In Deep Space Nine's Chief of Security Odo is one who finds his identity in his job, which is a sufficient burden to keep him plenty occupied. In a more benign laboratory than what Odo experienced, philosophical instead of exobiological, he presents an ideal case study of George Herbert Mead's theory of how the self is formed and transformed. According to Mead, language starts with meaningful gestures. When creatures act in coordination through a gesture, signaling that the gesture (...) means the same to them; it becomes language. Focused attention is one of the ways one has of influencing the clarity and extent of memories. Over the arc of Deep Space Nine's tales, all the characters change. Yet Odo goes from being a one‐dimensional to a multidimensional character by learning languages from those who start out as generalized others, but become specific others as time goes on. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Naturalized Context of Moral Reasoning1Elizabeth BaetenAmerican philosophy of the past century seems to have availed itself of the advances in science primarily under the rubric of philosophy of science, especially using physics as the exemplar of scientific inquiry and almost entirely in service of developing an adequate epistemology (and related logic). Though there has been some philosophical work using biological sciences as areas of inquiry, this is most (...) often a matter of investigating either the logic or content of the life sciences as it relates to that of physics or chemistry; for example, trying to determine the proper method and scope of reduction. Cognitive science has been a fruitful avenue for philosophy of mind, but in most cases the dominant model sees mind as “software” able to be understood independently of the process of evolution that led to the human brain.Very little work (until the past half decade) has used advances in the life sciences as fodder for philosophic speculation in areas such as ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics, and so on, though some subfields, like medical ethics, provide exceptions. American pragmatic naturalists, on the other hand, from the second half of the ninteenth century into the middle of the twentieth, insisted that the content of the life sciences was essential in understanding human nature. John Dewey, for example, thoroughly incorporated the premise of humans as biological organisms making our way in environments that must be navigated using natural powers and natural solutions to impediments to action. George Herbert Mead provides another example of a fully naturalized conception of human existence, especially as biological organisms in social interaction in various spheres.What I am particularly concerned with here is making sense of the moral sphere with a conception of the human subject as a product of evolution and both socially constituted and uniquely integrated in an environment (more [End Page 63] carefully—a related suite of environments). The beginning point of this re-framing is in Mead’s notion of the social constitution of human being. Most readers of Mead take up such constitution only in the arena of what Mead calls “significant gesture,” using spoken language, especially in propositional form, as exemplary and as providing the foundation for mind, self-consciousness, and so on. But Mead’s concept of sociality is much wider in scope than this; the concept is fundamental to his cosmology. Furthermore, Mead’s notion of sociality is closely linked to his claim that the emergence of true novelty is possible in a fully naturalized cosmos.Without exploring in greater depth Mead’s contribution to thinking about sociality as a precondition for the most fundamental natural processes,2 I would like to use a broadened version of this to frame some contemporary work in biology, ecology, and cognitive science as they relate to human existence, especially in terms of how we may think productively about the moral sphere.In earlier work, I noted that there is a ubiquitous premise in Western moral theories that I believe is mistaken—or at least worthy of serious reconsideration. Most moral theory takes as axiomatic that whatever feature makes us uniquely human is the same feature that, when perfected, makes us moral. That is, that being “good” at being human makes us “good” humans. This is obviously so for Aristotle, insofar as it is rationality that is our special ergon, and it is using rationality well and beautifully that constitutes human virtue. But I think similar assumptions underlie much of moral theory, ancient and modern, and extend to contemporary work that takes language (or concept) use as peculiarly human and sees linguistic (or conceptual) analysis of moral claims as the proper domain of ethical theory.It seems that this presupposition, in part insisting that morality is uniquely human, is put in question if we take seriously evolution through natural selection and understand the human species to be as much a product of natural selection as any other species. There has been a good deal of ethological work done in the past several decades pointing out the protomoral capacities of other highly social animals, especially in those species to which we are most closely related (see, for example... (shrink)

