Handeln, Personsein, Menschenwürde und zahlreiche Fragen der Angewandten Ethik – das ist das weite Spektrum dieser Festschrift und auch des Denkens von Ralf Stoecker, dem sie gewidmet ist. Ganz in seinem Geiste laden die Beiträge des Bandes dazu ein, zusammen zu denken und zusammenzudenken, was – möglicherweise – zusammengehört.

Handeln, Personsein, Menschenwürde und zahlreiche Fragen der Angewandten Ethik – das ist das weite Spektrum dieser Festschrift und auch des Denkens von Ralf Stoecker, dem sie gewidmet ist. Ganz in seinem Geiste laden die Beiträge des Bandes dazu ein, zusammen zu denken und zusammenzudenken, was – möglicherweise – zusammengehört.

What is good sex? This question can be evaluated in multiple dimensions, the moral dimension being only one of them. My main thesis in this paper is that a criterion for good sex is whether the participants are on a par with each other. This can be understood as a moral ideal. In order to make this argument, I first explain what is meant by “sex”. This is, on the one hand, to delineate clearly which phenome-na are included in the (...) definition for the purposes of this argument. It is, on the other hand, to repel the problematic image of sex as something exclusively physical. In a second step I will address the issue of consent. Consent is, in my view, a minimal condition for the moral quality of sexual activities. It is only when consent is given by all participants that sexual activity is legitimized. Of course many related questions arise in this context, but without consent, we cannot speak of the moral quality of sexual activities at all. But why is consent so important? It is important to protect people. The protection is more successful if we take into account the attitude with which people engage with each other sexually. Sexual activities where people are on a par with each other are morally better than those where people are not. Being on par means that each participant’s desires and wishes are respected equally. I develop this thesis further by engaging with different objections. If we set out to question whether a sexual activity is morally good, we will also have to answer the question whether the participants who are engaged in this activity are on a par with each other. (shrink)

Ereignet sich anstelle von Klang oder Sprache, Musik oder Lärm lediglich Stille oder vielmehr das, was wir für Stille halten, kommt ein unerwartetes Aufmerken in Gang. Die Stille kann auffordern, genauer hinzuhören, aber auch genauer hinzusehen. Ein plötzliches Aufmerken geschieht jedoch nur, wenn die Stille den Wahrnehmenden unerwartet trifft. Einer im Alltäglichen zumeist durch die Priorität des Bewussten, Bekannten oder Vertrauten untergeordneten Stille, können Arbeiten, wie jene von Aernout Mik, eine konkrete Erfahrbarkeit geben. Was er erfahrbar werden lässt, ist aber (...) nicht die Stille, sondern das, was in der Regel überhört wird. In der Verkehrung des vermeintlich Unhörbaren in ein Hörbares zeigt sich mit der Stille ein Möglichkeitsraum, dessen Besonderheit die Autorin mit der Frage, was sich in der Erfahrung von Stille zeigt, nachgeht. Ist also von einer Stille als ästhetischem Phänomen die Rede, ist nicht eine Stille innerhalb der Rezeption genuin stiller Kunstwerke gemeint, sondern der bewusste Entzug des Auditiven. Damit widerspricht die Autorin zugleich einer Vorstellung von Stille als mess- oder bestimmbarer Grösse und stellt die Stille aus der ästhetischen Erfahrung heraus ins Zentrum ihrer Betrachtungen. (shrink)

Editorial: Concepts of Animal Welfare Content Type Journal Article Pages 93-103 DOI 10.1007/s10441-011-9134-0 Authors Kristin Hagen, Europäische Akademie zur Erforschung von Folgen wissenschaftlich-technischer Entwicklungen Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler GmbH, Wilhelmstr. 56, 53474 Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler, Germany Ruud Van den Bos, Behavioural Neuroscience, Animals in Science and Society, Faculty of Veterinary Medicine, Rudolf Magnus Institute of Neuroscience, Utrecht University, Yalelaan 2, 3584 CM Utrecht, The Netherlands Tjard de Cock Buning, Department of Biology and Society (ATHENA Institute), Faculty of Earth and Life Sciences, Vrije Universiteit, (...) De Boelelaan 1087, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands Journal Acta Biotheoretica Online ISSN 1572-8358 Print ISSN 0001-5342 Journal Volume Volume 59 Journal Issue Volume 59, Number 2. (shrink)

Wie entstand die besondere Ermächtigung des Menschen zur Gestaltung von Geschichte und Zukunft? Ist der Gedanke der 'Machbarkeit' nicht sogar Ausgangspunkt der neuzeitlichen Wende? In welcher Kontinuität stehen die autoritär-ideologischen oder völkischfaschistischen Gesellschaftsideologien des 20. Jahrhunderts? Welche Visionen werden in der Globalisierungsdebatte erörtert? Die Vorstellung einer grundsätzlichen Gestaltbarkeit gesellschaftlicher Wirklichkeit scheint ein spezifisches Kennzeichen moderner Gesellschaften zu sein. Ein Kennzeichen, das bisher wenig hinterfragt ist. Eine besondere Herausforderung sucht dieser interdisziplinär angelegte Band, indem er zur Diskussion stellt, inwieweit der politische (...) Plan, eine radikal veränderte Zukunft für eine nächste Generation schaffen zu wollen, gesellschaftliche Gewaltprozesse akzeptiert und legitimiert. (shrink)

