The present article, which was originally the keynote presentation on August 12, 2004, at the annual conference of the Venerable John Henry Newman Association at Mundelein, Illinois, traces the stages of Newman’s view of the hierarchy from the time of his involvement in the Oxford Movement to his post-conciliar reflections about the teaching of the First Vatican Council.Newman’s theology of the hierarchy, which cannot be understood apart from the controversies which engaged him, is, from a present-day perspective, (...) both “stimulating and problematic.”. (shrink)

This article, originally the concluding chapter of Cardinal Dulles’ recent book on Newman’s theology, provides an insightful discussion of Newman’s relevance for today by comparing his theological thought with a series of themes that were subsequently treated by the Second Vatican Council (1962-65): from revelation and faith, scripture and tradition, and the development of doctrine, to questions of ecclesiology, especially infallibility, the role of the laity, and social-political issues.“After nearly two centuries, the writings of Newman continue to (...) have a very modern ring,” Dulles writes. (shrink)

This article indicates the light that an epistemology like Newman’s, with its stress on the convergence of probabilities, the experience of conscience, and the presence of grace, can shed on the problem of faith and reason. The longstanding controversy over this problem between evidentialists and fideists has found new echoes in recent disputes between foundationalists and nonfoundationalists. It is necessary to distinguish between different aspects of the approach to faith—-the metaphysical, the historical, the religious, and the theological—-each with its (...) own logic and distinct style of epistemology. Examination of these aspects indicates that neither evidentialism nor fideism, neither foundationalism nor nonfoundationalism, does justice to the complexity of the matter. Faith arises out of a process in which human reason, in a large and comprehensive sense, is involved at every step of the way. Faith is not above or beyond reason, even though it depends for its origin and existence upon the grace of God. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS The Craft of Theology: From Symbol to System. By AVERY DULLES, S.J. New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1992. Pp. x + 228 with index. $22.50 (cloth). The catholicity of Avery Dulles's method in The Craft of Theology is best demonstrated by the broad compass of his self-chosen label, "postcritical theology." Postcritioal theology, he states, puts no un· fair demands on the reader to conform (...) to the spirit of the age nor does it imply that previous approaches (precritical, critical, paracritical) are obsolete. Postcritical theology seeks to make the ecclesial character of theology more recognizable than has most Catholic theology since the Second Vatican Council (viii). Postcritical theology takes its cues from a variety of sources: Polanyi's attention to the tacit dimensions of knowing, Lonergan's understanding of the dynamics of conversion, the "sense of the faithful" in Johann Adam Mohler, the recovery of the tradition in John Henry Newman and Maurice Blondel, and the postliberal theology of Albert Outler and George Lindbeck. Alongside these more traditionally oriented sources, The Craft of Theology also explores the social and symbolic dimension of ·the divine self-com· munication (22). To this end, Dulles employs Ricoeur's theory of the symbol in order to extract " the latent meaning of the classical doctrine of the hypostatic union " and Habermas's notion of an ideal speech situation in his anthropological analysis of the symbolism of sin as "anti-communicative" (27, 33). Dulles's latest work is a carefully structured synthesis of the typologies and constructive proposals which his readers have encountered in previous works. Even though the twelve chapters were originally composed for different occasions, Dulles intends the work " to have greater unity than a simple collection" (ix). The first four chapters are devoted to questions of theological method, including the develop· ment of fundamental theology or apologetics. The next two chapters deal with Scripture and tradition as sources of theology. The seventh chapter specifies the role of the ecclesiastical magisterium in systematic theology and includes a discussion of " the delicate problem of theological dissent." This is followed by two chapters on the relationship of theology to two cognate disciplines, philosophy and physical science. Without calling for a specifically Christian or Catholic philosophy, 513 514 BOOK REVIEWS Dulles nonetheless raises the question of whether " the intimate connection between systematic theology and the type of metaphysical realism that was embodied in scholasticism, both medieval and modern " can ever be adequately surpassed (ix-x, 133). Chapters ten and eleven pick up the thread of chapter seven by addressing the place of university theology in the service of the Church and the question of academic freedom. The final chapter develops the argument that ecumenism -both interreligious and intra-Christian-is best understood not as a separate branch of theology but as a dimension of all good theology. As in Models of Revelation (1983), his fundamental theology derives principally from a theory of symbolic mediation of doctrines. In The Craft of Theology, Dulles is prudent to address the charge of subjectivism commonly made against his theory of symbolic mediation and analysis