Written by four recognized experts with senior experience in research and government, this text is the first comprehensive survival kit for students and practitioners of economic policy. It is set to become an indispensable resource for everyone involved or interested in modern economic policy. Academic scholars willing to engage in policy discussions and students at graduate or advanced undergraduate levels will find it an essential bridge to the policy world. What makes the book unique is that it combines like no (...) other, facts-based analysis, state-of-the art theories and models, and insights from first-hand policy experience at national and international levels. The book has grown out of ten years of experience teaching economic policy at the graduate level. It provides an intellectually coherent framework to understand the potentialities and limits of economic policy. It addresses positive dimensions, normative dimensions and political-economy constraints. It fills an important gap by reconciling in each major policy area stylized facts of recent economic history, key questions faced by contemporary policymakers, and essential lessons from theory which are captured and explained in a clear, concise, and self-contained way. All major areas of domestic and international policymaking are covered: fiscal policy, monetary policy, international finance and exchange-rate policy, tax policy, and long-term growth policies. The book concludes with a special chapter on the lessons of the financial crisis. The authors are intellectually non-partisan and they draw examples from various countries and experiences; from emerging markets to developing economies, shedding light when necessary on local specificities such as European Union rules and instruments. Economic Policy: Theory and Practice is the essential guide to economic policy in the new post-crisis context. (shrink)

Jan Patocka (1907-1977) est l'un des philosophes tchèques les plus éminents du XXe siècle pour ses travaux sur la phénoménologie et la philosophie antique traduits pour la plupart en français. Il fut par ailleurs, avec Vaclav Havel, l'un des principaux opposants à la mise au pas de la Tchécoslovaquie par l'Union soviétique, engagement qu'il paiera de sa vie après un long interrogatoire policier. La naissance est généralement peu étudiée par la philosophie. Dans la mesure où la phénoménologie se consacre à (...) l'apparition des phénomènes, ce thème ne pouvait lui rester étranger. La naissance se confond avec notre venue au monde, notre irruption dans la vie : elle est le foyer de l'existence. C'est l'originalité de ce questionnement que met en valeur Frédéric Jacquet, en situant cette oeuvre par rapport aux fondateurs de la phénoménologie, Husserl et Heidegger, et en la confrontant avec Sartre et Merleau-Ponty. (shrink)

The pigeonhole principle is a well-known mathematical principle and is quite simple to understand. It goes as follows: If n items are placed into m containers, and if m (...) an identifier (nominal). They suggest quantities first need to be turned into categories. We believe this difference can instead be explained by pragmatic factors not taken into account in their study. We disambiguate the problems given to participants and study the effects of their disambiguation and the influence of different kinds of quantities: countable and mass. We show that using a problem with countable quantities instead of hair, usually understood as non-countable, increase the performance of participants, no longer distinguishable from that of the nominal problem. (shrink)

