How different neural crest derivatives differentiate in distinct embryonic locations in the vertebrate embryo is an intriguing issue. Many attempts have been made to understand the underlying mechanism of specific pathway choices made by migrating neural crest cells. In this speculative review we suggest a new mechanism for the regulation of neural crest cell migration patterns in avian and mammalian embryos, based on recent progress in understanding the expression and activity of receptor tyrosine kinases during embryogenesis. Distinct subpopulations of crest‐derived (...) cells express specific receptor tyrosine kinases while residing in a migration staging area. We postulate that the differential expression of receptor tyrosine kinases by specific subpopulations of neural crest cells allows them to respond to localized growth factor ligand activity in the embryo. Thus, the migration pathway taken by neural crest subpopulations is determined by their receptor tyrosine kinase response to the differential localization of their cognate ligand. (shrink)

Evidence is accumulating that individual and environmental factors in childhood and adolescence should be considered when investigating adult health and aging-related processes. The data required for this is gathered by comprehensive long-term longitudinal studies. This article describes the protocol of the Zurich Longitudinal Studies (ZLS), a set of three comprehensive cohort studies on child growth, health, and development that are currently expanding into adulthood. Between 1954 and 1961, 445 healthy infants were enrolled in the first ZLS cohort. Their physical, motor, (...) cognitive, and social development and their environment were assessed comprehensively across childhood, adolescence, and into young adulthood. In the 1970s, two further cohorts were added to the ZLS and assessed with largely matched study protocols: Between 1974 and 1979, the second ZLS cohort included 265 infants (103 term-born and 162 preterm infants), and between 1970 and 2002, the third ZLS cohort included 327 children of participants of the first ZLS cohort. Since 2019, the participants of the three ZLS cohorts have been traced and invited to participate in a first wave of assessments in adulthood to investigate their current health and development. This article describes the ZLS study protocol and discusses opportunities, methodological and conceptual challenges, and limitations arising from a long-term longitudinal cohort recruited from a study about development in early life. In the future, the ZLS will provide data to investigate childhood antecedents of adult health outcomes and, ultimately, will help respond to the frequent call of scientists to shift the focus of aging research into the first decades of life and, thus, to take a lifespan perspective on aging. (shrink)

Introduces the phenomenology of the Other, taking into account the work of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, Schutz, and Derrida, but mostly going back to things themselves.

This paper investigates the interaction between semantic theories for cp-laws (roughly, laws that hold “all things equal”) and metaphysical theories of kinds in the special sciences. Its central conclusion is that cp-laws concerning kinds behave differently from cp-laws concerning non-kinds: “ravens are black” which concerns the kind corvus corax, behaves differently from from “albino ravens are white” which concerns the non-kind grouping of albino ravens. I argue that this difference is in the first instance logical: the two sorts of cp-laws (...) give rise to different inferential patterns. I draw two further conclusions. The difference in logical behavior poses a severe problem for extant semantic theories of cp-laws, and: we cannot elucidate the distinction between kinds and non-kinds by suggesting that only kinds can appear in laws. (shrink)

It is shown in Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory that Cκ, the Axiom of Choice for κ-indexed families of arbitrary sets, is equivalent to the condition that the frame envelope of any κ-frame is κ-Lindelöf, for any cardinal κ.

This volume explores the role and status of phenomena such as feelings, values, willing, and action in the domain of perception and (social) cognition, as well as the way in which they are related. In its exploration, the book takes Husserl's lifelong project Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins (1909-1930) as its point of departure, and investigates these phenomena with Husserl but also beyond Husserl. Divided into two parts, the volume brings together essays that address the topics from different phenomenological, philosophical, (...) and psychological perspectives. They discuss Husserl's position in dialogue with historical and recent philosophical and psychological debates and develop phenomenological accounts and descriptions with the help of Geiger, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Plessner, Sartre, Scheler, Schopenhauer, and Reinach. (shrink)

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 89, Issue 4, Page 754-755, December 2011.

