This book offers both the theoretical background behind the minority effect, teachers' personal experiences as they experienced being a minority, and their analyses and insights for teaching diverse learners. This book uses real-life experiences of diverse people to illustrate that, if not understood and addressed, situational minorities at school or work are unlikely to perform at their highest potentials.

Everybody negotiates. But not everybody negotiates ethically. One driver of unethical negotiation behavior is power. Yet, we still haven’t discovered the principalmoderating and mediating influences between power and ethical negotiation behavior. In this pair of experimental studies we’re interested in finding out how resilience and moral identity affect an individual’s ethical behavior in both simple and complex negotiations when primed for power.

Moral stress is an increasingly significant concept in business ethics and the workplace environment. This study compares the impact of moral stress with other job stressors on three important employee variables—fatigue, job satisfaction, and turnover intentions—by utilizing survey data from 305 customer-contact employees of a financial institution’s call center. Statistical analysis on the interaction of moral stress and the three employee variables was performed while controlling for other types of job stress as well as demographic variables. The results reveal that (...) even after including the control variables in the statistical models, moral stress remains a statistically significant predictor of increased employee fatigue, decreased job satisfaction, and increased turnover intentions. Implications for future research and for organizations are discussed. (shrink)

The purpose of this valuable book is to consider recent cultural trends in bioethics from a Catholic perspective. Bioethics is intended for a lay audience interested in understanding bioethical issues from a Catholic perspective.

The central conflicts of the world today are closely related to cultural, traditional, and religious differences between nations. As we move to a globalized world, these differences often become magnified, entrenched, and the cause of bloody conflict. Growing out of a conference of distinguished scholars from the Middle East, Europe, and the United States, this volume is a singular contribution to mutual understanding and cooperative efforts on behalf of peace. The term paideia, drawn from Greek philosophy, has to do with (...) responsible education for citizenship as a necessary precondition for effective democracy. (shrink)

Bradley contends that the semiology of Charles Sanders Peirce , the founder of pragmatism, is a standing challenge as much to Gadamerian hermeneutics as to Saussure’s structuralism and its deconstructionist progeny. For Peirce physical matter itself is one specific mode of the activity of semiosis or sign interpretation. The paper outlines the central point and purpose of Peirce’s general metaphysics and describe the basic features of his theory of signs.

On the evening of November 5, 1831, a young Frenchman by the name of Alexis de Tocqueville met the last surviving signer of the Declaration of Independence, Charles Carroll of Carrollton. Just a little over a year after their meeting, Carroll, age 95, would pass away to much acclaim from the young republic. He would be memorialized as a great man in Israel and as the last of the Romans. That he would be remembered as both a Hebrew prophet (...) and a Republican demigod would not shock the young Frenchman. Indeed, Carroll impressed Tocqueville so much that he lamented that “this race of men is disappearing now after having provided America with her greatest spirits.” With the passing of the revolutionary generation, Tocqueville continued, “the tradition of cultivated manners is lost; the people is becoming enlightened, attainments spread, and a middling ability becomes common. The striking talents, the great characters, are rare. Society,” he thought, “is less brilliant and more prosperous.” Whereas Europe had theorized about such great men in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, America had actually produced a genius generation. Carroll was the last remnant. Carroll reminisced proudly about his days in the American Revolution, his own thoughts on independence, and his respect for the English. Tocqueville, it seems, listened with rapt attention. (shrink)