Bilder haben seit je her das Vermögen, sich als Metamalerei reflexiv mit den Bedingungen ihrer eigenen Bildlichkeit auseinander zu setzen. In Momenten,medialer Vanitas’, wie sie der Beitrag nachvollzieht, ist es die Symbolik der Vanitas, welche gegen das Bild als solches gerichtet wird. Schon im Barock entstehen sie mit so unterschiedlichen Werken wie jenen Cornelius Norbertus Gijsbrechts und Michelangelo Merisi da Caravaggios, die als spezifisch,thanatologische Metamalerei‘ bezeichnet werden können. Sie zielen auf die mortifzierenden Strukturen bildlicher Repräsentation, ihre Medialität und Materialität. Doch (...) auch in zahlreichen zeitgenössischen Bildern von Marlene Dumas finden sich solch selbstreflexive Momente medialer Vanitas und damit moderne Transformationen eines vormodernen Topos. (shrink)

Im Sinne eines Antwortens widmet sich dieser Beitrag den szenischen Beobachtungen und Recherchen wie sie vornehmlich von Birgit Althans und Janna R. Wieland im Theater Milo Raus vorgenommen wurden. Ein erster Fokus liegt zunächst auf der Frage nach dem Affiziert-werden im Theater im Allgemeinen und im Besonderen im Theater Milo Raus. Eine besondere Berücksichtigung erfährt dabei die Frage nach Blickereignissen im Theater unter dem Aspekt des das Theater konstituierende Moment der Fremd-/scham. Im Weiteren wird auf das paradoxe Verhältnis von Selbst- (...) und Fremdbezug, Realität und Virtualität, Nähe und Ferne, die gleichzeitige Ab- und Anwesenheit von Körperlichkeit im Theater Milo Raus unter erfahrungstheoretischer Perspektive eingegangen, um abschließend der Frage nachzugehen, wie künstlerische Verfahren und wissenschaftliche Verfahren ineinanderzugreifen vermögen. (shrink)

Abstract„Erleuchtung“ ist einer der prominentesten Begriffe, mit dem in der europäischen Kultur- und Religionsgeschichte Ideen der Vervollkommnung des Menschen zum Ausdruck gebracht worden sind. Anhand ausgewählter Beispiele umreißt das vorliegende Papier seine Entwicklung von einer Metapher in der griechischen Philosophie hin zu einem transkonfessionellen Sammelbegriff, der im Zuge der Pluralisierung von Religionen seit den 1960er Jahren eine Konjunktur in neuen, durch Markt und Medien allgemein zugänglichen Sinnstiftungsangeboten der „populären Religion“ (Knoblauch) erfahren hat. In einer Tour d’horizon, die bei Platon einsetzt (...) und über Clemens von Alexandrien und Ps.-Dionysios Areopagita ins 18. Jahrhundert sowie in die Gegenwart führt, wird gezeigt, wie sich Vorstellungen von Licht und Erleuchtung und die Rede hierüber zu einem religiösen Begriff verdichtet haben, der über lange Zeit einen Ort im Christentum hatte, bevor er, begünstigt durch die Aufklärung, zu einer populären Kategorie wurde, die vor allem mit asiatischen, oder zumindest asiatisch inspirierten, Praktiken zur Erlangung von Heil in Verbindung gebracht wird. Der Beitrag rückt bei der Darstellung dieser Entwicklung in der Moderne Auswirkungen der Aufklärung in den Blick sowie asiatisch-euroamerikanische Beziehungsdynamiken der europäischen Kolonialzeit, die zur Entdeckung des Buddhismus als Religion führten. Haben diese doch maßgeblich dazu beigetragen, dass Erleuchtung im gegenwärtigen populären Verständnis, wie es sich beispielhaft in der sog. Satsang-Bewegung und populär-religiöser Erzähl- und Ratgeberliteratur findet, nicht mehr, wie in der neoplatonischchristlichen Prägung des Begriffs, als Zwischenstufe auf einem Weg zur Vervollkommnung gilt, sondern als Ziel und bleibender Besitz, der mit Vollendung assoziiert wird. (shrink)

