On teaching methods and professionalism of teacher in Indonesia from Christian perspectives.

The processes underwriting the acquisition of culture remain unclear. How are shared habits, norms, and expectations learned and maintained with precision and reliability across large-scale sociocultural ensembles? Is there a unifying account of the mechanisms involved in the acquisition of culture? Notions such as “shared expectations,” the “selective patterning of attention and behaviour,” “cultural evolution,” “cultural inheritance,” and “implicit learning” are the main candidates to underpin a unifying account of cognition and the acquisition of culture; however, their interactions require greater (...) specification and clarification. In this article, we integrate these candidates using the variational (free-energy) approach to human cognition and culture in theoretical neuroscience. We describe the construction by humans of social niches that afford epistemic resources called cultural affordances. We argue that human agents learn the shared habits, norms, and expectations of their culture through immersive participation in patterned cultural practices that selectively pattern attention and behaviour. We call this process “thinking through other minds” (TTOM) – in effect, the process of inferring other agents’ expectations about the world and how to behave in social context. We argue that for humans, information from and about other people's expectations constitutes the primary domain of statistical regularities that humans leverage to predict and organize behaviour. The integrative model we offer has implications that can advance theories of cognition, enculturation, adaptation, and psychopathology. Crucially, this formal (variational) treatment seeks to resolve key debates in current cognitive science, such as the distinction between internalist and externalist accounts of theory of mind abilities and the more fundamental distinction between dynamical and representational accounts of enactivism. (shrink)

Why should we care what happens to future generations? Samuel Scheffler argues that we are more invested in the fate of our descendants than we may realize. Implicit in our own attachments are powerful reasons for wanting the chain of human generations to persist into the indefinite future under conditions conducive to human flourishing.

Valuing -- Morality and reasonable partiality -- Doing and allowing -- The division of moral labour : egalitarian liberalism as moral pluralism -- Is the basic structure basic? -- Cosmopolitanism, justice, and institutions -- What is egalitarianism? -- Choice, circumstance, and the value of equality -- Is terrorism morally distinctive? -- Immigration and the significance of culture -- The normativity of tradition -- The good of toleration.

Explaining Mental Illness est un manuel de sociologie sur la santé mentale dont l’ambition est explicitée dès l’introduction: il s’agit d’articuler les recherches sur la santé mentale avec la sociologie générale. Le livre est coécrit par Baptiste Brossard et Amy Chandler, tous les deux spécialistes de l’automutilation et du suicide, ainsi que chercheurs à l’université de York (Royaume-Uni). L’originalité de l’ouvrage se reflète dans son titre, il s’agit d’expliquer (explaining) la santé menta...

Essays in the ethics of business and management.

In the article, I set out to outline the state of play in contemporary philosophy of mind. Given the wide range of issues and contributions which now make up the subject, the article sketches only some of the main areas of investigation, and their interconnections without attempting to give a complete listing of the positions (and arguments for them) within these areas.

Identifies, analyzes and critiques the philosophy's conceptual structure and theoretical groundwork.

Machery and Weiskopf argue that the kind concept is a natural kind if and only if it plays an explanatory role in cognitive scientific explanations. In this paper, we argue against this explanationist approach to determining the natural kind-hood of concept. We first demonstrate that hybrid, pluralist, and eliminativist theories of concepts afford the kind concept different explanatory roles. Then, we argue that we cannot decide between hybrid, pluralist, and eliminativist theories of concepts, because each endorses a different, but equally (...) viable, specification of the explananda of cognitive science. It follows that an explanationist approach to determining the natural kind-hood of concept fails, because there is no consensus about whether or not concept should be afforded an explanatory role in our best cognitive scientific explanations. We conclude by considering what our critique of explanationism could imply for further discussions about the explanatory role of concepts in cognitive science. (shrink)

Philosophical Investigations, Volume 45, Issue 3, Page 320-333, July 2022.

Some philosophers argue that all concepts cannot have the same representational structure, because no single kind of representation has been successful in accounting for the phenomena related to the formation and application of concepts. Here, I argue against this “appeal to cognitive science” by demonstrating that different theories of the kind concept cohere with different interpretations of the argument. To circumvent the threat of relativism, I argue that theories of concept should be understood as working hypotheses, which are provisionally accepted (...) to facilitate the investigation and explanation of the mind/brain. From this perspective, theories of concept are to be evaluated as part of a comparative analysis of the different kinds of cognitive science they inspire. (shrink)

