Precautionary Criminalisation in an Age of Vulnerable Autonomy Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-3 DOI 10.1007/s11572-012-9142-4 Authors Jonathan Simon, Adrian A Kragen Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA Journal Criminal Law and Philosophy Online ISSN 1871-9805 Print ISSN 1871-9791.

Moral distress is a phenomenon of increasing concern in nursing practice, education and research. Previous research has suggested that moral distress is associated with perceptions of ethical climate, which has implications for nursing practice and patient outcomes. In this study, a randomly selected sample of registered nurses was surveyed using Corley’s Moral Distress Scale and Olson’s Hospital Ethical Climate Survey (HECS). The registered nurses reported moderate levels of moral distress intensity. Moral distress intensity and frequency were found to be inversely (...) correlated with perceptions of ethical climate. Each of the HECS factors (peers, patients, managers, hospitals and physicians) was found to be significantly correlated with moral distress. Based on these findings, we highlight insights for practice and future research that are needed to enhance the development of strategies aimed at improving the ethical climate of nurses’ workplaces for the benefit of both nurses and patients. (shrink)

Family members do not have an official position in the practice of euthanasia and physician assisted suicide in the Netherlands according to statutory regulations and related guidelines. However, recent empirical findings on the influence of family members on EAS decision-making raise practical and ethical questions. Therefore, the aim of this review is to explore how family members are involved in the Dutch practice of EAS according to empirical research, and to map out themes that could serve as a starting point (...) for further empirical and ethical inquiry. A systematic mixed studies review was performed. The databases Pubmed, Embase, PsycInfo, and Emcare were searched to identify empirical studies describing any aspect of the involvement of family members before, during and after EAS in the Netherlands from 1980 till 2018. Thematic analysis was chosen as method to synthesize the quantitative and qualitative studies. Sixty-six studies were identified. Only 14 studies had family members themselves as study participants. Four themes emerged from the thematic analysis. 1) Family-related reasons to request EAS. 2) Roles and responsibilities of family members during EAS decision-making and performance. 3) Families’ experiences and grief after EAS. 4) Family and ‘the good euthanasia death’ according to Dutch physicians. Family members seem to be active participants in EAS decision-making, which goes hand in hand with ambivalent feelings and experiences. Considerations about family members and the social context appear to be very important for patients and physicians when they request or grant a request for EAS. Although further empirical research is needed to assess the depth and generalizability of the results, this review provides a new perspective on EAS decision-making and challenges the Dutch ethical-legal framework of EAS. Euthanasia decision-making is typically framed in the patient-physician dyad, while a patient-physician-family triad seems more appropriate to describe what happens in clinical practice. This perspective raises questions about the interpretation of autonomy, the origins of suffering underlying requests for EAS, and the responsibilities of physicians during EAS decision-making. (shrink)

Responding to recent calls from within critical MOS and organizational ethics studies to explore questions of difference and inclusion ‘beyond unity and fixity’, this paper seeks to enrich the debate on difference and its negotiation in organizations, thereby foregrounding difference as the contested and ever-changing outcome of power-invested configurations of practice. The paper presents an ethnographic study conducted in a psychosocial day-care centre that positions itself as a ‘space of multiplicity’ wherein ‘it is normal to be different’. Highlighting the context-specific (...) challenges and struggles encompassing mental ill-health as a category of difference deviating from the norm, our paper contributes to a critical-affirmative understanding of difference. We foster an approach that values normative orientations such as ‘egalitarian difference’ and ‘difference as multiplicity’ yet avoids idealising portrayals of an ethics of difference that challenges normalcy and unconditionally favours otherness and calls for ‘radically other kinds of difference’. (shrink)

Summary With regard to the dynamics of human experience and behavior, Gestalt theoretical psychotherapy (GTP) relies mainly on Kurt Lewin’s dynamic field theory of personality. GTP is carried out by including a re-interpretation of Lewin’s theory in some aspects of psychotherapeutic practice in relation to critical realism. Human experience and behavior are understood to be functions of the person and the environment (including the other individuals therein) in a psychic field (life space), which encompasses both of these mutually dependent factors. (...) The anthropological model of this approach is, therefore, not mono-personal but, a priori, structural and relational in nature. It does not one-sidedly focus on the “inner components” of a person, but on the interrelation of the individual and a given environment, which affects experience and behavior. After a brief introduction of these basic concepts, this lecture will focus especially on Lewin’s concept of tension-systems, which may be considered as the Gestalt theoretical counterpart of Freud’s drive theory. Further, we define the basic assumptions which underlie GTP and explain how the person moves through her/his life experience in terms of Gestalt psychology. (shrink)

Bernadette M Tobin; An Aristotelian Theory of Moral Development, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 23, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 195–211, https://doi.