The aim of my paper is to show the discussion concerning the idea of cosmopolitan society. I intend to examine the structure and content of the argumentation which put into question the very notion of cosmopolitanism, as well as the contemporary content of this concept. I will look at nationalistic discourse as presented, for instance, by Gertrude Himmelfarb, which puts emphasis on national values as an indispensable part of group and individual identity. On the other hand, I am going to (...) analyze left-wing evaluation of cosmopolitanism as an ideologically motivated attempt to hide the real contradictions of the contemporary world. Finally, I will prove that these critiques cannot undermine the concept of cosmopolitanism, but they force us to rethink a way in which cosmopolitan society can be achieved. If cosmopolitan society is to emerge, we need to reconstruct the idea of democracy and the notion of multi-cultural pluralistic society. I propose such rethinking of cosmopolitanism by the introduction of the notion of “dialogical cosmopolitanism,” which refers to M.M. Bakhtin’s concept of dialogue and G.H. Mead’s idea of “taking the role of the other.”. (shrink)

Ein berühmter, immer wieder zitierter Satz von Max lautet: "Interessen (materielle und ideelle), nicht: Ideen, beherrschen unmittelbar das Handeln der Menschen. Aber: die 'Weltbilder', welche durch 'Ideen' geschaffen wurden, haben sehr oft als Weichensteller die Bahnen bestimmt, in denen die Dynamik der Interessen das Handeln fortbewegte." Die neuere Soziologie ist diesem Grundsatz allerdings nicht gerecht geworden. Werte und ihre Wirkung werden entweder als gegeben vorausgesetzt (so bei Talcott Parsons) oder überhaupt als irrelevant betrachtet (so in der Rational Choice- und Systemtheorie). (...) Die umfangreiche, empirische Werteforschung hat vielfältige Ergebnisse erbracht, blieb jedoch weitgehend ohne theoretisches Fundament, sodass ihre Befunde vielfach anfechtbar sind. Weber selbst gab im Hinblick auf die Frage nach der Relevanz der Werte nur unbefriedigende Antworten: Die Entscheidung für bestimmte Werte sei eine rein individuelle Angelegenheit und zwischen den verschiedenen Werten gebe es einen unversöhnlichen Kampf. Im vorliegenden Buch wird diese Problematik erstmals in der deutschen Soziologie umfassend untersucht und es wird dafür (u.a. im Anschluss an Autoren wie Immanuel Kant, George H. Mead und Raymond Boudon), eine neue, konstruktive und erklärungsstarke Lösung gefunden. Unter Zuhilfenahme von Überlegungen aus Philosophie, Sozialtheorie und empirischer Sozialforschung sowie unter Einbeziehung historischer Kämpfe zur Anerkennung und Durchsetzung der Werte kann man feststellen, dass es gesellschaftliche Grundwerte gibt, dass deren Anzahl klar bestimmbar ist und dass zwischen ihnen keineswegs Konflikt, sondern Komplementarität besteht. Mit diesen Thesen und Befunden kann dieses Buch als neues soziologisches Standardwerk angesehen werden. Es hat auch für Vertreter vieler anderer geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlicher Disziplinen grundlegende Bedeutung. Der Autor Dr. Max Haller war nach wissenschaftlichen Tätigkeiten am Institut für Höhere Studien in Wien und an der Universität bzw. ZUMA Mannheim 1985-2015 Professor für Soziologie in Graz. Er lehrte als Gastprofessor auch an Universitäten in mehreren Ländern Europas, den USA und Afrika. Seine Publikationen erschienen in den renommiertesten internationalen soziologischen Zeitschriften. Er ist Mitglied der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften und forscht dort jetzt zu Fragen der Migration, Staatsbürgerschaft und Mehrsprachigkeit. Er war Mitbegründer der Europäischen Gesellschaft für Soziologie und der Wiener Gesellschaft für Soziologie. (shrink)

