, it will be shown that the theory should be understood as an enrichment of the orthodoxy, rather than an alternative. (shrink)

Abstract: Research on the nature and varieties of the format of cognitive representations in philosophy and cognitive science have been partly shaped by analogies to external, public representations. In this paper, we argue that relying on such analogies contributes to framing the question of cognitive formats in problematic, potentially counterproductive ways. We show that cognitive and public representations differ in many of their central features, making analogies to public representations ill-suited to improving our understanding of cognitive formats. We illustrate these (...) points by examining two case studies in which analogies to public representations may have had a negative impact on research: the 80’s-90’s debate about compositionality and cognitive architecture between symbolicists and connectionists; and contemporary discussions about the nature of visual demonstratives. Finally, we outline an alternative, computational account of formats that does not share the shortcomings of appeal to public representations. (shrink)

Abstract: Research on the nature and varieties of the format of cognitive representations in philosophy and cognitive science have been partly shaped by analogies to external, public representations. In this paper, we argue that relying on such analogies contributes to framing the question of cognitive formats in problematic, potentially counterproductive ways. We show that cognitive and public representations differ in many of their central features, making analogies to public representations ill-suited to improving our understanding of cognitive formats. We illustrate these (...) points by examining two case studies in which analogies to public representations may have had a negative impact on research: the 80’s-90’s debate about compositionality and cognitive architecture between symbolicists and connectionists; and contemporary discussions about the nature of visual demonstratives. Finally, we outline an alternative, computational account of formats that does not share the shortcomings of appeal to public representations. (shrink)

Husserl on the Ego and its Eidos (Cartesian Meditations, IV) ALFREDO FERRARIN THE THEORY OF the intentionality of consciousness is essential for Husserl's philosophy, and in particular for his mature theory of the ego. But it runs into serious difficulties when it has to account for consciousness's transcendental constitution of its own reflective experience and its relation to immanent time. This intricate knot, the inseparability of time and constitution, is most visibly displayed in Husserl's writings from the 192os up (...) to the notion of the eidos ego in the fourth Cartesian Meditation. In this paper I want to dwell on the most problematic aspects of this theory. After a few preliminary remarks about the intentionality of consciousness (sec- tion 1), I try to place the theory of the substrate of habitualities in the context of Husserl's evolution on the issue of the reflection of the ego on itself (section ~). I briefly follow the threads of Husserl's shifting position from the Logical Investi- gat/ons and Ideas I to Ideas II, the Cartesian Meditations and the Cr/s/s. I indicate Husserl's works are quoted with the following abbreviations: CM = Cartesiani.~he Meditationen, Husserliana Bd. I, hrsg. v. S. Strasser (Den Haag, 195o); Carte- s/an M~, trans. D. Cairns (Dordrecht, 196o ) SW = Husserl, Shorter Works, ed. P. McCormick and F. Elliston (Notre Dame, 198a) IZ = Zur Phttnomenologie des inneren Zeilheun~tseim (z 893-z 917), Husserliana Bd. X, hrsg. v. R. Boehm (Den Haag, 1966 ) Ideen I = ldeen zu einer reinen Ph~nomenologie und ph~nomenologischen Philosophic, Husserliana Bd. III, hrsg. v. W. Biemel (Den Haag, t95o); Ideas I, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague, Boston, Lancaster, s983) ldeen// = ld., Hussefliana Bd. IV, hrsg. v. M. Biemel (Den Haag, 1952); Ideas I1, trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Dordrecht, Boston, London, x 989) FTL = Forma/e und transzendenta~ Log/k, Husserliana Bd. XVII, hrsg. v. P. Janssen (Den Haag, t974) Kr/sh = Kr/s/s der europ~/schen W/ssen~haften, Husserliana Bd. VI, hrsg. v. W. Biemel (Den Haag, 1954) I wish to express my gratitude to Pierre Kerszberg and Alessandra Fussi for their helpful com- ments on an earlier draft of the paper, and to Graham Harman for checking the final version of my English text. [645] 646 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 32:4 OCTOBER 1994 some historical antecedents, in particular Aristotle, of Husserl's theory of abid- ing properties which, as far as I can see, have not been pointed out before. Husserl's Entwicklungsgeschichte on the topic of the pure ego has already been the object of important scholarly works, of which Kern's 1964 Husserl und Kant seems to me the best example. But what the secondary literature does not do is develop thematically the ambiguities of Husserl's definitions of consciousness and temporality in a unitary and comprehensive way. While I follow the lead of Berger, Broekman, Kern, Marbach,' and others, I find that their work does not sufficiently stress the difficulties at the core ofintentionality and reflective time- consciousness. Therefore, although section 2 is a necessary presupposition for drawing some critical conclusions in the final two sections, it does not exhaust my theme. After clarifying the peculiarity of the notions of essence, intuition, tran- scendental and apriori, as well as their irl:educibility to a Kantian meaning, I turn to the "de facto transcendental ego" resulting from eidetic variation (section 3) in order to introduce an examination of temporality. The difficul- ties in the twofold requirement, namely, that consciousness be the identical subject of its Erlebnisse and be synthetically unified in time, concern the unity, primacy, and mutual relation of time and consciousness in the constitution of our experience. They have been heady pointed out by Ricoeur in his commen- tary on the Cartesian Meditations. But what I want to argue in section 4, going beyond Ricoeur's text, is that the tension between temporally constituted and constitutive consciousness in the ego's reflection on its own retentions and protensions does not simply make the question of time ambiguous, but has crucial and problematic bearings on the very definition of consciousness as intentionality. In this respect... -/- . (shrink)