According to Charles Taylor, practical reasoning helps us overcome cultural conflicts of val-ue when we are able to show that the passage from one value to another represents an epistemic gain. This paper argues that practical reasoning can be effective in pathological cases of cultural convergence but only if it is understood as a species of the creative social imagination.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Classics and the Uses of ReceptionJames Bradley WellsCharles Martindale and Richard F. Thomas, eds. Classics and the Uses of Reception. Classical Receptions. Malden: Blackwell, 2006. xiv + 335 pp. 20 black-and-white figs. Paper, $36.95.Passion and parrhesia characterize this collection of twenty-three essays on applications of reception theory and practice to classical studies. Charles Martindale and Richard F. Thomas originally conceived of this project as an invitation (...) to "wider debate about the uses of reception within classics" (2). This volume is the product of an admirably collaborative process, which did not serve to put contributors on message with any particular ideological or theoretical stance but created a forum for sustained dialogue, a sort of salon whose doors are now open to broader participation. Classics and the Uses of Reception throws down challenges to conventional ways of thinking about texts, history, modes of perception, and styles of analysis; this willingness to take a stand gives the collection its passionate quality.Some authors speak to the capacity that reception has for enabling classics to join the fray of contemporary intellectual life with more commitment and to become more attractive to today's students. The essays are intensely self-reflexive and practice a confrontational parrhesia that dismantles assumptions, admits its faults, and prefers open-endedness to gift-wrapped conclusions. This book is a provocation, not a primer, even if there are many fine illustrations of what reception theory and practice look like—and it is not a point of entry for research on, say, pastoral poetry, Sophocles' Antigone, or the Venus de Milo. Prospective readers who hope to find here the footing necessary to make their own receptionalist forays will still need to read their Hans Robert Jauss and Wolfgang Iser, although many essays do describe the intellectual genealogy of reception, both in its theoretical dimensions and in terms of particular topics in classical studies. These topics are appealingly diverse.Diverse too—or divergent in this case?—are the rhetorical strategies of the essays in the collection. In addition to authors who conform to the generic parameters of the expository essay, some authors adopt an insistently centrifugal style that replicates the openendedness of the point of reception, the moment of interaction between a text and its interlocutor. I get that, but I had trouble with the essays that read like theory interloping. I use theory and savor the specificity [End Page 135] of definition, the hyperqualification of thought aspiring to exactitude sans simplicity for its own sake, and complex sentence structure that is a reflex of the ideas it conveys, so if I locate some of the essays in this collection on the spectrum of, at one end, stupefying displays of jargon, and, at the other, postmodern-cute, we are talking about the alienation of an interested reader. In what follows, I summarize, necessarily crudely, the contents of the twenty-three essays in Classics and the Uses of Reception.The first two essays, Martindale's "Introduction: Thinking Though Reception" (1–13) and William W. Batstone's "Provocation: The Point of Reception Theory" (14–20), preface the two sections of the book, "Part I: Reception in Theory" and "Part II: Studies in Reception." A core thread in Classics and the Uses of Reception is the problem of history, which Martindale weighs vis-à-vis reception specifically as it pertains to classics. In light of key tenets of reception theory—first, that meaning is situated but not instantiated and, second, that meaning is a product of the dialogue that emerges in the interface of two horizons of expectations, that of the classical text, broadly conceived to include all communicative media, and that of the reader—reception in classics offers the prospect of retooling how the discipline approaches history so that classicists might more rigorously disclose present dimensions of their encounters with antiquity. Batstone's essay addresses a danger to which virtually any methodology is susceptible: to command an analytical vista impervious to the hints—indeed, responsibility to acknowledge—that what we see has something to do with us. Easing over a palette of thinkers that includes Kristeva, Gadamer, Heidegger, Bakhtin, Lacan, and Freud, Batstone's discussion of subjectivity and... (shrink)

Jean Paul Sartre and Michael Foucault -- Socrates and the Buddha -- Sigmund Freud and Richard Dawkins -- Paul Gauguin and Vincent van Gogh -- Carl Jung and Mircea Eliade -- Charles Darwin and Michael Behe -- Frans de Wall and Barbara King -- Paul Maclean and Michael Persinger -- Pierre Teilhard de Chardin and Francis Collins -- John Hick and the Dalai Lama.

