In Creative Understanding, Roberto Torretti lays out a classification of possible relationships between physical theories by distinguishing four big types of relationships between two given theories considered in diachronic perspective: specialization, extension, reformulation, and substitution. Within the structuralist metatheory, this author and others also have propounded in several writings a diachronic typology of intertheoretical relations. Leaving besides differences of detail, both typologies reveal remarkable coincidences, although the structuralist typology is formally more precise than Torretti’s. However, in the last portion of (...) this article, I discuss a further type of intertheoretical relation in diachronic perspective, which, until recently, had not been considered by any approach in philosophy of science: what I call “crystallization” and is exemplified by the development of thermodynamics in the 19th century. (shrink)

BackgroundPreprint usage is growing rapidly in the life sciences; however, questions remain on the relative quality of preprints when compared to published articles. An objective dimension of quality that is readily measurable is completeness of reporting, as transparency can improve the reader’s ability to independently interpret data and reproduce findings.MethodsIn this observational study, we initially compared independent samples of articles published in bioRxiv and in PubMed-indexed journals in 2016 using a quality of reporting questionnaire. After that, we performed paired comparisons (...) between preprints from bioRxiv to their own peer-reviewed versions in journals.ResultsPeer-reviewed articles had, on average, higher quality of reporting than preprints, although the difference was small, with absolute differences of 5.0% [95% CI 1.4, 8.6] and 4.7% [95% CI 2.4, 7.0] of reported items in the independent samples and paired sample comparison, respectively. There were larger differences favoring peer-reviewed articles in subjective ratings of how clearly titles and abstracts presented the main findings and how easy it was to locate relevant reporting information. Changes in reporting from preprints to peer-reviewed versions did not correlate with the impact factor of the publication venue or with the time lag from bioRxiv to journal publication.ConclusionsOur results suggest that, on average, publication in a peer-reviewed journal is associated with improvement in quality of reporting. They also show that quality of reporting in preprints in the life sciences is within a similar range as that of peer-reviewed articles, albeit slightly lower on average, supporting the idea that preprints should be considered valid scientific contributions. (shrink)

Born on October 26, 1946, Carlos Ulises Moulines studied Physics, Philosophy and Psychology at the University of Barcelona, obtaining a Degree in Philosophy from that same University and a PhD in Philosophy from the University of Munich, supervised by Wolfgang Stegmüller. He is one of the most outstanding contemporary philosophers of science and one of the most prominent exponents of metascientific structuralism. In this interview he talks about biographical aspects, philosophy of science in general and specific topics, as (...) well as presenting his impressions on some topics related to academic life. (shrink)

These days, a number of philosophers of science indulge in lamenting about a crisis of their discipline. They complain about its loss of relevance, and bemoan the mar gi na lization of their dis cipline in the philosophical community and in the wider academia , Hardcastle and Richardson ). The Munich take on the philosophy of science does not succumb to this temptation. According to it, philosophy of science is well and alive. In Carlos Ulises Moulines’s Die Entwicklung (...) der modernen Wissen schaftstheorie Eine historische Einführung the word “crisis” is used only in reference to the 1940s when clas sical logical positivism encountered some dif fi culties in dealing with problems concerning veri fi cation, the ana ly tic/synthetic distinction, and similar conundrums. For Moulines, “crisis” is not a word that applies to contemporary philosophy of science. (shrink)

This paper explores and expands upon Jorge Gracia's reasons for the apparent lack of Hispanics in US philosophy. The point is to explain the underrepresentation of Hispanics in philosophy, with a focus on a specific subgroup of Hispanics, namely, "homegrown" US Hispanics. This group wasentirely missing from the "established" ranks in Gracia's census. I propose a phenomenological explanation for this lack, rooted in my experience as ahomegrown US Hispanic. This experience gives rise to a sense of identity described as "post-immigrant." (...) Those of us in the American philosophical establishment who share this identity, or who feel its pull, desire but hesitate to fully and authentically engage philosophy and the philosophical life, where thisrequires an uncompromising insertion of our cultural and historical identity into what we write and teach. The reason for the absence of homegrown Hispanicphilosophers who are willing to engage issues related to their circumstance as Hispanics is what I call, "the post-immigrant fear.". (shrink)