of models (50-52). His theory of symbolic mediation, he states, is closer to the symbolical theology of Karl Rahner than to the less dialectical " experiential-expressive " theory exemplified by Schleiermacher 's statement that " Christian doctrines are accounts of the religious affections set forth in speech" (18). As with Rahner, symbolic realism for Dulles rests upon a theological anthropology that takes corporeal existence in a historically constituted, communal body as a real, symbolic expression of the human spirit. Dulles's theory of symbolic communication is supposed to accord greater cognitive import to religious symbols than does the view that symbols are merely expressions of the inner sentiments of the faithful (17-18). In Models of Revelation, Dulles defined the cognitive value of the symbol as surpassing the passing mood of the subject and " giving rise to thought" (137, 153). In The Craft of Theology, however, Dulles frequently reverts to a less nuanced position. Sometimes he equates symbolical theology with critical reflection upon a non-discursive human evocation of an interior state: [R] ecognition of the symbolic or evocative character of revelation can... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Integralism and Justice for AllJames Dominic Rooney O.P.Catholic integralism has received a lot of attention recently, promoted by pundits and scholars alike.1 Much ink has been spilled in scholarly venues discussing historical evidence marshaled by defenders of integralism who argue that the Catholic Church has rights to the coercive power of the state in service of its religious mission, notably Thomas Pink.2 My interest in this piece is different. (...) I aim simply to show that integralism is unjust. To prove this, I propose two problems that illustrate the integralist position entails violations of distributive justice concerning the rights of non-Catholics. It is important to highlight that my argument that integralism is unjust will not require denying Pink's controversial views about the power of the Church to direct state policy. In other words, I presume the truth of Catholicism and Pink's controversial readings of Church documents, but show that these readings do not allow us to arrive at the view that integralism is true. What my argument attacks is not that the Church has such powers, but that there is any identifiable "ideal" political arrangement in which these powers are exercised.Pink has attempted to show that—contrary to popular perception—the [End Page 1059] Second Vatican Council's declaration on religious freedom, Dignitatis humanae (DH), is compatible with integralist positions. Appealing to arguments given by Francisco Suarez, Pink argues that the Church has rights to the coercive power or authority of the state. On this reading, "the authority to direct and coerce in matters religious...belongs to the Church. It no more belongs to the state than it belongs to private individuals."3 Instead, the Church is a coercive authority which can impose "temporal penalties" on its members.4 Further, the baptized acquire obligations to lend the Church their temporal authority in service of its mission; thus, "rulers and officials of Christian states—[fulfill] their baptismal obligations to the Church in lending her their power and resources to hold other baptized Christians to their baptismal obligations."5 Consequently, the Church has a right, given its coercive authority to impose temporal penalties on its members, to the temporal power which baptized rulers hold, in service of its mission.6Pink's interpretation of what was called the Church's "indirect power" over government therefore involves a strong thesis that the Church has God-given rights to utilize civic coercion for its own supernatural ends. I will refer to this controversial thesis about "indirect power" as the "Suarezian thesis" (but will not be concerned with whether his view accurately represents Suarez). Pink and other integralists claim that this strong thesis about a native or intrinsic right of the Church to the coercive power of the state is doctrinally binding on Catholics.7 But Pink's view of that indirect power is controversial among Catholic theologians. Theologians as noteworthy as Avery Dulles, Joseph Ratzinger, and John Henry Newman explicitly reject this interpretation that the Church has native or intrinsic rights to civil coercive authority.8 For my purposes, I will concede the Suarezian thesis and [End Page 1060] illustrate that it is theoretically independent of integralism. Indeed, I will argue that integralism is false even if the Church did have a claim to temporal coercive power of the state. Integralism is more than the Suarezian thesis, does not follow from it, and does not strictly require it.The essay will be structured as follows. I will begin by providing clarifications on the meaning and nature of the integralist thesis. Then I will propose two arguments to show that, even if the Suarezian thesis were true, it would not entail that integralist states are the ideal political arrangement. What I will show is that there is no good sense in which integralist states are politically ideal. This is not to say integralist states are always impermissible. There are constraints that integralists themselves accept on when integralist states are permissible, and only when these constraints are met is an integralist state supposed to be politically ideal. I will construe the constraints charitably. Then I will show both that integralism lacks any good justification for the claim that... (shrink)

