In order to prevent the rapid spread of COVID-19, governments have placed significant restrictions on liberty, including preventing all non-essential travel. These restrictions were justified on the basis the health system may be overwhelmed by COVID-19 cases and in order to prevent deaths. Governments are now considering how they may de-escalate these restrictions. This article argues that an appropriate approach may be to lift the general lockdown but implement selective isolation of the elderly. While this discriminates against the elderly, there (...) is a morally relevant difference—the elderly are far more likely to require hospitalisation and die than the rest of the population. If the aim is to ensure the health system is not overwhelmed and to reduce the death rate, preventing the elderly from contracting the virus may be an effective means of achieving this. The alternative is to continue to keep everyone in lockdown. It is argued that this is levelling down equality and is unethical. It suggests that in order for the elderly to avoid contracting the virus, the whole population should have their liberty deprived, even though the same result could be achieved by only restricting the liberty of the elderly. Similar arguments may also be applied to all groups at increased risk of COVID-19, such as men and those with comorbidities, the obese and people from ethnic minorities or socially deprived groups. This utilitarian concern must be balanced against other considerations, such as equality and justice, and the benefits gained from discriminating in these ways must be proportionately greater than the negative consequences of doing so. Such selective discrimination will be most justified when the liberty restriction to a group promotes the well-being of that group (apart from its wider social benefits). (shrink)

In De Anima 2.4, Aristotle claims that nutritive soul encompasses two distinct biological functions: nutrition and reproduction. We challenge a pervasive interpretation which posits ‘nutrients’ as the correlative object of the nutritive capacity. Instead, the shared object of nutrition and reproduction is that which is nourished and reproduced: the ensouled body, qua ensouled. Both functions aim at preserving this object, and thus at preserving the form, life, and being of the individual organism. In each case, we show how Aristotle’s detailed (...) biological analysis supports this ontological argument. (shrink)

Ross P. Cameron argues that the flow of time is a genuine feature of reality. He suggests that the best version of the A-Theory is a version of the Moving Spotlight view, according to which past and future beings are real, but there is nonetheless an objectively privileged present. Cameron argues that the Moving Spotlight theory should be viewed as having more in common with Presentism than with the B-Theory. Furthermore, it provides the best account of truthmakers for (...) claims about what was or will be the case. Cameron goes on to defend an account of the open future, and argues that this is a better account than that available to the Growing Block theory. (shrink)

'Chains of Being' argues that there can be infinite chains of dependence or grounding. Cameron also defends the view that there can be circular relations of ontological dependence or grounding, and uses these claims to explore issues in logic and ontology.

Plato’s references to Empedocles in the myth of the Statesman perform a crucial role in the overarching political argument of the dialogue. Empedocles conceives of the cosmos as structured like a democracy, where the constituent powers ‘rule in turn’, sharing the offices of rulership equally via a cyclical exchange of power. In a complex act of philosophical appropriation, Plato takes up Empedocles’ cosmic cycles of rule in order to ‘correct’ them: instead of a democracy in which rule is shared cyclically (...) amongst equal constituents, Plato’s cosmos undergoes cycles of the presence and absence of a single cosmic monarch who possesses ‘kingly epistēmē’. By means of a revision of Empedocles’ democratic cosmology, Plato’s richly woven myth is designed precisely to reject the appropriateness of democracy as a form of human political association and legitimate monarchy in its stead. (shrink)

Distinguishing “business” concerns from “ethical” values is not only an unfruitful and meaningless task, it is also an impossible endeavor. Nevertheless, fruitless attempts to separate facts from values produce detrimental second-order effects, both for theory and practice, and should therefore be abandoned. We highlight examples of exemplary research that integrate economic and moral considerations, and point the way to a business ethics discipline that breaks new ground by putting ideas and narratives about businesstogetherwith ideas and narratives about ethics.

When a person at risk of having a child with a genetic illness or disease wishes to have an unaffected child, this can involve difficult choices. If the pregnancy is established by sexual intercourse, the fetus can be tested early in pregnancy, and if affected a decision can be made to abort in the hope that a future pregnancy with an unaffected fetus ensures. Alternatively, preimplantation genetic diagnosis can be used after in vitro fertilisation to select and implant an unaffected (...) embryo that hopefully will proceed to term and produce a healthy baby. We are aware that many individuals at risk regard the latter as ethically more acceptable than the former, and examine whether there is an ethical difference between these options. We conclude that PGD and implantation of an unaffected embryo is a more acceptable choice ethically than prenatal diagnosis followed by abortion for the following reasons: Choice after PGD is seen as ethically neutral because a positive result balances a negative result simultaneously . While there is usually the intention to establish a healthy pregnancy after an abortion, this is not simultaneous; A woman sees abortion as a personal physical violation of her integrity, and as the pregnancy proceeds she increasingly identifies with and gives ethical status to the embryo/fetus as it develops in utero and not in the laboratory; Many people see aborting a fetus as “killing”, whereas in the case of PGD the spare embryos are “allowed to die”. We argue that this difference of opinion gives further weight to our conclusion, but note that this has been addressed and debated at length by others. (shrink)

