McDowell’s “Avoiding the Myth of the Given” (2008, 2009) attempts to reconcile two claims: 1) what we most fundamentally experience is a fundamental level of invariable simple objects and their sensible properties; experience of these objects and properties is the ultimate ground of our knowledge of the world; 2) experience is through-and-through conceptually structured. This leads McDowell to endorsing the incoherent notion of intuitional content – necessary and thus irrevisable basic empirical conceptually structured contents or empirical categories. The notion requires (...) the necessity and irrevisability of purely formal concepts and the on-going responsiveness to experience of empirical concepts. This reveals a dilemma: If the fundamental objects of experience are invariable then they cannot have empirically conceptual form; for revisability is a mark of the empirically conceptual. But purely formal concepts cannot give us the fundamental empirical structure of the world. The dilemma forces us to choose between claiming that the fundamental objects of experience are invariable and claiming that they are conceptually formed. I conclude by briefly describing how Kant successfully faces the challenge of accounting for the most fundamental invariable level of objects of experience without yielding to the myth of the given. (shrink)

Anthropology of Consciousness, EarlyView.

Thinking About Judaism: Philosophical Reflections on Jewish Thought examines the light shed by philosophy upon significant areas of Jewish life and academic studies, including Jewish history, Jewish ethics, Jewish law, and Jewish aesthetics. As the author clearly illustrates, the teachings of leading theorists on the subjects of general history, ethics, law, and aesthetics inspire us to think about corresponding subjects related to Judaica.

John McDowell argued that the virtuous person (VP) knows no temptation: her perception of a situation silences all competing motivations – be it fear in the face of danger or a strong desire. The VP cannot recognize any reason to act non-virtuously as a reason, and is never inclined to act non-virtuously. This view rests on the requirement that the VP rationally respond, and not merely react, to the environment – it rests on the requirement that the relation between the (...) VP and the world (ethical requirements) must rule out the possibility that the VP is a brain in a vat. I will argue that the opposite is true: virtue requires a sensitivity to temptation. The VP, as such, must be able to recognize reasons for performing non-virtuous actions as reasons, and be inclined to perform them. She must find nothing human alien. This is so because the VP must possess the ability to understand non-virtuous agents, and understanding necessarily involves vulnerability to temptation. Otherwise, it will be argued, the VP views the actions of others as determined from outside the space of reasons. But the VP, like any other person, must have the ability to view the actions of others as rational responses to the environment, not only as reactions to it. Put differently, the VP’s view of others must rule out the possibility that they are brains in a vat – the possibility that their actions are merely caused, rather than justified, by the facts. Finally, it will be suggested that an amended conception of the VP can meet both requirements: view others as rationally responsive to the world, without relinquishing its relation to the facts. (shrink)

Obsessive doubt and commitment phobia are relationship wreckers. Written by an anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) expert, Relationship OCD offers an evidence-based, cognitive-behavioral approach to finding relief from chronic relationship anxiety. Readers will learn to challenge the intrusive thoughts and worries that trigger harmful emotions, embrace the uncertainty inherent in all human connections, and discover a deeper sense of intimacy and trust.

McDowell’s “Avoiding the Myth of the Given” (2008, 2009) attempts to reconcile two claims: 1) what we most fundamentally experience is a fundamental level of invariable simple objects and their sensible properties; experience of these objects and properties is the ultimate ground of our knowledge of the world; 2) experience is through-and-through conceptually structured. This leads McDowell to endorsing the incoherent notion of intuitional content – necessary and thus irrevisable basic empirical conceptually structured contents or empirical categories. The notion requires (...) the necessity and irrevisability of purely formal concepts and the on-going responsiveness to experience of empirical concepts. This reveals a dilemma: If the fundamental objects of experience are invariable then they cannot have empirically conceptual form; for revisability is a mark of the empirically conceptual. But purely formal concepts cannot give us the fundamental empirical structure of the world. The dilemma forces us to choose between claiming that the fundamental objects of experience are invariable and claiming that they are conceptually formed. I conclude by briefly describing how Kant successfully faces the challenge of accounting for the most fundamental invariable level of objects of experience without yielding to the myth of the given. (shrink)

The Subject of Violence is a critical investigation of violence and its subjectifying capacities. It both relies on and explores the work of Hannah Arendt.