Bernadette M Tobin; Richard Peters's Theory of Moral Development, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 23, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 15–27, https://doi.

The Medical Innovation Bill continues its journey through Parliament. On 23 January 2015, it was debated for the final time in the House of Lords and with one final amendment, the House moved to support the Bill, which then moved to the House of Commons on 26 January. It will be debated again on 27 February 2015. The Bill’s purpose is to encourage responsible innovation in medical treatment. Although this goal is laudable, it is argued that the Bill is unnecessary (...) and has the potential to undermine the very cause it aims to advance. More useful for encouraging responsible innovation is the continued education of health-care professionals on how the law already supports practitioners who look to improve care through responsible innovation. (shrink)

Synthetic biologists are extremely concerned with responsible research and innovation. This paper critically assesses their culture of responsibility. Their notion of responsibility has been so far focused on the identification of risks, and in their prudential attitude synthetic biologists consider that the major risks can be prevented with technological solutions. Therefore they are globally opposed to public interference or political regulations and tend to self-regulate by bringing a few social scientists or ethicists on board. This article emphasizes that ethics lies (...) beyond prudence and requires a cultural evaluation of the modes of existence of the various microorganisms designed by synthetic biologists, independently of their potential applications. (shrink)

Property in Human Tissue It seems that a recurring theme in our Recent Developments is the issue of property rights in tissue . This has most commonly been associated with access to reproductive material and begins from the presumption of no property in tissue. A recent decision for the Superior Court of Justice, Ontario, whilst unsuccessful on largely procedural grounds, warrants a brief note because it adds to the general discourse on property in tissue and adopts a different approach. Piljak (...) Estate v Abraham 2014 ONSC 2893 addressed the question of whether or not the family of a deceased person could access liver tissue for genetic testing. The property question arose because the family applied for access to the tissue under Rule 32.01 and in order for the tissue to fall within the ambit of the Rule it must be defined as real or personal property.Background .. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:ABORTION AS A SACRAMENT: MIMETIC DESIRE AND SACRIFICE IN SEXUAL POLITICS Bernadette Waterman Ward SUNY-Oswego "If men got pregnant, abortion would be a sacrament." That familiar taunt is mostly aimed at Roman Catholics to humiliate them for their purportedly religious and anti-rational opposition to abortion. It is conventional to sniffthat the "religious assumptions" on which disapproval of abortion is "typically based" are "highly questionable" (Chambers 1). But the (...) cultural theories of René Girard suggest that it is because men don't get pregnant that abortion already is a sacrament. The key elements of sacrificial religion, as Girard defines it, are the presence of intolerable tension that must lead to social disruption; the choice of a victim who cannot strike back to absorb the community's violence; and the concealment ofthe function ofthe sacrifice, which employs actual violence for the purpose of stabilizing institutional violence. Abortion in America is upheld not as medical or even political policy, but as, in fact, a religious sacrifice. Girard's definition ofreligion requires neither a moral code nor a divinity nor a metaphysical grounding. The cult of Dionysus, to name only one example, evidently endorsed nothing we would recognize as a general code of morality; Buddhism, a far more august example, does not focus on a divinity; animism proposes no universal metaphysics. As to sacraments, Bernadette Waterman Ward19 Thomas Aquinas, following St. Augustine, did not scruple to call nonChristian sacrifices sacraments oftheir religions, "Whether true or false."' Scapegoating defines religious sacrifice. It protects the sacrificing community and promotes its unity—so long as all believe that the scapegoat must suffer. Often the victim is called an enemy to some established order; sacrifice is always conservative, even if it upholds an inherently unstable system. Because powerlessness, not real disruptive power, is the criterion for becoming a scapegoat, sacrifice requires a strong shared illusion. Classical religions provide unopposable gods to choose the tragically necessary victims, allowing strong ambivalence to surround the sacrifice itself. Ifthis is not present, the death or banishment takes on a different character—more political than religious, though Girard notes a fundamental unity between those two methods ofcontrolling mimetic violence. Mimetic violence originates in illusion surrounding a rivalry. Often there is an object involved, such as territory or wealth or political rank, but the object, which seems important, is actually irrelevant. The rivalry can continue, seeking new objects, whatever concrete acquisitions either party makes or loses. General, aimless rivalry dominates a social world of fragile, undefined selves in which anyone can be a model for imitation, and therefore anyone can be a threat to one's sense ofself. What an imitator actually seeks is to have whatever is desirable; most desirable ofall, perhaps, is the ability to know what is desirable, a mysterious quality that is constantly attributed to others; Girard calls this quality "being." From the nursery we are each other's disciples, wanting each other's toys not because of their inherent virtue so much as because someone else has seen some virtue in them. As human desire has no real single object, it has no closure; envy and revenge threaten others in a widening net of destruction. In the classic scenario, the model whose "being" has become matter for imitation finds himself in competition for the object, and attacks the rival, who returns in kind. A disciple who can rally aspire to the model's status can become a dangerous, even a deadly rival; in imagination, and sometimes in reality, they turn each other intp monsters. Yet as the desire has no single object, neither has the rage: the violence can be easily transferred to another object than one's rival. Sometimes those who are uneasy about their status in relation to one another can cement a powerful unity by focusing blame on some common target: a scapegoat. The Orwellian scenario is in fact the normal scenario: individuals caught in the maelstrom of social instability 'Summa Theologiae, 3a.61.1 31. 20Abortion as a Sacrament seek to avoid victimization by diverting the violence into blame and destruction directed, first of all, against someone else—and, if possible, against someone who cannot strike back: a sacrifice. Not all sacrificial religious... (shrink)

