Antalya, which is today’s attraction center with its historical and natural beauties, was described as “a city like heaven” since ancient times. This city hosted many civilisations and states until the 13th century and became an important seaport after The Seljuks took over the region. The Seljuks applied civilization and urbanization policy also in Antalya, like other regions they ruled. The mosques, madrasahs (Islamıc theology institutions), schools, baths, caravansearis (hostels), hospices, and water cisterns in this period changed the structure of (...) the city and paved the way for improvements of public life. During the Ottomans some of these social institutions were kept active while the others no longer served to the public. However, with the construction of new social institutions, urbanization was resumed. The madrasas were generally built near or adjacent to the mosques, and had a significant role in developing the society and cultural structure. Although the madrasas in Antalya were mainly the institutions that maintain the education system, the research on these madrasas mostly focuses on their architectural features. The majority of these madrasas that are not comprehensively studied. Therefore, the functioning structures and the problems of Antalya Madrasas (Antalya, Korkuteli and Elmalı), which are reflected in the archive documents between the 17th and 20th centuries and also both individuals and institutions that had influence on these madrasas are going to be investigated in this study. Thus, this paper will shed more light on Antalya Madrasas.Summary: Antalya city, which was completely under the Seljuk sovereignty during the reign of Sultan Alaeddin Keykubat I (1219-1236), was named as Alâiyye dedicated to the Sultan's name and became an important port city of the Seljuk State after then. In the process of the fall of the Seljuk State and the beginning of the Emirates (Beylikler) period, the city became a land of Teke-Oğulları, a part of a Hamid-oğulları, and in 1390 the city became an Ottoman city after the struggle of Yıldırım Bayazid with Teke-oğuları. Antalya was home to the madrasahs, one of the formal education institutions during both the Seljuk and the Ottoman Empire. The madrasahs were built next to the mosque or in a detached area built by sometimes administrators or statesmen, sometimes by members of the dynasty or by the citizens who were wealthy. In Antalya, both single floor and second floor madrasahs were built. This study based on the documents from Prime Ministry Ottoman Archive, the travel books of İbn Bibi and Evliya Çelebi, the works on Antalya Madrasahs to be determine the madrasah in the districts of Antalya as Korkuteli and Elmalı. In addition to the Seljuk madrasahs such as Imaret Madrasah, Atabey Armagan Madrasah and Karatay Madrasah, there are also some madrasahs belonging to the Ottoman period, in Antalya. As a matter of fact, the madrasahs increased in number in the period of the Ottoman. Antalya madrasahs which are reflected in archival documents for any reason are as follows: “Süleyman Madrasah” located in Hatip Süleyman Street, “Madrasah built by Haci Mahmed” located in Elmali Street, “Hacı Abbaszâde Hacı Süleyman Madrasah” in Süleyman Street, “İsmail Efendi Madrasah” in Tahtapazarı Kızılsaray Street, Kasab Hacı Ahmed Madrasah, Hacı Cafer Ağa Madrasah, Murad Ağa Madrasah, Esir Hacı Ali Madrasah, Hacı Hasan Madrasah,“Madrasah built by Hasan Efendi” in Keçiyalar Street, in the Kadılar Street of Gediz County “Madrasah built by Yusuf Efendi”, “Madrasah built by Hızır Efendi” in Cami-i atik Street, Murat Pasha Madrasah, “Sefer Ağa Madrasah” located outside the city wall, “Büyülü Minaret Madrasah, Hatuniye Madrasah, Sheik Sinan Camii Madrasah located outside the city Wall, In addition to these madrasahs mentioned in some studies in Antalya, it is also stated that there are madrasahs such as Müsellim Madrasah, Kesik Minaret Madrasah, Karakas Madrasah, Varsakli Mehmet Efendi Madrasah, Meydan Madrasah, Surmeli Madrasah, Canmülk Madrasah, Ahi Kız Madrasah, Hacı Naim Efendi