Andrea Cesalpino is an important figure in the history of science. He demonstrated that blood circulates into heart from veins and from the heart to arteries, paving the way to Harvey’s complete description of blood circulation. Moreover, he was the founder of botany as a systematic discipline, which he based, rather than on the observation of accidental similarities of plants, on the discovery of their vegetative-generative principle. In philosophy, he attempted to conciliate the immortality of the soul (i.e., the form (...) of the body) with the existence of a unique immaterial intellect, which is individuated and multiplied in the singular souls that participate to it. (shrink)

Although the modern age is often described as the age of democratic revolutions, the subject of popular foundings has not captured the imagination of contemporary political thought. Most of the time, democratic theory and political science treat as the object of their inquiry normal politics, institutionalized power, and consolidated democracies. The aim of Andreas Kalyvas' study is to show why it is important for democratic theory to rethink the question of its beginnings. Is there a founding unique to democracies? (...) Can a democracy be democratically established? What are the implications of expanding democratic politics in light of the question of whether and how to address democracy's beginnings? Kalyvas addresses these questions and scrutinizes the possibility of democratic beginnings in terms of the category of the extraordinary, as he reconstructs it from the writings of Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and Hannah Arendt and their views on the creation of new political, symbolic, and constitutional orders. (shrink)

Is logic masculine? Is women's lack of interest in the "hard core" philosophical disciplines of formal logic and semantics symptomatic of an inadequacy linked to sex? Is the failure of women to excel in pure mathematics and mathematical science a function of their inability to think rationally? Andrea Nye undermines the assumptions that inform these questions, assumptions such as: logic is unitary, logic is independenet of concrete human relations, and logic transcends historical circumstances as well as gender. In a series (...) of studies of the logics of historical figures--Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Abelard, Ockham, and Frege--she traces the changing interrelationships between logical innovation and oppressive speech strategies, showing that logic is not transcendent truth but abstract forms of language spoken by men, whether Greek ruling citizens, or scientists. (shrink)

Andrea Sangiacomo offers a new understanding of Spinoza's moral philosophy, how his views significantly evolved over time, and how he himself struggled during his career to develop a theory that could speak to human beings as they actually are--imperfect, passionate, and often not very rational.

– The paper defends a naturalistic version of modal actualism according to which what is metaphysically possible is determined by dispositions found in the actual world. We argue that there is just one world—this one—and that all genuine possibilities are anchored by the dispositions exemplified in this world. This is the case regardless of whether or not those dispositions are manifested. As long as the possibility is one that would obtain were the relevant disposition manifested, it is a genuine possibility. (...) Furthermore, by starting from actual dispositional properties and branching out, we are able to include possibilities that are quite far removed from any state of affairs that happens to obtain, while still providing a natural and actual grounding of possibility. Stressing the importance of ontological considerations in any theory of possibility, it is argued that the account of possibility in terms of dispositional properties provides a more palatable ontology than those of its competitors. Coming at it from the other direction, the dispositional account of possibility also provides motivation for taking an ontology of dispositions more seriously. As well as the relevant dispositional notions required to lay out the view, the paper discusses the dispositional realism needed as the basis for the account of possibility. (shrink)

Influential theories on affect and emotion propose a fundamental differentiation between emotion and cognition, and research paradigms designed to test them focus on differences rather than similarities between affective and cognitive processes. This research orientation is increasingly challenged by the widespread and successful use of cognitive research paradigms in the study of affect and emotion—a challenge with far-reaching implications. Where and on what basis should theorists draw the line between cognition and emotion, and when is it useful to do so? (...) Should researchers build more global, integrative models of cognition and emotion, or should they rely on local, content-specific models that draw attention to a differentiation between affective and cognitive processes? This special issue compiles different viewpoints on fundamental issues in the relationship between affect and cognition. (shrink)

She was intensely sympathetic. She was immensely charming. She excelled in the difficult arts of family life. She sacrificed herself daily. If there was chicken, she took the leg, if there was a draught, she sat in it—in short, she was so constituted that she never had a mind or wish of her own, but preferred to sympathise always with the minds and wishes of others. — Virginia Woolf (1979, 59).