The status of being a subject, a self and being self-aware of it, is to be interpreted here through the process of the child‘s role play with the doll: By speaking to the doll, this inanimate being is seen as animate and becoming the alter ego of the child. Communicating with it thus means that the child speaks to it- self. It has thus established a — so to speak 'tautological‘ — self-relationship, a behavior in which it encounters only figures (...) of itself. This effect of reflexive tautologization, as I would like to say briefly, is decisive: The individual does not gain a self be- cause he puts himself in the other´s place — think of G.H. Mead — but because he rather eliminates the moment of otherness by means of reflexive tautologization and thus, in tautological self-execution, constitutes himself as self and ultimately as self- consciousness: role-playing as the self-fulfilling design of self- hood. Implicated thereby is, according to my argument, that the self-interpretation of the subject as free or as determined is essentially to be conceived as a self-fulfilling design — free is he who (with all conditionalities) 'designs' himself as free. And in turn, the demand for mutual recognition of the subjects results from this as well. ************************************************************************************************* Der Status, ein Subjekt, ein Selbst und dessen sich selbst bewusst zu sein, soll hier am Vorgang des kindlichen Rollenspiels mit der Puppe gedeutet werden: lndem das Kind zur Puppe spricht, kann dieses an sich Leblose begeistet und zum Alter Ego werden. Mit ihm kommunizieren bedeutet somit, dass das Kind vielmehr zu sich selbst spricht. Es hat damit ein — gleich- sam 'tautoIogisches‘ — Selbstverhältnis hergestellt, ein Verhal- ten, in dem ihm nur Gestalten seiner selbst begegnen. Dieser Effekt reflexiver Tautologisierung, wie ich kurz sagen möchte, ist entscheidend: Das lndividuum gewinnt nicht deshalb ein Selbst, weil es sich in den Andern versetzt — man denke an G.H. Mead —, sondern weil es vermittels reflexiver Tautologi- sierung das Moment der Andersheit vielmehr eliminiert und sich so, im tautologischen Selbstvollzug, als Selbst und letztlich als Selbst-Bewusstsein konstituiert: Rollenspiel als sich selbst er- füllender Entwurf von Selbstsein. lmpliziert ist damit, so mein Argument, dass die Selbstdeutung des Subjekts als frei oder als determiniert, essentiell als selbsterfüllender Entwurf zu be- greifen ist — frei ist, wer sich (bei allen Bedingtheiten) als frei 'entwirft'. Und im Gegenzug ergibt sich die Forderung wechsel- seitiger Anerkennung der Subjekte ebenso daraus. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 541 But the end result is what La Capra terms "a philosophical conservatism," a call to create a morality to counteract the disintegrating forces in modern society. Here too Durkheim joins hands with Weber, Freud, and Malinowski. "Excessive individualism was symptomatic of social disintegration" (p. 145). Its antidote is the formation of cooperative groups. So for Weber the individual, in order to be a genuine man, must (...) always stand in a state of tension between self-interest and selflessness. So too for Freud and Malinowski unbridled individualism, incest and rebellion, are the major threats facing society. In contrast to Weber, who foresaw that "not summer's bloom lies ahead of us, but rather a polar night of icy darkness and hardness.... "Durkheim's work stands in the more benign, less beclouded light of Cartesianism. La Capra stresses the philosopher rather than the sociologist in Durkheim, but in a comparative analysis with his great contemporaries that judgement may well stand. LUCIANC. MARQUIS Pitzer College and Claremont Graduate School The Li/e and Mind o/John Dewey. By George Dykhuizen. Introduction by Harold Taylor; edited by Jo Ann Boydston. (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1973. Pp. xxv + 429. $15.00) This detailed and documented account of the "life and mind" of John Dewey is the fruit of years of careful research by Professor Dykhuizen of the University of Vermont, and it is also the product of cooperation by many institutions and individuals whose records have been made available to the author. The book is a synthesis of biography, history, and philosophy; it is good reading matter as well as an excellent reference work, truly a magnum opus, a worthy record of the inseparability of Dewey's life and mind. The story begins in the obscurities of rural life and schooling in the 1860s, and it culminates in the complicated international affairs of the world since 1914. It is appropriate and inevitable that the public activities of Dewey should dominate the account of the last thirty years of his life. But it is remarkable that a philosopher should be devoted to so many and varied public affairs without being distracted by them. This fact is explained by the character of his philosophy: his philosophical devotion to "inquiry" made almost any public problem grist for his mill. He faced problems professionally as an analyst, not in order to solve them but in order to understand them concretely as obstacles to action. The biography gives abundant evidence of this fact, both in technical philosophical issues and in "the problems of men." Dewey confessed that his science of inquiry was unfortunately entitled "Logic." When he began his inquiries into the process of thinking, the German term logische Studien was still commonly used for any work on the theory of knowledge, and Dewey was not prepared for the revival and reconstruction of formal logic during his mid-career. I am reminded of a remark by his colleague, Professor Woodbridge, who said: "At first I could not figure out what Dewey's logic was about; then it suddenly occurred to me that he was telling us 'How We Think'." For Dewey and Mead the problem of knowledge was almost entirely the problem of thinking, "reflective thinking." At Columbia we tried to make textbooks on reflective thinking, much to Dewey's amusement and scorn: "You should use reflective thinking, not teach it as subject-matter. And as for formal logic, you should save that for graduate school; it corrupts young minds who mistake it for knowledge." Despite his emphasis on "reflective thinking" he disliked the term "reflection"; it had been too much abused by philosophers who engaged in speculation, meditation, and other forms of "day-dreaming." Dewey's preference for "imagination" instead of "consciousness" is related to this circumstance. He regarded "consciousness" as an abstraction; whereas imagining is a cenlxal 542 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY aspect of thinking. It implies not merely getting a suggestion in relation to a problem, but getting a suggestion whose consequences could be anticipated. Unless a suggestion anticipates consequences, it is not an idea; it has no meaning, no means to suggest for the problem or plan. Accordingly, for Dewey "acting consciously... (shrink)