The modern world was in part born as a reaction against Aristotelianism. However, the image of Aristotle to which modern philosophers reacted was partial, to say the least. Paradoxical though it may seem, today, more than twenty-three centuries on, we may now be in the most advantageous position for understanding the Stagirite's philosophy and applying it to contemporary problems. The present book contributes to the forming of an idea of Post-modern reason inspired by a constellation of Aristotelian concepts, such as (...) prudence (phronesis), practical truth (aletheia praktike), science in act (episteme en energeiai), metaphor (metaphora), similarity (homoiosis) and the imitation-creation pair (mimesis-poiesis). They all form an interconnected network and together they make up an idea of reason that may prove suitable for the present. These concepts offer the most promising basis for undertaking a series of urgent reconciliations: of facts and values, of means and ends, of theoretical and practical reason, of intelligence and emotion. Aristotle's notions could help solve many dualisms of modern times. He offers a third way between identity and difference in ontology and politics, between algorithm and anarchism in methodology, between naïve realism and plain relativism in epistemology, between equivocity and univocity in language, between Enlightenment and Romanticism in culture... On the way, this shift facilitates the relationships between science, arts and ethics - the three parts of the sphere of culture which Modernity had separated - as well as the integration of the sphere of culture itself with the world of life. (shrink)

Interpretations are generally regarded as the formal representation of the concept of translation.We do not subscribe to this view. A translation method must indeed establish relative consistency or have some uniformity. These are requirements of a translation. Yet, one can both be more strict or more flexible than interpretations are. In this article, we will define a general scheme translation. It should incorporate interpretations but also be compatible with more flexible methods. By doing so, we want to account for methods (...) that seem to imply a sense of translation but are not reducible to interpretations. The main example will be the relative consistent proof between ZF and NBG given by Novak (1950). Further, we will explore a way of combining interpretations. This should account for truth conditions discarded by interpretations in translated theories. (shrink)