Hermeneutics, the Bible and Literary Criticism. Edited by Ann Loades and Michael McLain.The Craft of Theology: From Symbol to System. By Avery Dulles.The Shape of Soreriology. By John McIntyre.Not the Cross But the Crucfied. By H.‐E. Mertens.Verbum Curo: An Encyclopedia on Jesus, the Christ. By Michael O'Carroll.The Search for the Origins of Christian Worship: Sources and Methods for the Study of the Early Liturgy. By Paul Bradshaw.Worship: Initiation and the Churches. By Leonel L. Mitchell.The Eucharistic Mystery: Revitalizing the Tradition. (...) By David Power.Church of Churches: The Ecclesiology of Communion. By J.‐M. Tillard.God and History, Aspects of British Theology 1875‐1914. By Peter Hinchliff.Clear Heads and Holy Hearts: The Religious and Theological Ideal of John Henry Newman. By Terrence Merrigan.The Desert Fathers on Monastic Community. By Graham Gould.John Moschos, ‘The Spiritual Meadow’. Introduction, translation and notes by John Wortley.A Gentle Touch. By David Pailin.The Eye of the Storm: Spiritual Resources for rhe Pursuit of Justice. By Kenneth Leech.The Church and the Arts. Edited by Diana Wood.Anti‐Christian Polemic in Early Islam: Abu Isa al‐Warraq's ‘Against the Trinity’. Edited by David Thomas.Bernardus Magister: Papers Presented at the Nonacentenary Celebration of the Birth of St Bernard of Clairvaux. Edited by John R. Sommerfeldt.Church and City 1000‐1500: Essays in Honour of Christopher Brooke. Edited by David Abulafia, Michael Franklin and Miri Rubin.‘Piers Plowman’ and the Problem of Belief. By Britton J. Harwood.Ignutius of Luyola: The Psychology of a Saint. By W. W. Meissner.Jerome Naahl, S. J., 1507‐1580: Tracking the First Generation of Jesuits. By William V. Bangert, edited and completed by Thomas M. McCoog.From Bishop to Witch: The System of the Sacred in Early Modern Terra d'Otranto. By David Gentilcore.Civic Politics in the Rome of Urban VIII. By Laurie Nussdorfer.Michel de Montaigne: The Complete Essays. Translated by M. A. Screech.Montaigne and Melancholy: The Wisdom of the ‘Essays’. By M. A. Screech.Religion and Philosophy. Edited by Martin Warner.What is Faith? Essays in the Philosophy of Religion. By Anthony Kenny.Truth and Hisroriciry. By Richard Campbell. (shrink)

We often describe ourselves as agnostic on a wide range of questions, such as does God exist, is String Theory true, or will the President win re-election? But what does it mean to be agnostic and when is agnosticism justified? This monograph addresses these and related questions.

Territorial disputes have defined modern politics, but political theorists and philosophers have said little about how to resolve such disputes fairly. Is it even possible to do so? If historical attachments or divine promises are decisive, it may not be. More significant than these largely subjective claims are the ways in which people interact with land over time. Building from this insight, Avery Kolers evaluates existing political theories and develops an attractive alternative. He presents a novel link between political (...) legitimacy and environmental stewardship, and applies these ideas in an extended and balanced discussion of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. The result is the first systematic normative theory of territory, and an impressive example of applied philosophy. In addition to political theorists and philosophers, scholars and students of sociology, international relations, and human geography will find this book rewarding, as will anyone with wider interests in territory and justice. (shrink)

In a series of recent papers, Jane Friedman has argued that attitudes like wondering, enquiring, and suspending judgement are question-directed and have the function of moving someone from a position of ignorance to one of knowledge. Call such attitudes interrogative attitudes. Friedman insists that all IAs are governed by the following Ignorance Norm: Necessarily, if one knows Q at t, then one ought not have an IA towards Q at t. However, I argue that key premisses in Friedman’s argument actually (...) point towards an opposing conclusion; namely, that IAs are not governed by the Ignorance Norm, and IAs have functions other than moving someone from a position of ignorance to one of knowledge. I conclude that the Ignorance Norm should be rejected. (shrink)

