From Society to System presents an overview of sociologist Michel Freitag's (1935-2009) distinctive, multifaceted and interdisciplinary work. Elaborated within the grand sociological tradition, his dialectical sociology redefines sociality as the realm of the symbolic to pinpoint its ontological frailty.

Ce livre de Michel Freitag interpelle "tous ceux qui s'interrogent sur la place qu'ils tiennent ou le rôle qu'ils jouent dans l'aventure de l'Université contemporaine." (Georges Leroux, Spirale) Une des constantes des écrits contenus dans ce livre "réside dans la comparaison systématique que Michel Freitag établit entre les caractéristiques de la modernité et celles de la postmodernité et les conséquences de celle-ci sur le traitement des enjeux et des problèmes actuels." (Louis Guay, Anthropologie et société) "Dans une société (...) réduite au bavardage, à l'insignifiance, à la poursuite de petits bonheurs mesquins, le tout sous contrôle bureaucratique de plus en plus envahissant, une telle réflexion est devenue essentielle. Voici un livre de bonne foi qui n'attend que ses lecteurs, qu'on souhaite nombreux." (Robert Major, Voix et images). (shrink)

Kant’s theory of cognition centrally builds on his conception of self-consciousness and the transcendental use of the phrase “I think”: the ability to add the phrase “I think” to a representation is a necessary condition of the ability to cognize objects. The paper argues that “I think”, rather than denoting the content of a predicative judgement, is typically an expression of the subject’s thinking. It expresses a kind of self-consciousness that, without assertively representing the subject itself, indicates that representational contents (...) are unified in a single consciousness of a single subject. Our aim is thus to develop and defend an expressivist interpretation of Kant’s “I think”. (shrink)

Kant's theory of cognition centrally builds on his conception of self‐consciousness and the transcendental use of the phrase “I think”: the ability to add the phrase “I think” to a representation is a necessary condition of the ability to cognize objects. The paper argues that “I think”, rather than denoting the content of a predicative judgement, is typically an expression of the subject's thinking. It expresses a kind of self‐consciousness that, without assertively representing the subject itself, indicates that representational contents (...) are unified in a single consciousness of a single subject. Our aim is thus to develop and defend an expressivist interpretation of Kant's “I think”. (shrink)

The paper argues that Gareth Evans’ argument for transparent self-knowledge is based on a conflation of doxastic transparency with ascriptive transparency. Doxastic transparency means that belief about one’s own doxastic state, e.g., the belief that one thinks that it will rain, can be warranted by ordinary empirical observation, e.g., of the weather. In contrast, ascriptive transparency says that self-ascriptions of belief, e.g., “I believe it will rain”, can be warranted by such observation. We first show that the thesis of doxastic (...) transparency is ill-motivated and then offer a non-epistemic interpretation of ascriptive transparency by reference to the theory of explicit expressive acts: “I think it will rain” requires attendance to the weather because the utterance expresses a belief about the weather, not about ourselves. This will allow us to avoid what is often called “the puzzle of transparent self-knowledge” while remaining faithful to Evans’ linguistic observations. (shrink)

The paper analyzes the nature and scope of Moore’s paradox, articulates the desiderata of a successful solution and claims that psychological expressivism best meets these desiderata. After a brief discussion of prominent responses to Moore’s paradox, the paper offers a solution based on a theory of expressive acts: a Moorean utterance is absurd because the speaker expresses mental states with conflicting contents in commissive versions of the paradox and conflicting states of mind in omissive versions. The paper presents a theory (...) of expressivism for self-ascriptions of mental states. In addition, it introduces the idea of expressive denegation—the speaker’s expressing the absence of a mental state—as an analysis of negative self-ascriptions of mental states. Some of the consequences of expressivism for avowals are explored. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 16 This paper deals with an apparent tension in Wittgenstein’s _Philosophical Investigations_: Wittgenstein holds an expressivist position with regard to avowals, but also claims that the _doxastic_ avowal “I believe that p” is a “hesitant assertion” of p. It is argued that the tension is apparent only and that Wittgenstein’s expressivism in fact justifies and explains his views on “I believe”: avowals typically are _explicit expressives_ and usually implicate the corresponding illocutionary acts. The hesitant assertion of (...) p is the result of an implicature of the explicit expressive “I believe that p”. The paper also addresses the ambiguity of avowals and the possibility of thereby undermining the Frege–Geach objection to psychological expressivism. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that some cases of naked statistical evidence license a high credence, but not an outright belief. If this is correct, there cannot be an unconditional bridge principle from credence to outright belief. We show that at least one prominent putative counterexample to such a bridge principle is based on a mistake, by demonstrating that the statistical evidence falls short not only of licensing rational belief, but also of justifying a high credence.