This book introduces readers to central concepts and ideas in Mexican philosophy. Couched in stories and anecdotes from the author's life, the book offers these concepts and ideas as orientations, recommendations, or exhortation for navigating today's world. The structure and the style of the book aims at making these accessible to both specialists and non-specialist or anyone who may have had some experience with contemporary forms of marginalization, alienation, objectification, or any of the various forms of dread and accidentality familiar (...) to modern life. This, the author thinks, is most of us. Narrowing down the scope of the tradition, the author draws from the history of Mexican philosophy in the 20th century, as it is at this time that Mexican philosophy comes into its own. The book begins with two short introductions, one is an introduction philosophy in Mexico, the other to Mexican philosophy. Here, readers are introduced to Alfonso de la Veracruz, who offered the first philosophy course in the Americas in 1540 in the monastery of a small town in Michoacán, Mexico. From there, it presents four main themes from Mexican philosophy that recur in the philosophical literature. The remainder of the book serves as a "guide" for living a better, more fulfilling life. The main characters in what the author considers an uncontroversial retelling of Mexican philosophy are Antonio Caso, Samuel Ramos, Emilio Uranga, Leopoldo Zea, Jorge Portilla, Rosario Castellanos, Elsa Cecilia Frost, and, of course, persons in the author's own life. (shrink)

One challenge faced by aesthetics is the development of an account able to trace out the continuities and discontinuities between general experience and aesthetic experiences. Regarding this issue, in this paper, I present an enactive model of some raw cognitive dynamics that might drive the progressive emergence of aesthetic experiences from the stream of general experience. The framework is based on specific aspects of John Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy and embodied aesthetic theories, while also taking into account research in ecological psychology, (...) cognitive sciences, and dynamic systems theory. The model focuses on dynamically relevant nodes at the pre-reflective and the reflective side of experience that would work as nested rhythmic constraints at different cognitive timescales with the potential to shunt experiences toward the aesthetic in everyday situations. My proposal constitutes a way to explore aesthetic experiences from an enactive perspective that regards them as transformative events in which cognitive processes entrain and are entrained by changes taking place in the environment, the brain, and the body. (shrink)

In this paper I explain how Spinoza's ontological monism is related to the monotheism of a distinct tradition in medieval Aristotelianism exemplified by Maimonides. My main contention is that Maimonides' God, conceived as intellectual activity has the same structure as Spinoza's Deus sive Natura. The main difference between them is that Maimonides' God is confined to cognitive activity, whereas Spinoza's God is extensive activity as well. I trace the impact of the medieval doctrine of God on Spinoza's thought from the (...) Cogitata Metaphysica to the Ethics, establishing conceptual parallels, literary links, and an explanation of the steps leading from the former to the latter. (shrink)

O nosso artigo está dividido em duas partes. A primeira parte visa mostrar como o sentido da transcendência está profundamente enraizado em todo o pensamento heideggeriano. A segunda parte procura ilustrar essa hipótese de leitura recorrendo a alguns textos de juventude do filósofo e os interpretando a partir de diversos estudos sobre a gênese de sua obra. No entanto, pressupomos que a sua relação com o cristianismo não foi ultrapassada nem com a sua ruptura com o “sistema do catolicismo” e (...) nem com o seu afastamento filosófico da teologia. Ao contrário, a experiência cristã, de certa forma, persiste em todo seu itinerário e está presente, mesmo após a “viravolta” (Kehre) dos anos trinta. Essa experiência, para além de qualquer adesão doutrinária, alimenta a questão acerca de Deus como a sempre impensada transcendência encarnada no pensamento da e na existência. Palavras-chave: Heidegger, Transcendência, Experiência Cristã, Teologia, Crítica da Razão Moderna. (shrink)