Accounts of solidarity typically defend it in teleological or loyalty terms, justifying it by invoking its goal of promoting justice or its expression of support for a shared community. Such solidarity seems to be a moral option rather than an obligation. In contrast, A Moral Theory of Solidarity develops a deontological theory grounded in equity. With extended reflection on the Spanish conquest of the Americas and the US Civil Rights movement, Kolers defines solidarity as political action on others' terms. Unlike (...) mere alliances and coalitions, solidarity involves a disposition to defer to others' judgment about the best course of action. Such deference overrides individual conscience. Yet such deference is dangerous; a core challenge is then to determine when deference becomes appropriate.Kolers defends defernce to those who suffer gravest inequity. Such deference constitutes equitable treatment, in three senses: it is Kantian equity, expressing each person's equal status; it is Aristotelian equity, correcting general rules for particular cases; and deference is 'being an equitable person,' sharing others' fate rather than seizing advantages that they are denied. Treating others equitably is a perfect duty; hence solidarity with victims of inequity is a perfect duty. Further, since equity is valuable in itself, irrespective of any other goal it might promote, such solidarity is intrinsically valuable, not merely instrumentally valuable. Solidarity is then not about promoting justice, but about treating people justly. A Moral Theory of Solidarity engages carefully with recent work on equity in the Kantian and Aristotelian traditions, as well as the demandingness of moral duties, collective action, and unjust benefits, and is a major contribution to a field of growing interest. (shrink)

Her shape and his hand -- Distractions -- The other door, it's floods of tears with consolation enclosed -- Not only the footprints but the water too and what is down there -- There are crossroads.

What exactly is it that makes someone a parent? Many people hold that parenthood is grounded, in the first instance, in the natural derivation of one person's genetic constitution from the genetic constitutions of others. We refer to this view as "Geneticism". In Part I we distinguish three forms of geneticism on the basis of whether they hold that direct genetic derivation is sufficient, necessary, or both sufficient and necessary, for parenthood. Parts two through four examine three arguments for geneticism: (...) the property argument, the causal argument, and the parity argument. We conclude that none of these arguments succeeds. (shrink)

I argue that the concept of direction of fit is best seen as picking out a certain inferential property of a psychological attitude. The property in question is one that believing shares with assuming and fantasizing and fails to share with desire. Unfortunately, the standard analysis of DOF obscures this fact because it conflates two very different properties of an attitude: that in virtue of which it displays a certain DOF, and that in virtue of which it displays certain revision (...) conditions. I claim that the latter corresponds with the aim of an attitude, not its DOF. In order to remedy this failure of the standard analysis, I offer an alternative account of DOF, which I refer to as the two-content analysis. (shrink)

The second essay of Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality (GM) offers a naturalistic and developmental account of the emergence of conscience, a faculty uniquely responsive to remembering and honoring obligations. This article attempts to solve an interpretive puzzle that is invited by the second essay's explanation of nonmoral obligation, prior to the capacity to feel guilt. Ostensibly, Nietzsche argues that the conscience and our concept of obligation originated within contractual (“creditor-debtor”) relations, when creditors punished delinquent debtors (GM II:5). However, this interpretation, (...) which I call the contractualist reading, is incoherent and subject to an insoluble bootstrapping problem. I argue instead that Nietzsche provides two accounts of nonmoral obligation in the second essay, and that the conscience originated in the morality of custom to track rule prohibitions (“I will nots” [GM II:3]), which Nietzsche conceives of as involuntary or reciprocal obligations that, unlike contractual debts, do not require the making of promises. (shrink)

I here defend the thesis that the best life is the life that one plays as a game—specifically, a ‘Suitsian’ game that meets the definition proposed in The Grasshopper by Bernard Suits. Even more specifically, it is a nested, open, role-playing game where the life’s quality as a game partly depends on there being no more people than players. To defend this thesis I refute two powerful challenges to it, one from Thomas Hurka (2006) and another from within The Grasshopper (...) itself. In the process, I offer a new interpretation of that enigmatic and challenging book. (shrink)