Prominent instances of anti-luck epistemology, in particular sensitivity and safety accounts of knowledge, introduce a modal condition on the pertinent belief in terms of closeness or similarity of possible worlds. Very roughly speaking, a belief must continue to be true in close possibilities in order to qualify as knowledge. Such closeness-accounts derive much support from their (alleged) ability to eliminate standard instances of epistemic luck as they appear in prominent Gettier-type examples. The article argues that there are new Gettier-type examples (...) which are grounded in “distant” epistemic luck. It is demonstrated that sensitivity and safety theories cannot handle such examples. (shrink)

The paper critically examines an objection to epistemic contextualism recently developed by Elke Brendel and Peter Baumann, according to which it is impossible for the contextualist to know consistently that his theory is true. I first present an outline of contextualism and its reaction to scepticism. Then the necessary and sufficient conditions for the knowability problem to arise are explored. Finally, it will be argued that contextualism does not fulfil these minimal conditions. It will be shown that the contrary view (...) is based on a misunderstanding of what contextualists are claiming. (shrink)

The paper explores the disjunctive riddle for induction: If we know the sample Ks to be P, we also know that they are P or F. Assuming that we also know that the future Ks are non-P, we can conclude that they are F, if only we can inductively infer the evidentially supported P-or-F hypothesis. Yet this is absurd. We cannot predict that future Ks are F based on the knowledge that the samples, and only they, are P. The ensuing (...) challenge is to account for the unprojectibility of the disjunctive hypothesis. I provide an explanation in terms of epistemic dependence. The P-or-F hypothesis is unprojectible because the evidence supporting it depends epistemically on the evidence for the defeated P-hypothesis. The paper also shows that the disjunctive riddle covers the essence of Goodman's infamous grue-problem, which, therefore, can be resolved by the same means: In contrast to the green-hypothesis, the grue-hypothesis is unprojectible because the grue-evidence depends on the evidence for a defeated hypothesis. (shrink)

It has frequently been observed that typical utterances of the form “I believe that P” are assertions of the embedded proposition P. Yet that the matrix clause “I believe that” should be semantically idle creates an interesting puzzle: linguistic orthodoxy holds that the utterance is an assertion about one’s doxastic state, not about the content of this state. In response to the puzzle, Tim Henning has recently proposed a new semantic theory, parentheticalism, according to which “S believes that P” expresses (...) P from S’s point of view: the at-issue content in belief ascriptions is the embedded proposition P. The puzzle is then claimed to be resolved as follows: as speaker and doxastic subject are identical in the first-person case, “I believe that P” expresses P from the speaker’s own point of view. In this paper, I argue, first, that parentheticalism is highly doubtful and, second, that even if parentheticalism were true, it would be unable to resolve the transparency puzzle. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 65 Heft: 3 Seiten: 436-455.

Modern cities have recently evolved as centres for material and intangible exchanges and this obliges us to rethink the urban scene. The passing from the industrial era to the new age of information has rendered obsolete the models envisaged by Max Weber, Georg Simmel and Walter Benjamin. Basing her argument on the typology put forward by Saskia Sassen, Barbara Freitag sketches out the different profiles of contemporary cities. Urban centres are now defined by the level, scale and intensity of (...) the exchanges to which they give rise. On the first level is the global city, nerve centre of the globalized economy (Tokyo, New York, London...) and capable of challenging the power of the state. On the second level are the megalopoles (Mexico, São Paulo...), which are only prevented from joining the ranks of the global cities because much of their population is excluded from the global economy. Next come the metropoles, cities like Paris (‘19th-century capital’), which have retained a way of life global centres can no longer provide. However, most of the world’s population is concentrated in the peripheral boroughs of the information society’s global economy. It is for the sake of this population that attention must be paid to the transformations endured by 21st-century cities. (shrink)