The author deals with one aspect of the justification of governmental action and its product (the law). He focuses on the authoritative character of legal rule, analyzing the apparent capacity of governments to produce reasons for action not grounded on substantive moral considerations. The assumption of that capacity seems necessary in order to establish a general moral obligation to obey a government irrespective of the actions required. This question is faced in connection with the thesis that only a particular form (...) of government, democracy, is morally justified insofar as it rests on legal rules issued by a legitimate source. (shrink)

This chapter subsumes David Marr’s levels of analysis account of explanation in cognitive science under the framework of mechanistic explanation: Answering the questions that define each one of Marr’s three levels is tantamount to describing the component parts and operations of mechanisms, as well as their organization, behavior, and environmental context. By explicating these questions and showing how they are answered in several different cognitive science research programs, this chapter resolves some of the ambiguities that remain in Marr’s account, and (...) shows that many different areas and traditions of cognitive scientific research can be unified under the mechanistic framework. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to point out significant and meaningful overlapping between several styles of scientific thinking, as they were proposed by Crombie (1981) and discussed by Hacking (1985; 2009). This paper is divided in four sections. First, I examine an interpretation made by Barnes (2004) about the incompatibility among scientific styles. As explained by its author, this interpretation denies any possibility of similarities between styles of scientific reasoning. In opposition, the following sections of this paper include explanations (...) of relevant characteristics of Geometry, as stated in Euclid's Elements, which are also present in other three scientific styles: modeling, experimental exploration and taxonomic style (and some of the shared characteristics are even used to define such styles). By stressing out these characteristics I argue that these four styles discussed by Hacking are not so different from each other, in fact, they overlap and may even be abridged into one foundational style: geometric. El objetivo de este artículo consiste en explicar traslapes importantes y significativos entre varios estilos de pensamiento científico, tal como fueron propuestos por Crombie (1981) y discutidos por Hacking (1985; 2009). El presente artículo está dividido en cuatro secciones. Primero, se examina la interpretación de Barnes (2004) sobre la incompatibilidad entre diversos estilos. Según este autor, no existe posibilidad alguna de encontrar similitudes en los estilos de razonamiento científico. En oposición a esta interpretación, las siguientes secciones explican características relevantes de la Geometría, tal como fueron plasmadas en Los Elementos de Euclides, y que están presentes en otros tres estilos: de modelación, de experimentación y taxonómico (las características compartidas incluso definen algunos de estos estilos). Destacar estas características me permite argumentar que estos cuatro estilos discutidos por Hacking no son tan diferentes entre sí, de hecho, se traslapan e incluso pueden ser condensados en un estilo fundacional: el geométrico. (shrink)

This book presents practical holism as a framework for understanding the ways in which our society and individual lives are affected by moral, legal, political, economic, and other considerations. Only nomadic thought is able to capture the interactions among all those crucial aspects.

The purpose of the paper is to present a logical framework that allow to formalize a kind of prima facie duties, defeasible conditional duties, indefeasible conditional duties and actual (indefeasible) duties, as well as to show their logical interconnections.

This paper considers the way mathematical and computational models are used in network neuroscience to deliver mechanistic explanations. Two case studies are considered: Recent work on klinotaxis by Caenorhabditis elegans, and a longstanding research effort on the network basis of schizophrenia in humans. These case studies illustrate the various ways in which network, simulation and dynamical models contribute to the aim of representing and understanding network mechanisms in the brain, and thus, of delivering mechanistic explanations. After outlining this mechanistic construal (...) of network neuroscience, two concerns are addressed. In response to the concern that functional network models are non-explanatory, it is argued that functional network models are in fact explanatory mechanism sketches. In response to the concern that models which emphasize a network’s organization over its composition do not explain mechanistically, it is argued that this emphasis is both appropriate and consistent with the principles of mechanistic explanation. What emerges is an improved understanding of the ways in which mathematical and computational models are deployed in network neuroscience, as well as an improved conception of mechanistic explanation in general. (shrink)