Leitkonzepte wie Nachhaltigkeit bedürfen, sollen sie erfahrbar werden, der konkreten Umsetzung. Nachhaltiges Denken in Form von Gedankenentwürfen muss demnach in nachhaltiges Handeln in Form entsprechender Initiativen überführt werden. Dabei geht nachhaltiges Denken weit über Unternehmensgrenzen hinaus und ragt in alle gesellschaftlichen Systeme hinein. Eine besonders wichtige "Keimzelle" des komplementären nachhaltigen Denkens und Handelns sind die Kommunen. Sie sind zum einen als Handlungseinheiten klein genug, um Nachhaltigkeit mit konkreten Initiativen ein Gesicht zu geben. Zum anderen sind sie aber auch groß genug, (...) um Nachhaltigkeit in einen übergeordneten Zusammenhang zu stellen und entsprechende Aktivitäten zu koordinieren und zu fördern. Mit dem inhaltlichen Fokuspunkt Wirtschaft und dem kommunalen Fokuspunkt Hannover wird mit diesem Werk ein konkreter und praxisnaher Forschungsbereich näher beleuchtet. Die kombinierte Forschungs- und Praxisperspektive des Werkes wurde ausgewählt, um sowohl den theoretischen Diskussionsstand widerzuspiegeln und mit dem integrativen Ansatz anzureichern als auch exemplarisch den praxisnahen Anwendungs- und Ausprägungsstand abzubilden. Das Buch richtet sich an Experten*innen im Bereich Kommunales Management aber auch an Wissenschaftler*innen und Studierende in Studiengängen zum Thema Nachhaltigkeitsmanagement und Regionale Entwicklung. Der Inhalt Konzeptionelle Grundlagenbeiträge Schnittstelle Kommune - Wirtschaft: Triebfeder für lokale und regionale Nachhaltigkeit Referenzbeispiele für (integriertes) kommunales Nachhaltigkeitsmanagement Die Herausgeber*innen Prof. Dr. Kristin Butzer-Strothmann ist Professorin für Allgemeine BWL, insbesondere Marketing und Empirische Sozialforschung an der Leibniz-Fachhochschule in Hannover. Prof. Dr. Friedel Ahlers ist Professor für Allgemeine BWL, insbesondere Unternehmensführung und Personalwirtschaft an der Leibniz-Fachhochschule in Hannover. (shrink)

Thema des Sammelbands ist der Zusammenhang von ubung und Wissen in religiosen und philosophischen Kontexten der Vormoderne. AN einzelnen regional und sozial differenzierten Fallbeispielen aus dem euro-asiatischen Raum werden ubungspraktiken, durch die Wissen hergestellt, vermittelt und bestatigt, aber auch hinterfragt und modifiziert wurde, klassifiziert und erortert. UNtersucht werden Materialien, Medien und Darstellungsweisen aus griechisch-romischer Philosophie, Christentum, Judentum und Islam, Hinduismus und Buddhismus, die von der wechselseitigen Verwiesenheit von ubung und Wissen zeugen. uBerlegungen zum Thema im Kontext globaler Austauschbeziehungen, wie sie (...) z.B. Den modernen Yoga pragen, runden den Band ab. (shrink)

What is it to be a better ape? This is the question Victor Kumar and Richmond Campbell ask in their book on the evolution of the moral mind, an ambitious story that starts with the common ancestor of the modern apes—humans, chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, and orangutans. Of all of us, it’s the humans who remain in the running for being a better ape, because we’re the ones who have all the necessary ingredients: the binding emotions of sympathy and loyalty which (...) we share with our nonhuman cousins, but also the collaborative emotions of trust and respect and the reactive emotions of guilt and resentment. Importantly, only humans are thought to have norms, and to be biologically prepared to learn norms. For Kumar and Campbell, the co-evolution of emotions and norms is what set humans on this path so we can become a better ape. -/- The story they tell is artfully woven from major theories in psychology and anthropology, and those of us who have pre-existing opinions about these theories have points where we can quibble regarding the nature of the emotions–whether only humans imitate, what norms of fairness amount to, or whether any other species are generalists who can survive in a wide range of habitats. Rather than focusing on these, I want to turn to an exciting hypothesis Kumar and Campbell propose about the evolution and function of norms. While it is most common to think that norms helped our ancestors solve the collective action problems that emerged when larger groups of individuals started living together, Kumar and Campbell suggest a different, though complementary, function for norms. They propose that norms provide a more precise and flexible means for coordinating behavior in quickly changing societies. On their view, it isn’t the size of community that is the most significant variable, but rather the speed at which culture evolves. -/- That norms are a human universal is indubitable. Our contemporary human societies are rife with rules constraining our behaviors, governing aspects of our lives from birth to death, prescribing practices about what to wear, how to work, what to eat, when and how to sleep as well as rules about rare practices that are proscribed. However, Kumar and Campbell also presume that norms are human unique. Here I have more than a quibble, given the burgeoning empirical and theoretical literature on the question of animal normativity (Andrews 2020; Danón 2019; Fitzpatrick 2020; de Waal 2014; von Rohr et al. 2011; Rohr et al. 2015; Whiten et al. 2005; Westra et al., in prep)... (shrink)