In a recent contribution to this journal, Fernando Broncano-Berrocal defends the safety conception of knowledge against my counterexamples in Freitag 2014 by adding a new clause to the safety condition. In this brief reply, I argue that Broncano-Berrocal's modification cannot be plausibly understood as a natural development of the original safety idea and that, moreover, the resulting account of knowledge can be refuted by a slight alteration of my original examples.

Possibility and reference have been central topics in metaphysics and the philosophy of language in the past decades. Wolfgang Freitag’s Form and Philosophy provides a novel approach to these notions and their interrelations, based on the concept of form as the key modal concept: form is the possibility space of objects. In its historic dimension, the book analyses the role of form in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. In its systematic dimension, the book (...) offers an alternative ontological basis to David Armstrong’s combinatorial theory of possibility and rejects David Lewis’ analysis of possibility in terms of possible worlds. Representation is shown to rest on the idea of direct reference as proposed by David Kaplan and Saul Kripke. It is argued that the problem of reference links up with Wittgenstein’s rule-following problem, the nature of which is extensively discussed. It emerges that form and reference are complementary with respect to the notion of representation. Once their individual roles are seen, many metaphysical puzzles appear in a new light or disappear altogether. (shrink)

It has been frequently suggested that epistemic contextualists violate the knowledge norm of assertion; by its own lights contextualism cannot be known and hence not be knowingly stated. I have defended contextualists against this objection by showing that it rests on a misunderstanding of their commitments (Freitag 2011, 2012, 2013b). In M. Montminy's and W. Skolits' recent contribution to this journal (2014), their criticism of my solution forms the background against which the authors develop their own. The present reply (...) ventures to demonstrate that their objections are ineffective, since they rest on a confusion of two different ways in which contextualism is unknowable. The precise nature of the original problem will be clarified and my solution briefly restated. (shrink)

The paper investigates the prospects of Spohn’s ranking theory with respect to Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction. Based on a novel analysis of the riddle (Freitag [manuscript]), we show it to be an inductive extension of Hansson’s puzzle (Hansson 1992, 1999). As a consequence, a solution needs to take into account the dependence relations between evidential beliefs: “grue” is unprojectible because it depends on evidence whose projection is defeated. It will be suggested that this solution can be implemented into (...) Spohn’s ranking theory, but that ranking theory is unable to provide a proper explanation of the required conditional ranks. (shrink)

This collection includes twenty original philosophical essays in honour of Wolfgang Spohn. The contributions mirror the scope of Wolfgang Spohn’s work. They address topics from epistemology (e.g., the theory of ranking functions, belief revision, and the nature of knowledge and belief), philosophy of science (e.g., causation, induction, and laws of nature), the philosophy of language (e.g., the theory of meaning and the semantics of counterfactuals), and the philosophy of mind (e.g., intentionality and free will), as well as problems of ontology, (...) logic, the theory of practical rationality, and meta-philosophy. ― Contributors: Ansgar Beckermann, Wolfgang Benkewitz, Bernd Buldt, Ralf Busse, Christoph Fehige, Wolfgang Freitag, Gordian Haas, Volker Halbach, Franz Huber, Andreas Kemmerling, Manfred Kupffer, Hannes Leitgeb, Godehard Link, Arthur Merin, Thomas Müller, Julian Nida-Rümelin, Martine Nida-Rümelin, Hans Rott, Holger Sturm, Thomas Ede Zimmermann, Alexandra Zinke. (shrink)

The paper argues that action explanations of the form ‘because p’ do not indicate that reasons are non-psychological facts or propositions. ‘Because p’ has two different uses: In the explanatory use, ‘because’ operates on the alleged fact that p. In the reason-giving use, however, ‘because’ operates not on p, but on the agent’s belief that p: she does not describe but express her reason. I conclude that a proper analysis of reason-giving ‘because’-utterances suggests that reasons are mental states.

