The paper examines a widely discussed passage in Diodorus’ Historical Library that describes the development of the social structure of the Lipari Islands. By reconstructing the history of research, terminological ambiguities are identified, forming the basis for a reinterpretation of the passage. It is demonstrated that the Liparensians implemented specific institutional orders, continually adapting to the demands of their surroundings, yet always aware of the impact and consequences of their actions.

Two experiments investigated whether motion metaphors for time affected the perception of spatial motion. Participants read sentences either about literal motion through space or metaphorical motion through time written from either the ego‐moving or object‐moving perspective. Each sentence was followed by a cartoon clip. Smiley‐moving clips showed an iconic happy face moving toward a polygon, and shape‐moving clips showed a polygon moving toward a happy face. In Experiment 1, using an explicit judgment task, participants judged smiley‐moving cartoons as related to (...) ego‐moving sentences about space and about time, and shape‐moving cartoons as related to object‐moving sentences. In Experiment 2, participants viewed the same stimuli, but the cartoons were task‐irrelevant. Event‐related brain potentials revealed an early attentional effect of congruity on cartoons following sentences about space, and a later semantic effect on cartoons following sentences about time. Results are most consistent with accounts that posit differences in the processing of novel and conventional metaphors. (shrink)

Time–space synesthetes report that they experience the months of the year as having a spatial layout. In Study 1, we characterize the phenomenology of calendar sequences produced by synesthetes and non-synesthetes, and show a conservative estimate of time–space synesthesia at 2.2% of the population. We demonstrate that synesthetes most commonly experience the months in a circular path, while non-synesthetes default to linear rows or rectangles. Study 2 compared synesthetes’ and non-synesthetes’ ability to memorize a novel spatial calendar, and revealed better (...) performance in synesthetes. The capacity to learn mappings between arbitrary spatial forms and temporal sequences is present in all individuals, and time–space synesthetes’ enhanced visuo-spatial memory abilities may underlie their creation of idiosyncratic spatial calendar forms. (shrink)

Current research on choice overload has been mainly conducted with choice options not associated with specific brands. This study investigates whether the presence of brand names in the choice set affects the occurrence of choice overload. Across four studies, we find that when choosing among an overabundance of alternatives, participants express more positive feelings (i.e., higher satisfaction/confidence, lower regret and difficulty) when all the options of the choice set are associated with familiar brands, rather than unfamiliar brands or no brand (...) at all. We also find that choice overload only appears in the absence of brand names, but disappears when all options contain brand names—either familiar or unfamiliar. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. (shrink)

We analyze conceptual patterns shared by Michael Ende’s novel about time, Momo, and examples of time conceptualization from psychology, sociology, economics, conventional language, and real social practices. We study three major mappings in the materialization of time: time as money in relation with time banking, time units as objects produced by an internal clock, and time as a substance that flows. We show that binary projections between experiential domains are not enough to model the complexity of meaning construction in these (...) widely successful examples. To account for the intricacies of time materialization in context, we use generic integration templates, models for conceptual templates based on Fauconnier and Turner’s Blending Theory. The interplay of such detailed patterns with pragmatic and cultural factors, including diachronic aspects, is crucial to identify the cognitive models at work, and the factors that guide their instantiations as a variety of surface products. The blending model for the spatialized time can be refined and extended to the materialization of time. (shrink)

l / Some Aspects and Developments of Gestalt Psychology1 [I] The Development and Status of the Problem At the basis of the constitution of the physical ...

Traditional Bayesianism requires that an agent’s degrees of belief be represented by a real-valued, probabilistic credence function. However, in many cases it seems that our evidence is not rich enough to warrant such precision. In light of this, some have proposed that we instead represent an agent’s degrees of belief as a set of credence functions. This way, we can respect the evidence by requiring that the set, often called the agent’s credal state, includes all credence functions that are in (...) some sense compatible with the evidence. One known problem for this evidentially motivated imprecise view is that in certain cases, our imprecise credence in a particular proposition will remain the same no matter how much evidence we receive. In this article I argue that the problem is much more general than has been appreciated so far, and that it’s difficult to avoid it without compromising the initial evidentialist motivation. _1_ Introduction _2_ Precision and Its Problems _3_ Imprecise Bayesianism and Respecting Ambiguous Evidence _4_ Local Belief Inertia _5_ From Local to Global Belief Inertia _6_ Responding to Global Belief Inertia _7_ Conclusion. (shrink)

The phenomenon of base-rate neglect has elicited much debate. One arena of debate concerns how people make judgments under conditions of uncertainty. Another more controversial arena concerns human rationality. In this target article, we attempt to unpack the perspectives in the literature on both kinds of issues and evaluate their ability to explain existing data and their conceptual coherence. From this evaluation we conclude that the best account of the data should be framed in terms of a dual-process model of (...) judgment, which attributes base-rate neglect to associative judgment strategies that fail to adequately represent the set structure of the problem. Base-rate neglect is reduced when problems are presented in a format that affords accurate representation in terms of nested sets of individuals. (shrink)

Aron reflects with simplicity and depth on industrial society, communism, the future of democracy, peace and war, the nuclear age, and also Charles de Gaulle, Jean-Paul Sartre, Andre Malraux, Henry Kissinger and others.