A bi- or multilingual repertoire is a complex and dynamic system of languages (Herdina & Jessner, 2002; Herwig, 2001; Larsen-Freeman & Cameron, 2008; Stotz & Cardoso, 2022) which interact with each other and with the conceptual system (Kroll & Stewart, 1994; Pavlenko, 2009). Importantly, fluent and regularly used native languages are not spared from the influence of later acquired non-native ones. The paper presents the results of a case study conducted with a native speaker of Polish with three (...) additional languages: English, German, and French. Based on the analysis of the instances of lexical reverse transfer observed in the spoken production in her L1, it is concluded that reverse transfer may lead to partial L1 attrition, at least when the monolingual perspective is taken. From the multilingualism point of view, reverse transfer should rather be treated as a phenomenon leading to partial restructuring and enhancement of mother tongue competences. (shrink)

This paper aims to integrate insights from psychoanalytic theory into business ethics research on the sources of ethical failures within organizations. We particularly draw from the analysis of sources and outcomes of neurotic processes that are part of human development, as described by the psychoanalyst Karen Horney and more recently by Manfred Kets de Vries; we interpret their insights from a stakeholder theory perspective. Business ethics research seems to have overlooked how “neurotic management styles” could be the antecedents of unethical (...) behavior within organizations. After showing the connection between five managerial neuroses and the corresponding potential ethical failures within organizations that have been already identified within business ethics research, we suggest three organizational strategies to counteract these failures. First, we argue that managers should pay greater attention at the complexity of human motivation, avoiding the simplistic view of compliance‐based approaches. Second, we discuss the importance of developing a conversation around values within organizations, enabling healthy individual growth and limiting the emergence of neurotic processes. Finally, we discuss the role of the business ethicist in facilitating such a process, suggesting a parallel between the role of the business ethicist and that of the psychoanalytic therapist. (shrink)

This paper aims to integrate insights from psychoanalytic theory into business ethics research on the sources of ethical failures within organizations. We particularly draw from the analysis of sources and outcomes of neurotic processes that are part of human development, as described by the psychoanalyst Karen Horney and more recently by Manfred Kets de Vries; we interpret their insights from a stakeholder theory perspective. Business ethics research seems to have overlooked how “neurotic management styles” could be the antecedents of unethical (...) behavior within organizations. After showing the connection between five managerial neuroses and the corresponding potential ethical failures within organizations that have been already identified within business ethics research, we suggest three organizational strategies to counteract these failures. First, we argue that managers should pay greater attention at the complexity of human motivation, avoiding the simplistic view of compliance‐based approaches. Second, we discuss the importance of developing a conversation around values within organizations, enabling healthy individual growth and limiting the emergence of neurotic processes. Finally, we discuss the role of the business ethicist in facilitating such a process, suggesting a parallel between the role of the business ethicist and that of the psychoanalytic therapist. (shrink)

There is a lack of theoretical consensus on how multinational enterprises (MNEs) should implement corporate social responsibility (CSR) to build legitimacy, particularly those operating in the smaller Asian emerging market context, where current growth in the global economy is being felt more acutely than elsewhere. This paper argues for theoretical integration of business ethics (BE) and international business (IB) research to address this concern. Hence, we explore the management of CSR strategies by MNE subsidiaries with specific interest on their proactive (...) adoption of strategic CSR to obtain legitimacy in a foreign host country. Drawing on the recent CSR literature and related theories, including stakeholder theory and institutional theory, propositions and a conceptual framework are developed and presented. The framework integrates BE and IB concepts on the different dimensions of CSR and provides a theoretical derived explanation of the process for strategic adoption of global through to more local CSR strategies by MNE subsidiaries to build legitimacy in an emerging market context. In addition, the framework provides valuable insights into the adoption of different ethical approaches or CSR strategies based on the level of ethical pressure in a host country and the degree of CSR ingrainedness in the parent company. (shrink)

