1 Evidence-based policy requires researchers to provide the answers to ecological questions that are of interest to policy makers. To find out what those questions are in the UK, representatives from 28 organizations involved in policy, together with scientists from 10 academic institutions, were asked to generate a list of questions from their organizations. 2 During a 2-day workshop the initial list of 1003 questions generated from consulting at least 654 policy makers and academics was used as a basis for (...) generating a short list of 100 questions of significant policy relevance. Short-listing was decided on the basis of the preferences of the representatives from the policy-led organizations. 3 The areas covered included most major issues of environmental concern in the UK, including agriculture, marine fisheries, climate change, ecosystem function and land management. 4 The most striking outcome was the preference for general questions rather than narrow ones. The reason is that policy is driven by broad issues rather than specific ones. In contrast, scientists are frequently best equipped to answer specific questions. This means that it may be necessary to extract the underpinning specific question before researchers can proceed. 5 Synthesis and applications. Greater communication between policy makers and scientists is required in order to ensure that applied ecologists are dealing with issues in a way that can feed into policy. It is particularly important that applied ecologists emphasize the generic value of their work wherever possible. (shrink)

Research involving recently deceased humans that are physiologically maintained following declaration of death by neurologic criteria—or ‘research involving the recently deceased’—can fill a translational research gap while reducing harm to animals and living human subjects. It also creates new challenges for honouring the donor’s legacy, respecting the rights of donor loved ones, resource allocation and public health. As this research model gains traction, new empirical ethics questions must be answered to preserve public trust in all forms of tissue donation and (...) in the practice of medicine while respecting the legacy of the deceased and the rights of donor loved ones. This article suggests several topics for immediate investigation to understand the attitudes and experiences of researchers, clinical collaborators, donor loved ones and the public to ensure research involving the recently deceased advances ethically. (shrink)

A dazzling insight into what gives meaning to our life and to us as a species. What makes us human? From Professor Brian Cox on the particles of dust that make us, to Caitlin Moran on the joy of Friday nights, and A C Grayling on how we express ourselves through culture: this illuminating book shares over 100 mind-expanding answers to that question. We all want to understand our place in the universe and find a sense of purpose in (...) the life. This book will help the reader navigate that journey with the help of leading names from the worlds of literature, history, philosophy, politics, sport, comedy and popular culture. Originally broadcast as a popular feature on the Jeremy Vine Show, What Makes Us Human? includes short essays from: Andrew Marr, Carlo Rovelli, Justin Welby, Marian Keyes, Alain de Botton, Robert Webb, Richard Dawkins, Stephen Fry, and many more"--Publisher's description. (shrink)

We investigate a simple stochastic model of social network formation by the process of reinforcement learning with discounting of the past. In the limit, for any value of the discounting parameter, small, stable cliques are formed. However, the time it takes to reach the limiting state in which cliques have formed is very sensitive to the discounting parameter. Depending on this value, the limiting result may or may not be a good predictor for realistic observation times.

Derek Parfit's “reductionist” account of personal identity (including the rejection of anything like a soul) is coupled with the rejection of a commonsensical intuition of essential self-unity, as in his defense of the counter-intuitive claim that “identity does not matter.” His argument for this claim is based on reflection on the possibility of personal fission. To the contrary, Simon Blackburn claims that the “unity reaction” to fission has an absolute grip on practical reasoning. Now David Lewis denied Parfit's claim that (...) reductionism contravenes common sense, so I revisit the debate between Parfit and Lewis, showing why Parfit wins it. Is reductionism about persons then inherently at odds with the unity reaction? Not necessarily; David Velleman presents a reductionist theory according to which fission does not conflict with the unity reaction. Nonetheless, relying on the distinction between person level descriptions of first-person states and the first-person perspective itself, I argue that Velleman's theory does not eliminate fission-based conflict with the unity reaction. Footnotesa * Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the philosophy departments at Rutgers University and Bowling Green State University. I am indebted to many members of these audiences, and to the other contributors to this volume, for their comments—especially Frank Arntzenius, Michael Bradie, David Copp, John Finnis, Jerry Fodor, Brian Loar, Barry Loewer, Colin McGinn, Fred Miller, Mark Moyer, David Oderberg, Marya Schechtman, David Schmidtz, David Sobel, and Sara Worley. Special thanks to David Sanford. I am also grateful to graduate students in my seminar at Bowling Green during the spring of 2003, for urging me to take seriously the grip of the unity reaction; I am especially grateful for the comments of Nico Maloberti, Jonathan Miller, John Milliken, Robyn Peabody, Jennifer Sproul, Jessica Teaman, and Sherisse Webb. (shrink)