Madrasah, Susam Madrasah, Çömlekçi Madrasah, Değirmenönü Madrasah, Ak Mescid Madrasah, Âşık Doğan Madrasah and Çukur Madrasah.According to archive documents, in the sub-district of Antalya, which is used as a plateau or plateau area, some madrasahs were recorded as follows: Pınarbaşı Madrasah, Hızır Efendi Madrasah, Mustafa Efendi Madrasah, Emir Sinaneddin Madrasah, Hacı Menlü (Mevlüt) oğlu Ömer Medrese, Abu Bakr Agha Madrasah, Koca Hafız Medrese, Hacı Mollaoğlu El-Hac Ömer Madrasah, Sheikh İsmail Efendi Madrasah. However, Süleyman Fikri Erten, who works on Antalya, stated that the number of madrasahs is eight as: Haci Ahmet Madrasah of Kalkanlı, Sultan Hatun Madrasah, Koparanzade Hacı Hüseyin Madrasah, Karabayırlı Hacı Hüseyin Madrasah, Kaşlı Ali Efendi Madrasah, Hacı Hüseyin Madrasah, Şalaka Ahmet Madrasah and Oyunyeri Madrasah.The madrasahs built in Elmalı, another distict of Antalya, were as follows: Ketenci Ömer Paşa Madrasah, Esbak Mir-i Ahur Hacı Mehmet Bey Madrasah, Haydar Baba Madrasah, Arifî Ahmed Paşa Madrasah, Hüseyin Efendi Madrasah, Debbağ Baba Madrasah, Şeyh Ümmi Sinan Madrasah, Babazade Hacı Abdurrahman Madrasah, Hacı Şeyh Efendi Madrasah, Mustafa Efendi Madrasah, Hasan Efendi Madrasah, Salih Efendi Madrasah, Halil Efendi Madrasah, Çankırlı Madrasah, Osman Efendi Madrasah and “Mehmet Efendi Madrasah in Örtekiz village”. In addition, two madrasahs, except from these, were also found in the archive documents.A madrasah was built almost at every Street of Antalya and the madrasahs were usually named by the name of their builders. Madrasah students were provided with a certain amount of scholarship to continue their education according to the level of the education in the madrasahs and the level of the courses taught, salaries of the scholars, the status of the builder of the madrasah. The scholars who worked in the madrasahs worked with a document called berat-i sharif and in the case of the disappearance of this document a new berat-i sharif would be prepared by the Shaykh al-Islami. Scholars working without this document were also determined. In the scholar appointments foundation, board of trustees, müfti, and the city regents were very influential. There were also some appointments resulted from death, promotion besides leaving job with their own will. There were some problems with the appointments in Antalya and the foundation revenues to which the madrasah was attached were delivered to certain individuals until these problems were resolved.In madrasahs of Antalya, science was given a great importance and all kinds of monetary issues were tired to be eliminated with donations given to both scholars and students. However, it is observed that madrasahs were involved in some events in Antalya. As a matter of fact, among those who participated in the Şah Kulu Rebellion that took place in 1510-1511, there were also madrasah students and education training had therefore been disrupted for a long time. it is known that the state sent orders to the judges (qadi) in the region consecutively in order to prevent the rebellion. Also during this period some madrasahs were used as the activity center of armed students or people who disguised them.One of the issues that negates the education and training in the madrasahs in Antalya is that in 1890 the immigrants started to be hosted in Antalya and the guests visiting were accommodated in madrasahs as there were no other available places. This situation had been continued for a long time and even telegrams have been sent about the students living on the sidewalks.Another important issue that disrupts education was epidemic diseases. It was reported that too many people died in the district of Istanoz because of smallpox, there was no doctor and the health personnel should go to the region urgently. Despite all the problems experienced in madrasahs, they continued their activities in Antalya and while continuing their activities under the control of foundations in 1826, with the establishment of the Ministry of Foundations, they were connected to this institution. (shrink)