Since structural descriptions rather than ostensive ones are required by the logic of the cultural sciences, the Platonic eidos as a regulative idea continues to play a creative role in establishing the formal unity of historical concepts. Paul Natorp, Troeltsch’s neo-Kantian contemporary and early proponent of the logicist thesis in Germany, first construed mathematical logic as a Platonistic search for the unconditioned in the form of absolutely foundational concepts or categories of thought. The hidden Platonism expressed in Troeltsch’s formal logic (...) of history is rather close to Natorp’s reading of the Platonic ideas as functions of knowledge, as methods, unities, and pure postulates of thought whose cognitive role is to be comprehensive, heuristic, and revelatory. Moreover, such characteristic 19th-century Hegelian histories of philosophical concepts as those of Adolf Trendelenburg and Gustav Teichmüller, or F. C. Bauer’s dialectical historical methodology of congruence and manifestation in ecclesiastical historicity, were Platonically oriented in that development meant fulfillment as abstract pristination [[sic]] or as the progressively emergent pure logic of historical ideas. The same climate of thought is expressed in F. H. Bradley’s version of the Identity of Indiscernibles and a Platonic-Hegelian ascent of concepts is present even later in Nicolai Hartmann’s neo-idealist treatment of the realization of concepts as "living spirit" in the progressive movement of research itself. (shrink)

We may paraphrase Charles Péguy by noting that the philosophical classics are new every morning and nothing is as old as today’s latest philosophical fad. Even fads are not without their value, however, if some new approach or method is introduced and shown to be really contributory to “progress in clarification” in either historical understanding or in the pursuit of new knowledge. In any case, the great enduring philosophical views present a continual challenge to be updated in the light (...) of new knowledge. We know much more now about individuals, classes, relations, predication, identity, and the like, than was known in the days of Peirce and Bradley. It may be helpful to examine the views of these writers on these topics, especially as concerns continuous relations, in the light of what we now know. The result will be not only an updating but to some extent a defense and rational reconstruction of some views which have long been in disrepute among writers who pride themselves upon logical clarity. (shrink)

In his magnum opus, Process and Reality, Alfred North Whitehead claims a special affinity to Oxford philosopher Francis Herbert Bradley. McHenry clarifies exactly how much of Whitehead's metaphysics is influenced by and accords with the main principles of Bradley's absolute idealism. He argues that many of Whitehead's doctrines cannot be understood without an adequate understanding of Bradley, in terms of both affinities and contrasts. He evaluates the arguments between them and explores several important connections with William James, (...) Josiah Royce, George Santayana, Bertrand Russell, and Charles Hartshorne. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Charles Faulkner Bryan: His Life and MusicTerese M. VolkCarolyn Livingston, Charles Faulkner Bryan: His Life and Music ( Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 2003)There are many biographical studies in music education history.1 Indeed, it seems one of the easiest fields in historical research to mine—that is, until the researcher finds him or herself in the midst of what could be a years-long endeavor. Then the (...) choice is to commit to the research or quit. Carolyn Livingston did not quit. Her research began in 1981, continued through twenty years of investigations, interviews, library searches, and analyses, and has culminated in Charles Faulkner Bryan: His Life and Music. This book is not just the usual sequence of events in the life of a musician. Rather, it is more like becoming acquainted with someone you have never met before, yet feel comfortable with immediately. Charles Faulkner Bryan is genuinely likeable, and Livingston brings the person of Bryan to the fore and lets his humanity shine through his life and his music.Charles Faulkner Bryan: His life and Music is divided into two sections (pre- and post-WWII), each with four chapters. Livingston looks at this musician from several perspectives: the composer, the educator, the researcher, and the man. Appalachian folk music is the theme that connects the chapters, as it connected the events in Bryan's life. [End Page 211]Chapter 1 focuses on Bryan's youth, during which he and his family discovered his musical abilities. From performing at school, to building his own "turtle uke,"2 to his studies at the Nashville Conservatory of Music, Livingston describes the family support behind his developing musicality. Chapter 2 shows the reader his humanity even more clearly. Livingston tells of his early career as a music educator at the Tennessee Polytechnic institute; his marriage; and his mentorship of a young Black singer, J. Robert Bradley. That Bryan, a white Southerner, gave voice lessons to Bradley was not only generally unheard of with segregation as it was in the United States during the 1930s, but was dangerous to his career as well. Bryan moved on to teach at Peabody College in Nashville and then worked for the Works Progress Administration (WPA) Music Program on the Tennessee Music Project. Later he became the assistant state coordinator for the Tennessee State Defense Council. During both of these service positions, he called for music education improvements in Tennessee. Commenting on his work during this period, Livingston says, "Bryan was both of his time and ahead of his time... grounded in reality and yet visionary."3In Chapter 3, Livingston gives the reader a review of the "status of folk music scholarship and performance" as it existed in the 1930s.4 She takes pains to introduce the folk music researchers and musicians who influenced Bryan in his work with Appalachian folk music: Lucien L. McDowell and Flora Lassiter McDowell, George Pullen Jackson, Charles Seeger, and John Jacob Niles. These connections and friendships were to influence his awareness of Appalachian folk music and would continue for the rest of his life. By 1945 he had come to be considered an authority on folk music in his own right and his vision of this music came to encompass "the ultimate meaning in representing America itself."5Chapter 4 traces Bryan's development as a composer. It is in this chapter that Livingston begins to incorporate analyses of Bryan's most popular compositions. Her reviews of these compositions are clear and detailed without being overly theoretical. Some of the selections she analyzes include "Charlottown," "The Ballad of the Harp Weaver," and the White Spiritual Symphony. The Symphony in particular shows his respect for the folk songs he incorporated in this composition. Indeed, as Livingston points out several times, he maintained the integrity of these songs in all his compositions and performances. Chapter 4 concludes with Bryan's academic achievements: a Guggenheim Fellowship for music composition and his acceptance at Yale University to study composition under Hindemith.Livingston continues the discussion and analyses of Bryan's compositions in Chapter 5, detailing his time at Yale. His completed choral works from this period include the "Bell... (shrink)