"Thema der Beiträge sind intentionale Praktiken der Wissensvermittlung, die in den Medien Text und Bild in vormodernen Kulteren von der Antike bis ins Frühmittelalter erkennbar und beschreibbar sind. Untersuchungsgegenstand sind altorientalische, antike griechische, römische, syrische, klassisch-arabische und frühmittelalterliche Texte und bildliche Darstellunen, in denen die Kommunikation von Sach-/Fachwissen und religiösem, philosophischem, politischem, sozialem, paradigmatischem Wissen eine Rolle spielt. Im Fokus stehen die an diesen Prozessen beteiligten Akteure, insbesondere die Darastellung ihrer verbalen, mimischen und gestischen Kommunikation bzw. (Selbst- ) Inszenierung in (...) Text und Bild."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungSystemmedizinische Ansätze zeichnen sich durch die Integration großer Datenmengen aus vielfältigen Datenquellen aus und führen systembiologische und medizinische Forschungsansätze mit informationswissenschaftlichen Methoden und prädiktiven Verfahren mathematischer Modellierung zusammen. Hieraus resultiert eine enge Kooperation von Ärzten und Naturwissenschaftlern, wobei insbesondere die Expertise nicht-ärztlicher Forscher zunehmend an Bedeutung für die Datenaufbereitung und -interpretation gewinnt. Aus ethischer Perspektive wirft diese Entwicklung Fragen nach der konkreten Gestaltung einer systemmedizinischen Zusammenarbeit sowie möglichen Rollenveränderungen und neuen Verantwortungszuschreibungen an Ärzte und nicht-ärztliche Forscher auf. Um diese Fragen (...) mit Blick auf die Erfahrungen und Perspektiven der beteiligten Akteursgruppen zu beleuchten, führten wir eine qualitative Interviewstudie mit Ärzten und nicht-ärztlichen Forschern aus unterschiedlichen systemmedizinischen Kontexten durch. Aus dem Interviewmaterial ließen sich zwei Konzeptionen von Systemmedizin rekonstruieren. Die erste ist durch eine eindeutige arbeitsteilige Rollentrennung zwischen Ärzten und Forschern charakterisiert: Der Forscher fungiert als Dienstleister, der Arzt als translationaler, interdisziplinär ausgerichteter Mediziner. Die zweite zeichnet sich durch eine weitreichende Aufhebung der Rollentrennung von Ärzten und Forschern aus: Die Berufsgruppen agieren als interdisziplinäres Team mit einer engen wechselseitigen inhaltlichen und methodischen Zusammenarbeit der Akteure. In beiden Konzeptionen werden Rollenkonflikte von Ärzten und Forschern deutlich, die insbesondere auf die Diskrepanz zwischen dem Arzt- und Forscherethos und die mit ihnen je verknüpften spezifischen Handlungsnormen und Ziele zurückzuführen sind. Ferner besteht mit Blick auf die dem Arzt und Forscher jeweils zukommende Verantwortung gegenüber Patienten vielfältiger normativer Klärungsbedarf, insbesondere hinsichtlich der Frage, welche Verantwortung den Akteursgruppen gerechtfertigter Weise zugeschrieben werden kann. Diesbezüglich erscheint eine Differenzierung von versorgungsnäheren und grundlagenforschungsorientierten Arbeitsfeldern angeraten. (shrink)

In einem kürzlich erschienenen Artikel argumentiert Almut v. Wedelstaedt überzeugend, warum Zustimmung zwar „die Bedingung für die Legitimation von Sex“ ist (2020, 127), dass die moralische Güte von Sex aber nur dann einzuschätzen ist, wenn wir darauf achten, ob die Beteiligten der Handlung sich auf Augenhöhe begegnen. Die Idee ist: Es gibt legitime sexuelle Handlungen, die moralisch gut sind, und es gibt legitime sexuelle Handlungen, die moralisch besser sind. Hier möchte ich die Idee des besseren Sexes genauer ausloten. (...) Während v. Wedelstaedt von moralisch gelungenem Sex spricht und somit auf der Ebene der moralischen Bewertung von Sex bleibt, möchte ich die Frage danach stellen, was Sex qualitativ gut macht. Tatsächlich wird in der Zustimmungsdebatte meist davon ausgegangen, dass diese zwei Fragen wenig gemeinsam haben; ob eine sexuelle Handlung legitim ist, hat zunächst nichts damit zu tun, ob diese auch gut ist. Ich werde drei Argumente liefern, warum wir legitimen Sex und qualitativ guten Sex zusammen betrachten sollten – und es wird sich zeigen, dass die gegenwärtige philosophische und rechtstheoretische Debatte Zustimmung verkürzt diskutiert und daher alleingenommen wenig hilfreich ist, stattdessen benötigt die Zustimmungsdebatte auch eine Untersuchung von qualitativ gutem Sex. (shrink)

In spite of his status as a highly original thinker whose views were, in many ways, ahead of his time and anticipate those of more famous successors, the work of Johann Gottfried von Herder has not received the attention it deserves in mainstream philosophical discourse. In Herder's Hermeneutics, Kristin Gjesdal successfully addresses this deficit by exploring the enlightenment origins of the hermeneutic tradition through a careful and compelling reconstruction of Herder's theory of interpretation. Breaking with the widespread view of Herder (...) as a contra-Enlightenment thinker, Gjesdal conceives of Herder's hermeneutics as contributing to the enlightenment of the Enlightenment project through an immanent critique of... (shrink)