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Die mitmenschlichen Begegnungen in der Milieuwelt" verfügbar.

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Leibniz" verfügbar.

The paper presents and defends a Bayesian theory of trust in social networks. In the first part of the paper, we provide justifications for the basic assumptions behind the model, and we give reasons for thinking that the model has plausible consequences for certain kinds of communication. In the second part of the paper we investigate the phenomenon of overconfidence. Many psychological studies have found that people think they are more reliable than they actually are. Using a simulation environment that (...) has been developed in order to make our model computationally tractable we show that in our model inquirers are indeed sometimes better off from an epistemic perspective overestimating the reliability of their own inquiries. We also show, by contrast, that people are rarely better off overestimating the reliability of others. On the basis of these observations we formulate a novel hypothesis about the value of overconfidence. (shrink)

According to the Argument from Disagreement (AD) widespread and persistent disagreement on ethical issues indicates that our moral opinions are not influenced by moral facts, either because there are no such facts or because there are such facts but they fail to influence our moral opinions. In an innovative paper, Gustafsson and Peterson (Synthese, published online 16 October, 2010) study the argument by means of computer simulation of opinion dynamics, relying on the well-known model of Hegselmann and Krause (J Artif (...) Soc Soc Simul 5(3):1–33, 2002; J Artif Soc Soc Simul 9(3):1–28, 2006). Their simulations indicate that if our moral opinions were influenced at least slightly by moral facts, we would quickly have reached consensus, even if our moral opinions were also affected by additional factors such as false authorities, external political shifts and random processes. Gustafsson and Peterson conclude that since no such consensus has been reached in real life, the simulation gives us increased reason to take seriously the AD. Our main claim in this paper is that these results are not as robust as Gustafsson and Peterson seem to think they are. If we run similar simulations in the alternative Laputa simulation environment developed by Angere and Olsson (Angere, Synthese, forthcoming and Olsson, Episteme 8(2):127–143, 2011) considerably less support for the AD is forthcoming. (shrink)

According to the traditional Bayesian view of credence, its structure is that of precise probability, its objects are descriptive propositions about the empirical world, and its dynamics are given by conditionalization. Each of the three essays that make up this thesis deals with a different variation on this traditional picture. The first variation replaces precise probability with sets of probabilities. The resulting imprecise Bayesianism is sometimes motivated on the grounds that our beliefs should not be more precise than the evidence (...) calls for. One known problem for this evidentially motivated imprecise view is that in certain cases, our imprecise credence in a particular proposition will remain the same no matter how much evidence we receive. In the first essay I argue that the problem is much more general than has been appreciated so far, and that it’s difficult to avoid without compromising the initial evidentialist motivation. The second variation replaces descriptive claims with moral claims as the objects of credence. I consider three standard arguments for probabilism with respect to descriptive uncertainty—representation theorem arguments, Dutch book arguments, and accuracy arguments—in order to examine whether such arguments can also be used to establish probabilism with respect to moral uncertainty. In the second essay, I argue that by and large they can, with some caveats. First, I don’t examine whether these arguments can be given sound non-cognitivist readings, and any conclusions therefore only hold conditional on cognitivism. Second, decision-theoretic representation theorems are found to be less convincing in the moral case, because there they implausibly commit us to thinking that intertheoretic comparisons of value are always possible. Third and finally, certain considerations may lead one to think that imprecise probabilism provides a more plausible model of moral epistemology. The third variation considers whether, in addition to conditionalization, agents may also change their minds by becoming aware of propositions they had not previously entertained, and therefore not previously assigned any probability. More specifically, I argue that if we wish to make room for reflective equilibrium in a probabilistic moral epistemology, we must allow for awareness growth. In the third essay, I sketch the outline of such a Bayesian account of reflective equilibrium. Given that this account gives a central place to awareness growth, and that the rationality constraints on belief change by awareness growth are much weaker than those on belief change by conditionalization, it follows that the rationality constraints on the credences of agents who are seeking reflective equilibrium are correspondingly weaker. (shrink)