Le livre de Dragoş Duicu présente l’oeuvre de Patočka comme une phénoménologie du mouvement dont il opère l’archéologie conceptuelle en effectuant un retour à Aristote, ce qui permet aussi de situer Patočka dans le paysage phénoménologique. Il est établi tout au long de l’ouvrage que le mouvement est le sens d’être de l’être, dès lors compris comme physis, et de l’existence elle-même qui est mouvement de part en part, force voyante. Ce qui pour la tradition philosophique échappe au mouvrement est (...) en vérité toujours une extase du mouvement, déposé par lui, et s’avère dès lors secondaire, dérivé, car sédimenté. La philosophie de Patočka se donne donc indissociablement comme une ontologie et une phénoménologie du mouvement, l’auteur proposant un approfondissement cosmologique de la phénoménologie largement étayé sur une théorie de la sédimentation. Le livre offre une interprétation aussi érudite qu’originale de la cosmologie et de l’anthropophénoménologie patočkiennes.The book of Dragoş Duicu, presents the work of Patočka as a phenomenology of movement wherein he operates a conceptual archaeology by returning to Aristotle, and which allows him to situate Patočka in the phenomenological landscape. It is established throughout the work that movement is the meaning of being, therefore understood as physis, and that existence itself is all-around movement, force voyante. That which in the philosophical tradition escapes from movement is always in truth an ecstasy of movement, laid by the movement, which happens to be secondary and derivative, for it is ‘sedimented.’ The philosophy of Patočka presents itself therefore inseparably as an ontology and phenomenology of movement, as the author proposes a cosmological deepening of phenomenology largely supported by a theory of sedimentation. The book offers an interpretation as scholarly as it is original of the Patočkian cosmology and anthropo-phenomenology.Il libro di Dragoş Duicu presenta l’opera di Jan Patočka come una fenomenologia del movimento di cui l’autore svolge un’archeologia concettuale, che risale fino ad Aristotele, e al tempo stesso una ricollocazione all’interno del paesaggio fenomenologico. Il libro è attraversato da un filo rosso: il movimento è il senso d’essere dell’essere, in quanto physis, e dell’esistenza stessa, in quanto movimento anch’essa da cima a fondo, movimento o forza veggente. In questa prospettiva, ciò che per la tradizione filosofica si sottrae al movimento è sempre in verità un’estasi del movimento, depositata dal movimento stesso e proprio perciò secondaria, derivata, sedimentata. La filosofia di Patočka si offre, indissociabilmente, come un’ontologia e come una fenomenologia del movimento, come mostra Duicu sulla base di un approfondimento cosmologico della fenomenologia patockiana largamente incentrato su una teoria della sedimentazione. Il libro offre quindi un’interpretazione tanto erudita quanto originale della cosmologia e dell’antropologia patočkiane. (shrink)

L’enjeu de cette analyse de la signification de l’expression sub quadam specie aeternitatis est double: projeter un éclairage nouveau, d’une part sur la nature des rapports entre raison et science intuitive, d’autre part sur l’articulation entre durée et éternité. Que les formules sub specie et sub quadam specie aeternitatis soient équivalentes ou non, il s’agit dans les deux cas de figure, de déterminer les raisons de la présence, puis de la disparition de l’adjectif quadam. Enfin on examine les occurrences de (...) l’expression sub quadam specie aeternitatis et des deux autres variantes pour mieux cerner leur signification et leur portée. (shrink)

L'expérience esthétique est la voie de la phénoménologie ; c'est du moins ce qu'établit Dufrenne avec une profondeur inégalée. Cette expérience est décrite de façon novatrice selon une phénoménologie du sentiment, qui est le fil conducteur de cette philosophie. La réduction - devenue dès lors réduction esthétique - conduit à l'essence de la manifestation et se prolonge en une réduction cosmologique : le monde se trouve conquis en sa figure originaire, la Nature, qui est pensée comme source ou matrice universelle. (...) L'esthétique enveloppe en outre une réflexion sur l'imagination, l'image et l'imaginaire, comme sur la beauté, marquant l'une des originalités de la perspective dufrennienne. Les percées ontologiques réalisées débouchent alors sur une cosmo-esthétique qui se prolonge en une cosmopoétique. Il s'agit à la fois de concevoir l'appartenance de l'homme au monde, qui le précède et l'excède, ainsi que la différence subjective, puisqu'il est capable de le percevoir. Cette philosophie définit la Nature comme Infini expressif - esthétique et poétique -, et montre que l'homme est appelé à vivre poétiquement, les exigences éthiques et politiques étant nouées à l'esthétique, où le sens de l'humain s'atteste."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

The author describes and sociocognitive skills that he argues as being necessary for tool use. We propose that those skills could be based on simpler detection systems humans could share with other animal tool users. More specifically, we discuss the impact of object affordances on the understanding and the social learning of tool use.

In his book, Emre Şan undertakes a confrontation between Merleau-Ponty and Patočka on the question of transcendence understood as a phenomenological problem,indeed as the problem of phenomenology. This approach has the great merit of identifying the meaning of being of Being as promise, on the path of an ontology beyondHusserl and Heidegger. Emre Şan’s book thus offers a very important contribution to phenomenological studies.