In spite of his status as a highly original thinker whose views were, in many ways, ahead of his time and anticipate those of more famous successors, the work of Johann Gottfried von Herder has not received the attention it deserves in mainstream philosophical discourse. In Herder's Hermeneutics, Kristin Gjesdal successfully addresses this deficit by exploring the enlightenment origins of the hermeneutic tradition through a careful and compelling reconstruction of Herder's theory of interpretation. Breaking with the widespread view of Herder (...) as a contra-Enlightenment thinker, Gjesdal conceives of Herder's hermeneutics as contributing to the enlightenment of the Enlightenment project through an immanent critique of... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Women Philosophers in the Long Nineteenth Century: The German Tradition ed. by Kristin Gjesdal and Dalia NassarAlison StoneKristin Gjesdal and Dalia Nassar, editors. Women Philosophers in the Long Nineteenth Century: The German Tradition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. 336. Hardback, $99.00."How plausible, [Dalia Nassar and I] kept asking, is it that women published philosophy in the early modern period and then simply ceased to think and publish (...) philosophy in the nineteenth century?" remarked Kristin Gjesdal recently (interview with Richard Marshall, 3:16am [blog], https://www.3-16am.co.uk/articles/gadamer-herder-and-the-womenphilosophers-of-the-long-nineteen-cent ury?c=end-times-series). Not plausible at all—yet this is what historians of women in philosophy often seem to have assumed, judging by the remarkably small amount of scholarship on nineteenth-century women philosophers compared with those of the early modern period or the twentieth century. Eileen O'Neill, for instance, claims that it was "not a particularly friendly century for women philosophers" (1). In fact, as Gjesdal and Nassar observe, women were "significant contributors" to the "thriving intellectual cultures in German-speaking countries" at this time (1). Gjesdal and Nassar contrast Germanic countries to France and Britain in this regard, yet I would add that nineteenth-century Britain too had a vibrant print and periodical culture that created openings for women philosophers such as Harriet Martineau, Anna Jameson, Frances Power Cobbe, and many others. The broader point remains: the nineteenth century has only seemed empty of women philosophers because we have not yet investigated the women thinkers of this period or challenged the canons and narratives from which they have been excluded.Recognizing German women philosophers is particularly important because the vast majority of scholarship on the nineteenth century focuses on the German tradition. Consequently, unless we recover the work of German-speaking women, we will never change the narrative about this period. This makes the present anthology invaluable for both teaching and research. Edited by Gjesdal and Nassar, it contains new translations, nearly all by Anna Ezekiel, of texts by historical German-speaking women philosophers.Regarding teaching, many courses on post-Kantian European philosophy include no women until Beauvoir or Arendt. Such courses typically cover Fichte, Hegel, Marx, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Husserl, and Heidegger. The editors have clearly designed this volume to enable instructors easily to bring women into such courses, by providing extracts—of suitable lengths for teaching—from women affiliated respectively with German idealism and Romanticism (Germaine de Staël, Karoline von Günderrode, and Bettina von Arnim), Marxism (Clara Zetkin, Rosa Luxemburg), Nietzscheanism (Hedwig Dohm, Lou Salomé), and phenomenology (Edith Stein, Gerda Walther). Some of these women are already well-known as political activists, as with Luxemburg and Zetkin, or under the elastic heading of "writers," as with Staël and von Arnim. But this collection presents these women's writings in a new light, showcasing their philosophical side. After all, we have learned to read Marx and Nietzsche philosophically: why not extend the same courtesy to Staël or Luxemburg?For researchers, this collection will likewise be invaluable. Post-Kantian European philosophy has been slow to respond to the wider questioning and broadening of the traditional philosophical canon. It remains sadly common for narratives of nineteenth-century German philosophy to discuss men only—a position that this book makes untenable. [End Page 336] Hopefully it will galvanize philosophers to integrate these women into the historiography of the post-Kantian tradition at last.In the introduction, the editors helpfully contextualize the selected writings, arguing that these women's exclusion from academic institutions led them to philosophize in ways that spoke to general audiences, connected with lived experience, and addressed practical and political concerns. In short, these women did a type of philosophy that was not purified but socially engaged, and can be a model for us today. Thereafter the book consists of sections on nine women philosophers, ordered chronologically. Each section begins with an editorial introduction to the philosopher and her interests, ideas, writings, and interlocutors.The writings included from Staël—whose work spans the period from the French Revolution into Romanticism—are "On Women Writers" from... (shrink)

En skumrand (poem) av A. Larsen.--Platons øyeblikks-filosofi eller Dialogen Parmenides' 3. hypotese, av E.A. Wyller.--Gresk og israelittisk historiesyn, av T. Boman.--Lukrets, dikter og filosof, av E. Skard.--Amor og Psyche, elskoven og sjelen, av H.P. L'Orange.--Augustins liv og lære, av P. Dietrichson.--Thomas Aquinas' syn på naturvitenskapene, av D. Føllesdal.--Mester Eckehart, av A. Brynildsen.--Renessanse-humanistene og "humanitas," av P. Svendsen.--Striden mellom de gamle og de nye, av A. Aarnes.--Harmonitanken i Schillers filosofiske avhandlinger, av O. Koppang.--Grunntrekk i Wilhelm von Humboldts sprogfilosofi, av I. Dal.--Noen (...) bemerkninger til Dostojevskijs Storinkvisitoren, av E. Krag.--Speculum og analogi i Peer Gynt, av B. Blekastad.--Om pakt-begrepet i "Kristin Lavrandsdatter," av D. Haakonsen.--Subjektivitet og sanning, av H. Skjervheim.--Refleksjoner om helhetssyn, sannhet og kunnskap, av A. Næss.--I tid og rum (poem) av A. Øverland. (shrink)