A critical opportunity for identifying children experiencing domestic minor sex trafficking exists in healthcare settings. This quantitative study documented the disconnect between youth seeking help and interventions offered by healthcare providers. Ninety-one sex youth exploited through sex trafficking answered questions detailing their experiences of seeking medical treatment for injuries associated with selling or trading sex. Healthcare providers who were aware that injuries were sustained due to sex trafficking did not always alert legal or mandated reporting authorities. This analysis identified violations (...) of the four pillars of ethical healthcare. This investigation revealed lost opportunities to intervene on behalf of youth suffering trauma and abuse from sex trafficking highlighting the necessity for a formal protocol in healthcare settings to effectively intervene. (shrink)

This anthology in epistemology is a collection of essays and excerpts from seminal texts on ways of knowing in mathematics, the natural and social sciences and the liberal and fine arts and communication.

ABSTRACTAmong the most forceful and provocative criticisms that have been leveled at US drone strikes against alleged terrorists far from conventional battlefields has been Jeremy Waldron's charge that they cannot be justified in terms of a neutral principle that most reasonable people would accept. In essence, Waldron asks ‘whether we are comfortable with [such a norm] in the hands of our enemies’. He thinks most people will say ‘no’ and that this is a reason not to embrace a permissive norm (...) in the first place. We will argue that a key assumption in Waldron's argument is highly contestable, and that if it is challenged, the whole argument can be turned inside out to provide support for a limited drone program aimed at terrorist leaders. In essence, if the suspected terrorists who are the targets of drone strikes are understood to be combatants rather than civilians, as the US government has forcefully argued that they should be, then the norm permitting strikes against them is the humanitarian principle.. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant is strict about the limits of self-knowledge: our inner sense gives us only appearances, never the reality, of ourselves. Kant may seem to begin his inquiries with an uncritical conception of cognitive limits, but in Kant and the Subject of Critique, Avery Goldman argues that, even for Kant, a reflective act must take place before any judgment occurs. Building on Kant’s metaphysics, which uses the soul, the world, and God as regulative principles, Goldman demonstrates how Kant can (...) open doors to reflection, analysis, language, sensibility, and understanding. By establishing a regulative self, Goldman offers a way to bring unity to the subject through Kant’s seemingly circular reasoning, allowing for critique and, ultimately, knowledge. (shrink)

Richard Holton has argued that the traditional account of intentions—which only posits the existence of all-out intentions—is inadequate because it fails to accommodate dual-plan cases; ones in which it is rationally permissible for an agent to adopt two competing plans to bring about the same end. Since the consistency norms governing all-out intentions prohibit the adoption of competing intentions, we can only preserve the idea that the agent in a dual-plan case is not being irrational if we attribute to them (...) a pair of partial intentions. I argue that, contrary to initial appearances, (i) Holton has yet to offer us an actual account of partial intentions, and (ii) that the traditional account of intentions already has the resources necessary to accommodate dual-plan cases. (shrink)

In several contexts Nietzsche claims that he wants to free humanity of the affect of guilt. He also argues that we are not ultimately responsible for who we are or what we do because libertarian free will is a false belief invented for the purpose of legitimizing judgments of guilt. Combining these related threads of argument, we arrive at what would seem to be an uncontroversial conclusion: Nietzsche does not think guilt is an apt response to wrongdoing, and he therefore (...) thinks we ought to dispense with the feeling of guilt altogether. I argue against this conclusion by offering a comparative analysis of two kinds of guilt Nietzsche discusses in his works, reactive guilt, which is a reaction to an act of wrongdoing, and proactive guilt, which is a drive or desire to make oneself feel guilty. Here I offer an account of Greek guilt as a species of reactive guilt, and I argue that Nietzsche only rejects proactive guilt, which is endemic to Judeo-Christianity. (shrink)

According to the Strong Belief Thesis (SBT), intending to X entails the belief that one will X. John Brunero has attempted to impugn SBT by arguing that there are cases in which an agent intends to X but is unsure that she will X. Moreover, he claims that the standard reply to such putative counterexamples to SBT – namely, to claim that the unsure agent merely has an intention to try – comes at a high price. Specifically, it prevents SBT (...) from playing the kind of explanatory role the cognitivist requires. This article meets Brunero's challenge to SBT by offering an account of trying and intending to try that not only saves SBT from Brunero's criticism, but does so in a way that preserves the explanatory significance that cognitivists typically take SBT to have. (shrink)