Introduction: Healthcare practitioners have a legal, ethical and professional obligation to obtain patient consent for all healthcare treatments. There is increasing evidence which suggests dissonance and variation in practice in assessment of decision-making capacity and consent processes. Aims: This study explores healthcare practitioners’ knowledge and practices of assessing decision-making capacity and obtaining patient consent to treatment in the acute generalist setting. Methods: An exploratory descriptive cross-sectional survey design, using an online questionnaire, method was employed with all professional groups invited via (...) email to participate. Data were collected over 3 months from July to September 2015. Survey content and format was reviewed by the liaison psychiatry team and subsequently contained five sections (demographics, general knowledge and practice, delirium context, legal aspects and education/training). Descriptive, univariate and bivariate analysis of quantitative data and qualitative content analysis of qualitative data were undertaken. Ethical considerations: The study was approved by the institutional Human Research and Ethics Committee and informed consent was taken to be provided by participants upon completion and submission of the de-identified survey. Results: In total, 86 participants engaged the survey with n = 24, exiting at the first consent question. Almost two-thirds of respondents indicated that all treatments required patient consent. Knowledge of consent and decision-making capacity as legal constructs was deficient. Decision-making capacity was primarily assessed using professional judgement and perceived predominantly as the responsibility of medical and psychology staff. A range of patient psychological and behavioural symptoms were identified as indicators requiring assessment of decision-making capacity. Despite this, many patients with delirium have their decision-making capacity assessed and documented only sometimes. Uncertain knowledge and inconsistent application of legislative frameworks are evident. Many participants were unsure of the legal mechanisms for obtaining substitute consent in patients with impaired decision-making capacity and refusing treatment. Conclusion: The legal context of decision-making capacity and consent to treatment appears complex for healthcare practitioners. Professional, ethical and legal standards of care in this context can benefit from structured education programmes and supportive governance processes. An understanding of why ‘duty of care’ is being used as a framework within the context of impaired decision-making capacity is warranted, alongside a review of the context of Duty of Care within health policy, guidance and faculty teaching. (shrink)

In conversation with Emmett Harsin Drager and Andrea Long Chu's “After Trans Studies,” this collaborative essay also turns to questions of field formation and the ethos of trans studies. Situating the growth of the field in the material conditions of precarity under which trans knowledge-workers work, the authors argue that trans studies can't be “over” because, in fact, it isn't yet here. Rather than viewing this as only a dismal proposition, however, they insist that the tenuousness of trans studies provides (...) us with the opportunity to envision and enact more sustaining ways of being “in the field.”. (shrink)

Philosophy of Mind in the Early and High Middle Ages provides an outstanding overview to a tumultuous 900-year period of discovery, innovation, and intellectual controversy that began with the Roman senator Boethius and concluded with the Franciscan theologian and philosopher John Duns Scotus. Relatively neglected in philosophy of mind, this volume highlights the importance of philosophers such as Abelard, Duns Scotus, and the Persian philosopher and polymath Avicenna to the history of philosophy of mind. Following an introduction by Margaret (...) class='Hi'>Cameron, twelve specially commissioned chapters by an international team of contributors discuss key topics, thinkers and debates, including: mental perception Avicenna and the intellectual abstraction of intelligibles Duns Scotus soul, will, and choice in Islamic and Jewish contexts perceptual experience the systematization of the passions the complexity of the soul and the problem of unity the phenomenology of immortality morality the self. Essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy of mind, medieval philosophy, and the history of philosophy, Philosophy of Mind in the Early and High Middle Ages is also a valuable resource for those in related disciplines such as Religion. (shrink)

INDICE -/- Note biografiche Introduzione, di Riccardo Faucci -/- Parte I - Da Verri a Toniolo 1. Jeremy Bentham: Contemporary Interpretations, di M.D.A. Freeman 2. Su Helvétius, Beccaria e Bentham, di Letizia Gianformaggio 3. L'etica utilitaristica di Pietro Veti, di Vincenzo Polignano 4. ll liberismo interventista di Vincenzo Emanuele Sergio, di Anna Li Donni 5. Il concetto di " felicità pubblica, nella << Genesi del diritto penale » di Romagnosi, e il rapporto Romagnosi-Bentham, di Robertino Ghiringhelli 6. « La (...) più grande felicità per il maggior numero » all'Accademia dei Georgofili ( 18)0-1850), di Gabriella Gioli 7. Una nota su Manzoni critico dell'utilitarismo, di Maurizio Mori 8. Sul concetto di utile in Francesco Ferrara e in Maffeo Pantaleoni, di Daniela Parisi Acquaviva 9. Sul pensiero sociale cristiano di fronte all'edonismo, di Luciano Avagliano 10. Giuseppe Toniolo e il recupero cattolico dell'utile e del valore, di Anna Camaiti -/- Parte II Aspetti di storia del pensiero economico nell’età classica -/- 1. La filosofia economica di Thomas Hobbes, di Marco Bertozzi 2. Ordinamento del sapere, modelli metodologici ed economia politica in Adam Smith, di Sergio Cremaschi 3. Elementi classici nel pensiero di Adam Smith: giurisprudenza romana e morale stoica, di Gloria Vivenza 4. Il “lusso” negli economisti italiani del Settecento, di Cosimo Perrotta 5. Prezzi naturali, prezzi di mercato e legge degli sbocchi nel dibattito fra Malthus e Ricardo, di Lilia Costabile 6. Marx e la moneta, di Roberto Petrini -/- . (shrink)