For Kant as for Hegel method is not a structure or procedure imported into philosophy from without, as, e.g. a mathematical demonstration in modern physics or in the proof-structure of philosophies such as Spinoza’s or Wolff’s. For both Hegel and Kant method is the arrangement that reason gives its contents and cognitions; for both, that is, method and object do not fall asunder, unlike in all disciplines other than philosophy. For Kant method is the design and plan of the whole, (...) the scientific form that guides the organization of cognitions (KrV A 707/B 736, Ak 24, 780). Likewise, Hegel writes that method is the consciousness of the form of its inner movement (WL 1, 49, SL 53, W 3 47, PhS 28). Unfortunately, Hegel never considers Kant an example or a precursor or a positive role model. It is important to ask why Hegel never takes seriously Kant’s Doctrine of Method. Why, if he shares so many central points with the Architectonic of the first Critique, does he never acknowledge Kant as a possible ally? Why does he misunderstand Kant on analysis and synthesis as he does? These are some of the questions I plan to discuss in this paper. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that there is philosophy of science since philosophy existed. Thus, the idea that the philosophy of science was born with neopositivism is historically wrong and detrimental to the development of the philosophy of science itself. Neopositivism tried to found the philosophy of science as an anti-philosophical discipline, as a field of study that came to replace simple philosophy. The attempt was maintained for thirty years, but failed. Now, this does not mean that we cannot make (...) good philosophy of science today, but that the philosophy of science has returned to the common house of philosophy, it is gradually recovering the connection that it should never have lost with the main philosophical traditions and disciplines. (shrink)

Many artists, art critics, and poets suggest that an aesthetic appreciation of artworks may modify our perception of the world, including quotidian things and scenes. I call this Art-to-World, AtW. Focusing on visual artworks, in this paper I articulate an empirically-informed account of AtW that is based on content related views of aesthetic experience, and on Goodman’s and Elgin’s concept of exemplification. An aesthetic encounter with artworks demands paying attention to its aesthetic, expressive, or design properties that realize its purpose. (...) Attention to these properties make percipients better able to spot them in other entities and scenes as well. The upshot is that an aesthetic commerce with artworks enlarges the scope of what we are able to see and has therefore momentous epistemic consequences. (shrink)

According to the semantic view of computation, computations cannot be individuated without invoking semantic properties. A traditional argument for the semantic view is what we shall refer to as the argument from the cognitive science practice. In its general form, this argument rests on the idea that, since cognitive scientists describe computations (in explanations and theories) in semantic terms, computations are individuated semantically. Although commonly invoked in the computational literature, the argument from the cognitive science practice has never been discussed (...) in detail. In this paper, we shall provide a critical reconstruction of this argument and an extensive analysis of its prospects, taking into account some ways of defending it that have never been explored so far. We shall argue that explanatory considerations support at best a weak version of the argument from the cognitive science practice, according to which semantic properties concur with formal syntactic properties in individuating computations in cognitive science, but not a strong version, according to which computation individuation in cognitive science is semantic as opposed to formal syntactic. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant Yearbook Jahrgang: 8 Heft: 1 Seiten: 1-16.

El transhumanismo es una moda intelectual que propone la transformación de los seres humanos mediante diversas tecnologías. Expondremos brevemente los rasgos más conspicuos del TH, así como las principales críticas que se le han hecho. Pero la intención de este artículo no es entrar en esta polémica; aportaremos tan solo las claves imprescindibles para poder seguir adelante. Y una de las claves más intrigantes del TH es que, por debajo de su pátina tecno-futurista, remite a ciertas ideas filosóficas tan viejas (...) como, en apariencia, incompatibles entre sí. El TH remite al naturalismo radical, tanto como al nihilismo existencialista. La tesis que aquí se defiende es que tanto el naturalismo radical como el nihilismo existencialista son producto de las diversas oleadas del dualismo: del dualismo platónico antiguo, del dualismo cartesiano moderno. Una vez que separamos, a la manera dualista, la libertad por un lado y la naturaleza por el otro, podemos contar hasta dos, como hacen los dualistas, o quedarnos solo en uno, como hacen los existencialistas, que se paran en la libertad, y los naturalistas, que solo cuentan con la naturaleza. En cualquier caso, la imagen del ser humano, que es libertad y naturaleza, sale dañada. Asoma entonces el animal aporético y enfermizo al cual hay que salvar… de sí mismo. ¿Cómo? Siguiendo el método de Procusto, pero ahora con los prefijos bio e info en lugar de sierra y martillo. Hasta que el pobre ser humano encaje en el lecho de la utopía que algunos visionarios han urdido. ¿Y no hay otra vía, otra forma de mejorar la vida humana que sea más respetuosa para con la humana envergadura? Quizá sí, mas para trazar esa tercera vía, entre el naturalismo radical que mutila y el nihilismo existencialista que descoyunta y estira, habría que negar de antemano el dualismo que a los dos engendra, y atenerse a la sensatez común, en línea con la tradición aristotélica, antes que a las ensoñaciones utópicas. En nuestra opinión, el concepto aristotélico de naturaleza humana nos habilita para juzgar las antropotecnias mejor que la normatividad extraída de las visiones futuristas propias del TH. (shrink)