Conservation biologists recognize a duty to maintain as much value as possible in ecosystems that are threatened by recent anthropogenic impacts. Until recently the paradigm of contemporary conservation seemed relatively straightforward: the best way to maintain the value of species and ecosystems at a given location was to maintain—or shepherd the system back towards—historical conditions. Among the most difficult theoretical tasks was the determination of “baseline” historical conditions (or trajectories) to return to, recognizing the dynamism of ecosystems over time. However, (...) the rate, scale, and magnitude of contemporary climate change, species introductions, and land-use change make it increasingly impractical to return locations to any kind of historical state. This forces a paradigm shift which is both ongoing and difficult, and necessitates a rigorous evaluation of the scientific and ethical foundations of modern conservation along with a careful reexamination of terminology. Here, I discuss the moral relevance and waning utility of the geographically-based and dichotomous understanding of “native” (or “in situ”) which is an important component of conservation ethics and practice. I then propose a new understanding of nativeness in which a species is native—not to a geographic location—but to a quantifiable set of biotic, climatic, geologic, and topographic conditions (i.e. its niche) that can then map to geographic space. Following this, I demonstrate the unique utility of this concept, which I will refer to as “econativeness,” in thinking through conservation problems—range expansions, range contractions, species introductions, and assisted migration—where the classical understanding of nativeness has become increasingly inadequate for assessing the moral value of species. (shrink)

Steady progress toward justice is not evident within extant political systems. A good-faith commitment to justice therefore requires oppositional collective action. This paper articulates and defends a moral principle of “progressive solidarity” that guides oppositional political action. Solidarity requires us to work alongside others according to their choice of action, even if this requires doing what we believe unwise or immoral. Progressive solidarity requires deference to the decisions of the least well-off group. Although individual judgment is by no means suspended, (...) solidarity nonetheless challenges moral autonomy. The paper argues that working to alleviate others’ misery is neither necessary nor sufficient for solidarity; rather, solidarity accepts others’ own account of their interests – whether or not their analysis is correct – and contributes to their pursuit of their aims. After explicating the concept of progressive solidarity and contrasting it with sympathy, loyalty, generosity, and identification, the paper defends progressive solidarity in moral, epistemic, and strategic contexts. The final section responds to objections and suggests that the case for solidarity is strengthened by application to the contemporary world. (shrink)

Although ‘glue semantics’ is the most extensively developed theory of semantic composition for LFG, it is not very well integrated into the LFG projection architecture, due to the absence of a simple and well-explained correspondence between glue-proofs and f-structures. In this paper I will show that we can improve this situation with two steps: (1) Replace the current quantificational formulations of glue (either Girard’s system F, or first order linear logic) with strictly propositional linear logic (the quantifier, unit and exponential (...) free version of either MILL or ILL, depending on whether or not tensors are used). (2) Reverse the direction of the standard σ-projection from f-structure to meaning, giving one going from the (atomic nodes of) the glue-proof to the f-structure, rather than from the f-structure to a ‘semantic projection’ which is itself somehow related to the glue-proof. As a side effect, the standard semantic projection of LFG glue semantics can be dispensed with. A result is that LFG sentence structures acquire a level composed of strictly binary trees, constructed out of nodes representing function application and lambda abstraction, with a significant resemblance to external and internal merge in the Minimalist Program. This increased resemblance between frameworks might assist in making useful comparisons. (shrink)

This paper takes as point of departure the centrality of recognition in the contemporary political landscape. More specifically, it focuses on those struggles for recognition known as identity politics. We depart from the hypothesis that modern theories of recognition, more specifically those advanced by Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser, cannot adequately accommodate the demand for the recognition of difference. Our contribution with this article is to argue that, in a discussion of struggles for recognition, the distinction between affirmative and transformative (...) strategies must be taken into account. We argue that affirmative approaches to recognition risk resulting in the negation of difference and reproducing the exclusive social order. By thinking through the implications of an affirmative approach to recognition, we aim to contribute to the understanding of failed attempts at recognition. We conclude with a tentative outline of the conditions for a transformative approach that aspires to meet the demands of actors in movements for social justice and avoid the problems of the affirmative approach. (shrink)