J. M. Cameron; XII—Poetic Imagination, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 62, Issue 1, 1 June 1962, Pages 219–240, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristote.

Causal structure learning from time series data is a major scientific challenge. Existing algorithms assume that measurements occur sufficiently quickly; more precisely, they assume that the system and measurement timescales are approximately equal. In many scientific domains, however, measurements occur at a significantly slower rate than the underlying system changes. Moreover, the size of the mismatch between timescales is often unknown. This paper provides three distinct causal structure learning algorithms, all of which discover all dynamic graphs that could explain the (...) observed measurement data as arising from undersampling at some rate. That is, these algorithms all learn causal structure without assuming any particular relation between the measurement and system timescales; they are thus rate-agnostic. We apply these algorithms to data from simulations. The results provide insight into the challenge of undersampling. (shrink)

While there is a large and ever-expanding body of work on the fields of business ethics and corporate social responsibility, there is a noted absence of a single source on the methodology and research approaches to these fields. In this book, the first of its kind, leading scholars in the fields gather to analyse a range of philosophical and empirical approaches to research in business ethics and CSR. It covers such sections as historical approaches, normative and behavioural methodologies, quantitative, qualitative (...) and experimental perspectives, grounded theory and case methodologies, and finally a section on the role of the researcher in research projects. This book is a valuable and essential read for all researchers in business ethics and CSR, not only for those starting out in the fields, but also for seasoned scholars and academics. (shrink)

[opening paragraph]: Walter Freeman discusses with Jean Burns some of the issues relating to consciousness in his recent book. Burns: To understand consciousness we need know its relationship to the brain, and to do that we need to know how the brain processes information. A lot of people think of brain processing in terms of individual neurons, and you're saying that brain processing should be understood in terms of dynamical states of populations?

Simon Blackburn posed a dilemma for any realist attempt to identify the source of necessity. Either the facts appealed to to ground modal truth are themselves necessary, or they are contingent. If necessary, we begin the process towards regress; but if contingent, we undermine the necessity whose source we wanted to explain. Bob Hale attempts to blunt both horns of this dilemma. In this paper I examine their respective positions and attempt to clear up some confusions on either side. I (...) come to defend Hale’s conclusion that both horns of the dilemma can be resisted. I end by defending my own account of the source of necessity, and showing why it does not fall victim to Blackburn’s problem. (shrink)

Carruthers argues that an integrated faculty of metarepresentation evolved for mindreading and was later exapted for metacognition. A more consistent application of his approach would regard metarepresentation in mindreading with the same skeptical rigor, concluding that the “faculty” may have been entirely exapted. Given this result, the usefulness of Carruthers’ line-drawing exercise is called into question.

Should face transplants be undertaken? This article examines the ethical problems involved from the perspective of the recipient, looking particularly at the question of identity, the donor and the donor’s family, and the disfigured community and society more generally. Concern is expressed that full face transplants are going ahead.

[opening paragraph}: The latest book by moral philosopher Mary Midgley prompted Anthony Freeman to consider some of the cultural and ethical aspects of consciousness and to discuss them with the author. What have ethics to do with consciousness? First, it is consciousness that makes morality possible. Second, neither subject fits comfortably into currently popular reductive schemes. As a consequence both have tended to be isolated in a ghetto, shut off from the rest of the intellectual scene. So believes Mary (...) Midgley, and in The Ethical Primate she seeks to open up the ghetto for the good of those on both sides of its walls. (shrink)

