In this article, I am using the example of the introduction of osteosynthesis into surgical routine practice to analyze the use of the notions of art and science in medical innovation. The examination of the renegotiations of power and responsibility associated with the introduction of this new technique shows that proponents and critics actively linked their arguments to more fundamental epistemological and social issues. The proponents claimed to manage the uncertainties of innovation through making surgery more scientific, drawing on (...) the ideals of control, rationality, objectivity, and predictability. The critics mobilized another discursive pattern. They considered surgery an art and emphasized the individuality, contingency, and situatedness of medical practice. I investigate the discursive function of these argumentative patterns and how they played out in the concrete example of this surgical technique. (shrink)

This essay centralizes and explores Ernst Cassirer’s concept of style. Although it does not emerge as much as the concept of form or symbol in Cassirer’s corpus, style plays a major—if intrinsic—role throughout the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. I shall examine how Cassirer’s conception of style is derived from Goethe’s theory of art and why it is fundamental to Cassirer’s theory of knowledge. Style is considered the defining feature of the cultural sciences, as well as the sign of the anthropological (...) character of the natural sciences, and, more generally, as the creative principle underlying all objectivity. I argue that it is therefore justified to read style as the fundamental yet variable expression of our symbolic relation to reality. Indeed, style refers neither to an abstract principle nor to a predetermined truth: it is a formative force actualizing itself in the incessant diversification of its forms. In so doing, Cassirer’s underexamined concept of style proves highly relevant in our times of epistemic and cultural pluralism. (shrink)

Calls for incorporating social science into patient care typically have accounted for neither the logistic constraints of medical training nor the methodological fallacies of utilizing aggregate “social facts” in clinical practice. By elucidating the different epistemic approaches of artistic and scientific practices, this paper illustrates an integrative artistic pedagogy that allows clinical practitioners to generate social scientific insights from actual patient encounters. Although there is no shortage of calls to bring social science into medicine, the more fundamental processes (...) of thinking by which art and science proceed have not been addressed to this end. As such, the art of medical practice is conceptualized as an innate gift, and thus little is done to cultivate it. Yet doing so is more important than ever because uncertainty in diagnosing and treating chronic illnesses, the most significant contemporary mortality risks, suggests a re-expanding role for clinical judgment. (shrink)

I was surprised to note the critical tone of the discussion which my friend Leonard B. Meyer recently devoted in these pages to an article on the relation of art and science that I wrote for a popular scientific magazine. For I had believed all the while that in my article I was merely presenting to a general scientific audience a watered-down version of what I thought were Meyer's own views. Evidently I was mistaken in that belief, though I (...) have been unable to fathom just where I went wrong in interpreting Meyer's earlier writings, which, more than any other source, are the provenance of my ideas about the nature of art. Gunther S. Stent, professor of molecular biology at the University of California, Berkeley, is the author of Molecular Biology of Bacterial Viruses, Phage and the Origin of Molecular Biology, Molecular Genetics: An Introductory Narrative, The Coming of the Golden Age: A View of the End of Progress, and many important scientific papers. In Concerning the Sciences, the Arts—AND the Humanities" , Leonard B. Meyer took issue with views expressed by Professor Stent in "Prematurity and Uniqueness in Scientific Discovery," published in Scientific American. (shrink)

Background Biomedicine, i.e. the application of basic sciences to medicine, has become the cornerstone for the study of etiopathogenesis and treatment of diseases. Biomedicine has enormously contributed to the progress of medicine and healthcare and has become the preferred approach to medical problems in the West. The developments in statistical inference and machine learning techniques have provided the foundation for personalised medicine where clinical management can be fully informed by biomedicine. The deployment of precision medicine may impact the autonomy and (...) self-normativity of the patients. Understanding the relationship between biomedicine and medical practice can help navigate the benefits and challenges offered by precision medicine. Methods Conventional content analysis was applied to “Le Normal and le Pathologique” (Canguilhem G. The Normal and the Pathological. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1991) and further investigated with respect to its relationship with techne and precision medicine using PubMed and Google Scholar and the Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy to search for the following keywords singularly or in combination: “Canguilhem”, “techne”, “episteme”, “precision medicine”, “machine learning AND medicine”. Results The Hippocratic concept of techne accounts for many characteristics of medical knowledge and practice. The advances of biomedicine, experimental medicine and, more recently, machine learning offer, in contrast, the model of a medicine based purely on episteme. I argue that Canguilhem medical epistemology establishes a framework where episteme and data-driven medicine is compatible with the promotion of patient’s autonomy and self-normativity. Conclusions Canguilhem’s medical epistemology orders the relationship of applied medicine with experimental sciences, ethics and social sciences. It provides guidance to define the scope of medicine and the boundaries of medicalization of healthy life. Finally, it sets an agenda for a safe implementation of machine learning in medicine. (shrink)