The shift in focus has changed the nature of the Project in a way which we hadn't expected and didn't really notice until this revision. Back in the late 1980s, we started the project as a "work around" for a situation that we found personally frustrating. We believed that widely-held beliefs about Mead's ideas were misinterpretations. But his published statements were often difficult to obtain. It was easier for scholars to rely from the secondary literature about Mead than (...) to consult primary sources. As a result, those frustrating misinterpretations persisted. Our solution: republish as much of Mead as possible in machine-readable form to make distribution, familiarity, and study easier. When the Web was established, we abandon plans for a CD and prepared the documents for the new medium. George's Page was born. (shrink)

This book introduces social scientists to the ideas of George Herbert Mead - one of the most original yet neglected thinkers of early twentieth century sociology. Mead is an exceptional case amongst sociological classics in that, until now, there has been no comprehensive reader of his work. As the first one-volume, comprehensive edited collection of Meadâes published and unpublished writing, this book fills this gap. It is the first to critically assess all of Mead's writings and draw (...) out the aspects that are central to his system of thought. The book is divided into three parts, comprising a total of 30 chapters - a third of which are published here for the first time. G.H. Mead: A Reader provides a unique and timely contribution to the understanding of this key theorist. It is essential reading for both undergraduate and postgraduate students in the fields of sociology, social psychology, philosophy of social science, social and cultural anthropology, and social and political theory. (shrink)

The only collection of Mead's writings published during his lifetime, these essays have heretofore been virtually inaccessible. Reck has collected twenty-five essays representing the full range and depth of Mead's thought. This penetrating volume will be of interest to those in philosophy, sociology, and social psychology. "The editor's well-organized introduction supplies an excellent outline of this system in its development. In view of the scattered sources from which these writings are gathered, it is a great service that this (...) volume renders not only to students of Mead, but to historians."--H. W. Schneider, Journal of the History of Philosophy. (shrink)

