The Spanish journalist, writer and philosopher Jose Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955) had intended to devote a book to the subject of the United States to dispel the confusion in the European mind due to the "mass of puerile judgments that one hears pronounced on North America even by the most cultured persons." His work habits, illnesses, the civil war in Spain and the long conflict in Europe prevented him from writing more than two essays: "The New United States" (March 22, (...) 1931) and "On the United States" (July 30, 1932). The present study offers the historical context for a more meaningful reading of the essays. (shrink)

Of the factors that contribute to a lack of awareness and appreciation by the English-reading world of the development of philosophy in Latin America, themost serious is the lack of bibliographical materials. To compile such was the purpose of the Conference on Teaching Materials for the Study of Latin American Thought held recently at the American University in Washington, D.C. Since the majority of the participants were connected with Latin American Studies Programs, the bibliographies proposed for the various projects were, (...) for the most part, in the Spanish and Portuguese languages. This language barrier still excludes the overwhelming majority of those in the English-reading world interested in matters philosophic from learning what has happened and is happening in that field in Latin America. Accordingly, what follows is a bibliographical introduction to works in English, discussed in the order of their appearance, on the study of philosophy in Latin America. Only what this author considers major works will be discussed, as limited space prevents an exhaustive bibliography. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 491 adequacy of his ideas. Yet our view of a person's character can govern our view of what he is trying to do. More specifically, if we think Dewey never completely abandoned the idealistic standpoint with its emphasis upon the harmony of self and community realization, that he sought out easy solutions to tough moral problems, we will not regard his work as making an honest attempt (...) even to face these problems. (Coughlan is very sympathetic to Randolph Bourne's criticism of Dewey on this point.) Viewing Dewey in this way, one is tempted to come to Coughlan's conclusion that there is an ambiguity in Dewey's philosophy about how values are created and, moreover, that this conclusion "haunts any philosophy.., that does not allow itself to appeal to some transcendent source" (pp. 161-162). By the time we reach this latter conclusion we have forgotten that the aim of Dewey's moral philosophy is not to point to some transcendent source that tells us what is "right" to do. Indeed, to the extent that we appeal to such a source, we are apt to ignore the existent factors that are responsible for creating the problem. Put another way, Dewey's standpoint requires that we reject the view that one of the parties to a moral conflict is wrong because he holds the wrong moral rule and the other right because he holds to some rule that truly tells us what we "ought" to do. Instead, he maintains that the origin of the conflict is within the situation itself, and the only way out of the conflict (if there is a way out) is to take advantage of or even reconstruct the factors in the situation. Instrumentalism is the position, itself always open to revision and reconstruction on particular points, that the philosopher can offer an interpretation of moral and political problems that makes them more amenable to resolution. The philosopher, unlike the casuist, cannot tell us what to do. He attempts to provide a conception of ourselves and our social situation that will enable us to go about doing. On specific matters, Coughlan uncovers much new and interesting information. To list only a few items: he points to the possible influence of a minister named Newman Smyth on Dewey's short-lived philosophy of "dynamic intuitionalism" as developed toward the end of the important 1884 paper, "The New Psychology." He gives the most complete account so far of Dewey's unsuccessful "Thought News" experiment at Michigan and of the early development of the organic circuit theory. He tells us something of the details of Vermont life that would tend to dispel the simplistic notion that Dewey's interest in democracy was a product of his growing up there. And--most interesting of ail--a fascinating chapter on the early life of Mead and his friend Castle reveals that at one point Mead was so reduced to despair at the prospect of a cold universe governed by the laws of Newtonian physics that he simply rid himself of it by maintaining that space is simply a construction of the optic nerve: "the three dimensions simply rest upon it!" (p. 128). It was a tough time to try to become a successful philosopher. His tendency to speculate about Dewey's motives aside, Coughlan has given us the most complete and carefully worked out treatment of the early years of Dewey's life. DONALD F. KOCH Michigan State University Human Reafity and the Social World: Ortega's Philosophy of History. By Oliver W. Holmes. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1975. Pp. xi + 175. $12.50) Professor Holmes's study in intellectual history is an inquiry into the interrelationship of Ortega's social and intellectual experiences with the formation of his ideas. In the author's own words: "This essay attempts a systematic analysis of Ortega's philosophy of human reality, the social world, and history. The unified analysis of his philosophy drew heavily upon the traditions of historicism, phenomenology, and existentialism. Such was the influence of these philosophical traditions that Ortega became, at once, critic and representative of their respective positions, problems, and solutions" (p. vii). 492 HISTORY... (shrink)

Bulhof's study is not intended, she informs us, as a chronological view of the development of the philosophical thought of Wilhelm Dilthey, but as a guide for readers through what she considers to be the intricacies of his labyrinthine, because unsystematized, position. It is a position whose major contribution is a hermeneutic science based on the conviction that cultural products express meanings comparable to literary texts.