The thesis which I wish to recommend to you is that science is a form of art though not of fine art: that like art, it is a human invention, not less real for that, and having value, or being valuable, partly if not mainly because of that. I mean to indicate by this statement that for me at least a better insight can be got into the nature of science by considering it as a form of art, (...) and asking how it differs from and how it resembles fine art. (shrink)

To analyze the relations between art and science, philosophers and historians have developed different lines of inquiry. A first type of inquiry considers how artistic and scientific practices have interacted over human history. Another project aims to determine the contributions that scientific research can make to our understanding of art, including the contributions that cognitive science can make to philosophical questions about the nature of art. We rely on contributions made to these projects in order to demonstrate that (...) art and science are codependent phenomena. Specifically, we explore the codependence of art and science in the context of a historical analysis of their interactions and in the context of contemporary debates on the cognitive science of art. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Art and Science, Facts and KnowledgeBengt Brülde (bio)Keywordsart, definitions, epistemology, facts and values, mental disorder, metaphysical realism, nominalism, physical disorder, social constructivismThe main purpose of my original article was to find out how the evaluative content of the concept of mental disorder, i.e. its "value component," should be characterized. Both Tyreman and Ross are focusing on other things, however. Tyreman seems to agree with my analysis, and his (...) primary objective is to find out whether my general analytical approach can be extended to other areas, e.g. whether it can be used to analyze the concept of physical disorder or the concept of art. It is hard to tell whether Ross agrees with my view, since her entire commentary is focused on a few assumptions I made in the beginning of the paper, mainly in passing, to make my evaluative investigation more manageable. In short, the main content of my original paper is never really challenged, and I do not think I have to revise my view on the evaluative content of the concept of mental disorder. Both commentaries give rise to questions that are interesting in their own right, however, e.g. questions about art and science, and about facts and knowledge. This gives me the opportunity to develop my views on a number of topics that I never touched upon in the original article, e.g. the purpose of defining "mental disorder," the factual component of the concept, the connection between ontological and epistemological issues, and the value-neutrality of science. I am very grateful to the editors for allowing me to give such an extensive reply.My Reply to TyremanTyreman wants to know whether the same kind of analysis given in my original paper can be applied just as usefully to other areas of health care. That is, the question is whether the same type of analytical approach can be extended to other areas where evaluative considerations seem to play a crucial part. In his commentary, Tyreman has mainly four areas in mind, namely physical disorder, art, good art, and good (competent) clinical practice. Or more specifically, the question is whether the kind of evaluative analysis I used in my original paper can help us answer the following four questions: (a) How should we define the concept of physical disorder, i.e. according to what criteria should we draw the line between physical disorders and other physical conditions? (b) How should we define the concept of art, i.e. according to what criteria should we draw the line between art and other artifacts and performances? (c) What is good art, i.e. according to what criteria should we evaluate those artifacts (etc.) that we have decided to categorize as works of art? (d) What makes a clinical performance or practice good or competent, according to what criteria should we evaluate such practices?The first two questions are conceptual, i.e. the question is how certain concepts should be [End Page 111] defined, and in what way or ways values enter the picture. The last two questions are straightforwardly evaluative, however, and it goes without saying that we have to rely on value judgments to answer these questions. This difference suggests that the conceptual analyses needed in the first two cases are somewhat different from the evaluative analyses needed in the last two cases. It is also far more likely that my analysis of mental disorder can be extended to the first two cases. After all, my approach is designed to capture the evaluative content of concepts that are not purely evaluative. (We will return to this below.)To see whether my analysis can be of any help in any of Tyreman's four cases, we need to recapitulate what it is all about. The analysis in question is specifically concerned with how the evaluative content of the concept of mental disorder should be characterized, i.e. how and to what extent we have to rely on value judgments to distinguish mental disorders from other conditions. The first part of the analysis consists in the formulation of four questions that any reasonably complete account needs to answer. These questions are: (0... (shrink)

The situation in motion picture industry is characterized by the fact that, on the one hand, we have ever more astounding inventions, and on the other, a flood of garbage TV and movies. If art is in crisis, it is hardly the fault of science. Perhaps it is the arts, especially cinema, that have not learned to harness the power of the media.