Among politicians and policy-makers it is almost universally assumed that more transparency in government is better. Until now, philosophers have almost completely ignored the topic of transparency, and when it is discussed there seems to be an assumption that increased transparency is a good thing, which results in no serious attempt to justify it. In this book Brian Kogelmann shows that the standard narrative is false and that many arguments in defence of transparency are weak. He offers a comprehensive (...) philosophical analysis of transparency in government, examining both abstract normative defences of transparency, and transparency's role in the theory of institutional design. His book shows that even when the arguments in favour of transparency are compelling, the costs associated with it are just as forceful as the original arguments themselves, and that strong arguments can be made in defence of more opaque institutions. (shrink)

Reinforcement schemes are a class of non-Markovian stochastic processes. Their non-Markovian nature allows them to model some kind of memory of the past. One subclass of such models are those in which the past is exponentially discounted or forgotten. Often, models in this subclass have the property of becoming trapped with probability 1 in some degenerate state. While previous work has concentrated on such limit results, we concentrate here on a contrary effect, namely that the time to become trapped may (...) increase exponentially in 1/x as the discount rate, 1− x, approaches 1. As a result, the time to become trapped may easily exceed the lifetime of the simulation or of the physical data being modeled. In such a case, the quasi-stationary behavior is more germane. We apply our results to a model of social network formation based on ternary (three-person) interactions with uniform positive reinforcement. (shrink)

© The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected] article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model...The editors of this interesting collection,1 Stephan Blatti and Paul Snowdon, have placed the various essays, most of which were specially written for this volume, in three categories: Part I contains articles critical of animalism; Part II contains essays defending animalism and (...) Part III contains essays drawing out the consequences and practical applications of animalism. After some introductory remarks, I will discuss two of the essays attacking animalism – those of Derek Parfit and Mark Johnston – and then comment on Paul Snowdon’s essay....First, though, a word on the definition of animalism. In their Introduction, Blatti and Snowdon define animalism as ‘… the... (shrink)

Since its publication in 1965, Brian Barry's seminal work has occupied an important role in the revival of Anglo-American political philosophy. A number of ideas and terms in it have become part of the standard vocabulary, such as the distinction between "ideal-regarding" and "want-regarding" principles and the division of principles into aggregative and distributive. The book provided the first precise analysis of the concept of political values having trade-off relations and its analysis of the notion of the public interest (...) has also been significant. (shrink)

Proclus' commentary on Plato's Cratylus is the only ancient commentary on this work to have come down to us, and is illuminating in two special ways. First, it is actually the work of two Neoplatonists. The majority of the material is supplied by the Athenian-based Proclus, who is well known for his magisterial commentaries on Plato's Timaeus and Parmenides, as well as for a host of other works involving the study of Plato. This material we have consists of excerpts from (...) Proclus' commentary edited by another figure who appears to be a Platonist working somewhat later in Alexandria. Consequently it contains insights into the philosophy of both of the principal late antique centers of Platonism, Athens and Alexandria. Secondly, the material is divided between the grittier issues of language-theory, on which it engages freely with other ancient philosophies, and theological discussion mostly involved with the etymologies of the names of Greek gods, in which Proclus is more concerned to relate his own brand of Platonism to the 'Orphic' and 'Chaldaean' theological systems, and also to Homer. Brian Duvick's extensive notes bring out all these facets of the ancient text. (shrink)

This book argues that, despite recent calls to arms to seek out and remove "corporate psychopaths" from the business world, efforts to eliminate the corporate psychopath presence would be illegal as well as unethical.

A philosophical analysis of the discourses, practices, and effects of representation in political institutions, focusing on American democracy.

This study develops a Heideggerian thesis on the significance of Dasein's bodiliness. In Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie , Heidegger claims that bodiliness secures the ground for the full being of the human. I situate this thesis squarely within die Sache selbst for Heidegger. Die Sache selbst concerns the issue of how being itself is engendered in human understanding . From as early as 1921, Heidegger explicitly understands his central topic in terms of ki&d12;nh siv . That is, the emergence of (...) being in conjunction with the ontological structure of the human being is ultimately intelligible as a kind of movement. The 1924 thesis makes sense ultimately insofar as bodiliness itself is understood as the ontological movement---the original being-moved or pa&d12;qov ---that allows entities to appear within the domain of human concerns. After examining Heidegger's retrieval of several key Aristotelian concepts , I interpret bodiliness as the always already operative being-pulled-out-ahead-of-itself by its own essential lack. Entities are first able to be present to Dasein because Dasein is opened in this way. Thus, bodiliness on my reading is die Sache selbst. My interpretation of Heidegger's thesis also forms the interpretive starting point for a rereading of Geworfenheit and Gewesenheit as concepts of bodiliness. As Dasein's original pa&d12;qov , bodiliness in Sein und Zeit would go by the name die gewesene Geworfenheit: the a priori or always already operative thrown-open-ness that first allows being to emerge to human understanding. (shrink)

THE SELF, THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE COMMUNITY: LIBERALISM IN THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF F. A. HAYEK AND SIDNEY AND BEATRICE WEBB by Brian Lee Crowley New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. 310 pp., $59.00.