We present and defend a view labeled “practiceism” which provides a solution to the incompatibility problems. The classic incompatibility problem is inconsistency of:1. Someone who intentionally violates the rules of a game is not playing the game.2. In many cases, players intentionally violate the rules as part of playing the game.The problem has a normative counterpart:1’. In normal cases, it is wrong for a player to intentionally violate the rules of the game.2’. In many normal cases, it is not wrong (...) for a player to intentionally violate the rules of the game.According to both formalism and informalism, the rules of the game include the formal rules of the game. Both traditional positions avoid the incompatibility problems by rejecting 1 and 1'. Practiceism rejects 2 and 2’: it maintains that the rules are the rules manifested in playing the game, not the formal rules.Practiceism presents two theses: (... (shrink)

Remarks on Sandra Lee Bartky's Femininity and Domination.

The possibility of promising requires a determined obligation that distinguishes breaking a promise from merely failing to keep it, thus enabling both parties to know what the promise entails. In addition, a recognizable commitment must bind the promiser and justify the promisee’s reliance. It is widely accepted that fulfilling these functions requires a rule of promises – either a convention or a moral principle. The paper criticizes this common view and presents an alternative. I introduce the concept ‘quamise’. Quamises are (...) particular expressions of intentions to act, made within personal relationships which involve normative requirements. Given these requirements, quamising determines an obligation and justifies reliance sans rule. I argue that promises within relationships are in fact quamises. Consequently, a unified account of promises is available only if quamises can be made to strangers, without implicitly appealing to a rule. I show that an attempt to quamise can, under appropriate conditions, create the relationship needed for quamising. The conditions that enable quamising to strangers include the social emotion of shame, which provides the accountability to strangers required for reliance, as well as various salient precedents and practices the parties can designate in order to determine an obligation. Thus, a rule of promises is unnecessary. According to this view, the moral nature of promises resembles that of personal commitments: fidelity to promises is a virtue in the sense that friendship is. (shrink)

The paper introduces the “Contest Paradox”: on the one hand, rational competitors employ the most effective means to achieve the constitutive end of games - winning; On the other hand, apparently rational competitors often employ means that are sub-optimal for winning, e.g., playing beautifully or fairly. Nevertheless, the actions of such competitors are viewed as rational. Are such competitors rational? I reject the possibility of resolving the paradox by appealing to additional ends or norms to winning, such as playing sportingly. (...) Instead, I argue that the constitutive end of games is not a win simpliciter, but a type of win, such as winning-beautifully or winning-fairly. This interpretive framework is theoretically advantageous because it accounts better for the ‘unity of action’ or ‘flow’ competitors experience, better deals with various cases, and accommodates different traditions of competing. (shrink)

The republican political tradition, which originated in Ancient Rome and picked up by several early-modern thinkers, has been revived in the last couple of decades following the seminal works of historian Quentin Skinner and political theorist Philip Pettit. Although educational questions do not normally occupy the center stage in republican theory, various theorists working within this framework have already highlighted the significance of education for any functioning republic. Looking at educational questions through the lens of freedom as non-domination has already (...) yielded important insights to discussions of political education. However, consideration of the existing republican educational discourse in light of the wide range of issues discussed in Pettit’s recent works reveals that it suffers from two major lacunae. First, it does not take into consideration the distinction (and deep connection) between democracy and social justice that has become central to Pettit’s republicanism. Thus, the current discussion focuses almost exclusively on education for democratic citizenship and hardly touches upon social justice. Second, the current literature thinks mainly in terms of educating future citizens, rather than conceiving of students also as political agents in the present, and of school itself as a site of non-domination. This paper aims at filling these voids, and it will therefore be oriented along two intersecting axes: the one between democracy and justice, and the other between future citizenship in the state and present citizenship at school. The resulting four categories will organize the discussion: future citizens and democracy; future citizens and social justice; present citizens and democracy; present citizens and social justice. This will not only enable us to draw a clearer line between the civic republican and liberal educational theories, but also make civic republican education a viable alternative to current educational approaches. (shrink)

Strategic fouls are intentional violations of the rules ‘in which the violator expects to be detected and penalized but expects some benefit to his or her competitive effectiveness’ (Fraleigh...