The author has collaborated in research teams to visualize supercomputer simulations and real-time data. She describes these collaborative projects that employ advanced-technology graphics and novel digital displays that include large-format IMAX film, high-definition television productions, and a museum digital dome at the American Museum of Natural History. The popularity of these images and the function that they provide in popular culture are discussed. She also describes two key technologies that she was part of designing: IntelliBadge(tm), a real-time visualization and ‘smart’ (...) tracking system; and Virtual Director(tm), a virtual camera choreography and remote collaboration system. The process of data-visualization involves the mapping of data from numerical form into an iconic representational form in the attempt to provide humans with insight and understanding of a phenomenon. This is discussed in the context of metaphor, cognition, and postcolonial theory. Because data-visualizations carry the ‘weight of scientific accuracy and advanced technology’, most general audiences confuse these visualizations as ‘real’; however, it is argued that data-visualizations are models and metaphors, not reality. In metaphor theory, the mapping of attributes from one domain of information into another is how humans understand, create, and engender new meaning. Data mapping is correlated with this theory. The author explores how the use of mapping information is culturally contingent. In the spirit of scientific inquiry, she deconstructs the very professional activity for which she is most famous. (shrink)

Proceedings of the 11th Interdisciplinary Symmetry Congress-Festival of the International Society for the Interdisciplinary Study of Symmetry. Special Theme: “Tradition and Innovation in Symmetry - Katachi”.

This volume brings together a distinguished collection of thinkers to consider the complex relation and divergence between art and science. How art and science relate to technology, why they should be thought relevant to morality, and what their study can possibly contribute to the understanding of the nature of the mind are only a few of the subjects explored in these pages.

Odour-sound correspondences provide some of the most fascinating and intriguing examples of crossmodal associations, in part, because it is unclear from where exactly they originate. Although frequently used as similes, or figures of speech, in both literature and poetry, such smell-sound correspondences have recently started to attract the attention of experimental researchers too. To date, the findings clearly demonstrate that the majority of non-synaesthetic individuals associate orthonasally-presented odours with various different sound properties, e.g., pitch, instrument type, and timbre, in a (...) non-random manner. What is more, these auditory-olfactory associations exhibit a number of features that are common to other crossmodal associations, such as their consistency over time, and their bidirectionality. However, the psychological mechanism underpinning these associations in the general population remain unclear, with a number of distinct hypotheses having been put forward over the years. In this chapter, we consider auditory-olfactory associations in art and science, focusing on poetry, music composition, and performance. First, we provide examples of the use of auditory-olfactory synaesthetic metaphors in poetry, from William Shakespeare through to Romanticism, illustrating how crossmodal associations have appeared in literature for centuries. Then, we move on to focus on music composition and performance, describing a number of examples where auditory stimuli have been purposely matched with crossmodally corresponding olfactory and/or visual stimuli. Considering the scientific study of smell-sound correspondences, we review the key psychophysical studies demonstrating that, beyond the artistic context, robust and non-random crossmodal associations are also triggered in the majority of the general population. We discuss a number of hypotheses that have been put forward over the years to account for such associations, focusing on the idea that certain correspondences between olfactory and auditory stimuli are mediated by the emotional character of the component stimuli. (shrink)

(1997). Super‐paradigms, art, and science: Romanticism and the birth of social science. The European Legacy: Vol. 2, Fourth International Conference of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas, pp. 749-754.

(1997). Super‐paradigms, art, and science: Romanticism and the birth of social science. The European Legacy: Vol. 2, Fourth International Conference of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas, pp. 749-754.