In this article we investigate whether non-culpably benefiting from wrongdoing or injustice generates a moral requirement to disgorge these benefits in order to compensate the victims. We argue that a strong requirement to disgorge such benefits is generated only if other conditions or factors are present. We identify three such factors and claim that their presence would explain why the normative features of certain types of cases of benefiting from wrongdoing differ from cases of benefiting from simple misfortune or bad (...) luck. (shrink)

This paper presents a comparative analysis of three American and three European corporate failures. The first part of the analysis is based on a theoretical framework including six areas of ethical climate; tone at the top; bubble economy and market pressure; fraudulent financial reporting; accountability, control, auditing, and governance; and management compensation. The second and third parts consider the analysis of these cases from fraud perspective and in terms of firm-specific characteristics and environmental context. The research analyses shed light on (...) the fact that, despite major differences between Europe and U.S. in terms of political institutions, laws and regulations as well as managerial practices, there are significant similarities between six groups. The analysis also demonstrates that, the ethical dilemma has been coupled with ineffective boards, inefficient corporate governance and control mechanisms, distorted incentive schemes, accounting irregularities, failure of auditors, dominant CEOs, dysfunctional management behavior and the lack of a sound ethical tone at the top. Significant similarities were also observed in the analysis from the fraud triangle perspective. However, there are several major differences between the six corporate failure cases particularly with regard to ownership structure, coverage in media, and legal, regulatory and governance frameworks. This research study may have several academic and practical contributions, particularly because of multidisciplinary, international features, and comparative analyses used in the paper. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Is it possible to effect singular reference to mathematical objects in the abstractionist framework? I will argue that even if mathematical expressions pass the relevant syntactic and inferential tests to qualify as singular terms, that does not mean that their semantic function is to refer to a particular object. I will defend two arguments leading to this claim: the permutation argument for the referential indeterminacy of mathematical terms, and the argument from the semantic idleness of the terms introduced by (...) abstraction principles. (shrink)

A version of the permutation argument in the philosophy of mathematics leads to the thesis that mathematical terms, contrary to appearances, are not genuine singular terms referring to individual objects; they are purely schematic or variables. By postulating ‘ante-rem structures’, the ante-rem structuralist aims to defuse the permutation argument and retain the referentiality of mathematical terms. This paper presents two semantic problems for the ante- rem view: (1) ante-rem structures are themselves subject to the permutation argument; (2) the ante-rem structuralist (...) fails to explain reference in a way that makes her account different to, and privileged over, that of her eliminativist rivals. Both problems undercut the motivation behind ante-rem structuralism. (shrink)

The realist versions of mathematical structuralism are often characterized by what I call ‘the insubstantiality thesis’, according to which mathematical objects, being positions in structures, have no non-structural properties: they are purely structural objects. The thesis has been criticized for being inconsistent or descriptively inadequate. In this paper, by implementing the resources of a real-definitional account of essence in the context of Fregean abstraction principles, I offer a version of structuralism – essentialist structuralism – which validates a weaker version of (...) the insubstantiality thesis: mathematical objects have no non-structural essential properties. Next, I show how this rendition of structuralism alleviates a Fregean worry against insubstantiality, which is directed at the explanation of the applicability of mathematics from the structuralist perspective. (shrink)

Attempts to apply the mathematical tools of dynamical systems theory to cognition in a systematic way has been well under way since the early 90s and has been recognised as a “third contender” to computationalist and connectionist approaches :441–463, 1996). Nevertheless, it was also realised that such an application will not lead to a solid paradigm as straightforwardly as was initially hoped. In this paper I explicate a method for assessing such proposals by drawing upon Lakatos’s Criticism and the growth (...) of knowledge, Cambridge University Press, London, pp 91–195, 1970) methodology of scientific research programs. MSRP focuses on the heuristics of a particular field and gauges the model/theory building stratagems by reference to theoretical and empirical progress, on the one hand, and the continuity and the autonomy of the way the field’s heuristic generates its series of models/theories, on the other. The requirement of continuity and autonomy afford distinct senses of ad hoc-ness, which serve as an effective tool to detect various subtleties which may otherwise be missed: the present approach identifies shortcomings missed by Chemero’s radical embodied cognitive science and falsifies Chemero’s claim that the methodological powers of his model-based account is on a par with computationalism. In general, I claim that MSRP is relevant to current methodological issues in cognitive science and can supplement debates regarding “local” assessments of methodologies, such as that between mechanical versus covering-law explanations. MSRP must at least be viewed as a necessary constraint for any methodological considerations in cognitive science. (shrink)

