Antonia Lolordo presents an original interpretation of John Locke's metaphysics of moral agency, in which to be a moral agent is simply to be free, rational, and a person.

This book offers a comprehensive treatment of the philosophical system of the seventeenth-century philosopher Pierre Gassendi. Gassendi's importance is widely recognized and is essential for understanding early modern philosophers and scientists such as Locke, Leibniz and Newton. Offering a systematic overview of his contributions, LoLordo situates Gassendi's views within the context of sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century natural philosophy as represented by a variety of intellectual traditions, including scholastic Aristotelianism, Renaissance Neo-Platonism, and the emerging mechanical philosophy. LoLordo's work will be essential (...) reading for historians of early modern philosophy and science. (shrink)

This is a review of Peter Anstey's John Locke and Natural Philosophy.

Extortion and bribery are regularly identified as well–nigh insoluble ethical problems for business, especially on an international scale, yet there are many initiatives being steadily pursued to combat them. One of the most impressive is the work of the International Chamber of Commerce, which published an important Report on the subject in 1977, the first such document prepared by the business community. Now that Report has undergone an in‐depth revision which was published last year and is the subject of this (...) study. Professor Argandoña is Secretary General of IESE [the International Graduate School of Management of the University of Navarre], Av. Pearson 21, E–Barcelona, Spain , and an Associate Editor of this Review. The article is a revised version of the presentation made to the Nineth EBEN Annual Conference held in Frankfurt in September last year. (shrink)

Paulo Friere is considered to be one of the most influential educational philosophers of the twentieth century. Within many progressive circles, he would be considered the most important radical educational philosopher of our times, given his contribution to a revolutionary understanding of education and his certainty and faith that education can function as one of the most significant empowering and democratizing forces in the lives of the disenfranchised. In this deeply personal introduction to the man,and his ideas and their contribution (...) to ideas of progressive schooling, Antonia Darder reflects on her personal memories of time spent with Freire and his influence on her own work. (shrink)

Early in Movements of the Mind, Wayne Wu puts forth a foundational picture of action. On this picture, intentional action is necessarily a solution to a selection problem, a problem of choice among multiple causally possible alternatives. Forming an intention solves one selection problem; acting on that intention requires solving yet further selection problems about how to execute that intention. There are two serious issues with this picture of action. First: some intentional actions are causally necessitated. They can't be solutions (...) to selection problems. Wu's argument for this claim, which contrasts reflex with action, does not succeed in showing that action must solve a selection problem — nor that reflex does not solve such a problem. Second: the requirement to solve further selection problems while acting on an intention leads to a vicious regress that threatens the possibility of action in general. If these two issues are addressed, Wu's groundbreaking scientific approach to mental action might offer us a powerful new theory of ongoing causal control over intentional action. (shrink)

This is the first modern edition of an important work by a previously neglected early 19th century woman philosopher, Mary Shepherd. Shepherd develops a distinctive philosophical system that can be seen as a competitor to Kant's Transcendental Idealism. The edition is aimed at researchers in early modern philosophy and is also intended to be used in graduate and undergraduate courses. It contains a concise introduction as guide for the reader.

Serial homology is widespread in organismal design, but the origin and individuation of these repeated structures appears to differ with the different types of serial homologues, and remains an intriguing and exciting topic of research. Here I focus on the evolution of the serially repeated eyespots that decorate the margin of the wings of nymphalid butterflies. In this system, unresolved questions relate to the evolutionary steps that lead to the appearance of these serial homologues and how their separate identities evolved. (...) I present and discuss two alternative hypotheses. The first proposes that eyespots first appeared as a row of undifferentiated repeated modules, one per wing compartment, that later become individuated. This individuation allowed eyespots to appear and disappear from specific wing compartments and also allowed eyespots to acquire different morphologies. The second hypothesis proposes that eyespots first appeared as individuated single units, or groups of units, that over evolutionary time were co‐opted into new compartments on the wing. I discuss the merits of each of these alternate hypotheses by finding analogies to other systems and propose research avenues for addressing these issues in the future. BioEssays 30:358–366, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Just as bodily actions are things you do with your body, mental actions are things you do with your mind. Both are different from things that merely happen to you. Where does the idea of mental action come from? What are mental actions? And why do they matter in philosophy? These are the three main questions answered in this paper. Section 1 introduces mental action through a brief history of the topic in philosophy. Section 2 explains what it is to (...) be a mental action in terms of intentional action. Section 3 argues that the fact that we can perform mental actions has some striking consequences concerning mental content. Section 4 shows how mental action helps to explain some important facts about self-knowledge and the normativity of thought. The conclusion mentions two further fruitful avenues for philosophical research on mental action. (shrink)