Certain anti-realisms about mathematics are distinguished by their taking proof rather than truth as the central concept in the account of the meaning of mathematical statements. This notion of proof which is meaning determining or canonical must be distinguished from a notion of demonstration as more generally conceived. This paper raises a set of objections to Dummett's characterisation of the notion via the notion of a normalised natural deduction proof. The main complaint is that Dummett's use of normalised natural deduction (...) proofs relies on formalisation playing a role for which it is unfit. Instead I offer an alternative account which does not rely on formalisation and go on to examine the relation of proof to canonical proof, arguing that rather than requiring an explicit characterisation of canonical proofs we need to be more aware of the complexities of that relation. (shrink)

In this paper I consider metaphysical positions which I label as ‘perspectival’. A perspectivalist believes that some portion of reality cannot extend beyond what an appropriately characterised investigator or investigators can (in some sense) reveal about it. So a perspectivalist will be drawn to claim that a portion of reality is, in some sense, knowable. Many such positions appear to founder on the paradox of knowability. I aim to offer a solution to that paradox which can be adopted by any (...) perspectivalist, which involves no restriction on the claim of knowability and which allows certain sentences to be unknowable. The solution hinges on recognising that what is meant by ‘knowable’ will vary from one type of proposition to another and thus that characterising the modality involved in the notion in terms of possible worlds will be impossible. I thus offer a subjunctive conditional reading of that modality, a reading which, I claim, has the virtues just recounted. (shrink)

I argue that a practice can only be taken to be one of apparent rule following if it contains a practice of policing moves within the practice. So the existence of an apparently rule-governed practice entails the existence of, what I call, a policing practice. I then argue that this entailment cannot be reconciled with a non-factualist construal of the policing practice. Thus non-factualism about the policing practice is false. Factualism about the policing practice entails realism about rules. So I (...) conclude that we ought to be realists about rules. Finally I distinguish a position which I call ultra-realism about rules and note that this too is a casualty of the view developed here. (shrink)

I begin by contrasting two facets of belief: that belief is a response to a sufficiency of evidence and that belief plays a role in one’s representation of reality. I claim that these conceptions of belief are in tension because whilst the latter – Representationalism – requires Logical Coherence of belief the former – Thresholdism – conflicts with Logical Coherence. Thus we need to choose between conceptions. Many have argued that the Preface Paradox supports Thresholdism. In contrast I argue that (...) Representationalism has a more plausible response to the paradox. (shrink)

: Some twenty years since its publication Putnam's model‐theoretic argument is still much discussed. The present paper aims to defend a reconstruction of the argument but begins by attempting to clarify the form of the argument. Usually, and with good textual grounds, the argument is treated as a reductio argument against metaphysical realism. I argue instead that it should be treated as developing a paradox. I go on to claim that the most promising response to this paradox is to be (...) able to provide a theory of sense, in the style recommended by Dummett. So, according to this reasoning, the argument is not an argument against metaphysical realism but an argument against positions which reject the notion of sense. (shrink)

Michael Dummett's approach to the metaphysical issue of realism through the philosophy of language, his challenge to realism, and his philosophy of language itself are central topics in contemporary analytic philosophy and have influenced the work of other major figures such as Quine, Putnam, and Davidson. This book offers an accessible and systematic presentation of the main elements of Dummett's philosophy. This book's overarching theme is Dummett's discussion of realism: his characterization of realism, his attack on realism, and his invention (...) and exploration of the anti-realist position. This book begins by examining Dummett's views on language. Only against that setting can one fully appreciate his conception of the realism issue. With this in place, Weiss returns to Dummett's views on the nature of meaning and understanding to unfold his challenge to realism. Weiss devotes the remainder of the book to examining the anti-realist position. He discusses anti-realist theories of meaning and then investigates anti-realism's revisionary consequences. Finally, he engages with Dummett's discussion of two difficult challenges for the anti-realist: the past and mathematics. (shrink)