The paper disputes the common view which holds that to lie is, essentially, to assert a disbelieved proposition. It shows by reference to self-defeating prophecies that one can lie by asserting a believed proposition, and by reference to self-fulfilling prophecies that one can be truthful by asserting a disbelieved proposition. It concludes that lying is, essentially, asserting a proposition believed to be false conditionally on the occurrence of the assertion.

The paper explores the ontology of ‚ought‘ by analyzing ought-sentences. It claims that ought-sentences are pragmatically ambiguous between a prescriptive and a descriptive reading, and argues that there is a close connection between the function of prescriptive ought-sentences and the truth conditions of descriptive ought-sentences. More precisely, the paper contends that the truth conditions of descriptive ought-sentences, and thereby oughtness itself, is grounded in desire.

Der Beitrag erörtert Schopenhauers Theorie der Seinsgründe, nicht-kausaler ontologischer Gründe im Reich der Mathematik. Er weist nach, dass Schopenhauers entscheidendes Argument für Seinsgr??nde auf einer zu engen Konzeption von Erkenntnisgr??nden beruht. Wo Schopenhauer Seinsgr??nde sieht, liegen lediglich Begr??ndungen für Überzeugungen vor.

Following in the wake of a certain epistemological and analytical crisis in positivism (its methodology is mercifully in good shape), a revival in the popularity and `scientific' legitimacy of various `comprehensive' analytical approaches in the social sciences has been witnessed over the last ten years. However, by insisting on the significant subjective dimension of action, these interpretive approaches have brought the problem of normativity inherent in the research object, as well as the problem of the `ideological' implication of the human (...) sciences, back into the centre of epistemological preoccupations. The question now is to know to what extent the so-called human sciences are prepared to accept, from a theoretical point of view, this dual objective and subjective dimension of their cognitive practice, seen in critical relationship with society. It is also a question as to whether the human sciences have at their disposal an adequate model for recognizing this normative dimension in its ontological and epistemological specificity. This article sets out to outline just such a model from a philosophical point of view in order to identify some main ideas relating to a pedagogical reorientation, introspective rather than dogmatic, of the normative task which has fallen to the human sciences in contemporary society. (shrink)

LikeI thinkin English,(eu) acho quein Brazilian Portuguese can function as a discourse marker (DM) with more than one meaning, and these meanings are curiously diametrically opposed. Certainty, doubt or uncertainty is inferred by hearers in an interactional context. In a sample of audio-video recorded interviews, the occurrences of this DM were classified by meaning, and association tests between meanings and linguistic factors (pronoun realization, polarity, position in utterance), real-world features (type of evidence from which the speaker says something, and discursive (...) topic), prosody (F0, intensity and duration), and facial expressions were carried out. Differences that distinguish these factors were identified among certainty, doubt and uncertainty uses. The certainty meaning of(eu) acho quewas associated with pronoun presence, more formality and topics in which the speaker had direct evidence. Uncertainty and doubt were associated with pronoun absence, less formality and topics in which the speaker did not have direct evidence. Patterns of intensity and duration acted to distinguish the certainty, doubt and uncertainty meanings of(eu) acho que. In a conditional decision tree, the position in utterance, presence of a pronoun, type of speaker’s evidence, discursive topic, and duration helped to disambiguate the meanings of(eu) acho que. These results suggest the relevance of a multilevel approach to describe DM, in different languages, at least with respect to mental state verbs. (shrink)

In this paper, it is shown that if [Formula: see text] is a complete type of Lascar rank at least 2, in the theory of differentially closed fields of characteristic zero, then there exists a pair of realisations [Formula: see text], [Formula: see text] such that p has a nonalgebraic forking extension over [Formula: see text]. Moreover, if A is contained in the field of constants then p already has a nonalgebraic forking extension over [Formula: see text]. The results are (...) also formulated in a more general setting. (shrink)

This commentary is a call to action for researchers to create and use genome-wide association studies (GWASs) with previously missed age groups (e.g., infancy, elderly), which will improve our ability to ask important developmental questions using genetic data to trace pathways across the lifespan.