George Herbert Mead (1863-1931) had a powerful influence on the development of American pragmatism in the twentieth century. He also had a strong impact on the social sciences. This classic book represents Mead's philosophy of experience, so central to his outlook. The present as unique experience is the focus of this deep analysis of the basic structure of temporality and consciousness. Mead emphasizes the novel character of both the present and the past. Though science is predicated on (...) the assumption that the present is predictable based on a thorough knowledge of the past, the experience of the present, says Mead, is an utterly unique moment comparable to no other, and when it is past the novel character of that unique experience is irrevocable. The emergence of novelty within the perceived rational order of reality is the crux of the problem that Mead explores. The present, in his words, is "the emergent event . . . something which is more than the processes that have led up to it and which by its change, continuance, or disappearance, adds to later passages a content they would not otherwise have possessed." The present as "the seat of reality" heavily conditions our retrospective view of the past as much as it helps to shape the future. The novelty of every present experience causes us to reconstruct our preceding experiences to make sense of the past, which is naturally assumed to be the main cause of what we presently experience. Our perspective on reality is thus relative to the conditioning of each new event and it changes continuously as the effects of the present shift our view of the past and future. This emphasis on the integrative, holistic nature of reality, in which everything past, present, and future is a condition of everything else, makes Mead's philosophy highly relevant to today's scientific picture of a quantum universe, where chance and probability play a role in the emergence of reality. Also of great interest is the way in which he extends his basic analysis of temporal-spatial reality to the emergence of mind and consciousness as a natural development of the evolutionary process. This stimulating and provocative work attests to John Dewey's praise of Mead as "the most original mind in philosophy in America" of his generation. (shrink)

The construct of wellbeing has been criticised as a neoliberal construction of western individualism that ignores wider systemic issues such as inequality and anthropogenic climate change. Accordingly, there have been increasing calls for a broader conceptualisation of wellbeing. Here we impose an interpretative framework on previously published literature and theory, and present a theoretical framework that brings into focus the multifaceted determinants of wellbeing and their interactions across multiple domains and levels of scale. We define wellbeing as positive psychological experience, (...) promoted by connections to self, community and environment, supported by healthy vagal function, all of which are impacted by socio-contextual factors that lie beyond the control of the individual. By emphasising the factors within and beyond the control of the individual and highlighting how vagal function both affects and are impacted by key domains, the biopsychosocial underpinnings of wellbeing are explicitly linked to a broader context that is consistent with, yet complementary to, multi-levelled ecological systems theory. Reflecting on the reciprocal relationships between multiple domains, levels of scale and related social contextual factors known to impact on wellbeing, our GENIAL framework may provide a foundation for a transdisciplinary science of wellbeing that has the potential to promote the wellbeing of individuals while also playing a key role in tackling major societal challenges. (shrink)

Preface, by Margaret Mead -- Introduction, by Margaret Mead -- The Arapesh of New Guinea, by Margaret Mead -- The Eskimo of Greenland, by Jeannette Mirsky -- The Ojibwa of Canada, by Ruth Landes -- The Bachiga of East Africa, by May M. Edel -- The Ifugao of the Philippine Islands, by I. Goldman -- The Kwakiutl of Vancouver Island, by I. Goldman -- The Manus of the Admiralty Islands, by Margaret Mead -- The Iroquois, by (...) B. Quain -- The Samoans, by Margaret Mead -- The Zuni of New Mexico, by I. Goldman -- The Bathonga of South Africa, by I. Goldman -- The Dakota, by Jeannette Mirsky -- The Maori of New Zealand, by B. Mishkin -- Interpretative statement, by Margaret Mead. (shrink)