In this commentary, Kristin Asdal reflects on pragmatism as one of the methodological touchstones of Science, technology and society. In its focus on practices, pragmatist STS can be prone to falling into a problematic presentism, obscuring the historicity of the practices being studied, and to falling into problematic material/semiotic binaries. But what does it take, in practice, to be pragmatic? In her commentary, Asdal points to how this ought to imply being open when it comes to our choice of methods, (...) thus finding creative ways of maintaining a crucial recognition of history as well as relations between the textual and the material. This in turn might instantiate new, distinctive, and inspiring modes of pragmatist methodological insight—such as precisely in these special issue papers devoted to animal care. These papers are also inspiringly pragmatic, in the meaning of careful—in order not to be overtly programmatic, i.e. deciding beforehand your position or standpoint on a given topic, such as human–animal relations. Following on from this she puts forward the notion “interested methods.”. (shrink)

The gay and lesbian liberation movement and its predecessor, the homophile movement that originated in the 1950s, have been relatively little studied by sociologists; yet theories of ethnic mobilization, especially competition theory, help us to understand the mobilization of lesbians and gay men. At the same time, lesbian/gay social movement activity provides an important critique of social movement theories. This article focuses on the Daughters of Bilitis, a homophile organization for women founded in 1956. Competition theory furnishes a useful framework (...) for understanding the transformation and decline of the DOB and its publication, the Ladder, at the end of the 1960s, but it cannot fully explain lesbian social and political organization. By viewing group identities as multiple and overlapping, new social movement theory contributes a more complete understanding of the Daughters of Bilitis and its relationship to other social movement groups in the late 1960s and early 1970s. (shrink)

The predominant contemporary concept of time is arguably measurable time, promoted as being in accordance with science. This is commonly understood as the time of physics, as, for instance, E. A. Milne claims in an article from 1950 on the modern conception of time, contrasting this with Plato's description of time as the “moving image of eternity”. The prevalence of an emphasis on measurability within such a conception of time is hard to avoid, although this can be nuanced somewhat. In (...) this article I turn to the ancient Greek notion of kairos in order to find another approach to the question of conceptions of temporality. A main objective is to indicate what this concept signifies in terms of adjusting to circumstances, catching the right moment and paying attention to due measure. I also briefly consider Baltasar Gracián's notions of festina lente and détencion in an attempt to show how this suggests a way in which we may be able to develop the ability to do the right thing at the right moment. (shrink)

The Ethics Ambassador program at the University of Colorado Hospital was born from a desire to encourage earlier ethics consultation, with the goal of providing timely, effective, and patient-centered ethics support. The selected Ethics Ambassadors are individuals from multiple roles across the hospital who receive regular education to serve as an ethics resource for their respective units or specialties. As embedded individuals, they are better able to recognize the unique needs and challenges of their units and provide relevant ethics education (...) to staff and faculty. Outcomes of the first year of the program illustrated the diverse ethics needs across the hospital and the benefits of utilizing embedded individuals, able to straddle both the domains of ethics and the needs of their individual units. (shrink)

Andrews argues for a pluralistic folk psychology that employs different kinds of practices and different kinds of cognitive tools (including personality trait attribution, stereotype activation, inductive reasoning about past behavior, and ...

The study of animal cognition raises profound questions about the minds of animals and philosophy of mind itself. Aristotle argued that humans are the only animal to laugh, but in recent experiments rats have also been shown to laugh. In other experiments, dogs have been shown to respond appropriately to over two hundred words in human language. In this introduction to the philosophy of animal minds Kristin Andrews introduces and assesses the essential topics, problems and debates as they cut across (...) animal cognition and philosophy of mind. She addresses the following key topics: what is cognition, and what is it to have a mind? What questions should we ask to determine whether behaviour has a cognitive basis? the science of animal minds explained: ethology, behaviourist psychology, and cognitive ethology rationality in animals animal consciousness: what does research into pain and the emotions reveal? What can empirical evidence about animal behaviour tell us about philosophical theories of consciousness? does animal cognition involve belief and concepts; do animals have a ‘Language of Thought’? animal communication other minds: do animals attribute ‘mindedness’ to other creatures? moral reasoning and ethical behaviour in animals animal cognition and memory. Extensive use of empirical examples and case studies is made throughout the book. These include Cheney and Seyfarth’s ververt monkey research, Thorndike’s cat puzzle boxes, Jensen’s research into humans and chimpanzees and the ultimatum game, Pankseep and Burgdorf’s research on rat laughter, and Clayton and Emery’s research on memory in scrub-jays. Additional features such as chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary make this an indispensable introduction to those teaching philosophy of mind, animal cognition. It will also be an excellent resource for those in fields such as ethology, biology and psychology. (shrink)

The Drama of History plumbs the rich relationship between drama and philosophy. Kristin Gjesdal offers a lively and accessible discussion of the philosophical aspects of Henrik Ibsen's work. She shows how well-known nineteenth-century philosophers such as Hegel and Nietzsche develop their thoughts in interaction with the dramatic arts. At the heart of this interaction is a shared interest in exploring the existential condition of human life as lived andexperienced in history. In this sense, Gjesdal engages philosophy's capacity beyond its narrow (...) academic confines. (shrink)