The goal of this dissertation is to show that cognitive science, while dealing with the special subject of the mind, can nonetheless fit into the same general model that Bas van Fraassen provides for the natural sciences. The dissertation focuses specifically on the nature of explanation in the cognitive sciences. ;Chapter One makes clear what I take cognitive science to be in the work. The two central cases here are Noam Chomsky's theory of generative syntax, and David Marr's computational theory (...) of vision. The bulk of this chapter is devoted to setting out the structure of the two theories, in order to provide concrete case studies in the sorts of explanations they give. ;Chapter Two sets out the model of explanation employed by considering the relative virtues of several recent approaches--Hempel's classic D-N model, Salmon's statistical relevance model, and Stalnaker and Lewis' counterfactual approach--and concluding with van Fraassen's pragmatics-oriented model. Like many accounts, van Fraassen's takes explanations to be answers to "Why?" questions, and emphasizes the pragmatic machinery at work in question-asking. ;Chapter Three considers two influential views of explanation in cognitive science. Such explanations are often said to be functional or dispositional. I look at proposals of each sort and argue that none of the explanatory strategies singled out can count as the central one in cognitive scientific explanation, because cognitive science has no central explanatory strategy. ;In Chapter Four I hold instead that cognitive science uses all the relevance relations found in natural science. The odd features of cognitive scientific explanation turn instead around the sorts of objects and processes that get posited in its theories--abstract, multiply-instantiable objects that can act as representations, and abstract processes of transformation on these objects. I do not, then, deny that we get new sorts of explanation in cognitive science--only that the source of this novelty has been properly located. (shrink)

In this extraordinary tribute to the importance of the ordinary places in our lives, fifty-two Minnesotans write about the special, sometimes secret, places that give their lives meaning. For some it is their home or cabin or lake. For others, it's a family farm or neighbourhood park, a backyard garden or north woods trail: all places where we find a personal and spiritual connection to the land. VOICES FOR THE LAND explores this complex relationship by linking these personal essays with (...) striking images captured by award-winning photographer Brian Peterson. This marriage of words, images, and landscape provides a powerful reminder of our deep and abiding connection to the land. The writers share the experience of these favourite places through their senses, from the aching tingle of a cold winter night and the sound of ice 'singing' to the buzz of mosquitoes and the acrid smell of burning peat. The Voices for the Land project, organised by the non-profit group 1000 Friends of Minnesota, encouraged Minnesotans to write about the land they love and to fight for its preservation. The Minneapolis Star Tribune published a selection of these essays, paired with Brian Peterson's photos, in an award-winning series. VOICES FOR THE LAND brings these essays and photos together in book form for the first time. (shrink)

Ernest Adams has claimed that a probabilistic account of validity gives the best account of our intuitive judgements about the validity of arguments. In particular, he claims, it has the best hope of accounting for our judgements about many arguments involving conditionals. Most of the examples in the literature on this topic have been arguments framed in the language of propositional logic. I show that once we consider arguments involving predicates and involving identity, Adams’s strategy is less successful.

Barrett and Artzenius posed a problem concerning infinite sequences of decisions. It appeared that the strategy of making the rational choice at each stage of the game was, in some circumstances, guaranteed to lead to lower returns than the strategy of making the irrational choice at each stage. This paper shows that there is only the appearance of paradox. The choices that Barrett and Artzenius were calling ‘rational’ cannot be economically justified, and so it is not surprising that someone who (...) makes them ends up with sub-optimal returns. A solution to the more general problem they pose is also advanced. (shrink)

Our primary interest this week will be in two objections Jackson mentions which seem to threaten his program. Each of them is avoided by appeal to the two-dimensional framework we sketched last week. Before we go over that framework again, we will start by looking at the objections. For reasons that may become apparent shortly, we will look at them in reverse order. So first we’ll look at this objection from Chapter 3, an objection which turns on the discovery of (...) a posteriori necessities by Kripke and Putnam. (shrink)