Bernadette M Tobin; Development in Virtues, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 20, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 201–214, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9.

Danišová, Nikola, 2021. Marginálie k figúre šibala v arcinaratívoch (Tematologicko-kultúrne súvislosti). Nitra: Univerzita Konštantína Filozofa v Nitre. ISBN 978-80-558-1807-8.

Considering the “Born-Alive” Rule and Possession of Sperm Following Death Content Type Journal Article Category Recent Developments Pages 323-327 DOI 10.1007/s11673-011-9324-0 Authors Bernadette Richards, Law School, The University of Adelaide, South Australia, Australia Bill Madden, School of Law, University of Western Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia Tina Cockburn, School of Law, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Qld, Australia Journal Journal of Bioethical Inquiry Online ISSN 1872-4353 Print ISSN 1176-7529 Journal Volume Volume 8 Journal Issue Volume 8, Number 4.

This paper offers a rhizomatic reading of Foucault scholarship in anglophone educational research. It delineates unique parameters of an educational field, the conditions of receptivity for Foucault's work, and identifies three temporary plateau-formations that have erupted in educational research. Indebted to (non-formulaic) principles of connectivity and heterogeneity, multiplicity, and asignifying ruptures the analysis brings to notice the recombinatorial attributes of the discipline of education through attention to what is encamped and what seeps in debates over his work.

The 21st century is steeped in claims to interconnection, technological innovation, and new affective intensities amid challenges to the primacy and centrality of 'the human'. Flashpoint epistemology attends to the lived difficulties that arise in teaching, policymaking, curriculum and research among continuous practices of differentiation, and for which there is no pre-existing template for judgment, resolution or action. Flashpoint Epistemology Volume 1 examines contemporary collisions and reworkings of cultural-political issues in education through arts and humanities-based approaches. How and whether lines (...) are (re)drawn in educational practice - and via who-what - between justice, morality, religion, ethics, subjectivities, intersectionality, the sublime and the senses are a particular focus. The volume offers innovative relational approaches and new narrativization strategies, examining the aporia experienced when operating in educational domains of inevitable, recurring, difficult, fortuitous and/or unforeseen flashpoints. The chapters will engage researchers seeking new approaches to education's complexities, nested discourses, and ever-moving horizons of enactment. It will also benefit post/graduate students and teachers whose work intersects with sociological, philosophical and cultural studies and who are curious about claims to interconnection, the ethical quandaries embedded in practice, and the affordances and limits of technological innovation. (shrink)

Croire ne peut s’appréhender sans son corollaire, douter. Le doute revêt des formes diverses que l’on retrouve en particulier chez les couples en thérapie. Dans ce cadre, pour tenter d’en approcher l’origine et la nature, l’auteur s’appuie sur les concepts d’identification projective, intrusive, adhésive, et de contenance développés par Meltzer. Dans cette perspective, un lien peut être fait entre la relation de couple et celle du bébé à son premier objet. La thérapie de couple est envisagée comme une tentative pour (...) chacun de passer du doute destructeur au doute positif, constructeur, permettant un véritable croire en l’autre et au couple. (shrink)