La ética ambiental nació como justa contestación a los excesos del antropocentrismo. Sin embargo, un énfasis obsesivo en lo ético y en lo ambiental, con el consiguiente olvido de lo antropológico, puede estar dañando la vida humana, la libertad de las personas y la vida en general. Abogamos aquí por la construcción de una ecología humana que vaya más allá y más al fondo que las éticas ambientales al uso. Defendemos que el humanismo es perfectamente compatible con el reconocimiento del (...) valor inherente de todos los seres naturales. Lo hacemos basándonos principalmente en algunas ideas de Hans Jonas, aunque rechazamos su heurística catastrofista. De él retomamos la idea de que existe una responsabilidad moral hacia los demás seres vivos, empezando por los más próximos en el tiempo y en el espacio, y hacia el libre florecimiento de las personas actuales. Con ello, también, se rebaja el peso de lo ético sobre nuestra acción ecológica. Esta ha de atender principalmente a criterios experienciales, antropológicos, científicos y de sentido común. Por último, defendemos que la política, la educación y la comunicación ambiental deben orientarse directamente hacia la libertad y el desarrollo virtuoso de las personas actuales, y no hacia el control de las mismas por culpabilización. El tránsito desde la ética ambiental hacia la ecología humana —concluimos— puede ser beneficioso tanto para las personas como para la naturaleza. (shrink)

In this article, we analyse the ontological import of adding classes to set theories. We assume that this increment is well represented by going from ZF system to NBG. We thus consider the standard techniques of reducing one system to the other. Novak proved that from a model of ZF we can build a model of NBG (and vice versa), while Shoenfield have shown that from a proof in NBG of a set-sentence we can generate a proof in ZF of (...) the same formula. We argue that the first makes use of a too strong metatheory. Although meaningful, this symmetrical reduction does not equate the ontological content of the theories. The strong metatheory levels the two theories. Moreover, we will modernize Shoenfields proof, emphasizing its relation to Herbrands theorem and that it can only be seen as a partial type of reduction. In contrast with symmetrical reductions, we believe that asymmetrical relations are powerful tools for comparing ontological content. In virtue of this, we prove that there is no interpretation of NBG in ZF, while NBG trivially interprets ZF. This challenges the standard view that the two systems have the same ontological content. (shrink)