Penser l'énergie de l'être, ou mieux encore l'être comme énergie - telle est la visée aussi discrète que décisive de la philosophie élaborée par Mikel Dufrenne. Il engage une refonte de la phénoménologie accomplie au prisme de l'esthétique, qui se déploie elle-même selon une phénoménologie du sentiment. Or, le sentiment esthétique est toujours la révélation d'un monde - allègre, tragique etc. - où le monde affleure en sa puissance-de-manifestation. La question est alors celle d'un approfondissement métaphysique de la phénoménologie, où (...) le monde, c'est-à-dire la Nature, est comprise comme ± Terre-mère abyssale et féconde?, source productrice universelle. Cependant, comment ce qui existe indépendamment de l'homme peut-il accéder, comme tel. à la manifestation? Comment l'humaine finitude peut-elle atteindre ce qui la précède et l'excède? Menant de ce point de vue une réflexion épistémique cruciale, le phénoménologue chemine vers une métaphysique dont il s'agit de livrer les coordonnées, elle appelle en outre une érotique, une éthique et une politique qui en sont le legs fécond.00Ces conquêtes s'effectuent de surcroît dans une confrontation avec Merleau-Ponty, Minkowski, Heidegger et Bergson, mais aussi avec Schelling et Plotin, le préciser permet d'établir la singularité de la voie tracée, celle d'une métaphysique de l'énergie édifiée depuis une phénoménologie du sentiment. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage met en évidence la version maldinéenne du retour aux choses mêmes, largement effectué selon une esthétique-artistique. Il est alors possible d'expliciter les notions de transpassibilité et de transpossibilité, coeur théorique de la phénoménologie événementiale édifiée par Maldiney.

La naissance est la source vive de notre existence, elle ne fut pourtant jamais mise au centre de la philosophie. Au contraire, il s'agit de montrer que la philosophie doit se constituer comme philosophie de la naissance, articulant phénoménologie, métaphysique et anthropologie. Considérer la naissance ouvre une compréhension neuve de l'épochè -- devenue épochè natale --, la réflexion suivant alors la voie d'une heuristique de la naissance. Cette heuristique archéologique décèle à la fois la Natalité-Infinie du monde et l'événement de (...) la naissance métaphysique de la vie. Il devient alors possible d'élaborer une anthropologie-selon-la-naissance qui décrit l'événement de la naissance d'un homme -- en tant que naissance existentiale, aperturale ou épochale --, ainsi que sa naissance continuée -- sa natalité existentielle. Cette dynamique existentielle est en outre susceptible de dénatalisation comme d'un procès de renatalisation examinés pour eux-mêmes, et cette anthropologie, nourrissant par ailleurs une conception inédite de la mort, enveloppe aussi les prolégomènes d'une esthétique, d'une érotique, d'une éthique et d'une herméneutique de l'existence sans jamais que le sens qui en émane ne résorbe l'étonnement qui l'a fait naître. (shrink)

The effects of mental fatigue on both cognitive and physical performance are well described in the literature, but the recovery aspects of mental fatigue have been less investigated. The present study aimed to fill this gap by examining the persistence of mental fatigue on behavior and electrophysiological mechanisms. Fifteen participants performed an arm-pointing task consisting of reaching a target as fast as possible, before carrying out a 32-min cognitively demanding task [Time Load Dual Back task], and immediately, 10 and 20 (...) min after completion of the TLDB task. During the experiment, electroencephalography was continuously recorded. The significant increase in mental fatigue feeling after the TLDB task was followed by a decrease during the 20 min of recovery without returning to premeasurement values. Brain oscillations recorded at rest during the recovery period showed an increase in both theta and alpha power over time, suggesting a persistence of mental fatigue. Arm-pointing movement duration increased gradually over time during the recovery period, indicating that behavioral performance remained impaired 20 min after the end of the cognitively demanding task. To conclude, subjective measurements indicated a partial recovery of mental fatigue following a cognitively demanding task, whereas electrophysiological and behavioral markers suggested that the effects of mental fatigue persisted for at least 20 min. While the subjective evaluation of mental fatigue is a very practical way to attest the presence of mental fatigue, electrophysiological and behavioral measures seem more relevant to evaluate the time course of mental fatigue effects. (shrink)