It is clear throughout Cognitive Gadgets Heyes believes the development of cognitive capacities results from the interaction of genes and experience. However, she opposes cognitive instincts theorists to her own view that uniquely human capacities are cognitive gadgets. Instinct theorists believe that cognitive capacities are substantially produced by selection, with the environment playing a triggering role. Heyes’s position is that humans have similar general learning capacities to those present across taxa, and that sophisticated human cognition is substantially created by our (...) socioculturally transmitted environment. It is a core strategy of Heyes to provide evidence of learning altering a cognitive capacity to conclude that a capacity is a cognitive gadget and not an instinct. We draw on recent work on the evolution of learning preparedness to examine the adequacy of this strategy. In particular, we analyse experimental evolution work showing how selection affects cognition within the laboratory. First, this work reveals that change due to learning can still be retained under genetic assimilation. This suggests that domain-specific adaptation can coexist with learning, moderate nativism, an option missed by the instinct versus gadget distinction. Second, we describe the conditions that select for increased preparedness in learning: certainty, reliability, and particular costs. We consider how these conditions can be used when conducting evolutionary reasoning about cognition, applying them to the important capacity for imitation. We find that the conditions lend theoretical support to moderate nativism about the capacity to imitate, which is supported by psychological evidence. (shrink)

We regularly make graded normative judgements in the epistemic domain. Recent work in the literature examines degrees of justification, degrees of rationality, and degrees of assertability. This paper addresses a different dimension of the gradeability of epistemic normativity, one that has been given little attention. How should we understand degrees of epistemic criticizability? In virtue of what sorts of factors can one epistemic failing be worse than another? The paper develops a dual-factor view of degrees of epistemic criticizability. According to (...) the view, degrees of epistemic criticizability are (i) an inverse function of degrees of doxastic justification and (ii) a function of degrees of agent culpability. The paper develops an account of each factor, and explains how they should be weighted. The paper also addresses the importance of modelling degrees of epistemic criticizability in a broader context. I focus on the role that such a model can play in the ethics of epistemic criticism. (shrink)

A multiple analogy is a structured comparison in which several sources are likened to a target. In "Multiple analogies in science and philosophy," Shelley provides a thorough account of the cognitive representations and processes that participate in multiple analogy formation. Through analysis of real examples taken from the fields of evolutionary biology, archaeology, and Plato's "Republic," Shelley argues that multiple analogies are not simply concatenated single analogies but are instead the general form of analogical inference, of which single analogies are (...) a special case. The result is a truly general cognitive model of analogical inference.Shelley also shows how a cognitive account of multiple analogies addresses important philosophical issues such as the confidence that one may have in an analogical explanation, and the role of analogy in science and philosophy.This book lucidly demonstrates that important questions regarding analogical inference cannot be answered adequately by consideration of single analogies alone. (shrink)

Ed Freeman’s influential ideas on stakeholder theory, business ethics, humanities, and capitalism became foundational in the management field and turned around the mainstream thinking about business. Stakeholder theory developed by Freeman and others posits that business is not as much about profits, but rather about creating value for its stakeholders, including employees, customers, communities, financiers, and suppliers. The relationship between a company and its stakeholders is the essence of business and should be of utmost attention to its managers. (...) Managers should avoid resorting to trade-offs by prioritizing one stakeholder group (e.g., shareholders) over the others and strive to run their companies in the interests of all stakeholders. The idea of pursuing the interests of all stakeholders became revolutionary in management and went far beyond the management field, expanding to Law, Health Care, Education, Public Policy and Administration, and Environmental Policy. This book is a collection of Ed Freeman’s most influential and important works on stakeholder theory as well as business ethics, humanities, and capitalism. (shrink)

This is the first modern, annotated and scholarly edition of Jean-Baptiste Du Bos’ _Critical Reflections on Poetry and Painting_, one of the seminal works of modern aesthetics in any language.

I respond to Tim Smartt’s (2023) skepticism about epistemic blame. Smartt’s skepticism is based on the claims that (i) mere negative epistemic evaluation can better explain everything proponents of epistemic blame say we need epistemic blame to explain; and (ii) no existing account of epistemic blame provides a plausible account of the putative force that any response deserving the label “blame” ought to have. He focuses primarily on the prominent “relationship-based” account of epistemic blame to defend these claims, arguing that (...) the account is explanatorily idle, and cannot distinguish between epistemically excused and epistemically blameworthy agents. I argue that Smartt mischaracterizes the account’s role for judgments of epistemic relationship impairment, leading to mistaken claims about the account’s predictions. I also argue that the very feature of the account that Smartt mischaracterizes is key to understanding what epistemic blame does for our epistemic responsibility practices that mere negative epistemic evaluation cannot. (shrink)