Social theorists in recent years have concerned themselves with the matter of the kind and intensity of people’s everyday reflective capacities. In this respect, Bourdieu has mostly been found wanting. This article seeks to counter this sentiment with recourse to an ‘anti-mechanistic’ reading of Bourdieu’s theory of practice. It begins by arguing that in imposing a strict delineation between consciousness and habitus, Bourdieu and his critics alike at times unwittingly conflate habitus and mechanistic habit, at once vaunting conscious deliberation and (...) neglecting the non-habitual acts that habitus makes possible. Next it turns to the treatment, within the mechanistic reading, of the notion of the ‘social world’. The argument is that in this reading the social world is reified and rendered the mere background or setting for social practices rather than the product of those practices. Without recognition of this latter quality, the social world becomes hypostatized and exists outside of time. The secondary aim, then, is to argue for a thoroughgoing temporal relation to social reality in Bourdieu’s theory. (shrink)

This is intended as an introductory statement to the explorations undertaken in the essays that follow. The authors of these essays attempt to introduce the reader to some of the insights of Michael Polanyi and their implications for the reader who wishes to come to a greater understanding of modern technological society, which — for better or worse — has come to define his very existence. Arguably, no twentieth-century thinker has probed more deeply than Polanyi into the dynamics of scientific (...) discovery or demonstrated more courage in his willingness to think outside the box of ruling orthodoxies and, consequently, come up with more profound insights and radically new ways of understanding the processes of scientific inquiry, their technological implications, and the sometimes fateful, but potentially fruitful, relationships that exist among science, technology, and society. Each of the following nine authors, grounded in different fields of study and research, but also in a common appreciation of Polanyi’s contributions, offers valuable insights into this multi-faceted subject. (shrink)

This volume collects, for the first time, her writings on the future of humanity and how humans can shape that future through purposeful action.

PREFACE. THE Author of this very practical treatise on Scotch Loch - Fishing desires clearly that it may be of use to all who had it. He does not pretend to have written anything new, but to have attempted to put what he has to say in as readable a form as possible. Everything in the way of the history and habits of fish has been studiously avoided, and technicalities have been used as sparingly as possible. The writing of this (...) book has afforded him pleasure in his leisure moments, and that pleasure would be much increased if he knew that the perusal of it would create any bond of sympathy between himself and the angling community in general. This section is interleaved with blank shects for the readers notes. The Author need hardly say that any suggestions addressed to the case of the publishers, will meet with consideration in a future edition. We do not pretend to write or enlarge upon a new subject. Much has been said and written-and well said and written too on the art of fishing but loch-fishing has been rather looked upon as a second-rate performance, and to dispel this idea is one of the objects for which this present treatise has been written. Far be it from us to say anything against fishing, lawfully practised in any form but many pent up in our large towns will bear us out when me say that, on the whole, a days loch-fishing is the most convenient. One great matter is, that the loch-fisher is depend- ent on nothing but enough wind to curl the water, -and on a large loch it is very seldom that a dead calm prevails all day, -and can make his arrangements for a day, weeks beforehand whereas the stream- fisher is dependent for a good take on the state of the water and however pleasant and easy it may be for one living near the banks of a good trout stream or river, it is quite another matter to arrange for a days river-fishing, if one is looking forward to a holiday at a date some weeks ahead. Providence may favour the expectant angler with a good day, and the water in order but experience has taught most of us that the good days are in the minority, and that, as is the case with our rapid running streams, -such as many of our northern streams are, -the water is either too large or too small, unless, as previously remarked, you live near at hand, and can catch it at its best. A common belief in regard to loch-fishing is, that the tyro and the experienced angler have nearly the same chance in fishing, -the one from the stern and the other from the bow of the same boat. Of all the absurd beliefs as to loch-fishing, this is one of the most absurd. Try it. Give the tyro either end of the boat he likes give him a cast of ally flies he may fancy, or even a cast similar to those which a crack may be using and if he catches one for every three the other has, he may consider himself very lucky. Of course there are lochs where the fish are not abundant, and a beginner may come across as many as an older fisher but we speak of lochs where there are fish to be caught, and where each has a fair chance. Again, it is said that the boatman has as much to do with catching trout in a loch as the angler. Well, we dont deny that. In an untried loch it is necessary to have the guidance of a good boatman but the same argument holds good as to stream-fishing... (shrink)