This dissertation examines the source and structure of twentieth-century existential despair and the implications for the existence of God that come with its resolution. ;I argue that a despairing consciousness is defined by giving epistemological primacy to thought over being. Although this dialectic defines despair generally, it is peculiar to the contemporary Western consciousness given that the latter has been defined by modern philosophy whose essential characteristic is the epistemological primacy of thought. ;Modern philosophy has taken offense in the face (...) of the "intentional paradox" as found in St. Thomas, that the object is imminent to consciousness while simultaneously ontologically transcending it. We can see this in the First Meditation of Descartes in which he overrides his immediate experience of the world in search for Absolute Certainty. ;It is our claim that a despairing consciousness is a closed Cartesian consciousness. In modern thought, it is Kierkegaard who has existentially appropriated it. An examination of Kierkegaard's epistemology verifies that he has indeed inherited the bifurcation of thought and reality. Moreover, he tells us what it is like inside a closed consciousness all the way through Religiousness A where it is realized that the only natural way to alleviate despair is to fulfill the Ideal of Absolute Certainty and in effect become the Eternal Deity. Kierkegaard recognizes that this Ideal cannot be met by a finite entity, but he does not see that the Ideal itself is the culprit; he thus offers Religiousness B as an "experimental" solution. ;An alternative phenomenology of despair is presented which closely resembles Religlousness A in that the individual attempts to become the Eternal Deity thereby also finding Religiousness B attractive. But the individual realizes that the problem is not a religious one by just skirting self-destruction and abolishing despair by accepting the intentional paradox. ;After a brief Interlude in which the alternative liberation is related to satori, we turn to a natural theology. The premise from which St. Thomas argues for the existence of God has been experienced by the individual in despair, namely, that essence does not equal existence in finite entities. It is thus argued that God exists. So if thought and being are properly related, the God of St. Thomas must be posited, and if not, the individual must become the God of St. Thomas in order to escape the resulting despair. (shrink)

In A Political Theory of Territory, Margaret Moore’s basic thesis is that peoples gain rights to territories by occupying them. The current article challenges the underpinning social ontology of this normative theory. For Moore, a people is a collective agent meeting conditions of mutual identification and shared aspirations, political capacity, and a history of political cooperation. In turn, a people so understood occupy a territory when its members reside in it and plan their lives around their relationship to it. Against (...) these conceptions, the current article argues that both notions – peoples and occupancy – fail, and for similar reasons, namely, an underlying subjectivism that creates more conflict than it resolves. (shrink)

In The Grasshopper, Bernard Suits argues that the best life is the one whose essence is game-play. In fact, only through the concept of game-play can we understand how anything at all is worth doing. Yet this seems implausible: morality makes things worth doing independently of any game, and games are themselves subject to moral evaluation. So games must be logically posterior to morality. The current paper responds to these objections by developing the theory of Ludic Constructivism. Constructivist theories such (...) as Kant’s explain normativity in a way that is both objective and cognitivist but also mind-dependent. Roughly, constructivists ground normative structures in rational procedures. But rational agency is diverse: it is realized in different ways and to different degrees by different agents. Yet Kantian Constructivism requires a strong identity of rational procedures across rational agents. Ludic Constructivism avoids this challenge by rejecting this strong identity of agency, instead building a normative framework out of the ingredients of Suits’s definition of game-play. We want to play the best games we can. In order to do so we must play games with a certain structure: they must be nested multiplayer games in which everyone who is capable of self-originating activity is engaged as a fellow player rather than a plaything. Nested games – games that are constructed out of other games – go best when each game contributes to the value of each other game in the nest. Such game nests are “reciprocating value-maximization structures”. Our lives go best when we design, play, and revise the game of our Individual Life and we also embed that game within the highest-order nested game of Fate of Humankind. In this way, Ludic Constructivism delivers a normative system that expands Kant’s Kingdom of Ends, and a life that meets Aristotle’s conception of pleasure. (shrink)