A travers les Dimensions de la conscience historique, Raymond Aron s'impose comme l'un des penseurs majeurs de l'histoire au XXe siecle. Apres les bouleversements issus du second conflit mondial, Raymond Aron pense le monde a l'aune de l'installation durable du communisme a l'Est de l'Europe, de la fin de la colonisation, des mutations que signale une phase de progres technique encore inconnue dans les societes developpees. Il prend acte du changement radical que marque pour la condition humaine l'avenement (...) de l'ere nucleaire. Face a ces mutations, le philosophe a plus que jamais le devoir de penser l'histoire et la liberte de l'homme face a l'evenement. Dialoguant avec Thucydide, combattant l'idee d'une fin de l'histoire avancee par Spengler et Toynbee et plus encore par la teleologie marxiste, il poursuit la reflexion sur les limites de l'objectivite historique engagee au cours des annees 1930.Les Dimensions de la conscience historique n'ont cesse de nourrir les debats sur l'histoire. Il demeure aujourd'hui un ouvrage indispensable pour reflechir a notre condition historique. (shrink)

This comprehensive anthology of newly translated writings presents some of Aron's most important essays in 20th-century intellectual history and political commentary.

This is the first part of Raymond Aron's landmark two-volume study of the sociological tradition¿arguably the definitive work of its kind. More than a work of reconstruction, Aron's study is, at its deepest level, an engagement with the very question of modernity: How did the intellectual currents which emerged in the eighteenth century shape the modern political and philosophical order? With scrupulous fairness, Aron examines the thought and arguments of the major social thinkers to discern how they (...) answered this question. Volume One explores three traditions: the French liberal school of political sociology, represented by Montesquieu and Tocqueville; the Comtean tradition, anticipating Durkheim in its elevation of social unity and consensus; and the Marxists, who posited the struggle between classes and placed their faith in historical necessity. In his customary clear and penetrating prose, Aron argues that each of these schools offers its own theory of the diversity of societies and that ¿each is inspired both by moral convictions and by scientific hypotheses.¿ This Routledge Classics edition includes an introduction by Daniel J. Mahoney and Brian C. Anderson. (shrink)

Aron Vinegar’s essay explores art history and visual culture’s dependence on a phenomenological conception of world, which is based on a hermeneutics of facticity, intentionality, and ontological difference. He argues that the ‘basic concept’ of world has structured the field of art history and visual culture in implicit and explicit ways, thus dictating many of its commitments and concerns. One of the primary limitations of this commitment to world, is that it has resulted in art history and visual culture’s (...) tendency to concern itself with a very small portion of existence, usually human existence, in its emphasis on hermeneutics and facticity, thus foreclosing on a more generous and speculative ontology, ethics, and politics. The concept of “world” suggests an overarching totality, an interconnected field of meaning and sense, often indicated by a tacit and resonate tonality. But there is no overarching “world” or “world-view” that can provide us with an overview of or container for the myriad worlds of things. An art history that is willing to consider that the world does not exist would acknowledge and embrace the fact that there is no overall focus, which can encompass things and events in all their spatio-temporal complexity. It would entail a practice attentive to a “supple and inflected bathmology” (Vinegar prefers this phrase to “flat ontology”) in its refusal to emphasize “privileged ontological scenes” predicated on hierarchies of ontological difference, and subsuming things and experience within the structures of phenomenological intentionality. To initiate such a practice, Vinegar suggests an embrace of what he terms “ontological indifference,” a robust notion of habit, and a temporal logic that would be fully attentive to a pluriverse of multiple existences and eruptions of substance, which extend well beyond ‘our’ realms of significance and meaning, cares and concerns, laughter and joy, losses and mournings. (shrink)

Aron sviluppa in questo testo alcune riflessioni sullo sviluppo tecnologico e sul rapporto tra la conoscenza scientifica e le sue applicazioni pratiche. Da una preliminare distinzione tra quattro forme di tecnica, egli analizza gli spe­cifici sviluppi di queste tecniche e i loro differenti rapporti per giungere a ripensare, alla luce delle recenti innovazioni, il problema dei paesi sot­tosviluppati, la tematica della guerra e le possibili derive dei regimi politici. L’incerta traduzione pratica delle innovazioni tecnologiche nella con­tem­po­raneità che emerge induce (...) Aron al richiamo finale a una scienza del­l’e­du­ca­zione che conduca alla saggezza e all’etica della prudenza che, sole, sono in grado di garantire un reale progresso dell’umanità.Aron develops in this text some reflections on the technological deve­lop­ment and the relationship between the scientific acquaintance and its prac­tical applications. From one preliminary distinction between four shapes of technique, he analyzes the specific developments of these techniques and theirs different relationships in order to rethink, to the light of the recent in­novations, the problem of the underdeveloped countries, the thematic of the war and the possible drifts of the political regimes. The uncertain practical translation of the technological innovations that emerges induces Aron to a fi­nal consideration about a science of education that leads to wisdom and to an ethics of prudence that can achieve a real progress for humanity. (shrink)

