Introduces the phenomenology of the Other, taking into account the work of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, Schutz, and Derrida, but mostly going back to things themselves.

Acknowledging sensuous worlds, which bestow sensual qualities on life-world, we are facing the age-old problem of how to think the intra- and intermodal unity of the senses and how to explain the corresponding phenomenon of synaesthesia. In tackling this problem, we will first pay our attention to the rhythmical quality of the senses. It is situated on the very threshold of the formation of the senses. The question about the natural or artificial nature of sensory rhythms begs a further question (...) whether, at any given moment, the senses can be perfectly coherent and in tune with what affects them. Is it not true that any eurhythmics is even at its best supposed to account for the Other disturbing the rhythm by stepping out of the line? (shrink)

An ambitious work that endorses a broad approach, it argues strongly against the roles both of truth theory and of radical interpretation. Weiss discusses a range of relevant themes relating to language, including translation, interpretation, normativity, community, and rules in order to reshape our understanding of language. A rigorous and systematic analysis, How to Understand Language advances the work of key thinkers in the area.

The Europe of many voices is founded on a balance between me and us. Even if persons, regions and countries communicate with their own voices, each voice is imbued with its inner and outer alienness, which can be represented but not replaced by others. There is no single European language, there is a variety of European languages. Interregional, international and intercultural experiences are characterized by the interweaving of one’s own and the foreign. We can be more or less close to (...) one another. Humanity can be understood only as an open horizon. Europe is not a stop on the path to a worldwide state, but a specific answer to global challenges. When the struggle for economic and military survival prevails, alienness turns into enmity. And the enemy is voiceless, just like the Barbarians. (shrink)

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 89, Issue 4, Page 754-755, December 2011.

Certain anti-realisms about mathematics are distinguished by their taking proof rather than truth as the central concept in the account of the meaning of mathematical statements. This notion of proof which is meaning determining or canonical must be distinguished from a notion of demonstration as more generally conceived. This paper raises a set of objections to Dummett's characterisation of the notion via the notion of a normalised natural deduction proof. The main complaint is that Dummett's use of normalised natural deduction (...) proofs relies on formalisation playing a role for which it is unfit. Instead I offer an alternative account which does not rely on formalisation and go on to examine the relation of proof to canonical proof, arguing that rather than requiring an explicit characterisation of canonical proofs we need to be more aware of the complexities of that relation. (shrink)

In this paper I consider metaphysical positions which I label as ‘perspectival’. A perspectivalist believes that some portion of reality cannot extend beyond what an appropriately characterised investigator or investigators can (in some sense) reveal about it. So a perspectivalist will be drawn to claim that a portion of reality is, in some sense, knowable. Many such positions appear to founder on the paradox of knowability. I aim to offer a solution to that paradox which can be adopted by any (...) perspectivalist, which involves no restriction on the claim of knowability and which allows certain sentences to be unknowable. The solution hinges on recognising that what is meant by ‘knowable’ will vary from one type of proposition to another and thus that characterising the modality involved in the notion in terms of possible worlds will be impossible. I thus offer a subjunctive conditional reading of that modality, a reading which, I claim, has the virtues just recounted. (shrink)

I argue that a practice can only be taken to be one of apparent rule following if it contains a practice of policing moves within the practice. So the existence of an apparently rule-governed practice entails the existence of, what I call, a policing practice. I then argue that this entailment cannot be reconciled with a non-factualist construal of the policing practice. Thus non-factualism about the policing practice is false. Factualism about the policing practice entails realism about rules. So I (...) conclude that we ought to be realists about rules. Finally I distinguish a position which I call ultra-realism about rules and note that this too is a casualty of the view developed here. (shrink)

Since its disc overy by Fitch, the paradox of knowability has been a thorn in the anti-realist's side. Recently both Dummett and Tennant have sought to relieve the anti-realist by restricting the applicability of the knowability principle -- the principle that all truths are knowable -- which has been viewed as both a cardinal doctrine of anti-realism and the assumption for reductio of Fitch's argument. In this paper it is argued that the paradox of knowability is a peculiarly acute manifestation (...) of a syndrome affecting anti-realism, against which Dummett's and Tennant's manoeuvres are not finally efficacious. The anti-realist can only cope with the syndrome by being much clearer about her notion of knowability. In fact, she'll have to offer an account which relativises the notion of knowability both to the world at which knowability is assessed and to the content of the proposition to which it is applied. This is not, however, merely an ad hoc manoeuvre to counter the problematic syndrome; rather it is just what we should expect from the anti-realist's intuitive use of the notion. A preliminary investigation indicates that there is no way of providing a general, systematic explanation of such a notion of knowability and thus an inherent restriction on the principle of knowability -- but one differing from those offered by either Dummett or Tennant -- is developed. (shrink)