If one attempts to examine the role of a concept in the writings of a man of letters, it seems appropriate to begin with some linguistic observations pertinent to the discussion: aesthetics. To what extent and in what particular way does the metaphorical field associated with the concept of organism determine or at least reach into descriptions of the creative process as such? Such an initial step of modest pragmatics suggests itself especially in view of the fact that Goethe never (...) developed a system of aesthetics, classical or otherwise, in which a theoretical analysis would be possible. In fact, we will see that he had a fundamental distrust of theoretical systems for art or nature. In what terms, then, does Goethe describe the process of artistic creation? As might be expected, there are indeed expressions of "conceiving," of "nurturing" a theme, of "bearing" a poem for years until its final "birth." Many of those poems that strike the reader with their convincing immediacy, which seem to have been nothing but impulse and instantaneous expression of feeling, came into the world after a considerable period of incubation. And Goethe emphasizes that the length of pregnancy poetic was not determined by the poet, but by an internal process of maturing and usually by an external, catalytic occasion. (shrink)

This special issue of Janus Head explores a number of disciplinary and interdisciplinary dimensions of the theme, the situated body. The body, of course, is always situated in so far as it is a living and experiencing body. Being situated in this sense is different from simply being located someplace in the way a non-living, non-experiencing object is located. That the body is always situated involves certain kinds of physical and social interactions, and it means that experience is always both (...) physically and socially situated. The interesting question is not only how this works (what precisely it means to be situated), but whether and how the answer to that question changes from one situation to another. It seems reasonable to say that the body is situated differently in different situations, and that this difference may not be simply a difference in the situational content but a difference in how the body processes being situated precisely because the circumstances are so different. The question is not just about differences in situations, but differences in situatedness. Is it possible that the body is X-situated (in terms of its situatedness) in the task of solving a mathematical problem, but is Y-situated when it is engaged in dancing with another person? And if, as seems obvious, there are significant physiological and experiential differences involved in being in these different situations, are some of these differences due to being X-situated, for example, rather than Y-situated? This collection of essays gathers together investigations of the situated body that address such variations in what it means to be situated. These investigations cross theory and practice, expression and performance and interweave disciplines and practices such as philosophical anthropology, cognitive science, phenomenology, architecture and painting, and artistic performances like dance and music. They describe the body as an experiencing enactive agent embedded in various pragmatic and social circumstances, the body as rigidly circumscribed in art and science, and the body as extended into its environment through the high technology that is more and more defining our experiences and our relationships.. (shrink)

In The Shock of Recognition, Lewis Pyenson uses a method called Historical Complementarity to identify the motif of non-figurative abstraction in modern art and science. He identifies the motif in Picasso's and Einstein's educational environments. He shows how this motif in domestic furnishing and in urban lighting set the stage for Picasso's and Einstein's professional success before 1914. He applies his method to intellectual life in Argentina, using it to address that nation's focus on an inventory of the natural (...) world until the 1940s, its adoption of non-figurative art and nuclear physics in the middle of the twentieth century, and attention to landscape painting and the wonder of nature at the end of the century. (shrink)

This article is focused on the concept of logic in Avicenna’s Isagoge, a text which had great impact both on Arabic and Western thought. Its main section is devoted to an investigation of Avicenna’s clarification of the nature of logic, its proper subject matter as well as its place within the canon of the philosophical sciences. In this connection, special attention is given to Avicenna’s use of the concepts ‘art’ and ‘science’. Significantly, he regards logic as both a (...) class='Hi'>science and an art, and argues that in the latter sense, logic is an instrument for the philosophical sciences. Because Avicenna’s Isagoge was read in the Latin West for several centuries, his ideas on the nature of logic played a prominent role in the debates at medieval universities and hence were a likely source of the distinction between ‘logica utens’ and ‘logica docens’. (shrink)

Metaphors abound in both the arts and in science. Due to the traditional division between these enterprises as one concerned with aesthetic values and the other with epistemic values there has unfortunately been very little work on the relation between metaphors in the arts and sciences. In this paper, we aim to remedy this omission by defending a continuity thesis regarding the function of metaphor across both domains, that is, metaphors fulfill any of the same functions in science (...) as they do in the arts. Importantly, this involves the claim that metaphors in arts as well as science have both epistemic and aesthetic functions. (shrink)

Both Kuhn and Cavell acknowledge their indebtedness to each other in their respective books of the 60s. Cavell in (Must We Mean What We Say (1969)) and Kuhn in (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 1962). They were together at Berkeley where they had both moved in 1956 as assistant professors after their first encounter at the Society of Fellows at Harvard (Kuhn 2000d, p. 197). In Berkeley, Cavell and Kuhn discovered a mutual understanding and an intellectual affinity. They had regular (...) conversations which Cavell describes as "extremely important" (Conant 1989, p. 40; cf. Cavell 1979, p. xix). Cavell says that he felt he wanted to assure Kuhn that "philosophy did not have standing answers to the questions [Kuhn] .. (shrink)

adiant Cool" has the makings of a gripping noir thriller: a missing body, a tough-talking female sleuth and a mustachioed Russian agent mixed up in a shadowy plot to take over the world. But the novel, by Dan Lloyd, a neurophilosopher at Trinity College in Hartford, is also a serious work of scholarship, the unlikely vehicle for an abstruse new theory of consciousness.