Aron Gurwitsch (1901-1973) est surtout connu du public fancophone par son ouvrage de 1957: Theorie du champ de la conscience. C'est la periode parisienne (de l'automne 1933 au printemps 1940) de Gurwitsch que le present volume documente tres precisement: il presente d'abord pour la premiere fois, les resultats substantiels d'un ouvrage en gestation qui n'aura pas vu le jour du vivant de l'auteur et qui rassemble, sous le titre Esquisse de la phenomenologie constitutive, les materiaux des cours et conferences (...) sur la Gestaltpsychologie, la psychologie intentionaliste, la phenomenologie de l'ideation, l'introduction a la phenomenologie. Le present volume rassemble aussi, a titre d'Appendice, quelques uns des articles publies par Aron Gurwitsch lors de cette periode parisienne. L'ensemble de ces travaux constitue un temoignage inedit sur une des toutes premieres introductions a la phenomenologie husserlienne, dans son veritable contexte de probleme. (shrink)

The eighth and final chapter of Aron Gurwitsch’s major book, Leibniz. Philosophy of Panlogism, a translation of which is presented here, lays the foundations for Gurwitsch’s phenomenological reading of Leibnizian thought as a whole, understood and interpreted as a transcendental philosophy : as an objective correlate of the divine thought that sustains its systematic unity and original coherence, the world is itself thoroughly understood as the realization and “incorporation” of logic, in a broader sense. Examining the ontological status of (...) relations, and Leibniz’s conception of divine understanding as the transcendental subject of “possible worlds”, this final chapter brings together the guidelines that support and sustain his entire interpretation. (shrink)

In our everyday discourse, most of us use modal statements to express possibility, necessity, or contingency. Logicians, linguists, and philosophers of language tend to use the possible world discourse to analyse the semantics of this kind of sentences. There is a disadvantage of this method: in the usual Quinean meta-ontology it commits the users to the existence of possible worlds. Even though there are many theories on metaphysics of these possible worlds, I will focus on the fictionalist approach, which aims (...) to suspend the undesired ontological commitment. Therefore it is an anti-realist theory. The fictionalist strategy is based on the idea that according to our common-sense ontology, fictions and fictional entities do not exist, and one can treat the possible world discourse as a fiction, and the possible worlds as fictional entities. However, in the last two decades, realist theories about fictions and fictional entities have arisen, especially the abstract artefact theory. In this paper I try to revise the fictionalist approach to modality by keeping the main idea that possible worlds are fictional entities, while accepting that fictional entities are abstract artefacts. The result is a new realist theory of modal fictionalism. (shrink)

Recent work on the logical theory of confirmation has centered on accounts of the confirmation of hypotheses relative to auxiliary assumptions or background theory. Whether such relative confirmation actually increases the credibility of the (relatively) confirmed hypothesis will depend in various ways on the epistemic status of the auxiliaries involved. Most obviously, if the auxiliaries are not themselves credible, confirmation relative to them will not increase the credibility of the hypothesis thus confirmed. A complete theory of confirmation must thus combine (...) an account of relative confirmation with an account of the route from relative confirmation to real confirmation. Some recent criticisms of hypothetico-deductive and bootstrapping accounts of relative confirmation are undermined by failure to appreciate the limitations of relative confirmation. (shrink)

This edition focuses on Aron's lifelong attempt to bridge the gap between knowledge and action and to understand the dialectical relationship between history ...

In this chapter, I argue that the field of cultural evolution can usefully inform attempts to understand and influence the long-term future. First, I provide an overview of cultural evolution, covering what it means for culture to evolve, the mechanisms by which it happens, the crucial importance of cumulative cultural evolution for hunan history, and how cultural evolution (and in particular intergroup competition) has driven the rise of large-scale cooperation. Second, I draw out some possible lessons from cultural evolution for (...) thinking about the long-term future. In particular, I suggest we should be careful not to prematurely ”lock in” certain values or other cultural features, and instead aim for a society open to variation and competition. I also consider whether the future will bring greater selection pressure for particular kinds of values, such as patience. (shrink)

Glymour has developed an account of the confirmation of scientific hypotheses which he advocates as an alternative to the hypothetico-deductive and Bayesian accounts. This account is subject to a counter-example which may be accomodated by a slight modification. So modified it describes an important dimension of confirmation. If the modification of Glymour's account is slightly extended, both the resulting account and the hypothetico-deductive account may be seen as special cases of a Bayesian theory which is immune to Glymour's criticisms.