Laws are supposed to tell us how physical systems actually behave. The analysis of an important part of physical practice--abstraction--shows, however, that laws describe the behavior of physical systems under very special circumstances, namely when they are isolated. Nevertheless, laws are applied in cases of non-isolation as well. This practice requires an explanation. It is argued that one has to assume that physical systems have dispositions. I take these to be innocuous from an empiricist's standpoint because they can--at least in (...) principle--be measured. Laws can be applied whenever such a disposition is present, they describe how the physical system would behave if the disposition were manifest. (shrink)

Andreas Christiansen,Bjørn Hallsson | : In many cases, the public want to restrict an activity or technology that they believe to be dangerous, but that scientific experts believe to be safe. There is thus a tension between respecting the preferences of the people and making policy based on our best scientific knowledge. Deciding how to make policy in the light of this tension requires an understanding of why citizens sometimes disagree with the experts on what is risky and what (...) is safe. In this paper, we examine two highly influential theories of how people form beliefs about risks: the theory that risk beliefs are errors caused by bounded rationality and the theory that such beliefs are part and parcel of people’s core value systems. We then discuss the implications of the psychological theories for questions regarding liberal-democratic decision making: Should policy be responsive to the preferences of citizens in the domain of risk regulation? What risk-regulation policies are legitimate? How should liberal-democratic deliberation be structured? | : Dans de nombreux cas, le public veut restreindre une activité ou une technologie qu’il croit être dangereuse, mais que les experts scientifiques considèrent être sécuritaire. Il y a alors une tension entre le respect des préférences des gens et des politiques fondées sur nos meilleures connaissances scientifiques. Décider comment élaborer une politique à la lumière de cette tension nécessite de comprendre pourquoi les citoyens sont parfois en désaccord avec les experts à propos de ce qui est risqué et ce qui est sûr. Dans cet article, nous examinons deux théories très influentes sur la façon dont les gens forment des croyances sur les risques : la théorie selon laquelle les croyances liées au risque sont des erreurs causées par la rationalité limitée et la théorie selon laquelle ces croyances font partie intégrante des systèmes de valeurs fonda-mentales des personnes. Nous discutons ensuite les implications des théories psychologiques pour les questions touchant la prise de décision libérale-démocratique : Les politiques devraient-elles être sensibles aux préférences des citoyens dans le domaine de la régulation des risques? Quelles politiques de régulation des risques sont légitimes? Comment la délibération libérale-démocratique devrait-elle être structurée? (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to defend the structural concept of representation, as defined by homomorphisms, against its main objections, namely: logical objections, the objection from misrepresentation, theobjection from failing necessity, and the copy theory objection. The logical objections can be met by reserving the relation.

I examine the central theoretical construct of ecological psychology, the concept of an affordance. In the first part of the paper, I illustrate the role affordances play in Gibson's theory of perception. In the second part, I argue that affordances are to be understood as dispositional properties, and explain what I take to be their characteristic background circumstances, triggering circumstances and manifestations. The main purpose of my analysis is to give affordances a theoretical identity enriched by Gibson's visionary insight, but (...) independent of the most controversial claims of the Gibsonian movement. (shrink)

Art historian Andrea Liss examines the inherent difficulties and productive possibilities of using photographs to bear witness, initiating a critical dialogue about the ways the post-Auschwitz generation has employed these documents to ...

In his book, Andreas Urs Sommer reflects on the question of what it really means when everybody’s appealing to values, all the time – the question, fundamentally, of what values actually are. Values explores both of these points, arriving at two intriguing suggestions: Maybe what we call values are just a set of elaborate fictions. And maybe those fictions serve some very important purposes.

We present a theory VF of partial truth over Peano arithmetic and we prove that VF and ID 1 have the same arithmetical content. The semantics of VF is inspired by van Fraassen's notion of supervaluation.

Each Aristotelian science consists in the causal investigation of a specific department of reality. If successful, such an investigation results in causal knowledge; that is, knowledge of the relevant or appropriate causes. The emphasis on the concept of cause explains why Aristotle developed a theory of causality which is commonly known as the doctrine of the four causes. For Aristotle, a firm grasp of what a cause is, and how many kinds of causes there are, is essential for a successful (...) investigation of the world around us. (shrink)

Papers by Andreas Bartels, Ansgar Beckermann, Frédéric Bouchard, Thomas Breuer, Bruno Eckhardt, Bruce Glymour, Claus Kiefer, Roberta Millstein and Alexander Rosenberg.