Nous voudrions montrer que la phénoménologie enveloppe l’exigence d’une métaphysique, et que la voie vers cette métaphysique consiste en une heuristique poétique. Dans ce cadre, la phénoménologie se voit définie de façon renouvelée – car son acte inaugural, l’épochè, se trouve lui-même ressaisi de façon novatrice en tant qu’elle engage la question du sentiment, de l’esthétique et du poétique. Mais précisons d’abord que la métaphysique est intégralement repensée, elle désigne désormais la théo...

Rien d'humain n'est étranger au monde, et tout en lui puise dans les ressources de la vie. Une philosophie de la naissance est requise pour le comprendre, le monde se confondant avec une immanence matricielle sans dehors. Toute chose en participe, les vivants et l'homme également, leur différence propre tenant à leur manière de naître : la cosmologie devient le soubassement de l'anthropologie dont la clef est une phénoménologie de la naissance et de l'enfance.00Des phénomènes négligés apparaissent désormais décisifs, comme (...) la tendresse - qui tient lieu d'une condition d'existence -, ainsi que la consolation et le jeu, la fragilité et l'humour, ou encore la grâce et le ravissement. Une esthétique s'élabore depuis le goût de l'enfant pour les couleurs, les formes et les textures, mais aussi depuis sa créativité native. Cette esthétique est inséparable d'une érotique et d'une éthique, et plus largement d'une réflexion sur la civilisation ; enfin, cette philosophie culmine dans une pensée de l'éducation, de la liberté et de la vérité. (shrink)

One of the first frameworks developed for understanding the relation of science and technology to the economy has been the linear model of innovation. The model postulated that innovation starts with basic research, is followed by applied research and development, and ends with production and diffusion. The precise source of the model remains nebulous, having never been documented. Several authors who have used, improved, or criticized the model in the past fifty years rarely acknowledged or cited any original source. The (...) model usually was taken for granted. According to others, however, it comes directly from V. Bush’s Science: The Endless Frontier. This article traces the history of the linear model, suggesting that it developed in three steps corresponding to three scientific communities looking at science analytically. The article argues that statistics is a main reason the model is still alive despite criticisms, alternatives, and having been proclaimed dead. (shrink)

In this book, Benoît Dubreuil explores the creation and destruction of hierarchies in human evolution. Combining the methods of archaeology, anthropology, cognitive neuroscience and primatology, he offers a natural history of hierarchies from the point of view of both cultural and biological evolution. This volume explains why dominance hierarchies typical of primate societies disappeared in the human lineage and why the emergence of large-scale societies during the Neolithic period implied increased social differentiation, the creation of status hierarchies, and, eventually, (...) political centralisation. (shrink)

This article aims to contribute to the elucidation of the nature of inquiry. I start with some common desiderata for any theory of inquiry. I then categorize inquiry as a structured process. By focusing on its essential components, I advance a new characterization of inquiry as a combination of questioning attitudes guiding actions. Finally, I turn to the recent objection that questioning attitudes are not necessary for inquiry. I argue that inquiry is a structured process essentially constituted by questioning attitudes (...) having two precise functional roles, initiating and guiding the deployment of cognitive capacities towards an epistemic goal. (shrink)

Following a common assumption, when one inquires into a question, one has an inquisitive attitude towards it. More precisely, I shall assume that there is an inquisitive attitude towards Q that all of those who inquire into Q have in common and in virtue of which they can be said to be in an inquisitive state of mind towards Q. This paper is about the nature of this attitude. I elucidate it by examining whether it boils down to doubt, curiosity, (...) epistemic desire, or wondering. I shall do this by examining whether having these attitudes is necessary and sufficient for being in an inquisitive state of mind. The test will prove negative for the first three, but the case of wondering is more complex. (shrink)