This essay addresses the questions of whether and how much responsibility for extreme poverty should be assigned to global and domestic institutional orders. The main focus is on whether the global order brings about the existing levels of extreme poverty or merely allows them. By examining Thomas Pogge's recent contribution on this topic, I argue that although he builds a plausible case for the claim that the global order brings about, and not merely fails to prevent, extreme poverty, the moral (...) and empirical complexity of the situation leaves room for doubting his conclusions. I conclude, however, that it is enough that there be a reasonable chance—though not conclusive evidence—that the global order brings about the existing extreme poverty to reduce considerably the moral weight of its privileged participants' appeal to cost when justifying their not taking steps to alleviate extreme poverty. (shrink)

There are two ways of thinking about the natural numbers: as ordinal numbers or as cardinal numbers. It is, moreover, well-known that the cardinal numbers can be defined in terms of the ordinal numbers. Some philosophies of mathematics have taken this as a reason to hold the ordinal numbers as (metaphysically) fundamental. By discussing structuralism and neo-logicism we argue that one can empirically distinguish between accounts that endorse this fundamentality claim and those that do not. In particular, we argue that (...) if the ordinal numbers are metaphysically fundamental then it follows that one cannot acquire cardinal number concepts without appeal to ordinal notions. On the other hand, without this fundamentality thesis that would be possible. This allows for an empirical test to see which account best describes our actual mathematical practices. We then, finally, discuss some empirical data that suggests that we can acquire cardinal number concepts without using ordinal notions. However, there are some important gaps left open by this data that we point to as areas for future empirical research. (shrink)

The interactivist model of representation makes foundational criticisms of assumptions concerning representation that have been standard since the pre-Socratics and presents a positive model that differs from others on offer in several ways. The interactivist model of representation (or re- presenting), consequently, does not fit well within standard categories (though it is closest to the general pragmatist framework), and, consequently, is often miscategorized and misunderstood. A recent paper by Gładziejewski (2016) gives us an opportunity to address some of these issues. (...) Gładziejewski presupposes a model of the nature of representation, in a version derived from Ramsey (2007), that is precisely of the sort that the interactivist model argues does not work and is not, in principle, possible. Gładziejewski argues that the interactivist model does not satisfy the desiderata of this kind of model of representation, not taking into account that the interactivist model argues directly against such models and their desiderata. The central (though not the only) point is that Gładziejewski begs the question concerning the interactivist model by assuming precisely what the interactivist model argues is impossible, then charging interactivism with not satisfying these impossible desiderata. By simply accepting the Ramsey framework for understanding and modeling representation, he ignores the arguments against such frameworks, and thereby renders his own arguments circular. (shrink)

Against mathematical platonism, it is sometimes objected that mathematical objects are mysterious. One possible elaboration of this objection is that the individuation of mathematical objects cannot be adequately explained. This suggests that facts about the numerical identity and distinctness of mathematical objects require an explanation, but that their supposed nature precludes us from providing one. In this paper, we evaluate this nominalist objection by exploring three ways in which mathematical objects may be individuated: by the intrinsic properties they possess, by (...) the relations they stand in, and by their underlying ‘substance’. We argue that only the third mode of individuation raises metaphysical problems that could substantiate the claim that mathematical objects are somehow mysterious. Since the platonist is under no obligation to accept this thesis over the alternatives, we conclude that, at least as far as individuation is concerned, the nominalist objection has no bite. (shrink)

Cases of grounding failure present a puzzle for fundamental metaphysics. Typically, solutions are thought to lie either in adding ontology such as haecceities or in re‐describing the cases by means of the ideology of metaphysical indeterminacy. The controversial status of haecceities has led some to favour metaphysical indeterminacy as the way to solve the puzzle. We consider two further treatments of grounding failure each of which, we argue, is a more plausible alternative. As such, the initial dichotomy is a false (...) one, and these alternative options deserve consideration before resorting to the heavyweight machinery of metaphysical indeterminacy. -/- . (shrink)

According to the realist rendering of mathematical structuralism, mathematical structures are ontologically prior to individual mathematical objects such as numbers and sets. Mathematical objects are merely positions in structures: their nature entirely consists in having the properties arising from the structure to which they belong. In this paper, I offer a bundle-theoretic account of this structuralist conception of mathematical objects: what we normally describe as an individual mathematical object is the mereological bundle of its structural properties. An emerging picture is (...) a version of mereological essentialism: the structural properties of a mathematical object, as a bundle, are the mereological parts of the bundle, which are possessed by it essentially. (shrink)

Are there entities which are just distinct, with no discerning property or relation? Although the existence of such utterly indiscernible entities is ensured by mathematical and scientific practice, their legitimacy faces important philosophical challenges. I will discuss the most fundamental objections that have been levelled against utter indiscernibles, argue for the inadequacy of the extant arguments to allay perplexity about them, and put forward a novel defence of these entities against those objections.