What can we expect of literature? And what should the role of criticism be? This collection reflects on developments in criticism and the different modes of knowledge that underwrite literature: a science model and its place in the university versus other ways of conceiving knowledge for which the arts have traditionally been seen as vehicles. Discussion ranges widely with contributions from leading academics as well as those outside the literary academy, including essays by the novelists Doris Lessing and David (...) Lodge. All the essays are concerned with what literature, and therefore criticism, is or aims to be. (shrink)

In the first collection of his essays to be published, Jeremy Holmes discusses the wider application of psychotherapy within psychiatry and suggests that psychoanalysis needs to escape from its esotericism by taking into account contemporary advances in cognitive science, family therapy and the realities of psychiatric work in a public health setting. Illustrating his arguments with literary as well as clinical examples, he emphasizes the importance of creativity in psychotherapy and the connections between the artistic and psychotherapeutic impulse.

The lecture is an argument for a marriage of theory and experience. It contains something old, something new, something borrowed and something true. The argument is that the dichotomy between science and art, between theory and experience is resolved and the components unified when the role of consensus in the acceptance of theory and the conception of experience is made clear. Moreover, the unification achieved brings with it a method for unifying the empiricism of Moritz Schlick1 with the consensualism (...) of Otto Neurath.2 In earlier work, I developed a mathematical model of consensus with Carl Wagner. That work concerned the aggregation of probabilities by weights of respect assigned by members of a community to each other that converged toward a consensual probability. The convergence depended on connectedness among the members of the group in terms of positive weights. We thought of the probabilities as probabilities of scientific theories or hypotheses. The process converging toward consensus was mathematically equivalent to finding consensual weights to be assigned to members of the group that could be used as a measure of competence and expertise. The consensual weights can be applied to find consensus concerning factors other than probabilities. The use of probabilities was in fact an incidental, though formally well articulated, application of the underlying aggregation of weights to obtain convergence toward consensual weights. (shrink)

This book conveys 12 case studies about projects taking place in a School/University/Community Partnership Network in southwest Ohio. Participants partner to better the education experiences and the lives of community members in the region. This book shows how educational and community partnerships take shape and how they look in practice.

This introduction to logic, which aims to reflect recent advances in the field, focuses on natural language, analyzing the structure of arguments conducted in English. The text includes problems with which students can test their skills.

Early in the 1240s the University of Paris hired a recent graduate from Oxford, Roger Bacon by name, to teach the arts and introduce Aristotle to its curriculum. Along with eight sets of questions on Aristotle's natural works and the Metaphysics he claims to have authored another eight books before he returned to Oxford around 1247. Within the prodigious output of this period we find a treatise on logic titled Summulae dialectices, and it is this that is here annotated and (...) presented in translation. The book is unique in several respects. First, there is the breadth of its sources. Not only do we find explicit reference to the usual authors such as Aristotle, Plato, Boethius, Porphyry, Cicero, and Priscian, we also find unexpected reference to Augustine, Bernardus Silvestris, Donatus, Terence, and Themistius, along with mention of the Muslim philosophers Algazel and Ibn Rushd. Second, it is clear that Bacon is drawing on or reacting to an extraordinarily wide variety of medieval sources: Garland the Computist, Hugh of St. Victor, Master Hugo, Hugutius of Pisa, Isidore of Seville, Nicholas of Damas, Nicholas of Paris, Richard of Cornwall, Robert Kilwardby, Robert of Lincoln, and Robert the Englishman. Third, it unexpectedly presents a full-blown treatment of Aristotle's theory of demonstration. And finally, Bacon reveals a highly unorthodox view of the signification of common terms. Bacon, here, takes his students and us deeper into medieval sources and controversy than any of his rivals do. (shrink)