We consider the foundational relation between arithmetic and set theory. Our goal is to criticize the construction of standard arithmetic models as providing grounds for arithmetic truth (even in a relative sense). Our method is to emphasize the incomplete picture of both theories and treat models as their syntactical counterparts. Insisting on the incomplete picture will allow us to argue in favor of the revisability of the standard model interpretation. We then show that it is hopeless to expect that the (...) relative grounding provided by a standard interpretation can resist being revisable. We start briefly characterizing the expansion of arithmetic `truth' provided by the interpretation in a set theory. Further, we show that, for every well-founded interpretation of recursive extensions of PA in extensions of ZF, the interpreted version of arithmetic has more theorems than the original. This theorem expansion is not complete however. We continue by defining the coordination problem. The problem can be summarized as follows. We consider two independent communities of mathematicians responsible for deciding over new axioms for ZF and PA. How likely are they to be coordinated regarding PA’s interpretation in ZF? We prove that it is possible to have extensions of PA not interpretable in a given set theory ST. We further show that the probability of a random extension of arithmetic being interpretable in ST is zero. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson supports the thesis that every possible entity necessarily exists and so he needs to explain how a possible son of Wittgenstein’s, for example, exists in our world:he exists as a merely possible object, a pure locus of potential. Williamson presents a short argument for the existence of MPOs: how many knives can be made by fitting together two blades and two handles? Four: at the most two are concrete objects, the others being merely possible knives and merely possible (...) objects. This paper defends the idea that one can avoid reference and ontological commitment to MPOs. My proposal is that MPOs can be dispensed with by using the notion of rules of knife-making. I first present a solution according to which we count lists of instructions - selected by the rules - describing physical combinations between components. This account, however, has its own difficulties and I eventually suggest that one can find a way out by admitting possible worlds, entities which are more commonly accepted - at least by philosophers - than MPOs. I maintain that, in answering Williamson’s questions, we count classes of physically possible worlds in which the same instance of a general rule is applied. (shrink)

Friedrich Nietzsche e a crítica da subjetividade cartesiana O nome de Descartes aparece várias vezes nas obras publicadas e nos fragmentos póstumos de Nietzsche. As considerações do filósofo alemão são quase sempre críticas e recuperam, embora com um diferente juízo de valor, a interpretação do pensamento cartesiano fornecida pela tradição idealista. Nesta perspetiva, Descartes é considerado o pai do racionalismo ocidental, o pensador que teria colocado o cogito no centro da representação. A este respeito, analisar criticamente a leitura nietzschiana não (...) significa só questionar a validade da sua interpretação, mas pôr em causa os mesmos cânones da modernidade filosófica. Palavras-chave: Nietzsche; Descartes; Cogito; Idealismo alemão; Heidegger; Modernidade. Friedrich Nietzsche et la critique de la subjectivité cartésienne Résumé: Le nome de Descartes apparait plusieurs fois dans les œuvres publiées et dans les fragments posthumes de Nietzsche. Les considérations du philosophe allemand sont presque toujours critiques et reprennent, même si avec un diffèrent jugement de valeur, l’interprétation de la pensée cartésienne fournie par la tradition idéaliste. Dans cette perspective, Descartes est considéré comme le père du rationalisme occidental, à savoir, le penseur qui aurait placé le cogito au centre de la représentation. À cet égard, analyser de façon critique l’approche de Nietzsche n’implique pas seulement mettre en question la validité de son interprétation, mais aussi remettre en cause les canons de la modernité philosophique. Mots-clés: Nietzsche; Descartes; Cogito; Modernité. Friedrich Nietzsche e the criticism of Cartesian subjectivity Abstract: Descartes’ name appears several times in Nietzsche’s published works and in his posthumous fragments. The considerations of the German philosopher are almost always critical and resume, although with a different value of judgement, the interpretation of Cartesian thought provided by Idealistic tradition. In this perspective, Descartes is considered as the father of Western Rationalism, namely, the author that would place the cogito at the center of representation. In this regard, to critically analyzing Nietzschean approach toward Descartes it does not only imply to questioning the validity of his interpretation, but also to questioning the very same canons of philosophical modernity. Keywords: Nietzsche; Descartes; Cogito; Modernity. (shrink)