The status of the knowledge iteration principles in the account provided by Lewis in “Elusive Knowledge” is disputed. By distinguishing carefully between what in the account describes the contribution of the attributor’s context and what describes the contribution of the subject’s situation, we can resolve this dispute in favour of Holliday’s claim that the iteration principles are rendered invalid. However, that is not the end of the story. For Lewis’s account still predicts that counterexamples to the negative iteration principle ) (...) come out as elusive: such counterexamples can occur only in possibilities which the attributors of knowledge are ignoring. This consequence is more defensible than it might look at first sight. (shrink)

The Europe of many voices is founded on a balance between me and us. Even if persons, regions and countries communicate with their own voices, each voice is imbued with its inner and outer alienness, which can be represented but not replaced by others. There is no single European language, there is a variety of European languages. Interregional, international and intercultural experiences are characterized by the interweaving of one’s own and the foreign. We can be more or less close to (...) one another. Humanity can be understood only as an open horizon. Europe is not a stop on the path to a worldwide state, but a specific answer to global challenges. When the struggle for economic and military survival prevails, alienness turns into enmity. And the enemy is voiceless, just like the Barbarians. (shrink)

Acknowledging sensuous worlds, which bestow sensual qualities on life-world, we are facing the age-old problem of how to think the intra- and intermodal unity of the senses and how to explain the corresponding phenomenon of synaesthesia. In tackling this problem, we will first pay our attention to the rhythmical quality of the senses. It is situated on the very threshold of the formation of the senses. The question about the natural or artificial nature of sensory rhythms begs a further question (...) whether, at any given moment, the senses can be perfectly coherent and in tune with what affects them. Is it not true that any eurhythmics is even at its best supposed to account for the Other disturbing the rhythm by stepping out of the line? (shrink)

We further develop a previously introduced method of constructing forcing notions with the help of morasses. There are two new results: (1) If there is a simplified (ω 1 , 1)-morass, then there exists a ccc forcing of size ω 1 that adds an ω 2 -Suslin tree. (2) If there is a simplified (ω 1 , 2)-morass, then there exists a ccc forcing of size ω 1 that adds a 0-dimensional Hausdorff topology τ on ω 3 which has spread (...) s(τ) = ω 1 . While (2) is the main result of the paper, (1) is only an improvement of a previous result, which is based on a simple observation. Both forcings preserve GCH. To show that the method can be changed to produce models where CH fails, we give an alternative construction of Koszmider's model in which there is a chain 〈X α | α < ω 2 〉 such that X α ⊆ ω 1 , X β — X α is finite and X α — X β has size ω 1 for all β < α < ω 2. (shrink)

We have grown used to leading the hermeneutics to its philosophical honorary status up various steps. It begins relatively innocently with the skill of interpretation and explanation: it goes on with philosophical hermeneutics which prepares the general epistemological and theoretical framework for methodical understanding, and it ends with the hermeneutic philosophy, in which both philosophizing and pre-philosophical life are decisively defined as understanding and mutual understanding. This hermeneutic philosophy need not restrict itself to the hermeneutics of texts, but can extend (...) to encompass the hermeneutics of senses, images and that of human comportment. The touchstone for determining the direction in which hermeneutics is going will be otherness. The crucial question is: can otherness be overcome on the grounds of hermeneutics or can hermeneutics itself become questionable by otherness? In dealing with this question we are mostly referring to the third of the above-mentioned phases, i.e. the philosophical core of hermeneutic philosophy, which finds its most effective expression in Gadamer’s Truth and Method. That this effect is not without its doubts is not evident only from the German debates, in which the older, »traditional« hermeneutics presents various arguments defending its rights against Gadamer’s attempt at overcoming it, but also from a variety of types of hermeneutics from Italy. If we side with Jean Greisch in defining the contemporaneousness as »the age of hermeneutic reason«, it may well be that this definition of our age also reveals its limits. (shrink)