In several early 19th century works, Mary Shepherd articulates a theory of causation that is intended to respond to Humean skepticism. I argue that Shepherd's theory should be read in light of the science of the day and her conception of her place in the British philosophical tradition. Reading Shepherd’s theory in light of her conception of the history of philosophy, including her claim to be the genuine heir of Locke, illuminates the broader significance of her attempt to reinstate reason (...) as the source of scientific knowledge. Reading Shepherd's theory in light of the science of the day helps make plausible her claim that there are robust natural kinds in nature, defined by their causal powers: this is precisely what then-recent advances in chemistry hold. (shrink)

Background Informed consent is often cited as the “cornerstone” of research ethics. Its intent is that participants enter research voluntarily, with an understanding of what their participation entails. Despite agreement on the necessity to obtain informed consent in research, opinions vary on the threshold of disclosure necessary and the best method to obtain consent. We aimed to investigate Australian researchers’ views on, and their experiences with, obtaining informed consent. Methods Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 23 researchers from NSW institutions, working (...) in various fields of research. Interviews were analysed and coded to identify themes. Results Researchers reported that consent involved information disclosure, understanding and a voluntary decision. They emphasised the variability of consent interactions, which were dependent on potential participants’ abilities and interests, study complexity and context. All researchers reported providing written information to potential participants, yet questioned the readability and utility of this information. The majority reported using signed consent forms to ‘operationalise’ consent and reported little awareness of, and lack of support in implementing more dynamic informed consent procedures, such as verbal informed consent, that was fit for the purposes of their studies. Views on Human Research Ethics Committees varied. Some reported inconsistent, arduous inputs on the information form and consent process. Others expressed reliance on HRECs for guidance, viewing them as institutional safeguards. Conclusions This study highlights the importance of transparent relationships, both between researchers and participants, and between researchers and HRECs. Where the relationship with study participants was reported as more robust, researchers felt that they were better able to ensure participants made better, more informed decisions. Where the relationship with HRECs was reported as more robust, researchers were more likely to view them as institutional safeguards, rather than as bureaucratic hindrances. Conscientious and mindful researchers are paramount to ensuring the procedure accommodates individual requirements. This study advocates that when designing ethical informed consent practices, researchers should be integrated as autonomous players with a positive input on the process, rather than, in the worst case, predatory recruiters to be curtailed by information forms and oversight. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas asked the essential philosophical question which continues to resound to the modern day: what constitutes a human being? This volume looks at Aquinas's views on bodily and spiritual identity through a lens of theological concerns, pagan and Arabic authoritative sources, and contemporary polemic with dualist heresy.

Many great authors claim that reading literature can expand your phenomenal imagination and allow you to imagine experiences you have never had. How is this possible? Your phenomenal imagination is constrained by your phenomenal concepts, which are in turn constrained by the phenomenology of your own actual past experiences. Literature could expand your phenomenal imagination, then, by giving you new phenomenal concepts. This paper explains how this can happen. Literature can direct your attention to previously unnoticed phenomenal properties of your (...) own past experiences, as brought to mind by involuntary memory. This process gives you the opportunity to notice those phenomenal properties for the first time, and so also to form phenomenal concepts of those properties. Forming a new phenomenal concept strictly expands the range of your phenomenal imagination. It gives you the capacity to imagine more than you could have before, including certain specific kinds of experience that you yourself have never enjoyed firsthand. Literature’s capacity to expand your phenomenal imagination in this way is central to its social, moral, and epistemic value. (shrink)

What insight is there to gain when Adorno is put “beside himself”? The humoristic tendency of Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s famous essay on the culture industry highlights the non-categorical modalities borrowed from the avant-gardes and psychoanalysis that disorganize Kant’s supposedly invariant concepts a priori: partialities of the driven montage, allegorisation. This tendency opens on the decentering consequences for the thinking of another subject, beyond the logic of suspicion and the melancolic jouissance that block it.