George Herbert Mead had a powerful influence on the development of American pragmatism in the twentieth century. He also had a strong impact on the social sciences. This classic book represents Mead's philosophy of experience, so central to his outlook. The present as unique experience is the focus of this deep analysis of the basic structure of temporality and consciousness. Mead emphasizes the novel character of both the present and the past. Though science is predicated on the (...) assumption that the present is predictable based on a thorough knowledge of the past, the experience of the present, says Mead, is an utterly unique moment comparable to no other, and when it is past the novel character of that unique experience is irrevocable. The emergence of novelty within the perceived rational order of reality is the crux of the problem that Mead explores. The present, in his words, is "the emergent event... something which is more than the processes that have led up to it and which by its change, continuance, or disappearance, adds to later passages a content they would not otherwise have possessed." The present as "the seat of reality" heavily conditions our retrospective view of the past as much as it helps to shape the future. The novelty of every present experience causes us to reconstruct our preceding experiences to make sense of the past, which is naturally assumed to be the main cause of what we presently experience. Our perspective on reality is thus relative to the conditioning of each new event and it changes continuously as the effects of the present shift our view of the past and future. This emphasis on the integrative, holistic nature of reality, in which everything past, present, and future is a condition of everything else, makes Mead's philosophy highly relevant to today's scientific picture of a quantum universe, where chance and probability play a role in the emergence of reality. Also of great interest is the way in which he extends his basic analysis of temporal-spatial reality to the emergence of mind and consciousness as a natural development of the evolutionary process. This stimulating and provocative work attests to John Dewey's praise of Mead as "the most original mind in philosophy in America" of his generation. (shrink)

Unlike some other reproductions of classic texts (1) We have not used OCR(Optical Character Recognition), as this leads to bad quality books with introduced typos. (2) In books where there are images such as portraits, maps, sketches etc We have endeavoured to keep the quality of these images, so they represent accurately the original artefact. Although occasionally there may be certain imperfections with these old texts, we feel they deserve to be made available for future generations to enjoy.

Murray Jardine’s The Making and Unmaking of Technological Society further develops several of the author’s political and economic concerns articulated in his earlier Speech and Political Practice. It probes the impact and implications of both Christianity and modern technology for our understanding of, and ability to cope with, problems that have become endemic to Western and, specifically, American culture. Jardine’s major continuing themes include: the importance to a well-formed self and society to be concretely grounded in a sense of place; (...) the participation of the knower in the dynamic processes of creativity and discovery; how even a highly literate culture is nourished and equipped for its communal endeavors by the temporal and tensional vestiges of its oral beginnings; and how the crucial element of faith, understood as trust and commitment, gives to speech acts the power to shape self, society, and history. The major new focus of this book is suggested in the subtitle: How Christianity Can Save Modernity From Itself. More thoroughly than in Speech and Political Practice, Jardine elaborates how Christianity is important in shaping our understanding of the speech act as a creative force. He outlines how Christianity and the Greek tradition have been significant forces shaping modernity; he argues that Christianity offers potential for addressing the nihilism found in the consumer society of post-modernity. Jardine is critical of those who are unable to recognize the perversions of Jesus’ message in Western history, but he is also critical of those who attribute virtually all positive developments during the past two millennia to Christianity. Nevertheless, he emphasizes the positive difference that Christian values and doctrine have made in the course of the past two thousand years. As in his earlier work, Jardine draws from an impressive range of sources, in order to make an original contribution. He is especially indebted to William Poteat, Michael Polanyi, and Ludwig Wittgenstein; his teacher Poteat’s influence is pervasive. (shrink)