This book revisits the encounter between Chinese and Western philosophy while unfolding questions about the way "comparative philosophy" is conducted today. In the vulgate of intellectual history, "Western thought" has constructed a substantialist view of reality that puts "relations" and "processes" into a subordinate position. The same view explains for the primacy given to the autonomy of individual beings. In contrast, according to the same vulgate, Chinese thought has been mainly stressing the fluidity of all phenomena and forms of life (...) so as to best adapt to their overarching patterns. I label such vision the Disneyland of comparative philosophy. It deciphers texts, partly in function of concepts that it extracts from them, partly according to notions that are superimposed over these texts. The two first chapters are focused upon the Western version of the "Disneyland of comparative philosophy." The third chapter shifts to Chinese narratives about local, comparative and global philosophies. In contrast to these approaches, the fourth chapter offers a blueprint as to the way to engage different philosophical traditions into tasks they define and share together. A last chapter presents four cases of ongoing transcultural philosophical dialogues and the promises they bear. Once it develops outside pre-formatted narratives, the web shaped by our philosophies and wisdoms suggests the outlines of a world that we could inhabit together. (shrink)

Are doubt and suspension of judgment similar attitudes? In the burgeoning literature on suspension of judgment, the notion of doubt is curiously absent. This paper aims to argue for the plausibility of an identity claim, which I term the “No-Difference View.” This view suggests that there is no substantial difference between being in doubt and suspending judgment. The argument will draw on historical and systematic considerations that support the No-Difference View as a plausible view within the logical space of positions.

In this paper I raise a paradox of belief inspired by Kripke’s ‘paradox of knowledge', which states that knowledge seems to make permissible an intuitively unacceptable form of dogmatism. This paradox of belief is based on an intuitively correct principle of doxastic coherence. My aim is to show that this paradox contributes to elucidating the puzzling nature of belief.

Suspension of judgment is a ubiquitous phenomenon in our lives. It is also relevant for several debates in contemporary epistemology (e.g., evidentialism/pragmatism; peer-disagreement/higher-order evidence; inquiry). The goal of this paper is to arrive at a better understanding of what suspension of judgment is. We first question the popular assumption that we call the Triad view according to which there are three and only three (paradigmatic) doxastic attitudes, namely, belief, disbelief, and suspension of judgment. We elaborate a cumulative argument regarding crucial (...) differences between belief/disbelief and suspension and conclude tentatively that suspension is not a doxastic state. On the constructive side, we defend the positive thesis (with special attention to justification/rationality and reasons for suspension) that suspension is rather an affective phenomenon, viz. a sort of mood. Finally, we consider further consequences of our view for contemporary debates in epistemology, and how it relates to ancient skepticism. (shrink)

My main aim in this paper is to contribute to the elucidation of the nature of non-religious faith. I start by summarising several well-known arguments that belief is neither necessary nor sufficient for faith. I then try to identify the nature of the positive cognitive attitude towards p that is involved in having faith that p. After dismissing some candidates for the role, I explore the idea that faith and hope are similar attitudes. On this basis, I then advance a (...) new characterisation of faith. Finally, I turn to the question of the rationality of faith. I argue that faith is intrinsically irrational because it is an intrinsically incoherent propositional attitude, but that there is nonetheless a sense in which faith is neither intrinsically epistemically irrational nor intrinsically practically irrational. (shrink)

The Prometheus myth has long now provided inspiration for those who envision solutions to environmental issues. Prometheus is the figure par excellence of human forethought and progress in the anthropocene. In this article, we introduce the concept of ambient Prometheanism to describe the way of thinking that foregrounds foresight and anticipation and advances technological solutions developed by capital and energy-intensive projects. We question this stance, arguing that ambient Prometheanism, with its emphasis on technofix, leads to the economisation and depoliticisation of (...) planetary environmental issues. Following Bernard Stiegler, we recover from the myth the figure of Epimetheus, Prometheus’ brother, as well as his associated faculty, epimetheia to theorise what we call an ‘Epimethean politics’. Thinking the anthropocene from the perspective of ambient Prometheanism and Epimetheanism means to consider the role of technology in climate politics, and in particular to make the case for the importance of afterthought in face of unintended consequences and accumulated errors. To substantiate our argument, we outline the challenge posed by emerging solutions focussed on technological intensification and socio-economic acceleration. An Epimethean politics of the climate requires to use reflexivity as a capacity to anticipate, but also to mobilise epimetheia to account for accidents and past mistakes. Such a politics builds from an alternative conception of technology, one that radically differs from ambient Prometheanism. Finally we read as actualisations of Epimethean politics contemporary eco-political struggles and their imperatives for multispecies living and convivial livelihoods. (shrink)