Peter Singer is well known to have argued for our responsibilities to address global poverty based on an analogy with saving a drowning child. Just as the passerby has a duty to save that child, we have a duty to save children ‘drowning’ in poverty. Since its publication, more four decades ago, there have been numerous attempts to grapple with the inescapable moral challenge posed by Singer’s analogy. In this paper, we propose a new approach to the Singerian challenge, through (...) offering a different explanation for why our intuitions about rescuing a threatened person in front of us are more demanding than our intuitions about rescuing those living under equally threatening conditions of poverty. We argue that understanding the underlying motive or mechanism by which people come to endorse intuitions about duties of assistance undermines our confidence in the validity and robustness of some of the highly demanding intuitions that Singer relies on. This, in turn, puts serious limitations on the normative and practical reach of Singer’s analogy. (shrink)

We study groups definable in tame expansions of ω-stable theories. Assuming several tameness conditions, we obtain structural theorems for groups definable and interpretable in these expansions. As our main example, by characterizing independence in the pair, where K is an algebraically closed field and G is a multiplicative subgroup of K× with the Mann property, we show that the pair satisfies the assumptions. In particular, this provides a characterization of definable and interpretable groups in in terms of algebraic groups in (...) K and interpretable groups in G. Furthermore, we compute the Morley rank and the U-rank in and both ranks agree. (shrink)

This paper takes a closer look at the incompatibility thesis, namely the claim that consequentialism is incompatible with accepting the moral relevance of the doing-allowing distinction. I examine two attempts to reject the incompatibility thesis, the first by Samuel Scheffler and the second by Frances Kamm. I argue that both attempts fail to provide an adequate ground for rejecting the incompatibility thesis. I then put forward an account of what I take to be at stake in accepting or rejecting the (...) incompatibility thesis, namely the underlying conception of responsibility. There are, I contend, two relevant conceptions of responsibility, the globalist and the localist. In order for the compatibilist argument to go through, the globalist conception must be adopted. I aim to provide a formulation and defence of the dependency of the compatibilist view on the globalist conception of responsibility. I will not, however, argue for one conception of responsibility over the other. (shrink)

According to the neo-Fregean abstractionism, numerical expressions of the form ‘the number of Fs’, introduced by Hume’s Principle, should be read as purportedly referential singular terms. I will explore the prospects of a version of abstractionism in which such expressions have presuppositional content, as in Strawson’s account. I will argue that the thesis that ‘the number of Fs’ semantically presupposes the existence of a number is inconsistent with the required ‘modest’ stipulative character of the truth of Hume’s Principle: since Hume’s (...) Principle is true and provably presupposes that numbers exist, what it presupposes is also true; and so numbers exist. This, however, means that numbers are conjured into existence by a direct stipulation. (shrink)

Reference may be fixed by stipulation through a speech act, just like bets and marriages. An utterance of _Let n refer to an/the F_ is a speech act by means of which, if successful, a speaker institutes a practice of referring, and a hearer coordinates by choosing a referent from the domain of discourse. We articulate a metasemantics for this view. On our view, the interlocutors can select a referent randomly, if necessary, motivated by the incentive to coordinate on the (...) use of a name. Moreover, we argue that reference fixed by a performative speech act is ‘thin’, or ‘undemanding’. Finally, we defend the thesis that co-reference might not determinately obtain despite reference being fixed. Performative reference makes sense of ordinary speakers’ practices, who appear to be very liberal and unimpressed by skepticism toward causally inert or epistemically indiscernible objects. (shrink)

