Students of philosophy, psychology, sociology, and literature will welcome this collection of original essays on self-deception and related phenomena such as wishful thinking, bad faith, and false consciousness. The book has six sections, each exploring self-deception and related phenomena from a different perspective.

During the period from Descartes to Rousseau, the mind changed. Its domain was redefined; its activities were redescribed; and its various powers were redistributed. Once a part of cosmic Nous, its various functions delimited by its embodied condition, the individual mind now becomes a field of forces with desires impinging on one another, their forces resolved according to their strengths and directions. Of course since there is no such thing as The Mind Itself, it was not the mind that changed. (...) Conceptions of the mind changed. Yet even to say this is misleading, because it suggests that somewhere out there in nowhere there is Nous, Psyche, Soul or Mind, the true but opaque object of all these conceptions. But of course there is no Mind in the realm of things in themselves, waiting for us to see it truly, like a China of the noumenal world, amused that our various conceptions reveal as much about ourselves as about it. (shrink)

The harvest and the pigeons. A note on the summit course of the pillar of Prusias at Delphi The remains of the pillar of Prusias, next to the temple of Apollon at Delphi, have generated much comment. Indeed, the course that supported the equestrian statue of the king of Bithynia presents 112 mortises, above and beyond the attachment holes of the statue itself. Until the present, it has been thought that these cavities served to attach vegetal elements, ears of corn (...) reaped by a laborer or, after the identification of the base as belonging to the pillar of Prusias, a field of corn signifying the beneficence of the king. A trail of textual and archaeological indications prompts a different interpretation for this enigmatic arrangement. The mortises would have served the insertion of bronze points (obeloi or meniskoi) forming a system of protection against defacement by birds, as is occasionally the case in sculpture and in temple architecture. (shrink)

L’étude du portique de Delphes attribué initialement aux Étoliens a été entreprise par A. Perrier en 2007 et les campagnes de relevés de terrain, commencées à la fin de l’année 2010 avec J.‑J. Malmary (architecte) et L. Fadin (topographe), se sont achevées en 2013 par des vérifications sur le monument, les derniers relevés ayant été mis au net en 2014. Un mémoire sur l’histoire, l’architecture et la topographie du portique et de sa terrasse a été déposé à l’Académie des inscriptions (...) et belles... (shrink)

A decision under ‘complete uncertainty’ is one where the decision maker knows the set of possible outcomes for each decision, but cannot assign probabilities to those outcomes. This way, the problem of ranking decisions is reduced to a problem of ranking sets of outcomes. All rankings that have emerged in the literature in this domain imply transitivity. In the current study, transitivity is subjected to an empirical evaluation in two experiments, where subjects are asked to choose between sets of monetary (...) consequences. After analysis with a Bayes Factor, very few violations of transitivity were found. It can be concluded that transitivity seems a plausible condition for the ranking of sets of monetary consequences. (shrink)

Many have said, and I think some have shown, that it is irrational to fear death. The extinction of what is essential to the self—whether it be biological death or the permanent cessation of consciousness—cannot by definition be experienced by oneself as a loss or as a harm.

We consider first order modal logic C firstly defined by Carnap in “Meaning and Necessity” [1]. We prove elimination of nested modalities for this logic, which gives additionally the Skolem-Löwenheim theorem for C. We also evaluate the degree of unsolvability for C, by showing that it is exactly 0′. We compare this logic with the logics of Henkin quantifiers, Σ11 logic, and SO. We also shortly discuss properties of the logic C in finite models.

The philosopher must inform himself of the relevant empirical investigation to arrive at a definition, and the scientist cannot afford to be naive about the..

Less than twenty years after computer science was able to establish itself as an academic discipline, a group of US computer scientists organized a conference on the history of programming languages. The conference is distinguished from other self-historicization projects by the organizer's claim to present an “accurate” account of their own discipline's history. However, the actors encountered challenges in terms of how to present their own history “objectively.” How to deal with incomplete memories? How to avoid putting others in a (...) bad light? There was far from agreement on these points and heated discussions ensued. Strategies had to be developed and compromises made to make the project a reality. The conference was intended to contribute to the history of computer science and the organizers sought exchange with professional historians. However, the project met with little interest among them. Rather, the discussion between the computer scientists and the historians shows how the history of science also struggled with questions of how to deal suitably with the past. In this respect, the Computer Scientists’ Conference not only illuminates the history of computer science, but also offers a new perspective on the history of the history of science. (shrink)

Recent works have invited us to look into how modes of secularism influence the shape of ‘modern’ religion. This literature has remained quite state-centred, paying less attention to how concepts of secularism migrate from one national context to another. This article seeks to investigate these transnational dynamics. More specifically, it aims to explore this process of travelling through the contemporary writings of the Quebec-based essayist Djemila Benhabib. The article approaches her writings as ‘travelogues’: a genre which acts as an invitation (...) to focus on the ‘travelling’ dimension and politics of location of her accounts. A special emphasis is put on analysing how her writings are vehicles for the travel of gendered visions of secularism from France to Quebec. Ultimately, the article argues that taking these processes of transnational migrations into consideration is necessary to better locate and understand the politics of national debates. (shrink)

La pensée de la différence de Luisa Muraro - philosophe italienne, membre de la librairie des femmes de Milan - déjà présentée dans un précédent numéro de CLIO (n° 12) mérite ici d’être redécouverte à travers cette oeuvre singulière qu’est L’ordre symbolique de la mère. Traduit de l’italien, cet ouvrage est original d’un double point de vue. Sa structure, tout d’abord. En effet, aux six chapitres répondent six contre-chants par lesquels l’auteure dévoile ses inspirations, précise ses concepts...