Excerpt from The Appeal to Immediate Experience: Philosophic Method in Bradley Whitehead and Dewey The insight and guidance of Professor John Herman Randall, Jr. have made this book possible. Rather than merely acknowledge my debt to him I would like to express my gratitude here for his unfailing kindness, his penetrating criticism of my efforts, and the help he has given me in clarifying the complex problems of this subject-matter. I wish also to acknowledge the kindness of the following (...) publishers in permitting me to quote from their publications: F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, by Allen and Unwin Ltd.; J. H. Randall, Jr. and J. Buchler, Philosophy: An Introduction, by Barnes Noble, Inc.; F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality and Essays on Truth and Reality, by Clarendon Press, Oxford; F. J. E. Woodbridge, Nature and Mind, by Columbia University Press; R. W. Church, Bradley's Dialectic, by Cornell University Press; John Dewey, The Man and His Philosophy, by Harvard University Press; J. Dewey, Logic and Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, by Henry Holt Company; R. Kagey, F. H. Bradley's Logic, by R. Kagey; J. Dewey, Nature in Experience and Whitehead's Philosophy, by Longmans, Green & Co.; A. N. Whitehead, Symbolism, Modes of Thought, Adventures of Ideas, Process and Reality, T. M. Forsyth, English Philosophy, and J. H. Muirhead, Bradley's Place in Philosophy, by the Macmillan Company; A. N. Whitehead, The Concept of Nature-and An Equiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge, by the Macmillan Company and the Cambridge University Press; H. B. Haldane, Human Experience, by John Murray Ltd.; J. Goheen, Whitehead's Theory of Value, by Northwestern University Press; J. Dewey, Experience and Nature, by Open Court Publishing Co.; G. Santayana, Realm of Essence and Scepticism and Animal Faith, by Charles Scribner's Sons; and J. Dewey, "How is Mind to be Known?" The Objectivism-Subjectivism of Modern Philosophy," M. Gross, The Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead," and M. C. Otto, The Journal of Philosophy. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Originally published in German in 1935, this monograph anticipated solutions to problems of scientific progress, the truth of scientific fact and the role of error in science now associated with the work of Thomas Kuhn and others. Arguing that every scientific concept and theory—including his own—is culturally conditioned, Fleck was appreciably ahead of his time. And as Kuhn observes in his foreword, "Though much has occurred since its publication, it remains a brilliant and largely unexploited resource." "To many scientists just (...) as to many historians and philosophers of science facts are things that simply are the case: they are discovered through properly passive observation of natural reality. To such views Fleck replies that facts are invented, not discovered. Moreover, the appearance of scientific facts as discovered things is itself a social construction, a _made_ thing. A work of transparent brilliance, one of the most significant contributions toward a thoroughly sociological account of scientific knowledge."—Steven Shapin, _Science_. (shrink)