Why talk about communism today?* A first point everybody will be agreed upon: the spectre of communism is not haunting Europe, nor for that matter any other region of the world. The only place where ‘communism’ is a positive name for anything is China, where it designates the ruling party of one of the most powerful capitalist nations of the world. In the immediate conjuncture, there are no real forces or conflicts that directly call for a reappraisal of communism. However, (...) certain questions linked to its reappraisal do appear to be at stake in conflicts that are taking place. (shrink)

The notion of sovereignty plays an important part in various areas of law, such as constitutional law and international public law. Though the concept of sovereignty as applied in constitutional law differs from that used in international public law, there is no true consensus on the meaning of “sovereignty” within these respective fields, either. Is sovereignty about factual power, or only about legal equality? Do only democracies have sovereignty, because they have legitimacy, or is there no connection between democracy, legitimacy (...) and sovereignty? Has the European Union encroached upon the sovereignty of the Member States, or is transferring competences to the European Union an expression and exercise of the very sovereignty some claim is under attack? Is it about states, or is it about peoples having a right to self-determination, and if the latter, does this represent popular sovereignty or something else? In order to answer these and related questions, we need a clear grasp of what “sovereignty” means. This book provides an analytical and conceptual framework for “sovereignty” in the context of law. The book does not seek to describe how the term “sovereignty” is used in the different contexts and discourses in which it is employed, but rather distinguishes between two possible meanings of sovereignty that allow the reader to use the term with specificity and clarity. In this way, this book hopes to offer valuable analytical tools for politicians, constitutional and international lawyers and legal theorists that help them be clear about what they mean when they speak of “sovereignty.”. (shrink)

: Malebranche famously objects to Descartes' argument that the nature of the mind is better known than the nature of body as follows: if we had an idea of the mind's nature we would know the possible range of modes of the mind, including the sensory modes, but we do not know those modes and thus can't have an idea of the mind's nature. I argue that Malebranche's objections are readily answerable from within the Cartesian system. This argument involves examining (...) the status of sensations in Descartes, innate ideas, and Malebranche's occasionalism. (shrink)

This is a review of Stephen Gaukroger's book Descartes's System of Natural Philosophy.

Infolge der Moderne schwinden absolute Erklärungsprinzipien: Man sucht Orientierung, um seine Lebenswelt und den erfahrungswissenschaftlich aufgeschlossenen Kosmos zu überschauen. Seine sich in diesem Kontext ausbildende, nie ganz bewusst gestaltete Weltanschauung artikuliert der Mensch auch in der Literatur. Antonia Bräutigam analysiert anhand von Jenseitsreisen in Werken von Autoren wie Thomas Mann, Samuel Beckett und C.S. Lewis die durch die Moderne geprägte Weltanschauung und reflektiert diese philosophisch-theologisch. Literatur erweist sich dabei als locus theologicus, als Erkenntnisort für die Theologie, das Motiv der (...) Jenseitsreise als Daseinsmetapher von hoher theologischer Relevanz. (shrink)

Aesthetic value empiricism claims that the aesthetic value of an object is grounded in the value of a certain kind of experience of it. The most popular version of value empiricism, and a dominant view in contemporary philosophical aesthetics more generally, is aesthetic hedonism. Hedonism restricts the grounds of aesthetic value to the pleasure enjoyed in the right kind of experience. But hedonism does not enjoy any clear advantage over a more permissive alternative version of value empiricism. This alternative is (...) aesthetic liberalism. On this view, an object’s aesthetic value is fully grounded in any value—not just the hedonic value—of a correct and complete experience of its sensory features. To demonstrate the advantages of liberalism over hedonism, I apply both views to analyze the aesthetic value of the Spring Temple Buddha and Anselm Kiefer’s Seraphim. I detail four advantages of liberalism over hedonism, and I conclude by defending liberalism from two kinds of objection. (shrink)

Locke claims that we have sensitive knowledge of the external world, in virtue of the fact that simple ideas are real, true, and adequate. However, despite his dismissive remarks about Cartesian external-world skepticism, Locke gives us little to go on as to how knowledge of the external world survives the fact of perceptual error, or even how perceptual error is possible. I argue that Locke has an in-principle problem explaining perceptual error.