This paper is based on the comments I gave to Alfred Mele regarding his original Zygote Argument during my presentation at a small workshop on manipulation arguments in Budapest back in 2012. After those comments, Mele changed the conclusion of his original Zygote Argument (OZA) from a positive, explanatory conclusion to a negative, non-explanatory conclusion--and, correspondingly, redefined 'incompatibilism' so that it would no longer refer in his work to the view that determinism precludes (undermines, eliminates, destroys, etc.) free will, but (...) refers narrowly to the perhaps spurious association claim that appears in the conclusion of the revised Zygote Argument (Mele 2013+). Yet, over the last decade, Mele has made no comment in print about the changes he made, the invalidity objection that led to them, nor to the fact that his revised Zygote Argument was originally presented by me as a (non-optimal) reaction to my invalidity objection to his original Zygote Argument. To my knowledge, Mele has only mentioned this 2015 paper once, at it was not in the context of understanding manipulation arguments; it was, rather, in the context of defending his revised, non-explanatory definition of 'incompatibilism' at the opening of Aspects of Agency (p. 6, n. 4). There, Mele singles out *just this 2015 paper* as a place where they'll find what Mele degrades as a type of nonstandard/nontraditional definition of 'incompatibilism' that he rejects. This is notable because Mele provides no empirical evidence that his preferred definition is standard, and most (including Lehrer, who coined the term) reject the negative, non-explanatory, association-based definition that Mele came to endorse in the aftermath of my invalidity objection to OZA. So, if Mele had a genuine concern about philosophers who use the term 'incompatibilism', then Mele could have--and should have--named almost any leading figure in free will for this purpose (since most--including Pereboom, Vihvelin, Haji, etc.) reject the non-explanatory definition that Mele-2013+ now endorses. Yet, for untold reasons, Mele isolated the working definition of 'incompatibilism' used in one paper by one unemployed junior researcher to use as his example--even though Neil Levy had used this same definition in previously published work (eg. Levy 2011). Moreover, if Mele were genuinely interested in helping his readers understand the ambiguity of terms like 'compatibilism' and 'incompatibilism' it is a mystery that he referenced a paper in which nothing of substance hung on the definitions given to these terms -- especially considering that he might have instead pointed them to my OTHER 2015 paper, "A Critique of Vihvelin's Three-Fold Classification" in which the MAIN AIM of the paper is to expose the difficulties facing anyone who wants to define the terms 'compatibilism' and 'incompatibilism' in a way that everyone will accept (including a critique of the negative, non-explanatory "incompossibilist" definition that Mele adopted after my objection to OZA). By all appearances, Mele's main aim in citing specifically THIS paper and none of my other work was to give readers the false impression that my working definition of 'incompatibilism' played some role in my charge that his argument is invalid (which it doesn't, given that the term doesn't appear in either the premises or conclusion of that argument). Mele adds to this unseemly rhetorical campaign in his book *Manipulation Agents* where he mentions an invalidity objection in the intro (p. 84) and then discusses that objection in the final lines of Chapter 5 of the book (p. 120-121). The invalidity objection discussed here is completely pedantic, has never been seriously raised in the primary literature (and was previously addressed in multiple places my multiple philosophers, including me), and has nothing whatever to do with my invalidity objection. In other words, Mele was content to discuss an invalidity objection that no one has ever had to an argument that is clearly valid while completely ignoring the ONLY substantive invalidity objection to his argument in print. This is unfortunate, because it has led to serious confusion --including the patently false description of my invalidity objection to OZA as an objection to the revised version of the Zygote Argument that Mele adopted in *response* my objection (e.g., Capes mistakenly claims "Mickelson (2015) contends that arguments like this [i.e. like the revised Zygote Argument] are invalid. But that’s because she defines “incompatibilism” differently than I’ve defined it here" in his "Manipulation Arguments and Direct Arguments" chapter in the 2023 Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Free Will; I did not say this, and the definition of 'incompatibilism' is irrelevant to my objection). In "The Zygote Argument Is Invalid--Now What?", I simply use the invalidity of the simple 2-premise Zygote Argument as a foil to make a series of more philosophically significant points (e.g. regarding the dialectical structure of the free-will debate, the role of best-explanation reasoning, and to develop the first-ever "master manipulation argument"). Mele has yet to address my reasons for calling attention to the non-trivial invalidity of his OZA or to any of my answers to the "Now What?" question in this paper, even though this question and my proposed answers to this question are the paper's main point. For those interested in a more recent discussion of how the logical and metaphilosophical observations made in this "Now What?" paper have helped to move the free-will debate forward, I suggest looking at the discussions of the "paradigm shift" in the free-will debate that helps to explain why the free-will debate has become mired in stalemates and empty verbal disputes that are found, for example, in my contributions to the Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Free Will (Intro and Chapter 4, 2023) and my paper "Free Will, Self-Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck" (2019). (shrink)

*As mentioned in Peter Coy's NYT essay "When Being Good Is Just a Matter of Being Lucky" (2023) -/- ----- -/- How is the problem of free will related to the problem of moral luck? In this essay, I answer that question and outline a new solution to the paradox of moral luck, the source-paradox solution. This solution both explains why the paradox arises and why moral luck does not exist. To make my case, I highlight a few key connections (...) between the paradox of moral luck and two related problems, namely the problem of free will and determinism and the paradox of self-creation. Piecing together intuitions, arguments, and insights from recent work on each of these three problems, I argue that the type of control necessary for moral responsibility can only be had by someone who is a genuine source of his own actions, but the relevant notion of sourcehood admits no coherent characterization. If our commonsense view of moral responsibility is incoherent, it is unsurprising that our commitment to the existence of morally responsible agents commits us to some paradoxical things—e.g. to both the existence and impossibility of moral luck. For more information about this article, please write to gmail account: kristin.mickelson.42. (shrink)