"[T]he richness of his analysis, [...] his poststrucuralist emphasis on genealogy, historicity, temporality, and discourse can supplement the sometimes arid terms of the agency/structure debate. [...] An invitation to readers who might not normally turn to Continental theory for methodological inspiration, to learn from Chamber's splendid, and, yesy, timely volume." -Diana Coole, Queen Mary University of London , from a book review in the June 04 Perspectives The standard, linear view of history is founded on the belief that political outcomes (...) are predetermined by what has gone before. This book challenges this view, arguing for what Samuel A. Chambers calls an untimely politics which renders the past problematic and the future unpredictable. This pathbreaking argument is advanced through a close reading of key texts in political theory and by entering into debates involving metaphysics, philosophy of language, and psychoanalysis versus discursive analysis. Chambers focuses on the theme of the relevance of language analysis to political debate, answering those critics who insist discourse approaches to politics are irrelevant. Heidegger, Nietzsche, Foucault and Derrida are used to challenge the political burden which is placed on language analysis to prove its value in the real world. Drawing from political theory and cultural studies Chambers takes on the same-sex marriage debate, showing how the use and misuse of language has contributed to an impasse that is not likely to be broken. Wide ranging and insightful, Untimely Politics makes a timely plea for a more politically relevant and culturally engaged form of intellectual engagement. (shrink)

Samuel R. Buss and Aleksandar Ignjatović. Unprovability of Consistency Statements in Fragments of Bounded Arithmetic.

Les études qui portent sur la stigmergie, ou qui l'exploitent pour le développement et la compréhension d'autres objets – comme la cognition sociale, les communs créatifs ou les systèmes adaptatifs complexes par exemple –, connaissent un essor extraordinaire depuis la fin des années 1990 ([11], [12], [22], [38]), essor frappé d'un caractère encore très exploratoire, puisqu'il n'en existe pas à ce jour de théorie unifiée, cohérente et consensuelle. Elle avait pourtant un sens très précis et un...

This text, which is part of a project, ‘Toward a Politics and Poetics of Singularity’, explores the implications of a phrase used more or less simultaneously, although independently, by Walter Benjamin and Sigmund Freud, ‘the single trait’. In his 1962 lectures on the problem of identification, Jacques Lacan focused on this phrase in Freud in order to exemplify the difference between the subject and the signifier. The use of the phrase by Benjamin in his essay on ‘Destiny and Character’ inflects (...) the discussion toward questions of ‘comedy’ and ‘tragedy’, and thereby links the singularity of the signifying process to literary and theatrical forms. (shrink)

This book presents extracts from Leibniz's letters to Newtonian scientist Samuel Clarke.

This is the text of The Lindley Lecture for 1994, given by Samuel Scheffler, an American philosopher.

Like process theism, Christian theology affirms the immanence of God in the world and of the world in God. Unlike process theism, it also affirms the ontological priority of God over the world. As a result, Christian theologians will object to describing God’s relation to the world by analogy with the mind’s relation to the body or in terms of whole-part relations. In Christian history, the God-world relation has been more often described in terms of “participation.” The world is said (...) to participate in God, keeping in mind that this language is highly metaphorical. The idea of participation is a development of themes enunciated by Plato and Aristotle, but adapted by Christian theologians to trinitarian ends. The created world participates in God by reflecting the trinitarian life of identity and difference. This establishes an organic and internal relation between God and the world. (shrink)

A third electrical geophysical prospection campaign conducted at Philippi in September 2001 added 9 ha to the area already covered. The interpretation of the results in the West part of the town shows that it was organised in three rows of insulae of the same module (ca. 27 x 83 m). The first row on the south side of the principal axis, which is the Via Egnatia, comprises several monumental groups, induding a large Early Christian basilica and a double stoa (...) along a small public square. The second and third rows are more difficult to interpret because of disturbances associated with the presence of a fortified Byzantine redoubt around the marsh Gate. A comparison of these geophysical data with the records of the French excavations, the epigraphic and photographie evidence and a topographical survey, has considerably clarified their interpretation. (shrink)

Serena Olsaretti brings together new essays by leading moral and political philosophers on the nature of desert and justice, their relations with each other and with other values.

Research into the ethics of artificial intelligence is often categorized into two subareas—robot ethics and machine ethics. Many of the definitions and classifications of the subject matter of these subfields, as found in the literature, are conflated, which I seek to rectify. In this essay, I infer that using the term ‘machine ethics’ is too broad and glosses over issues that the term computational ethics best describes. I show that the subject of inquiry of computational ethics is of great value (...) and indeed is an important frontier in developing ethical artificial intelligence systems. I also show that computational is a distinct, often neglected field in the ethics of AI. In contrast to much of the literature, I argue that the appellation ‘machine ethics’ does not sufficiently capture the entire project of embedding ethics into AI/S, and hence the need for computational ethics. This essay is unique for two reasons; first, it offers a philosophical analysis of the subject of computational ethics that is not found in the literature. Second, it offers a finely grained analysis that shows the thematic distinction among robot ethics, machine ethics and computational ethics. (shrink)