My aim in this article is to elucidate the nature of a form of intellectual and practical neutrality that is not covered by existing accounts of suspension of judgment. After rejecting some inadequate characterizations of this attitude of neutrality, I provide a positive characterization of it: it is a successful effort to resist certain tendencies that are part of the dispositional profile of the doxastic state one is in on a given issue. I conclude by saying a few words about (...) the reasons for which this effort can be made, and by answering in the negative the question of whether all the attitudes that can be characterized as attitudes of committed neutrality are of the same type. (shrink)

The progressive dominance of historical-critical methods in the reading of ancient Chinese classics has led scholars to privilege micro levels of textual analysis. Consequently, the question as to whether laws of composition could be identified in this corpus has often been ignored, or considered irrelevant. Working on Chinese number symbolism as well as on rules governing “ring composition” in other cultural contexts, this article aims at fashioning anew the question of the possibility of an ancient Chinese “structural rhetoric” and at (...) envisioning the patterns that might have governed it. It specifically applies the approach it propounds to Huainanzi 淮南子, showing how numerology frames its structure and argument, the text being built after the image of the “roundness” of the Way and of the Ruler. It then endeavors to apply these results to the unearthing of “inter-structural” patterns that would help us to locate Huainanzi, Lüshi Chunqiu 呂氏春秋, the versions at hand of Zhuangzi 莊子, Lunyu 論語, or yet Laozi 老子 into a textual universe that shares correlated rhetorical features. (shrink)

It is widely agreed that humans have specific abilities for cooperation and culture that evolved since their split with their last common ancestor with chimpanzees. Many uncertainties remain, however, about the exact moment in the human lineage when these abilities evolved. This article argues that cooperation and culture did not evolve in one step in the human lineage and that the capacity to stick to long-term and risky cooperative arrangements evolved before properly modern culture. I present evidence that Homo heidelbergensis (...) became increasingly able to secure contributions form others in two demanding Paleolithic public good games (PPGGs): cooperative feeding and cooperative breeding. I argue that the temptation to defect is high in these PPGGs and that the evolution of human cooperation in Homo heidelberngensis is best explained by the emergence of modern-like abilities for inhibitory control and goal maintenance. These executive functions are localized in the prefrontal cortex and allow humans to stick to social norms in the face of competing motivations. This scenario is consistent with data on brain evolution that indicate that the largest growth of the prefrontal cortex in human evolution occurred in Homo heidelbergensis and was followed by relative stasis in this part of the brain. One implication of this argument is that subsequent behavioral innovations, including the evolution of symbolism, art, and properly cumulative culture in modern Homo sapiens , are unlikely to be related to a reorganization of the prefrontal cortex, despite frequent claims to the contrary in the literature on the evolution of human culture and cognition. (shrink)

Suspension of judgment is often viewed as a member of the doxastic club, alongside belief and disbelief. In this paper, I challenge the widespread view that suspension is a commitment-involving stance on a par with belief and disbelief. Friedman's counterexamples to the traditional view that suspended judgement merely requires considering a proposition and being in a state of non-belief are criticized. I introduce a refined conception, emphasizing that suspension involves a proximal causal link between examining a proposition and the resulting (...) non-belief state. This episode manifests as an incapacity at making a judgement, occurring under specific circumstances. The refined view clarifies the nature of suspended judgement. (shrink)