F. H. Bradley has assured us that where all is bad it must be good to know the worst. In the case before us the worst is that Jonathan Edwards, from whatever perspective he is viewed, represents an imposing enigma. I confess at the outset that the enigma is one I am unable entirely to dispel, although I am confident that I can explain what is enigmatic about his thought, his approach, his caste of mind, and that I can (...) do so "not through a glass darkly." The central problem is this: Edwards, on the one hand, accepted totally the tradition established by the Reformers with respect to the absolute primacy and authority of the Bible, and he could approach the biblical writings with that conviction of their inerrancy and literal truth which one usually associates with Protestant fundamentalism. On the other hand, Edwards insisted vigorously on the criteria of reason and experience, and he was without equal on the American scene up to the time of Charles Peirce in his capacity for philosophical analysis, for sustaining a logical argument, and for expressing his conclusions with the most painstaking attention to subtle nuances of meaning and rhetorical effectiveness. Moreover, he insisted on the use of philosophical concepts and principles in considering the "things of religion" and his speculations about creation, his estheticism, and pantheism caused deep anxiety in the minds of traditional Calvinists, whose theology was as literal as their biblical exegesis. This double-barrelled character of his approach has led critics to define him as a reactionary and "medieval" thinker who had lost touch with those currents of thought which would eventually lead to the "modern" point of view. Without pausing to evaluate that charge at this point, one thing at least is clear: in relation to his contemporaries Edwards was alone in his attempt to make the religious tradition intelligible in those philosophical terms first laid down by Augustine and Anselm in their enterprise of "faith seeking understanding.". (shrink)

Patrick Stokes has argued that although many conspiracy theories are true, we should reject the policy of particularism (that is, the policy of investigating conspiracy theories if they are plausible and believing them if that is what the evidence suggests) and should instead adopt a policy of principled skepticism, subjecting conspiracy theories – or at least the kinds of theories that are generally derided as such – to much higher epistemic standards than their non-conspiratorial rivals, and believing them only if (...) they are proven up to the hilt. The reason is that although some conspiracy theories are true (or otherwise epistemically kosher) there is a widespread practice of conspiracy theorizing which leads to the social acceptance of conspiracy theories which (much like Lord Byron) are mad, bad and dangerous to ‘know’, leading to radically false beliefs about the natural and political worlds (for instance to Trump’s claim that Global Warming is a ‘Chinese Hoax’). Thus Stokes is a defender of the epistemic status quo in which the punditocracy routinely dismisses and sneers at ‘conspiracy theories’, simply because they are conspiracy theories, whilst admitting sotto voce that once in a blue moon there are some conspiracy theories that are true. It is just the he would prefer the epistemic policy of the punditocracy to be the policy of the populace at large. Stokes seems to be suggesting that although particularism looks like a sensible epistemic policy (and might indeed be the correct policy in an ideal world), if it were put into practice at the level of public debate it would give a specious air of plausibility to many false and dangerous conspiracy theories with pernicious social effects. I reply that the actual moral costs of conspiracy ‘skepticism’ (as it is currently practiced) exceed the likely costs of particularism, especially if it is informed by some sensible heuristics, ruling out some conspiracy theories as crazy and ruling in others as relatively sane. For the conspiracy ‘skepticism’ as currently practiced is highly selective, pouring scorn and contempt on conspiracy theories which threaten current elites whilst giving the conspiratorial concoctions of those elites something close to a free pass. (shrink)