The Guise Cooperative, a project out carried in northern Paris by Jean-Baptiste André Godin (1817-88), who was inspired by the utopian ideas of Charles Fourier (1772-1837), put into practice a model that: (a) was politico-democratic in its self-management by the workers in a foundry; (b) was socio-economic in combining for the first time international competition and social benefits; (c) anticipated ecological arguments in developing industrialization processes; (d) embodied religious tolerance; (e) outlived the genuine socialism inspired by Marx. Godin’s ‘Palais Social’ (...) in Guise, still lived in today by around 300 descendants of the workers, was proclaimed a Human Heritage monument and handed over to the European Union in 1991. (shrink)

Premier livre à paraître d'un ouvrage plus vaste intitulé DIALECTIQUE ET SOCIÉTÉ, cette Introduction à une théorie générale du Symbolique pose les fondements d'une théorie compréhensive de la société, de la socialité et de l'historicité. Du point de vue dialectique adopté par l'auteur, toute réalité sociale-historique est en effet de part en part constituée de pratiques sociales, et ces pratiques ne peuvent elles-mêmes être étudiées et comprises dans le respect de leur propre mode existentiel que si l'analyse reconnaît et assume (...) cette orientation significative qui fonde leur spécificité ontologique vis-à-vis des phénomènes de la nature « inanimée » aussi bien qu'à l'égard de ces autres niveaux de constitution du « rapport-au-monde » que représentent le comportement sensori-moteur propre à la vie organique en général, et l'opérationnalisation formelle propre à l'objectivation scientifique. -/- En une période où les sciences sociales sont portées à répudier l'héritage de la sociologie classique parce que les théorisations dogmatiques majeures comme le marxisme, le fonctionnalisme et le structuralisme dans lesquelles celleci s'était divisée sont en crise, DIALECTIQUE et SOCIÉTÉ reste au contraire attaché aux grandes questions posées par la tradition, tout en s'efforçant d'exhumer la dimension philosophique que cette dernière avait refoulée. En liant de manière formelle une théorie de l'action, une théorie de la structure, une théorie de l'historicité et une conception phénoménologique de l'objectivité visée par la connaissance critique de la société, l'ouvrage propose en quelque sorte une synthèse de Marx, Weber et Lévi-Strauss dans laquelle seule l'option positiviste faite par ces auteurs est vraiment rejetée. Mais l'enjeu de toute la réflexion épistémologique, théorique et méthodologique reste la compréhension de la société contemporaine. (shrink)

We study and develop a notion of isogeny for superstable groups inspired by the notion in algebraic groups and differential algebraic notions developed by Cassidy and Singer. We prove several fundamental properties of the notion. Then we use it to formulate and prove a uniqueness results for a decomposition theorem about superstable groups similar to one proved by Baudisch. Connections to existing model theoretic notions and existing differential algebraic notions are explained.

Résumé Projet réalisé au nord de Paris par Jean-Baptiste André Godin, (1817-1888), s’inspirant de l’idée utopique de Charles Fourier (1772-1837), le Familistère de Guise a mis en œuvre un modèle : (a) politico-démocratique d’autogestion par les ouvriers d’une usine de fourneaux ; (b) socio-économique qui alliait pour la première fois compétitivité internationale et bénéfices sociaux; (c) qui anticipait le raisonnement écologique dans le développement des processus d’industrialisation; (d) de tolérance religieuse (e) ayant survécu au socialisme réel inspiré de Marx. Le (...) Palais Social de Godin à Guise, habité à ce jour par environ 300 descendants des ouvriers, a été déclaré Patrimoine de l’humanité et confié à l’Union Européenne en 1991. (shrink)

My aim is to show that theories which try to construct truthmakers out of objects and properties/relations alone are not tenable: The Frege–Wittgenstein idea of incompleteness does not yield truthmakers. Armstrong’s theory of partial identity and the theory of moments, i.e., of non-transferable properties, yield truthmakers, but these theories have counter-intuitive consequences. I conclude that the notion of a truthmaker makes ontological demands beyond objects and properties/relations and propose that truthmakers are exemplification relations which are necessarily tied to objects and (...) properties/relations. (shrink)