The recent literature on social norms has stressed the centrality of emotions in explaining punishment and norm enforcement. This article discusses four negative emotions (righteous anger, indignation, contempt, and disgust) and examines their relationship to punitive behavior. I argue that righteous anger and indignation are both punitive emotions strictly speaking, but induce punishments of different intensity and have distinct elicitors. Contempt and disgust, for their part, cannot be straightforwardly considered punitive emotions, although they often blend with a colder form of (...) indignation to favor low-cost, indirect, and collective forms of punishment such as mockery, exclusion, and ostracism. (shrink)

Cet article vise à élucider la nature de l'enquête. Je présente tout d'abord les desiderata communs à toute théorie de l'enquête. Je catégorise ensuite l'enquête comme un processus structuré en me concentrant sur ses composantes essentielles : des attitudes de questionnement guidant des actions. Enfin, je me penche sur l'objection récente selon laquelle les attitudes de questionnement ne sont pas nécessaires à l'enquête. Je défends la thèse selon laquelle l'enquête est un processus structuré essentiellement constitué d'attitudes de questionnement ayant deux (...) rôles fonctionnels précis, soit d'initier et de guider le déploiement de capacités cognitives en vue d'un but épistémique. (shrink)

Theories of knowledge as credit for true belief, or as cognitive achievement, have to face the following objection: in the famous Barn façades case, it seems that the truth of Barney's belief that he is in front of a barn is to be explained by the correct functioning of his cognitive capacities, although we are reluctant to say that he knows he is in front of a barn. Duncan Pritchard concludes from this that a safety clause, irreducible to the conditions (...) a true belief must satisfy in order to be credited to the believer, constitutes a necessary condition of knowledge. Because those who define knowledge as a cognitive achievement have not convincingly answered this objection, I intend, in the first section of this paper, to refute it by showing how practical and doxastic achievements differ. Then I defend the idea that we should also distinguish two kinds of environmental epistemic luck, and, correlatively, two kinds of safety, that are not equally incompatible with knowledge. Finally, I argue that this distinction is inevitably vague and I indicate some consequences of this vagueness for our knowledge‐intuitions. (shrink)

The last sentence of Chapter 10 of the Analects describes a brief encounter between Confucius and a hen-pheasant, and it does so in puzzling terms, ridden with lexical difficulties. At the same time, intertextual references insert this fragment into the context of Confucius’ life mission as well as of Chinese mythological narratives. This contribution assesses the fragment’s meaning and significance: Confucius’ reaction to the hen-pheasant unveils his evolving understanding of the Heavenly Mandate bestowed upon him. The fragment thus forcefully concludes (...) the chapter in which it is inserted. Additionally, I put forward a hypothesis: the focus of this narrative, coupled with its positioning at the end of Chapter 10, induce us to postulate that it may have been purposefully located at the very center of the Analects, a proposition that reverberates on the way we look at the composition of the book. (shrink)

When on the last page of What Is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari (1995: 218) claim that philosophy needs a non-philosophy, this statement is the result of a long engagement with the problem of thinking in society. It is this engagement that we intend to reconstruct in this article. By developing an original definition of thinking after Heidegger, Deleuze is able to claim that philosophy is not the only ‘thinking’ discipline. Our point of departure is Deleuze's constant reference to a phrase (...) from Heidegger's lecture course What Is Called Thinking?: ‘We are not yet thinking’ (Deleuze 1988: 116, 1989: 167, 1994: 144, 2002: 108; Deleuze and Guattari 1995: 56). This phrase points to the demand for a new distribution of the relation between philosophy and its outside. The purpose of this article is to trace Heidegger's influence on Deleuze's definition of thinking and to raise two points. First, Deleuze borrows some elements of Heidegger's definition of thinking to further his own understanding of politics as an involuntary practice. For both, the question of thinking is political. Second, by departing from Heidegger, Deleuze can democratise the definition of thinking, beyond its confinement to philosophy, by turning to cinema. Deleuze calls cinema the art of the masses because it brings the masses in contact with external signs. Finally, in the last part of this article, we will discuss how Deleuze raises stupidity (and not error) as a transcendental problem that should be constantly fought. In this way, we hope to shed light on how Deleuze moves from Heidegger's question ‘what is called thinking?’ to the problem of stupidity and shame. (shrink)