It is commonly assumed that the scientific study of emotions should focus on discrete categories such as fear, anger, sadness, joy, disgust, shame, guilt, and so on. This view has recently been questioned by the emergence of the “core affect movement,” according to which discrete emotions are not natural kinds. Affective science, it is argued, should focus on core affect, a blend of hedonic and arousal values. Here, I argue that the empirical evidence does not support the thesis that core (...) affect is a more “natural” category than discrete emotions. I conclude by recommending a splitting strategy in our search for natural affective kinds. †To contact the author, please write to: Andrea Scarantino, Department of Philosophy and Neuroscience Institute, Georgia State University, P.O. Box 4089, Atlanta, GA 30302‐4089; email: [email protected]. (shrink)

As familiar as the form of the mathematical equation is to us, the ostensibly simple act of equating unlike things was an achievement many centuries in the making, and one that would ultimately redefine European mathematical enquiry such that its bias toward geometry and the concrete would be displaced by a bias toward algebraic abstraction. The moment of that displacement was the nineteenth century, and its broader significance is on particularly striking display in the British context, where the implications of (...) algebraic abstraction were the object of sustained enquiry among mathematicians, logicians, and economists. This article argues that the ascendance of the algebraic equation, and the transformation in the conception of number on which it was premised, were not simply the product of evolutionary pressures internal to mathematics; the Victorian embrace of algebra was also a response to the practical and cognitive demands of Victorian economic life, which was increasingly reliant on attenuated exchange relations and merely nominal forms of ownership. This was an economy organized around the global extension of trade and characterized by the exponential growth of financial intermediation, of what Walter Bagehot called “number abstracted from reference.” Victorian economic practices thus modeled an abstraction that helped to justify the abstractions of mathematics, and that mathematics in turn was used by economic theorists to argue for the necessity and objectivity of their models. This mutually sustaining dialogue is particularly visible in the writings of William Stanley Jevons, who applied the principles of algebra to philosophy and economic theory so as to reconceive the logic of cognitive and social life in terms of equations. This logic, for which he was merely a spokesman, continues to shape our faith in the special value of abstract, theoretical knowledge. (shrink)

Markus Ophälders presenta un breve ma altrettanto denso lavoro che intende dimostrare come l’estetica non sia una semplice branca della ricerca filosofica, nata nel Settecento e sviluppatasi nei secoli a venire, bensì come lo studio filosofico estetico sia una costante che accompagna la storia della filosofia nella sua interezza. Sebbene l’autore non voglia presentare una minuziosa storia dell’estetica, i tre capitoli di cui è composto il testo si impegnano a porre in rilievo i concetti fonda...

Furio Jesi to Max Brod (Turin, le 15 Janvier 1965) - L'esploratore della Kabbalah. Scholem e i mistici - Furio Jesi in «La Stampa», 7 Marzo 1980 - Furio Jesi to Gershom Scholem (Turin, le 26 Novembre 1966) - Gershom Scholem to Furio Jesi (Jerusalem, 1.4.1973) - Furio Jesi to Gershom Scholem (Novara, 28.5.1973).

Die Untersuchung von Strukturen des Exemplarischen ist in den letzten Jahren vermehrt in den Fokus geisteswissenschaftlicher Forschung gerückt. Der Band beleuchtet in systematischer und historischer Perspektive Funktionen der Verwendung von Bildern als Beispielen, Illustrationen und Exempla. Im Mittelpunkt des Buches steht die Frage, wie Bilder in epistemologische, kunsttheoretische und philosophische Diskurse eingebunden sind. Die grundlegende Annahme lautet: Der theoretische Umgang mit Bildern gehorcht einer Logik des Exemplarischen, welche die Allgemeinheit der Argumente an die konkrete Gegebenheit eines Anschaulichen bindet. 'Logik' wird (...) dabei in einem weiten, inklusiven Sinn verstanden, der die lange Tradition der Rhetorik, aber auch Kants Überlegungen zum reflexiven ästhetischen Urteil und die psychoanalytische Analyse des singulären Falls umfasst. (shrink)

In 'Arbeit am Kanon', Italian musicologist Federico Celestini and German philosopher Andreas Dorschel discuss aesthetic issues in the work of composers Joseph Haydn, Franz Schubert, Johannes Brahms, Anton Bruckner, Hugo Wolf, Gustav Mahler, Anton Webern, and Franz Schreker.