Much work in the philosophy of action in the last few decades has focused on the elucidation and justification of a series of purported norms of practical rationality that concern the presence or absence of intention in light of belief, and that demand a kind of structural coherence in the psychology of an agent. Examples of such norms include: Intention Detachment, which proscribes intending to do something in case some condition obtains, believing that such condition obtains, and not intending to (...) do that thing; Intention-Belief Consistency, which proscribes intending to do what you believe you will not do; Intention Consistency, which proscribes intending each of two ends you believe to be inconsistent; and Means-End Coherence, which proscribes intending an end and not intending the means you believe to be implied by your end. In this paper, I present a series of examples that show that these requirements are not genuine requirements of rationality. The reason for this is simple: these requirements concern the presence or absence of intention in light of all-out belief. Rational agents like us, however, do not, and in fact should not, always form or revise their intentions in light of what they all-out believe. When such agents do not form or revise their intentions in light of what they all-out believe, they need not be irrational if they do not conform to these requirements. (shrink)

Mineral species are, at first glance, an excellent candidate for an ideal set of natural kinds somewhere beyond the periodic table. Mineralogists have a detailed set of rules and formal procedure for ratifying new species, and minerals are a less messy subject matter than biological species, psychological disorders, or even chemicals more broadly—all areas of taxonomy where the status of species as natural kinds has been disputed. After explaining how philosophers have tended to get mineralogy wrong in discussions of natural (...) kinds, I show how minerals species don’t behave like natural kinds. They are defined on the basis of human intentionality, not merely natural distinctions. They aren’t ideal grounds for inductive inference. And they don’t form a system that divides nature along a set of equivalent joints. While this is a regrettable outcome to those of us who like the idea of science relying on natural kinds, I contend that mineralogy is doing just fine without a natural kind-based taxonomy, and may in fact be better off without one. (shrink)

In this article, I review a recent book edited by Gregory R. Smulewicz-Zucker that presents novel frameworks and refreshing perspectives on the issue of the ethical treatment of nonhuman animals.

La logique spécifique des jugements de valeur est à chercher dans le discours rhétorique. Cette thèse développée par Ch. Perelman dans L'Empire rhétorique (1977) nous rappelle l'introduction à l'éthique de Jean Buridan (XIVe s.). Selon Buridan la philosophie morale ne peut se contenter d'appliquer la logique générale: elle a besoin d'une logique spéciale, une „logique morale” qui n'est rien autre que la technique persuasive qu'on étudie dans la Rhétorique. Roger Bacon (XlIIe s.) a même essayé d'intégrer cette rhétorique dans l'éthique (...) : elle est la partie pratique de la science morale. Bien que leur textes rappellent parfois les considérations de la ‘nouvelle rhétorique’, la relation entre l'éthique et la rhétorique y est envisagée d'une manière toute différente. Pour les auteurs médiévaux la rhétorique est une science auxiliaire de l'éthique : elle sert de liaison entre la théorie et la pratique. Dans la partie théorétique de l'éthique la logique ‘générale’ reste en vigeur. Ce n'est que pour mettre en pratique les règles et valeurs qui ont été ‘démontrées’ par la théorie qu'on a recours à la technique persuasive et sa logique ‘spéciale’. La rhétorique n'a donc qu'une fonction subsidaire. On retrouve la même conception au début des temps modernes chez Francis Bacon qui attribue à la rhétorique la fonction d'appliquer le dictamen rationis à l'imagination pour exciter ainsi la volonté. Une tout autre conception est défendue par l'humaniste Lorenzo Valla qui essaie de réintégrer l'argumentation morale dans le discours rhétorique où elle trouve sa place originaire. Notre propre point de vue est développé en confrontation avec Aristote, de qui nous avons hérité le projet d'une ‘science pratique’ et l'ambiguité qui en est inhérente 1° La rhétorique présuppose l'éthique. 2° L'éthique qui se veut epistème, ne relève pas de la rhétorique qui n'est qu'une technè. Elle se présente comme une science à caractère dialectique. 3° Les difficultés arrivent dès qu'on exalte la fonction pratique de cette science (cf. récemment R. Hare). Dès que l'éthique veut être efficace dans la vie concrète, elle devient une argumentation qui relève plutôt du discours épidectique (Weltanschauung). Notre société, en pleine crise morale, a certainement besoin d'un tel discours qui essaie d'intensifier l'adhésion à des valeurs morales. Mais il nous semble qu'il reste à côté d'un tel discours - en pleine expansion des nos jours - une place bien discrète pour une reflection critique qui en analyse les raisons : qui n'est pas inutile, bien que peu efficace. (shrink)