The neo-republican political philosophy (sometimes referred to as civic republicanism) advances the idea of freedom as non-domination, in an attempt to provide democracy with a solid normative foundation upon which concrete principles and institutions can be erected so as to make freedom a reality. However, attempts to develop a republican educational theory are still hesitant, and fail to take the republican radical conception of freedom to its full conclusions. This article suggests that dialogue between neo-republicanism and critical pedagogy can be (...) mutually productive. In the first part of the article we present the neo-republican theory, and contrast it with traditional liberalism. In the second we focus on existing neo-republican theories of education, and claim that they do not take the republican presuppositions to their necessary conclusion, namely to an educational theory fully committed to the idea of freedom as dondomination. A republican educational theory, we argue, must take into consideration not only the freedom students will have in the future, but also their freedom in the present: it should think of school as a small-scale republic, which prepares its inhabitants to be future citizens of the state while at the same time treating them as free citizens in their own right. In the third part we use insights taken from critical pedagogy to chart the direction republican education must take by applying three key republican notions—democratic control, civic contestation, and trust. In the fourth and last part we outline four aspects in which neo-republicanism can shed new light on contemporary debates in critical pedagogy: the connection between democracy and justice, the multiplicity of forms of domination, critical education within schools, and work with students from relatively privileged backgrounds. (shrink)

The paper argues that Rawls's account of the obligation to keep promises entails that inasmuch as we are obliged to keep promises, we are also obliged to carry out threats. On the basis of the principle of fairness, Rawls claimed that a social practice creates a moral obligation if it is just, and one has benefited from it or entered it voluntarily. A practice of threats meets Rawls's first principle of justice. We may reasonably assume that immoral threats, just like (...) immoral promises, are not socially obliging. Threats meet Rawls's second principle of justice mainly because weaker parties benefit from drawing red lines, backed by credible threats. Finally, threats create social benefits: they contribute to social cooperation and collaboration. The argument entails that we must either accept the counterintuitive claim that threats are morally binding, or reject Rawls's account of the obligation to keep promises. (shrink)

It is commonly accepted that non-hypocrisy is a condition of blaming, and that it is a moral condition. This paper proposes an alternative, epistemic, view of blaming: knowledge is necessary for blaming, and with the added condition that knowledge provides a (motivating) reason for action – sufficient. First it is argued that knowing that the action of a blamee is wrong is necessary for blaming. Second, it is shown that the phenomenon of hypocritical blaming extends to circumstances not involving moral (...) judgment (such as sports). Third, it is claimed that expressions of intentions such as (1) “A is wrong and I intend to do it” are infelicitous as they stand. The similarities between such expressions and hypocritical blaming recommend a unified account of their infelicity. Finally, it is argued that only the epistemic view of blaming provides accounts for both moral and non-moral blaming, and for the related phenomena. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Understand All, Forgive Nothing:The Self-Indictment of Humbert HumbertYuval EylonFor me a work of fiction exists only insofar as it affords me what I shall bluntly call aesthetic bliss, that is a sense of being somehow, somewhere, connected with other states of being where art (curiosity, tenderness, kindness, ecstasy) is the norm.—Vladimir Nabokov, "On a Book Entitled Lolita"Pride is the tendency to overestimate oneself, or underestimate others. In either case, (...) a proud person overestimates his own qualities. Since such a person is inclined to view others as inferior and his own actions as admirable, a proud person is disposed to underestimate the suffering he inflicts on others, or worse—to try and justify it. Curiosity about others, tenderness, and kindness, rarely accompanies pride. Thus, it often conflicts with a charitable view of others, and begets cruelty and callousness. Pride is often accompanied by the desire to be admired by others. This desire gives rise to vanity, or vainglory: a vice that seems destined to give rise to further vices. Aquinas clearly expresses this view in the Summa Theologia:1... the vices which by their very nature are such as to be directed to the end of a certain capital vice, are called its daughters. Now the end of vainglory is the manifestation of one's own excellence, as stated above (A1, 4). To this end a man may tend in two ways. On one way directly, [End Page 158] either by words, and this is boasting, or by deeds, and then if they be true and call for astonishment, it is love of novelties which men are wont to wonder at most; but if they be false, it is hypocrisy. On another way a man strives to make known his excellence by showing that he is not inferior to another, and this in four ways. First, as regards the intellect, and thus we have "obstinacy," by which a man is too much attached to his own opinion, being unwilling to believe one that is better. Secondly, as regards the will, and then we have "discord," whereby a man is unwilling to give up his own will, and agree with others. Thirdly, as regards "speech," and then we have "contention," whereby a man quarrels noisily with another. Fourthly as regards deeds, and this is "disobedience," whereby a man refuses to carry out the command of his superiors.However, whereas pride is an attitude that a person has towards himself, vanity involves a relation with others which pride does not: it emanates from the need to manifest one's excellence to others and gain their approval. Thus, since the proud person does not engage with the opinions of others, his view of himself remains secure. Vanity, on the hand, can prove to be a blessing in disguise: the attempt to gain approval could lead to self-awareness.The pride of Humbert Humbert, the main character and narrator in Nabokov's Lolita, is the pride of an aesthete: intellectually superior, and determined to pursue his appetites. But Humbert is not only proud.2 He is also vain. Vanity leads him to seek the approval of others, and underlines his artistic aspirations. He undertakes the writing of a manuscript, designed to be a masterpiece that vindicates his actions. In his manuscript, Humbert tries to elicit the reader's sympathy, in the conviction that sympathetic identification would lead to acceptance. However, while he successfully challenges and threatens the reader's moral outlook, writing the manuscript has an unintended effect: it shatters Humbert's own convictions and leads to moral transformation. The reason for this transformation is that he recognizes the aesthetic faults of his work, and traces these faults to his own moral faults.The claim that aesthetic considerations can play an important role in moral thinking cannot be taken for granted. First, the threat of an empty aestheticism must be addressed, because it seems that aesthetic considerations and the pursuit of aesthetic ideals compete with moral considerations, rather than complete them. As Humbert illustrates, aesthetic pursuit motivates acts of cruelty and callousness, and aesthetic ideals are often devoid of any moral significance. Second, if aesthetic [End Page 159] considerations... (shrink)