In ‘Vollkommenes hält sich fern’ (‘Perfection keeps itself aloof’) – the book title is drawn from a verse of American poet Kimberly Johnson (*1971) –, Philip Alperson and Andreas Dorschel discuss issues in the philosophy of music and general aesthetics related to the body, to practices and genres, values and education.

Dynamic epistemic logics provide an account of the evolution of agents’ belief and knowledge when they learn the occurrence of an event. These logics started to become popular about 20 years ago and by now there exists a huge number of publications about them. The present paper briefly summarises the existing body of literature, discusses some problems and shortcomings, and proposes some avenues for future research.

The paper argues that Plessner’s theory of positionality can be traced back to Kant’s theory of predicabilia in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant’s theory of predicabilia allows for the reformulation of Plessner’s distinction between the organic structure of the living body on the one hand and the positional unity of this living body on the other hand. This enables a concept of non-physical spatiality from which Plessner’s concept of the boundary can be derived. Therefore, Plessner’s theory of positionality competes (...) neither with Kant’s transcendental epistemology nor with his anthropology but rather extends his philosophy of science. Plessner develops the conceptual specifics of living beings, supplementing Kant’s concept of matter as the specific object of physics. (shrink)

Die Untersuchung besteht aus drei Teilen. Im ersten Teil argumentiere ich, daß in der frühen Neuzeit durch die Zurückweisung des scholastischen Vokabulars das Problem, Ordnung und Regelmäßigkeit in der Natur zu erklären, neu aufgeworfen wird. Descartes führt den Begriff des Naturgesetzes ein, um dieses Problem zu lösen. Im zweiten und dritten Teil analysiere ich, was Descartes unter einem Naturgesetz versteht. Im zweiten Teil zeige ich, daß es für die verbreitete Auffassung, Descartes halte Naturgesetze für ewige Wahrheiten, keine guten Gründe gibt. (...) Im dritten Teil untersuche ich die Rolle, die Gott – Descartes zufolge – als Urheber der Naturgesetze spielt. Ich argumentiere, daß die “Daumenkino”-Auffassung von Naturgesetzen keine Folge der “creatio continua”- These ist, sondern eine Konsequenz des Cartesischen Materiebegriffs. Schließlich bemühe ich mich verständlich zu machen, weshalb Descartes fürchtet, seine Naturgesetzauffassung lege die Hypothese nahe, Gott sei die Weltseele. (shrink)

So geschaftig die internationale Nietzsche-Forschung auch ist, bleibt doch weithin unklar, was eigentlich gemeint ist, wenn wir von Nietzsches Philosophie sprechen. Handelt es sich um ein Gefuge von Lehrsatzen Wille zur Macht, Ewige Wiederkunft des Gleichen, Ubermensch? Wie sollen philosophisch interessierte Leserinnen und Leser damit umgehen, dass Nietzsche sich offensichtlich unentwegt selbst ins Wort fallt und jede doktrinale Festlegung verweigert? Ist das nur eine billige literarische Strategie, um das eigene Gefuge von Lehrsatzen interessanter zu machen? Oder handelt es sich vielmehr (...) um den Versuch, den Glauben an Philosophie als Gefuge von Lehrsatzen grundsatzlich zu problematisieren? Vielleicht ist Nietzsches Philosophie etwas vollig Anderes: eine andere Praxis. Der bekannte Nietzsche-Forscher Andreas Urs Sommer stellt und beantwortet in diesem Band grundlegende Fragen zum Umgang mit Nietzsches Texten, die so ganz anders zu funktionieren scheinen als landlaufige philosophische Texte. Die dafur erforderliche philosophische Hermeneutik muss auf einem sicheren philologisch-historischen Fundament stehen. (shrink)