There is more akrasia than meets the eye: it can occur in speech and perception, cognitively and emotionally as well as between decision and action. The lures of akrasia are the same as those that are exercised in ordinary psychological and cognitive inferential contexts. But because it is over-determined and because it occurs in opaque intentional contexts, its attribution remains highly fallible.

Background The often poor prognosis associated with cancer necessitates empowering patients to express their care preferences. Yet, the prevalence of Advance Directives (AD) among oncology patients remains low. This study investigated oncologists' perspectives on the interests and challenges associated with implementing AD. Methods A French national online survey targeting hospital-based oncologists explored five areas: AD information, writing support, AD usage, personal perceptions of AD's importance, and respondent's profile. The primary outcome was to assess how frequently oncologists provide patients with information (...) about AD in daily clinical practice. Additionally, we examined factors related to delivering information on AD. Results Of the 410 oncologists (50%) who responded to the survey, 75% (n = 308) deemed AD relevant. While 36% (n = 149) regularly inform patients about AD, 25% (n = 102) remain skeptical about AD. Among the respondents who do not consistently discuss AD, the most common reason given is the belief that AD may induce anxiety (n = 211/353; 60%). Of all respondents, 90% (n = 367) believe patients require specific information to draft relevant AD. Physicians with experience in palliative care were more likely to discuss AD (43% vs 32.3%, p = 0.027). Previous experience in critical care was associated with higher levels of distrust towards AD (31.5% vs 18.8%, p = 0.003), and 68.5% (n = 281) of the respondents expressed that designating a “person of trust” would be more appropriate than utilizing AD. Conclusion Despite the perceived relevance of AD, only a third of oncologists regularly apprise their patients about them. Significant uncertainty persists about the safety and relevance of AD. (shrink)

Courage is dangerous. If it is defined in traditional ways, as a set of dispositions to overcome fear, to oppose obstacles, to perform difficult or dangerous actions, its claim to be a virtue is questionable. Unlike the virtue of justice, or a sense of proportion, traditional courage does not itself determine what is to be done, let alone assure that it is worth doing. If we retain the traditional conception of courage and its military connotations–overcoming and combat–we should be suspicious (...) of it. Instead of automatically classifying it as a virtue, attempting to develop and exercise it, we should become alert to its dangers. And yet and yet. There is an aspect of traditional courage that serves us: we require the capacities and traits that enable us to persist in acting well under stress, to endure hardships when following our judgments about what is best is difficult or dangerous. If courage is checked, redefined as the virtue that enables virtue–the various sets of dispositions, whatever they may be, that make us resolute in worthy, difficult action–then we need not fear the dangers of courage. We need rather to reform it by diversifying it, as a heterogeneous variety of traits that enable us to act well under stress, against the natural movements of self-protection. (shrink)

Since many varieties of self-deception are ineradicable and useful, it would be wise to be ambivalent about at least some of its forms.1 It is open-eyed ambivalence that acknowledges its own dualities rather than ordinary shifty vacillation that we need. To be sure, self-deception remains dangerous: sensible ambivalence should not relax vigilance against pretence and falsity, combating irrationality and obfuscation wherever they occur.

The challenge of explaining the emotions has engaged the attention of the best minds in philosophy and science throughout history. Part of the fascination has been that the emotions resist classification. As adequate account therefore requires receptivity to knowledge from a variety of sources. The philosopher must inform himself of the relevant empirical investigation to arrive at a definition, and the scientist cannot afford to be naive about the assumptions built into his conceptual apparatus. The contributors to this volume have (...) approached the problem of characterizing and classifying emotions from the perspectives of neurophysiology, psychology, and social psychology as well as that of philosophical psychology. They discuss the difficulties that arise in classifying the emotions, assessing their appropriateness and rationality, and determining their function in motivating moral action. (shrink)

NO SOCIETY, NO COMMUNITY can operate without the contributions of distinctive types of mentalities and talents. No society or community is just unless it acknowledges and rewards the contributions of distinctive types of perspectives.

This article interrogates the extent to which institutional discourses on the governance of religious minorities are useful to think about the complexity of how religion gets negotiated in the quotidian. It takes as its starting point the exploration of the discourse on religious governance in the province of Quebec organized around the notion of request for accommodations. Through an analysis of public policy documents, it examines facets of this discourse of request, including the role it plays in delimiting what we (...) imagine the religious to be and how we imagine it to work. Second, drawing on interviews with self-identified Muslims in Montreal, the article explores how piety gets negotiated in their everyday. These narratives are approached as fertile sites to think differently about the recognition of difference. This two-pronged perspective acts as an invitation to think more broadly about not only what institutional discourses “produce” but also what they “obscure.”. (shrink)