In _Epistemic Explanations_, Sosa continues to defend a model of judgment he has long endorsed. On this complex model of judgment, judgment aims not only at correctness but also at aptness of a kind of alethic affirmation. He offers three arguments for the claim that we need this model of judgment instead of a simpler model, on which judgment aims only at correctness. The first argument cites the need to exclude knowledge-spoiling luck from apt judgment. The second argument uses the (...) complex model to distinguish judgment from mere guessing. The third argument involves the assessment of suspension of judgment as a performance. This paper shows why none of these arguments succeeds, and so recommends adopting the simpler model of judgment. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru dans la revue E-rea [En ligne], 13.1 | 2015. Nous remercions Antonia Rigaud et la revue E-rea de nous avoir autorisé à en reproduire le début ici. Représentant une journée dans la vie d'une ville, Manhatta oscille entre un traitement narratif nous invitant à suivre le quotidien de la ville et un traitement beaucoup plus abstrait, cherchant à capter une atmosphère beaucoup plus qu'à produire un document exact. Tourné en 1921, le film est resté (...) dans l'histoire comme le premier film - Cinéma, animation et vidéo – GALERIE – Nouvel article. (shrink)

The 18th-century American philosopher Jonathan Edwards argues that nothing endures through time. I analyze his argument, paying particular attention to a central principle it relies on, namely that “nothing can exert itself, or operate, when and where it is not existing”. I also consider what I supposed to follow from the conclusion that nothing endures. Edwards is sometimes read as the first four-dimensionalist. I argue that this is wrong. Edwards does not conclude that things persist by having different temporal parts; (...) he concludes that nothing persists. (shrink)

This essay will consider the dispute between Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey on the nature and validity of the theory/practice distinction. Their dispute concerns whether a strong affirmation of this distinction enables scientific inquiry or disables it. Inherent in this issue are two related questions, namely whether tmth can be pursued for its own sake, and, as a subset of this question, whether there is an evidence proper to the consideration of pure possibilities. I will argue that there is (...) a common ground between the logic of inquiry which Dewey is determined will have practical effect, and the logic of inquiry which Peirce is concemed will discover the truth promised by correct investigation. This compromise is found in the philosophy of Bemard Lonergan, whose critical realism includes an account of concrete judgement strikingly similar to that of John Dewey, but whose account of the normative stmcture of cognition, emanating from the individual's radical desire to know, also incorporates Peirce's emphasis on the pursuit of truth and on the validity of the scientist's consideration of pure logical possibilities. I will present these similarities, and will consider the stmcture of Einstein's 1905 paper, "On The Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies," as a case study which supports Lonergan's (and Peirce's) account of cognitional stmcture, but which poses problems for Dewe/s instrumentalism. The essay concludes that Lonergan offers a critical realism which successfully renounces the 'spectator' theory of knowledge without underestimating the importance of the normative element of understanding in the human desire to know. (shrink)

The central idea of the paper is that human thinking consists in a movement through which a person socially interacts with herself. Consequently, thinking does not offer the experience of a private refuge in the intimacy of the individual thinker's self-knowing, but a field where multiple points of view interact by contesting, distancing, approaching, agreeing or disagreeing, one to another. Classical (Isocrates, 1929/1968) and contemporary (Billig, 1987) rhetorical approaches to thinking stress that both “inner” and “social” discourse are addressed to (...) someone else, are determined by the anticipation of this audience, and both are interested in persuading it. In doing so, the discursive, rhetoric, and dialogic aspects of thinking become tied to argumentation. The paper tries to show, following the dialogical notion of discourse of Bakhtin (1986) and Vološinov (1929/1986) that, since every act of thinking consists in the raising of a point of view addressing another one and oriented by a particular interest, every stream of thought involves a rhetorical activity. A distinction between rhetoric and argumentation is proposed. On this basis, the rhetorical nature of thinking is discussed beyond argumentative discourse. Overall, this discussion contributes to a rhetorical approach to dialogism. (shrink)

This is about the tension between Epicurean and Galilean accounts of motion in Gassendi. For my more recent thoughts on this, see http://philpapers.org/rec/LOLCEG.

Les origines grecques de la conception d'harmonie (H. Dufourt) - Du monde au matériau : le devenir-musical du timbre (A. Soulez) - La musique est-elle un langage? (R. Casati et J. Dokic) - Le devenir du matériau musical au XXe siècle (M. Solomos) - Hauteur, timbre, harmonie, synthèse (J.C. Risset) et d'autres articles...