Según cierto sector de la posteoría, Ilya Prigogine habría creado una nueva alianza con la naturaleza bajo el signo de una conjunción de ciencia y filosofía, donde los estudios sobre la irreversibilidad, las estructuras disipativas y las estructuras auto-organizativas juegan un rol preponderante ..

Abstract Nowadays, there is a deep and widespread feeling of discomfort among academics due to the psychological and labor pressures that universities exert upon their researchers by demanding endless publications. In this paper, I offer numerous pieces of evidence of this crisis, which affects primarily those who inhabit academic ecologies. First, I argue that it is convenient to understand the current situation as an expression of technologies and individual apparatuses shaped by subjectivizing ideologies, and mechanisms of exclusion, stigmatization, and replacement. (...) Second, I examine two proposals against the crisis produced by the pace of academic production framed by the Slow movement. Lastly, after making explicit some of the assumptions that undergird the university’s epistemological machine, I propose to complement Ulmer and Mountz’s project with two suggestions. On the one hand, I extend an invitation to reflect on and with students as a means to redirect the university’s teleology. On the other hand, I suggest incorporating an ontogogic approach as a resistance apparatus against the pressure from the university’s production machine. The article’s point of departure is anti-dicotonegative because it is based on a summative approach rather than in an agonistic procedure. In other words, I propose two additional tools that can be put to the test to contribute to solving the university publication crisis. (shrink)