While it is uncontroversial that the slave revolt in morality consists in a denial of the nobles as objects of value, Nietzsche’s account in the Genealogy’s first essay invites ambiguities concerning its origin, ressentiment’s relationship to value creation, and its meaning. In this paper, I address these ambiguities by analyzing the morality of good and evil as an historical artifact of Judeo-Christian tradition, and I argue for a two-stage, non-strategic interpretation of the slave revolt, according to which Judaism and Christianity (...) each made essential and different contributions. The inversion of values began with the Jewish prophets, who claimed the poor were holy and ‘good’ and the rich ‘evil’, and it was sustained throughout the Second Temple period by the Jewish priests in relation to a ‘priestly-noble’ conception of the virtuous person as holy and pure. Christ, through his espousal of egalitarianism, negated the pathos of distance essential to noble values, thus beginning the second phase of the slave revolt where goodness became associated with a distinctly slavish conception of virtue. (shrink)

In his book, The Coherence of Theism, Richard Swinburne seeks to construct a coherent doctrine of God. As a part of this endeavour he examines the idea of omniscience in chapter 10. One of Swinburne's conclusions is that God as an omniscient being must engage in cognitive self- limitation in order to preserve the freedom of both divine and human future actions. In this paper, I want to look at his argument as it is presented in this chapter. I will (...) conclude that Swinburne's position on divine cognitive self- limitation results in an internal contradiction. (shrink)

On March 31, 2000, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial court ruled that a contract awarding custody of frozen pre-embryos to the wife upon divorce was unenforceable because it violates public policy. This is the first reported case to address a contract between the clinic and the parties where the contract would have awarded the pre-embryos to one of the gamete providers. The decision in A.Z. v. B.Z. 431 Mass. 150 differs from decisions in the two other courts of last resort deciding (...) related cases where enforcement of contracts was supported. This case represents an important development in the legal doctrines associated with frozen pre-embryos as it explicitly differs from the other courts’ decisions in addressing pre-embryos at the same developmental stage. (shrink)

Bioethical work on solidarity has yielded an array of divergent conceptions. But what do these accounts add to normative bioethics? What is solidarity’s distinctive social normative role? Prainsack and Buyx suggest that solidarity be understood as the ‘putty’ of justice. I argue here that the putty metaphor is deeply insightful and—when spelled out in detail—successfully explicates solidarity’s social normative function. Unfortunately, Prainsack and Buyx’s own account cannot play this role. I propose instead that the putty metaphor supports a conception of (...) solidarity as equity. This proposal enables us to answer whether and when we should act in solidarity, and with whom, while also capturing the putty metaphor and hence answering a basic question: what is solidarity for? (shrink)

Social movements are ubiquitous in political life. But what are they? What makes someone a member of a social movement, or some action an instance of movement activity? Are social movements compatible with democracy? Are they required for it? And how should individuals respond to movement calls to action? Philosophers have had much to say on issues impinging on social movements but much less to say on social movements as such. The current article provides a philosophical overview of social movements. (...) To do so it canvasses contemporary work on the nature of shared agency and collective action, social epistemology, democratic theory, and the theory of individual responsibility for structural injustice. The article finds that contemporary analytic philosophy has considerable work to do if it is to account for the nature, epistemology, ethics, and politics of social movements. There may be more things in the streets than are dreamt of in our philosophy. (shrink)

Volume 37, Issue 3, September 2024, Page 147-150.

This article challenges Lockean theories according to which the dispossession of Indigenous peoples was not intrinsically unjust. Specifically, the "agricultural argument," and more recently "efficiency" arguments, posit that Indigenous peoples lack(ed) rights to their lands because they did not or do not use those lands in particular ways. The current article shows that these approaches fail. One reason they fail is that they undermine anything that could be considered a _claim_ to land, replacing that idea with a perverse consequentialism, thereby (...) licensing a spiral of dispossessions. (shrink)

I defend the thesis that the constitutive aim of inquiring into some question, Q, is improving one’s epistemic standing with respect to Q. Call this the epistemic-improvement view. I consider and ultimately reject two alternative accounts of the constitutive aim of inquiry—namely, the thesis that inquiry aims at knowledge and the thesis that inquiry aims at belief—and I use my criticisms as a foil for clarifying and motivating the epistemic-improvement view. I also consider and reject a pair of normative theses (...) about when inquiry goes awry or is inappropriate. The first is the normative thesis defended by Dennis Whitcomb who claims that inquiry goes awry if it culminates in a belief that falls short of knowledge and that one should not inquire into Q if one already knows the answer to Q. The second is the normative thesis defended by Jane Friedman who claims that one should not inquire into Q if one already believes some complete answer to Q. (shrink)