According to Øystein Linnebo's account of abstractionism, abstraction principles, received as Fregean criteria of identity, can be used to reduce facts about singular reference to objects such as directions and numbers to facts that do not involve such objects. In this article, first I show how the resources of Linnebo's metasemantics successfully handle Dummett's challenge against the referentiality of the singular terms formed by abstraction principles. Then, I argue that Linnebo's metasemantic commitments do not provide us with tools for dispelling (...) the threat of a version of referential indeterminacy, according to which nothing in our use of a singular term, even when it is guided by an associated criterion of identity, could determine which particular object it refers to. I end by examining the bearing of the indeterminacy challenge to Linnebo's treatment of Frege's Caesar Problem: in the absence of an argument against the indeterminacy of reference, it is unclear how numerical expressions could qualify as genuine singular terms. (shrink)

In the original publication of the article, footnote 17 was incorrectly published. The corrected footnote is given below.

Indeterminacy of reference appears to be incompatible with the deflationist conceptions of reference: in deflationismDeflationism, the singular term ‘a’ refers to a, if it exists, and to nothing else, whereas if the term is referentially indeterminate, it has a variety of equally permissible reference-candidates: referential indeterminacyReferential indeterminacy and deflationismDeflationism cannot both be maintained. In this paper, I discuss the incompatibility thesis, critically examine the arguments leading to it, and thereby point towards ways in which the deflationist can explain referential indeterminacyReferential (...) indeterminacy. (shrink)

Radical indeterminacy of reference is the thesis that there is no fact of the matter as to which objects singular terms refer to, and which sets of objects are in the extensions of predicates. For instance, it is indeterminate as to whether ‘London’ refers to a city in England or instead to a dormant volcano in Africa. This paper addresses a largely unexplored challenge against radical indeterminacy of reference: the claim that it is self-refuting, rendering its own thesis ineffable. I (...) develop several versions of this challenge and argue that they mischaracterize referential indeterminacy – either by depicting it as reliant on the determinacy of reference and singular thought, or by tying it to eliminativism about reference. (shrink)

This paper provides a critical commentary on Kasher and Yadlin's article. I start with a few remarks regarding the authors? claim about the uniqueness of fighting terrorism and their proposed definition of acts of terrorism. The main part of my commentary, however, is devoted to discussing Kasher and Yadlin's Principle of Distinction (Part II of their paper). There, I raise several objections to their proposed ranking of state duties and to the way they use the ranking to justify what they (...) call targeted prevention of terror. Finally, I make a few remarks pertaining more specifically to the Israeli?Palestinian situation. (shrink)

In this paper, we study the field of algebraic numbers with a set of elements of small height treated as a predicate. We prove that such structures are not simple and have the independence property. A real algebraic integer is called a Salem number if α and are Galois conjugate and all other Galois conjugates of α lie on the unit circle. It is not known whether 1 is a limit point of Salem numbers. We relate the simplicity of a (...) certain pair with Lehmer's conjecture and obtain a model‐theoretic characterization of Lehmer's conjecture for Salem numbers. (shrink)

In this paper, we study an algebraically closed field \ expanded by two unary predicates denoting an algebraically closed proper subfield k and a multiplicative subgroup \. This will be a proper expansion of algebraically closed field with a group satisfying the Mann property, and also pairs of algebraically closed fields. We first characterize the independence in the triple \\). This enables us to characterize the interpretable groups when \ is divisible. Every interpretable group H in \\) is, up to (...) isogeny, an extension of a direct sum of k-rational points of an algebraic group defined over k and an interpretable abelian group in \ by an interpretable group N, which is the quotient of an algebraic group by a subgroup \, which in turn is isogenous to a cartesian product of k-rational points of an algebraic group defined over k and an interpretable abelian group in \. (shrink)

The claim that one is never morally permitted to engage in non-optimal harm doing enjoys a great intuitive appeal. If in addition to this claim, we reject the moral relevance of the doingallowing distinction. In this short essay, I propose a different take on the argument in question. Instead of opting to reject its conclusion by defending the moral relevance of the doingallowing distinction, we can no longer rely on the strong intuitive appeal of the claim that one is never (...) morally permitted to engage in non-optimal harm doing. (shrink)