You can come to know that you believe that p partly by reflecting on whether p and then judging that p. Call this procedure “the transparency method for belief.” How exactly does the transparency method generate known self-attributions of belief? To answer that question, we cannot interpret the transparency method as involving a transition between the contents p and I believe that p. It is hard to see how some such transition could be warranted. Instead, in this context, one mental (...) action is both a judgment that p and a self-attribution of a belief that p. The notion of embedded mental action is introduced here to explain how this can be so and to provide a full epistemic explanation of the transparency method. That explanation makes sense of first-person authority and immediacy in transparent self-knowledge. In generalized form, it gives sufficient conditions on an attitude’s being known transparently. (shrink)

Any contextualist approach to knowledge has to provide a plausible definition of the concept of context and spell out the mechanisms of context changes. Since it is the dynamics of context change that carry the main weight of the contextualist position, not every mechanism will be capable of filling that role. In particular, I argue that one class of mechanisms that is most popularly held to account for context changes, namely those that arise out of shifts of conversational parameters in (...) discourses involving knowledge claims, are not suited to the job because they cannot account for the genuinely epistemic nature of the context shift. A form of epistemic contextualism that defines the context through the structure of our epistemic projects is suggested. Context changes in this account are linked to changes in the background assumptions operative in our epistemic projects and the methods used to carry out our inquiries. (shrink)

Brazilian educator, Paulo Freire, best known for his work Pedagogy of the Oppressed, challenged education plans that contributed to the marginalization of minorities and the poor. Freire believed that education should be used for liberation by helping learners reflect on their experiences historically, giving immediate reality to issues of racism, sexism, and the exploitation of workers. Known as one of the most influential theoretical innovators of the twentieth century, his views have left a significant mark on progressive thinkers about education (...) and liberation. Reinventing Paulo Freire is an homage to him by protégé Antonia Darder. Here, she explores the legacy of Freire, interviews eight former students who studied him-- now teachers themselves, and reflects on the teaching practice as demonstrated by Freire himself. The interviews take the form of first person narratives; the epilogue consists simply of a letter and a poem. (shrink)

Comment écrivent les philosophes? répond à une question que tout le monde se pose : la langue du philosophe est-elle spéciale? Sa technicité est-elle de caractère scientifique? Le philosophe fait-il connaître quelque chose? Est-il créateur? L'enquête est menée depuis Kant qui a assigné à la philosophie la tâche de " présenter conceptuellement " les problèmes de connaissance. Si, d'après cette tâche, méthode et écriture font un, le philosophe est aussi un écrivain, mais de quelle sorte? L'activité compositrice à l'aide de (...) concepts éventuellement forgés oriente ici la réflexion. Il en va donc de ce que l'on entend par " concept " avec Frege père d'une conception analytique du concept, puis, second tournant, Wittgenstein. Tel le parricide de Platon contre Parménide, le geste de Wittgenstein est celui d'une redescente de la métaphysique au langage naturel. Il s'ensuit une stratégie d'écriture, le " style-Wittgenstein " (sous-titre), visant à l'autoeffacement de la langue spéciale du philosophe dont Antonia Soulez sonde les conséquences à la lumière du paradigme esthétique de la résonance. (shrink)

Co‐option of the eye developmental gene regulatory network may have led to the appearance of novel functional traits on the wings of flies and butterflies. The first trait is a recently described wing organ in a species of extinct midge resembling the outer layers of the midge's own compound eye. The second trait is red pigment patches on Heliconius butterfly wings connected to the expression of an eye selector gene, optix. These examples, as well as others, are discussed regarding the (...) type of empirical evidence and burden of proof that have been used to infer gene network co‐option underlying the origin of novel traits. A conceptual framework describing increasing confidence in inference of network co‐option is proposed. Novel research directions to facilitate inference of network co‐option are also highlighted, especially in cases where the pre‐existent and novel traits do not resemble each other. (shrink)

Antonia LoLordo - Malebranche - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:1 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.1 124-125 Andrew Pyle. Malebranche. London: Routledge, 2003. Pp. xiii + 289. Cloth, $80.00. Despite Malebranche's widely recognized importance, no comprehensive overview of his system was available before Pyle's excellent and wide-ranging study. Pyle agrees with scholarly consensus that occasionalism and the vision in God are Malebranche's two most significant doctrines, but his scope extends well beyond those to matters of theology, (...) physics and biology. In the first half of the book, Pyle lays out Malebranche's two key doctrines as responses to tensions within the Cartesian accounts of causation and of ideas. He details how Malebranche's theory of ideas is involved.. (shrink)