I begin by contrasting two facets of belief: that belief is a response to a sufficiency of evidence and that belief plays a role in one’s representation of reality. I claim that these conceptions of belief are in tension because whilst the latter – Representationalism – requires Logical Coherence of belief the former – Thresholdism – conflicts with Logical Coherence. Thus we need to choose between conceptions. Many have argued that the Preface Paradox supports Thresholdism. In contrast I argue that (...) Representationalism has a more plausible response to the paradox. (shrink)

: Some twenty years since its publication Putnam's model‐theoretic argument is still much discussed. The present paper aims to defend a reconstruction of the argument but begins by attempting to clarify the form of the argument. Usually, and with good textual grounds, the argument is treated as a reductio argument against metaphysical realism. I argue instead that it should be treated as developing a paradox. I go on to claim that the most promising response to this paradox is to be (...) able to provide a theory of sense, in the style recommended by Dummett. So, according to this reasoning, the argument is not an argument against metaphysical realism but an argument against positions which reject the notion of sense. (shrink)

Twenty Years After Communism is concerned with the explosion of a politics of memory triggered by the fall of state socialism in Eastern Europe, and it takes a comparative look at the ways that communism and its demise have been commemorated by major political actors across the region.

In the second book of theConfessions, Augustine flabbergasts his interpreters by exaggerating an adolescent escapade (a pear theft) and making it a monstrosity. He conjectures that the pear thieves might have commited the theft purely for the sake of thieving, and thus, that they displayed a kind of evil that is not even presented by the arch-villain of Ciceronian antiquity, the conspirer Catilina. Following Aquinas’ interpretation this comparison has been considered a reductio in most of the relevant literature up to (...) now. This paper presents a different interpretation: Augustine is mostly serious about his claim–and there might be more to his argument than meets the eye. The interpretation developed in the present paper is based on a construal of the pear theft as collective agency. (shrink)

We have grown used to leading the hermeneutics to its philosophical honorary status up various steps. It begins relatively innocently with the skill of interpretation and explanation: it goes on with philosophical hermeneutics which prepares the general epistemological and theoretical framework for methodical understanding, and it ends with the hermeneutic philosophy, in which both philosophizing and pre-philosophical life are decisively defined as understanding and mutual understanding. This hermeneutic philosophy need not restrict itself to the hermeneutics of texts, but can extend (...) to encompass the hermeneutics of senses, images and that of human comportment. The touchstone for determining the direction in which hermeneutics is going will be otherness. The crucial question is: can otherness be overcome on the grounds of hermeneutics or can hermeneutics itself become questionable by otherness? In dealing with this question we are mostly referring to the third of the above-mentioned phases, i.e. the philosophical core of hermeneutic philosophy, which finds its most effective expression in Gadamer’s Truth and Method. That this effect is not without its doubts is not evident only from the German debates, in which the older, »traditional« hermeneutics presents various arguments defending its rights against Gadamer’s attempt at overcoming it, but also from a variety of types of hermeneutics from Italy. If we side with Jean Greisch in defining the contemporaneousness as »the age of hermeneutic reason«, it may well be that this definition of our age also reveals its limits. (shrink)

We characterize complete Boolean algebras with dense subtrees. The main results show that a complete Boolean algebra contains a dense tree if its generic filter collapses the algebra's density to its distributivity number and the reverse holds for homogeneous algebras.

We present results concerning winning strategies and tactics in club games on [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL P]math imageλ. We show that there is generally no winning tactic for the player trying to get inside the club. The bound-countable game turns out to be rather fruitful and adds to some previous results about the construction of elementary substructures and their localization in certain intervals. We show that Player II has a winning strategy in the bound-countable game, thus establishing a new ZFC result. (...) The applications given are new proofs for two cardinal diamonds and the impossibility of collapsing cardinals to ℵ2 under certain conditions. (shrink)

Starting from one of the classical criticisms of evolutionary thinking accusing it of being based on tautological reasoning and being unable to predict future events, the authors propose an escape route from this attack by programmatically specifying the notion of fitness with reference to three particular aspects: cultural context, individual choice and social networks. Paralleling recent developments in economics, that try to explain preference formation endogeneously, the authors argue for an endogeneous explanation of the evolutionary fitness landscape to explain the (...) evolution of structural complexity. (shrink)

Angesichts globaler Herausforderungen, die Handlungs- und Steuerungskompetenzen jenseits der Nationalstaaten erfordern, ist das Konzept klassischer Staatlichkeit im Wandel begriffen. Die Autoren analysieren die Fragestellung "Wozu noch Staaten?" aus unterschiedlichen disziplinaren sowie verschiedenen national-spezifischen Blickwinkeln.