This paper is an exploration of the state of ‘clinical unease’ experienced by clinicians in contexts where professional judgement—grounded in clinical knowledge, critical reflection and a sound grasp of the law—indicates that there is more than one ethically defensible way to proceed. The question posed is whether the courts can be viewed as an appropriate vehicle to settle clinical unease by providing a ruling that clarifies the legal and ethical issues arising in the case, even in situations where there is (...) no dispute between the patient (or her proxies) and the healthcare team. The concept of ‘clinical unease’ is framed with reference to the broader experience of clinical decision-making, and distinguished from other widely discussed phenomena in the healthcare literature like moral distress and conscientious objection. A number of reported cases are briefly examined where the courts were invited to rule in circumstances of apparent ‘unease’. The respective responsibilities of clinicians and courts are discussed: in particular, their capability and readiness to respond to matters of ethical concern. Four imagined clinical scenarios are outlined where a clinical team might welcome a court adjudication, under current rules. Consideration is given to the likelihood of such cases being heard, and to whether there may be better remedies than the courts. There are final reflections on what clinicians may actually wish for in seeking court involvement, and on whether a willingness to engage with the experience of clinical unease may lead to greater sensitivity towards the value perspectives of others. (shrink)

Moral distress in health care has been identified as a growing concern and a focus of research in nursing and health care for almost three decades. Researchers and theorists have argued that moral distress has both short and long-term consequences. Moral distress has implications for satisfaction, recruitment and retention of health care providers and implications for the delivery of safe and competent quality patient care. In over a decade of research on ethical practice, registered nurses and other health care practitioners (...) have repeatedly identified moral distress as a concern and called for action. However, research and action on moral distress has been constrained by lack of conceptual clarity and theoretical confusion as to the meaning and underpinnings of moral distress. To further examine these issues and foster action on moral distress, three members of the University of Victoria/University of British Columbia (UVIC/UVIC) nursing ethics research team initiated the development and delivery of a multi-faceted and interdisciplinary symposium on Moral Distress with international experts, researchers, and practitioners. The goal of the symposium was to develop an agenda for action on moral distress in health care. We sought to develop a plan of action that would encompass recommendations for education, practice, research and policy. The papers in this special issue of HEC Forum arose from that symposium. In this first paper, we provide an introduction to moral distress; make explicit some of the challenges associated with theoretical and conceptual constructions of moral distress; and discuss the barriers to the development of research, education, and policy that could, if addressed, foster action on moral distress in health care practice. The following three papers were written by key international experts on moral distress, who explore in-depth the issues in three arenas: education, practice, research. In the fifth and last paper in the series, we highlight key insights from the symposium and the papers in the series, propose to redefine moral distress, and outline directions for an agenda for action on moral distress in health care. (shrink)

One of the core goals of Digital Health Technologies (DHT) is to transform healthcare services and delivery by shifting primary care from hospitals into the community. However, achieving this goal will rely on the collection, use and storage of large datasets. Some of these datasets will be linked to multiple sources, and may include highly sensitive health information that needs to be transferred across institutional and jurisdictional boundaries. The growth of DHT has outpaced the establishment of clear legal pathways to (...) facilitate the collection, use and transfer of potentially sensitive health data. Our study aimed to address this gap with an ethical code to guide researchers developing DHT with international collaborative partners in Singapore. We generated this code using a modified Policy Delphi process designed to engage stakeholders in the deliberation of health data ethics and governance. This paper reports the outcomes of this process along with the key components of the code and identifies areas for future research. (shrink)