This paper examines the notion of fouls in sports. In the first part of the paper, we examine some actual distinctions and classifications between different kinds of fouls. In the second part we examine the significance, validity, and justification of these classifications from a normative perspective.The term ‘foul’ evokes negative connotation; some would say—negative normative connotations. Conventional wisdom suggests that typically to commit fouls is, by definition, to go against the rules or principles of the contest. Since sport contests are (...) constitutive activities—this means that to foul is to go against the essence of the contest. In other words, to commit fouls seems not to play the game; it seems unsporting. Consider the following typical example: in a premiership match in 2014 Hull’s forward Nikica Jelavic spun around Company and had a clear path to the goal. Manchester City’s defender Vincent Kompany then held him back. Although immediately ejected from the game, it is noteworthy that Kompany... (shrink)

The thesis argued for in this work is that under certain conditions the use of violence is morally obligatory. The thesis is advanced as an alternative to both the pacifist and the liberal, right-oriented theses which are rooted in the idea that violence is evil. The defense consists of an exposition of the problems of the pacifist and liberal theses on the one hand and the development of a system that makes it possible to conceive of the use of violence (...) as morally obligatory on the other hand. ;The work begins with an examination of the socio-practical consequences of the idea that violent is evil--the blindness and insensitivity toward violence that most of us exhibit most of the time. Next comes an analysis of the pacifist and liberal moralities of violence that point out the two are grounded in similar utopian visions of a harmonious world and how they fail to be responsive to the demands of practice. The idea that violence is evil is examined next and a morally neutral conception of violence, an idea of non-abusive violence, is suggested as a preliminary to the consideration of an alternative morality of violence. ;The construction of an alternative begins with the outline of a schema for a moral system. The idea of human dignity is taken as its unifying notion and the ideals of justice, freedom and respect for persons as unfolding it. Moral rules understood as specifying moral obligation are taken as the mechanism of practical morality. The idea of moral policy is introduced as a middle ground between moral ideals and moral rules. The moral ideals are used to draw a distinction between savagery and a violent social world. The choice of a violent social world is understood as the choice of a world in which violence is morally regulated by rules that specify when we are morally obligated to use violence and when we are morally obligated to refrain from the use of violence. A discussion of such rules completes the construction of the alternative. (shrink)

This essay expresses ambivalence about the use of the term "evil" in analyses of terrorism in light of the association of the two in speeches intended to justify the United States' "war on terrorism." At the same time, the essay suggests that terrorism can be regarded as "evil" but only when considered among a multiplicity of "evils" comparable to it, for example: rape, war crimes, and repression.

In this essay I examine the history of the sexuality debates among feminists. In both the nineteenth century and the recent sexuality debates the personal is taken to be foundational for a political stance, while simultaneously the debates transform feminist understandings of the extent to which the personal is political. I suggest that this transformation undermines the epistemological assumptions of the debates, resulting in a feminism that cannot be radical.

At stake for this essay is the distinction between politics and war and the extent to which politics can survive war. Gender analysis reveals how high these stakes are by revealing the complexity of militarism. It also reveals the impossibility of gender identity as foundation for a more robust politics with respect to war. Instead, a non-ideal normative differentiation among kinds of violence is affirmed as that which politically cannot not be wanted.