Neste livro, o autor percorre seis séculos de história da civilização ocidental em busca dos momentos decisivos da luta intelectual entre dominados e dominadores. Atento às formulações da tradição hegeliano-marxista e sem descartar os clássicos da Sociologia, Alfredo Bosi investiga a dinâmica de antagônicos, discursos que moldaram a feição da sociedade, bem como suas singularidades culturais. Na primeira parte, Alfredo Bosi discorre sobre alguns autores das áreas de filosofia, política e literatura universais, destacando as estratégias contraideológicas que utilizaram (...) para combater o pensamento hegemônico. Em seguida, volta-se para o Brasil analisando as interseções com a cultura ocidental e detendo-se em figuras, como Joaquim Nabuco e Celso Furtado. O capítulo final tenta desatar o nó ideológico que reconhece na obra de Machado de Assis. (shrink)

The objectivity of representation Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9505-1 Authors Alfredo Paternoster, University of Bergamo, Via Pignolo 123, 24121 Bergamo, Italy Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

The notion of productive imagination is not only of crucial importance for Kant’s idea of pure reason, and for the unity of our theoretical experience, it is also stunningly seminal for post-Kantian philosophy: think, for instance, of Fichte, Schelling, the German Romantics, and of Hegel’s Glauben und Wissen. For the historian of philosophy, in particular, it is a very intriguing notion. Yet, however fundamental the notion of productive imagination is, it is not easy to determine its precise role in the (...) Critique of Pure Reason; the question of its historical genealogy is even more obscure. (shrink)

In this article, instead of taking a particular method as translation, we ask: what does one expect to do with a translation? The answer to this question will reveal, though, that none of the first order methods are capable of fully represent the required transference of ontological commitments. Lastly, we will show that this view on translation enlarge considerably the scope of translatable, and, therefore, ontologically comparable theories.

La recepción europea de Gómez Dávila comenzó a desplegarse de manera más amplia a partir de la lectura y difusión realizada por Franco Volpi. Este artículo alude a la manera como dicha lectura concretó las interpretaciones del colombiano, principalmente a la luz de una filosofía práctica y una perspectiva crítica. De dichas posturas, el italiano destaca la vocación vital y el carácter provocador del pensamiento de Gómez Dávila.

Whoever has even a superficial familiarity with recent, and not so recent, philosophical debates knows that in the last few decades philosophy of mind has been dominated by physicalist naturalism, and that philosophers of mind who are willing to seriously consider the possibility that materialism might be false are still quite rare. This being the situation, it is somewhat surprising that in the philosophical literature the pro-materialist conviction often seems to float free of the defence of any specific argument in (...) its favour. Yet, some arguments for physicalism have actually been put forward, and in this paper I examine three: the argument from the success of science, the argument from methodological naturalism, and the argument from the causal closure of the physical. They may not exhaust all that has been said to uphold physicalism in the metaphysics of mind, but they do offer, I think, a fair survey of the sorts of reasons that are given in this kind of discussion. If I am right on this point, and if I am right that the arguments I consider are weak and unconvincing, then the most popular form of naturalism concerning the mind cannot be viewed as being well backed up, contrary to what many of its supporters usually think. (shrink)

Introduction to the topical collection "The Structure of Perceptual Objects"—with contributions by Mohan Matthen, EJ Green, Alisa Mandrigin, Blazej Skrzypulec, and Anna Drożdżowicz.

Is consistency the sort of thing that could provide a guide to mathematical ontology? If so, which notion of consistency suits this purpose? Mark Balaguer holds such a view in the context of platonism, the view that mathematical objects are non-causal, non-spatiotemporal, and non-mental. For the purposes of this paper, we will examine several notions of consistency with respect to how they can provide a platon-ist epistemology of mathematics. Only a Gödelian notion, we suggest, can provide a satisfactory guide to (...) a platonist ontology. Is consistency the sort of thing that could provide a guide to mathematical ontology? If so, which notion of consistency suits this purpose? Mark Bala-guer holds such a view in the context of platonism, the view that mathematical objects are non-causal, non-spatiotemporal, and non-mental. Balaguer's version of Platonism, Full-Blooded Platonism (FBP), is the view that "there are as many abstract mathematical objects as there could be-i.e., there actually exist abstract mathematical objects of all possible kinds" (Balaguer, 2017, p. 381). He continues: Since FBP says that there are abstract mathematical objects of all possible kinds, it follows that if FBP is true, then every purely mathematical theory that could be true-i.e., that is internally consistent-accurately describes some collection of actually existing abstract objects. Thus it follows from FBP that in order to acquire knowledge of abstract objects, all we have to do is come up with an internally consistent purely mathematical theory (and know that it is internally consistent). (Balaguer, 2017, p. 381) * To be published in 43rd International Wittgenstein Symposium proceedings. (shrink)