Funniness, a property the nature of which is both seemingly obvious and yet resistant to analysis, has been the object of intermittent attention in philosophy since Plato. Sometimes this attention has taken the form of an investigation into the nature of laughter and the humorous. Sometimes it has taken comic art-forms as its object, though tragedy has received a good deal more attention from philosophers. And sometimes it has focused on jokes and put-downs in their considerable variety, and ethical questions (...) associated with them. All these inquiries are, of course, interlinked. In this paper, we focus on the ethics of jokes, but will then draw connections between that issue and the question of the ethical dimension of humor in put-downs and in art. Our inquiry is thus part of a larger investigation in aesthetics on the relation between artistic and moral value generally. (shrink)

Consequentialists do not deny that cost to the agent is a morallyrelevant consideration. For, they do include cost to the agent inthe calculation of the overall good. What they deny, however, isthat cost to the agent is a morally relevant factor independentlyof its impact on the overall good. I argue in this paper that, ifone rejects the claim that cost to the agent is a morallyrelevant factor on its own right, one is then committed toaccepting some `hyper' counter-intuitive moral claims. (...) I callthese claims hyper counter-intuitive because they are at a moreextreme level of counter-intuitiveness than the ones usuallyassociated with consequentialism. (shrink)

The extension of the principle of relativity to general coordinate systems is based on the hypothesis that an accelerated observer is locally equivalent to a hypothetical inertial observer with the same velocity as the noninertial observer. This hypothesis of locality is expected to be valid for classical particle phenomena as well as for classical wave phenomena but only in the short-wavelength approximation. The generally covariant theory is therefore expected to be in conflict with the quantum theory which is based on (...) wave-particle duality. This is explicitly demonstrated for the frequency of electromagnetic radiation measured by a uniformly rotating observer. The standard Doppler formula is shown to be valid only in the geometric optics approximation. A new definition for the frequency is proposed, and the resulting formula for the frequency measured by the rotating observer is shown to be consistent with expectations based on the classical theory of electrons. A tentative quantum theory is developed on the basis of the generalization of the Bohr frequency condition to include accelerated observers. The description of the causal sequence of events is assumed to be independent of the motion of the observer. Furthermore, the quantum hypothesis is supposed to be valid for all observers. The implications of this theory are critically examined. The new formula for frequency, which is still based on the hypothesis of locality, leads to the observation of negative energy quanta by the rotating observer and is therefore in conflict with the quantum theory. (shrink)

A gyroscope in orbit about a central rotating mass undergoes relativistic nutational oscillations in addition to the well-known precessional motions. The amplitude of the oscillation is proportional to the angular momentum of the rotating mass and its period is the Fokker period of geodetic precession. The amplitude is maximum for a polar orbit and vanishes if the orbit is equatorial. This nodding effect is due to a small divisor phenomenon involving the Fokker frequency, and its existence implies that the applicability (...) of the post-Newtonian approximation of general relativity is limited in time. The dynamical significance of the new effect for the relative motion of neighboring test masses in the field of a rotating mass as well as for the restricted three-body problem in general relativity is investigated and the possibility of its detection is briefly discussed. (shrink)

How do we acquire the notions of cardinality and cardinal number? In the (neo-)Fregean approach, they are derived from the notion of equinumerosity. According to some alternative approaches, defended and developed by Husserl and Parsons among others, the order of explanation is reversed: equinumerosity is explained in terms of cardinality, which, in turn, is explained in terms of our ordinary practices of counting. In their paper, ‘Cardinality, Counting, and Equinumerosity’, Richard Kimberly Heck proposes that instead of equinumerosity or counting, cardinality (...) is derived from a cognitively earlier notion of _just as many_. In this paper, we assess Heck’s proposal in terms of contemporary theories of number concept acquisition. Focusing on bootstrapping theories, we argue that there is no evidence that the notion of _just as many_ is cognitively primary. Furthermore, since the acquisition of cardinality is an enculturated process, the cognitive primariness of these notions, possibly including _just as many_, depends on various external cultural factors. Therefore, being possibly a cultural construction, _just as many_ could be one among several notions used in the acquisition of cardinality and cardinal number concepts. This paper thus challenges those accounts which seek for a fundamental concept underlying all aspects of numerical cognition. (shrink)