RésuméOn prend comme point de départ la crise actuelle de l'idée de raison, en envisageant la possibilité de son dépassement au moyen d'une reposition de cette idée, pour arriver ainsi à un rationalisme nouveau que l'on peut appeler » humaniste «. Ce rationalisme doit prendre conscience, tout d'abord, de la condition strictement humaine de notre savoir en tant que différente d'une connaissance intellectuelle absolue, dans un sens tout à fait opposé à la vision rationaliste de l'époque moderne. Dans cette ligne, (...) l'on fait remarquer l'aspect » compositif « et » divisif « de notre démarche rationnelle et son caractère dynamique, en exposant les possibilités explicatives de cette compréhension dynamique en face des mathématiques et des sciences de la nature. Il faut aussi donner raison du fait métaphysique dans lequel naturellement débouche le rationnel. Le kantisme est considéré dans sa position programmatique et historique, en soulignant chez lui la forte empreinte rationaliste, qui amène à une fermeture à l'égard du dynamisme propre de la science. L'on constate, enfin, les limitations épistémologiques du réalisme aristotélicien, entraǐnant une certaine absolutisation de l'immédiat sensible, qu'un réalisme actuel pourrait bien dépasser par la noétique dynamique et humaniste.ZusammenfassungDer Verfasser geht von der heutigen Krisis der Vernunftidee aus, um durch eine Wiederherstellung derselben Idee, die zu einem neuen Rationalismus, als humanistischer Humanismus gedacht, leiten muss, eine mögliche Überwindung dieser Krisis anzuzeigen. Dieser Rationalismus soll, im Gegensatz zur modernen intellektualistischen Anschauung, das spezifisch Menschliche unserer Erkenntnis als etwas Verschiedenes von einem rein intellektuellen Wissen darlegen. In diesem Sinne merkt man das » compositive « und » divise « Verfahren unserer Vernunft und ihren eigenartigen Dynamismus vor, um die erklärenden Möglichkeiten dieser dynamischen Auffassung in Verbindung mit der mathematischen und naturwissenschaftlichen Tatsache vorzustellen. Auch die Metaphysik soll als natürliche Vollendung des rationalen Strebens erkannt werden. Der Kantismus wird in seiner programmatischen und geschichtlichen Lage betrachtet, um seine mächtige rationalistische Prägung, in eine gründliche Blindheit vor der dynamischen Gestait der Wissenschaft leitend, zu bemerken. Endlich werden die episte‐mologischen Mängel des aristotelischen Realismus festgestellt, die ein heutiger Realismus durch eine dynamische und humanistische Erkenntnislehre überwinden kann.The critical attitude actually taken towards the idea of reason supplies the starting point; it is considered possible to overcome the resulting crisis by positing this idea anew, in order to establish a new rationalism which might be termed » humanist «. That rationalism should first of all duly record the fact that our knowledge is strictly human and differs as such from an absolutely intellectual knowledge, in a sense which contrasts with the present rationalist outlook. Following that line, the writer stresses the » compositive « and » divisive « aspects as well as the dynamic character of our rational activity, in the process of presenting the explicative possibilities of this dynamic understanding with reference to mathematics and natural science. The metaphysical fact into which the rational is bound to flow must be accounted for. Kantism is examined in its historical and programmatical position, stressing how deep the rationalist imprint is there, making it a blind alley as far as scientific dynamics are concerned; it is held that they could be overcome by present day realism, thanks to a dynamic and humanist noetic doctrine. (shrink)

No presente trabalho, pretende-se abordar a destruição fenomenológica, operada por Heidegger no ensaio A Origem da Obra de Arte, dos termos "matéria" e "forma", tomados da filosofia aristotélica como fio condutor da interpretação do ente enquanto tal e, por conseguinte, também da obra de arte. Para Heidegger, tal par conceitual procede da interpretação do modo de ser do utensílio, e, portanto, não diz respeito ao modo de ser específico da obra. Como a história da metafísica orientou-se pelos termos "matéria" e (...) "forma" como fio condutor da interpretação do ente como tal, toda estética e toda filosofia da arte estão, para Heidegger, assentadas na compreensão de um modo de ser que é estranho à obra. Cabe a desconstrução desses conceitos como primeiro passo no caminho para a essência da obra. (shrink)

América Latina enfrenta un proceso histórico, económico y político que exige la transformación del Estado, ello después de siglos de imposición del liberalismo y de décadas de imposición del neoliberalismo; tanto el pensamiento y las instituciones liberales han mostrado sus límites, deficiencias y efectos negativos, como el neoliberalismo ha llevado a varias crisis económicas, políticas y sociales en diversos países del continente. Es decir, que los ciudadanos y ciudadanas, la población, los pueblos, las culturas, las civilizaciones, las etnias y las (...) naciones han cobrado conciencia de ello, por lo que se han organizado para explicar, comprender y transformar al Estado. Ahora bien, dicha transformación se da desde un conjunto de praxis producto de la reflexión, teorización, explicación y comprensión del mundo que lleva a plantear el sentido de la práctica de transformación consciente o de la práctica revolucionario, también consciente. La conjunción de la teorización y de la práctica consciente llevan a conformar una praxis transformadora o revolucionaria. En este artículo para explicar la praxis y las derivas que ha ido adquiriendo en América Latina se aborda el trabajo de un conjunto de autores que han producido su obra teórica desde América Latina, además del análisis de la praxis del Ejército de Liberación Nacional (EZLN). (shrink)