Approaches to business ethics can be roughly divided into two streams: ‹codes of behavior’ and ‹forms of subjectification’, with code-oriented approaches clearly dominating the field. Through an elaboration of poststructuralist approaches to moral philosophy, this paper questions the emphasis on codes of behaviour and, thus, the conceptions of the moral and responsible subject that are inherent in rule-based approaches. As a consequence of this critique, the concept of a practice-based ‹ethics of responsiveness’ in which ethics is never final but rather (...) always ‹to come’, is investigated. In such an approach the ethical self is understood as being continuously constituted within power/knowledge relations. Following this line, we ask how one can become a responsible subject while also acknowledging certain limits of full responsibility. We thereby explore responsibility as a considered but unconditional openness in response to the other. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:diacritics 30.2 (2000) 25-42 [Access article in PDF] What is Political Feeling? Bernadette Meyler Anthony Cascardi. Consequences of Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cambridge UP,1999. As disaffection with poststructuralism increases, but new paradigms have not yet emerged, theorists have begun to reconsider the ties that current thought maintains with the tradition it critiques, in particular, its affiliations with the Enlightenment. Focus has inevitably fallen on the writings of Immanuel Kant, which (...) in the act of codifying Enlightenment rationality simultaneously initiated its dissolution. Disputes tend to arise, however, over the precise nature and cause of the hairline fracture that prevents Kant's Critiques from attaining the unity to which they aspire. Even greater controversy centers on the advisability of possible responses: should we set the bones, break open the gap, or provide an entirely new limb? In Consequences of Enlightenment, Anthony Cascardi undertakes a detailed discussion of how various theoretical schools interpret the fissure, and the problems posed by their accounts. Not simply remaining content with this critique of critiques, Cascardi presents his own stance, advising that we embrace Kant's recourse to "feeling" in the Critique of Judgment as an inevitable entailment of the Kantian system. Whereas Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment argues that the opposition between Kantian reason and Nietzschean irrationalism represents the undoing of the Enlightenment, Cascardi responds that Kant's own writings encompass the duality. As an essential moment of what he terms the Enlightenment's "aesthetic critique," the resistance that feeling poses to "the unity of experience"--or to the unity of the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason--should be embraced. Cascardi further maintains that this "should" entails political consequences, although his text does not itself fully elaborate a vision of what these might be.The fact that such a rich suggestion remains relatively undeveloped is perhaps inevitable in a book of such comprehensive scope. Consequences of Enlightenment is a text that seems to call the reader to the task of continuing the multiple projects that Cascardi has initiated. I will attempt to articulate what those endeavors might be, and to propose points in his work upon which future inquiry could be focused. Because Cascardi's goals are two-pronged--to examine twentieth-century thinkers' Kantian inheritance and to engage directly with the "aesthetic critique" of Kant--it is sometimes difficult to ascertain whether Consequences of Enlightenment attributes certain positions to Kant or to his interpreters. Although this difference might not seem significant given Cascardi's claims about the persistence of Kantian aporias in the work of his inheritors, returning to Kant may allow us to ask how we should proceed in developing the political potentials of aesthetic critique. Two principal questions arise in this regard. The first inquires whether and how one can think aesthetics with politics; in other words, [End Page 25] what is political feeling? The second question provides a more limited point of entry into the same problem by focusing on the Critique of Judgment itself; what politics are entailed respectively by the beautiful and the sublime?Cascardi discusses the Kantian sublime only twice in detail during the course of Consequences of Enlightenment, once in chapter 4, "Communication and Transformation: Aesthetics and Politics in Habermas and Arendt," and for the second time, and most provocatively, in chapter 7, "Feeling and/as Force." In treating Hannah Arendt, who, in her 1970 Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, attempted to derive a Kantian account of the political from the Critique of Judgment, Cascardi explains that she tried to complete the Enlightenment by erroneously "turning from the indeterminacy of the aesthetic in Kant to a politics that designates democratic community as its field or object-domain"; he then asserts that, "Specifically, the politics that Arendt would claim to derive from Kant's aesthetics is a democratic politics of the beautiful..." [156]. Subsequently elaborating on the reasons that Arendt overemphasized the beautiful, seemingly at the expense of the sublime, Cascardi writes, "Arendt's tendency to privilege the beautiful over the sublime must be seen as part of her larger effort to construct a rational politics. For this effort, she takes... (shrink)

La notion de médiation culturelle s'est institutionnalisée dans le monde culturel et dans le monde universitaire. Son analyse concerne la situation de médiation et le système de médiations comme répertoire d'actions, ce qui engage deux dimensions: la dimension historique et la dimension politique. Il est donc nécessaire, tant dans la recherche que dans les formations, de maintenir une distance critique envers certaines conceptions mythiques de la notion.The concept of cultural mediation has become an institutionalized part of the worlds of both (...) culture and the university. Analysis of the concept covers the context of mediation and the general system of mediations, understood as a repertoire of actions. This brings into play two dimensions, historical and political. It is therefore necessary to maintain a critical distance from certain mythologizing versions of this notion, as much in research as in education and training. (shrink)