We give reasons for our judgements of works of art. (2) Reasons are inherently general, and hence dependent on principles. (3) There are no principles of aesthetic evaluation. Each of these three propositions seems plausible, yet one of them must be false. Illusionism denies (1). Particularism denies (2). Generalism denies (3). We argue that illusionism depends on an unacceptable account of the use of critical language. Particularism cannot account for the connection between reasons and verdicts in criticism. Generalism comes in (...) two forms: reversible generalism is the thesis that there are meaningful generalizations in criticism that admit of exceptions; irreversible generalism is the thesis that such generalizations cannot admit of exceptions. It is argued that Frank Sibley's defence of reversible generalism cannot provide a criterion for distinguishing valenced from non-valenced properties, and thus fails. Irreversible generalism is correct: it is logically cogent and fits our critical practices. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Literature, Knowledge, and ValueOliver Conolly and Bashshar HaydarMany of the terms we use to assess works of literature are cognitive in nature. We say that a work is profound, insightful, shrewd, well-observed, or perceptive, and conversely that it is shallow, or sentimental, or impercipient. A common thread running throughout this terminology is that works of literature are ascribed cognitive features affecting the value of those works qua literature. Use (...) of this terminology therefore implies adherence to a substantial philosophical theory, cognitivism, the thesis that (1) works of literature have cognitive content, and (2) this content enhances their value as works of literature. Note that cognitivism is not the thesis that literature's value resides in its causing us to acquire knowledge, but rather in its displaying such knowledge. A given work's displaying knowledge does not of course entail that it causes us to acquire it.While cognitivism appears consistent with literary critical practice, it is open to a number of objections. In this paper we aim to defend cognitivism and in the process refine it. Broadly, objections to cognitivism deny either (1) the thesis that works of literature contain any cognitive content, or (2) the thesis that such content can be aesthetically relevant in the sense of being relevant to the evaluation of works of literature qua literature. The principal objection is to (2), for it is difficult to deny that no knowledge whatsoever can be obtained from works of art. For example, the Iliad sheds light on values, habits and customs of ancient Greeks, and nineteenth-century Russian novels may inform us about contemporary debates concerning the emancipation of the serfs. It is the relevance of such knowledge to the artistic value of the literature that is in issue. [End Page 111]IThe main challenge faced by the cognitivist is well put by the anti-cognitivist, Peter Lamarque, thus: the "question artistic cognitivists dread most is what (nontrivial) truths they have learnt from works of art." It is thought a difficult question because in "propositional terms the best they can come up with are usually generalities of numbingly banal kind."1 The objection, in short, is that while it is correct that truths can be gleaned from literature, they are trivial. We call this the triviality objection. Stolnitz for example states that the truth to be learned from Pride and Prejudice is, "Stubborn pride and ignorant prejudice keep attractive people apart," which he describes as "pitifully meager."2However, the notion of an insight implies nontriviality: a "trivial insight" is an oxymoron. So if the triviality objection succeeds, it follows that we should either stop calling works of literature insightful and perceptive, or that those terms have a different meaning in the context of literary criticism than they do in everyday parlance.There is nothing which in principle debars a philosophical theory from correcting mistaken practices but the practice in this case is widespread and, on the face of it, unobjectionable. The alternative available open to anti-cognitivism is that literary critical terminology has an altogether different meaning from that in ordinary parlance, so that in a literary context a term such as "insightful" has a formal meaning only. Peter Lamarque for instance asserts that we (rightly) evaluate works of literature in part in terms of their content, but not in terms of the truth of the content: "it is usually a work's treatment of a theme which is judged profound or sentimental."3 Lamarque gives the following examples: "Milton's treatment of the Fall is profound just as is Descartes's appeal to God to refute scepticism, but neither need be interpreted as true." However, it is not as easy to divorce profundity from truth as Lamarque implies. With regard to Milton's treatment of the Fall, it is possible to find it profound without believing in the literal truth of the Fall. One might point to, for example, Milton's treatment of the sexuality of Adam and Eve, and the way in which it is bound up with their awareness of their mortality. When, in Paradise Lost, Adam learns of Eve's disobedience, he declares his wish to fall with her... (shrink)