Derk Pereboom's Four-Case Argument is among the most famous and resilient manipulation arguments against compatibilism. I contend that its resilience is not a function of the argument's soundness but, rather, the ill-gotten gain from an ambiguity in the description of the causal relations found in the argument's foundational case. I expose this crucial ambiguity and suggest that a dilemma faces anyone hoping to resolve it. After a thorough search for an interpretation which avoids both horns of this dilemma, I conclude (...) that none is available. Rather, every metaphysically coherent interpretation invites either a hard- or soft-line reply to Pereboom's argument. I then consider a recharacterization of the dilemma which seems to clear the way for the defence of a revised Four-Case Argument. I address this rejoinder by identifying a still more fundamental problem shared by all viable interpretations of the manipulation cases, showing that each involves a type of manipulation which undermines the victim's agency. Because this diagnosis supports a soft-line reply to every viable interpretation of the argument and can be endorsed by any compatibilist, I consider it the final piece of the Soft-line Solution to the Four-Case Argument. Finally, I suggest a new taxonomy of manipulation arguments, arguing that none that employs the suppressive variety of manipulation found in Pereboom's argument offers a threat to compatibilism. (shrink)

My two principal aims in this essay are interconnected. One aim is to provide a new interpretation of the ‘infinite modes’ in Spinoza’s Ethics. I argue that for Spinoza, God, conceived as the one infinite and eternal substance, is not to be understood as causing two kinds of modes, some infinite and eternal and the rest finite and non-eternal. That there cannot be such a bifurcation of divine effects is what I take the ‘infinite mode’ propositions, E1p21–23, to establish; E1p21–23 (...) show that each and every one of the immanent effects of an infinite and eternal God is an infinite and eternal mode. The other aim is to show that these propositions can be understood as part of an extended critical response to Descartes’s infamous doctrine that God creates eternal truths and true and immutable natures. If we have the correct (Spinozan) conceptions of what God is and how God works, we see that an eternal and infinite God can only be understood to cause ‘eternal truths,’ and that these eternal truths are infinite and eternal modes of God. (shrink)

An old question in Spinoza scholarship is how finite, non-eternal things transitively caused by other finite, non-eternal things (i. e., the entities described in propositions like E1p28) are caused by the infinite, eternal substance, given that what follows either directly or indirectly from the divine nature is infinite and eternal (E1p21–23). In “Spinoza’s Monism I,” “Spinoza’s Monism I,” in the previous issue of this journal. I pointed out that most commentators answer this question by invoking entities that are indefinite and (...) sempiternal, but argued that perhaps we should not be so quick to assume that in Spinoza’s system, an infinite and eternal substance could cause such indefinite, sempiternal entities. But if such eternal-durational causation is denied, then it seems harder to see how Spinoza’s system could be coherent: if Spinoza holds that the infinite, eternal substance cannot cause anything that is not infinite and not eternal, then how can he also hold that all things are modes immanently caused by substance (E1p15, E1p18, E1p25)? In this essay, I explain how Spinoza’s system could be understood in light of a denial of eternal-durational causation. On the interpretation I offer, God is the cause of all things and all things are modes because the essences of all things follow from the divine nature and all essences enjoy infinite, eternal reality as modes immanently caused by the infinite, eternal substance. The same non-substantial essences can also be conceived as enjoying non-infinite, non-eternal reality, but so conceived, they are enduring, finite (or sempiternal, indefinite) entities that cannot be conceived as modes caused by and inhering in the one infinite, eternal substance. I conclude by pointing out that if we take this interpretive route, we do have to understand Spinoza as committed to acosmism, or a denial of the reality of the world – at least the world of enduring, finite things. (shrink)

Philosophy Compass, Volume 17, Issue 6, June 2022.

I argue that having a theory of mind requires having at least implicit knowledge of the norms of the community, and that an implicit understanding of the normative is what drives the development of a theory of mind. This conclusion is defended by two arguments. First I argue that a theory of mind likely did not develop in order to predict behavior, because before individuals can use propositional attitudes to predict behavior, they have to be able to use them in (...) explanations of behavior. Rather, I suggest that the need to explain behavior in terms of reasons is the primary function of a theory of mind. I further argue that in order to be motivated to offer explanations of behavior, one must have at least an implicit understanding of appropriate behavior, which implies at least an implicit understanding of norms. The second argument looks at three cases of nonhuman animal societies that appear to operate within a system of norms. While there is no evidence that any species other than humans have a theory of mind, there is evidence that other species have sensitivity to the normative. Finally, I propose an explanation for the priority of norms over a theory of mind: given an understanding of norms in a society, and the ability to recognize and sanction violations, there developed a need to understand actions that violated the norms, and such explanations could only be given in terms of a person's reasons. There is a significant benefit to being able to explain behavior that violates norms, because explanations of the right sort can also serve to justify behavior. (shrink)