At the beginning of the 20th century, Gestalt psychologists put forward the concept of psychoneural isomorphism, which was meant to replace Fechner’s obscure notion of psychophysical parallelism and provide a heuristics that may facilitate the search for the neural correlates of the mind. However, the concept has generated much confusion in the debate, and today its role is still unclear. In this contribution, I will attempt a little conceptual spadework in clarifying the concept of psychoneural isomorphism, focusing exclusively on conscious (...) visual perceptual experience and its neural correlates. Firstly, I will outline the history of our concept, and its alleged metaphysical and epistemic roles. Then, I will clarify the nature of isomorphism and rule out its metaphysical role. Finally, I will review some epistemic roles of our concept, zooming in on the work of Jean Petitot, and suggest that it does not play a relevant heuristic role. I conclude suggesting that psychoneural isomorphism might be an indicator of robustness for certain mathematical descriptions of perceptual content. (shrink)

In a broad-based study of experiences in psychological research, 65 undergraduates participating in a wide range of psychological experiments were interviewed in depth. Overall findings demonstrated that participants hold varying views, with only 32% of participants characterizing their experiences as completely positive. Participants' descriptions of their debriefing experiences suggest substantial variability in the content, format, and general quality of debriefing practices. Just over 40% of the debriefing experiences were viewed favorably. Positive debriefing experiences were described as including a thorough explanation (...) of the study and detailed information concerning the broader relevance of the experiment to the field of psychology. The most common complaint, characterizing 28.8% of the responses, was that the debriefing was unclear and that insufficient information was provided. Participants' views of psychological research and the discipline of psychology were also elicited. Results are discussed in terms of ethical and methodological implications. (shrink)

I argue for a manipulationist-mechanistic framework for content-NCC research in the case of visual consciousness (Bechtel 2008; Neisser 2012). Reference to mechanisms is common in the NCC research. Furthermore, recent developments in non-invasive brain stimulation techniques (NIBS) lend support to a manipulationist standpoint. The crucial question is to understand what is changed after manipulation of a brain mechanism. In the second part of the paper I review the literature on intentionalism, and argue that intervention on the neural mechanism is likely (...) to change the intentional content of consciousness. This urges us to shift from content-NCC to what I call “intentional mechanisms”. Such mechanisms, it is argued, should be understood as neural prerequisites of conscious visual experience. (shrink)

The present article offers an introductory vision to the political philosophy of science. The political philosophy of science is a new field of study where the philosophy of science and political philosophy converge. We will see the main contents of this field. We will also note that it depends on the construction of a model of rationality where science and politics can meet each other. Finally, the article tries to outline such a model of rationality. In order to do so, (...) we will review the relationship between Karl Popper’s scientific and political philosophy. I suggest to read Popper’s critical rationalism in terms of a kind of prudential rationality. (shrink)

According to the sensorimotor account, vision does not imply theconstruction of internally generated representations of the environment, butit isthe skillful exercise of the sensorimotor contingencies obeying sense-specific laws. In this short study, I focus on the notion of “sensorimotor law” and characterize the kind of explanation providedby the sensorimotor theory as a form of covering law model. I then question the nature of such sensorimotor laws and describe them as mechanisms. I show that a mechanistic interpretation provides a better account (...) of the sensorimotor invariances, which fosters us to rebalance the explanatory burden of sensorimotor action and information. Finally, I show that the question of the roleof representations within the sensorimotor theory should be reconsidered. (shrink)