This volume is a serious attempt to open up the subject of European philosophy of science to real thought, and provide the structural basis for the interdisciplinary development of its specialist fields, but also to provoke reflection on the idea of ‘European philosophy of science’. This efforts should foster a contemporaneous reflection on what might be meant by philosophy of science in Europe and European philosophy of science, and how in fact awareness of it could assist philosophers interpret and motivate (...) their research through a stronger collective identity. The overarching aim is to set the background for a collaborative project organising, systematising, and ultimately forging an identity for, European philosophy of science by creating research structures and developing research networks across Europe to promote its development. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this article we call for a paradigm change in relation to the way we tend to look at how markets and morals are entwined in the writings of Jonathan Swift (1667–1745). We argue that it would be wrong to apply contemporary notions of economics retrospectively and somewhat a-historically to a thinker of an axial time in which economics as a separate sphere did not exist, and morals and markets and the way they relate to each other were about (...) to be reconceptualised. We argue that it is thus no accident that Scottish Enlightenment thinkers such as David Hume and Adam Smith took to Swift. They admired more than the expressive or rhetorical skills in Swift; in the first instance, they read Swift as somebody who managed to express moral sentiments (and even outrage) in an appealing, that is mostly satirical way, thereby not only criticizing the cruel conditions in Ireland at the time but also identifying the gap between rhetoric and reality and thus taking issue with the hypocrisy and double standards of the time. We will use two famous examples of Swift's work to illustrate our case, A Modest Proposal (1729) and Directions to Servants (1745). (shrink)

[David Charles] Aristotle, it appears, sometimes identifies well-being with one activity, sometimes with several, including ethical virtue. I argue that this appearance is misleading. In the Nicomachean Ethics, intellectual contemplation is the central case of human well-being, but is not identical with it. Ethically virtuous activity is included in human well-being because it is an analogue of intellectual contemplation. This structure allows Aristotle to hold that while ethically virtuous activity is valuable in its own right, the best life available (...) for humans is centred around, but not wholly constituted by, intellectual contemplation. /// [Dominic Scott] In Nicomachean Ethics X 7-8, Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of eudaimonia, primary and secondary. The first corresponds to contemplation, the second to activity in accordance with moral virtue and practical reason. My task in this paper is to elucidate this distinction. Like Charles, I interpret it as one between paradigm and derivative cases; unlike him, I explain it in terms of similarity, not analogy. Furthermore, once the underlying nature of the distinction is understood, we can reconcile the claim that paradigm eudaimonia consists just in contemplation with a passage in the first book requiring eudaimonia to involve all intrinsic goods. (shrink)

There is a fascinating debate that was initiated by Graham Priest, who is a chief proponent of dialetheism, about the possibility of legal gluts. In this essay, after critically evaluating the original cases for and against the possibility of legal gluts, I adjudicate a recent debate in this Journal regarding their possibility and provide new reasons for countenancing them. If my considerations are correct, then I will have provided new grounds for the possibility of legal gluts.

At a time when Americans are increasingly concerned with finding jobs and economic stability, supporting families, and surviving in the global economy, many consider the arts to be a luxury, a frivolous distraction which entices students away from real learning. In Strong Arts, Strong Schools, Charles Fowler argues that, far from a luxury, the arts are a vitally important part of our society and our schools. Speaking directly to educators, policy makers, and parents alike, Fowler presents a compelling defense (...) of the arts and their importance in our lives. The arts illuminate "life in all its mystery, misery, delight, pity and wonder." Without them, students are deprived of learning what it means to be truly human. The arts teach students how rather than what to think. Highlighting the crucial effect of the arts on learning, he contends that the arts teach skills that other basic subjects cannot--critical thinking and problem solving, judgment and independence, attention to detail and craftsmanship, and an openness to other cultures and ways of thinking. Arguing on behalf of the arts, Fowler shows how the arts can enliven and extend the entire school curriculum by integrating different subjects in innovative interdisciplinary ways, sparking the interest of at-risk or special needs students. "The best schools have the best arts programs," writes Fowler. "Excellence in education and excellence in the arts go hand in hand." In eighteen compelling essays, Fowler demonstrates the importance of the arts in our culture and the necessity of rescuing the arts for our future. Beginning with an overview of the context in which the arts operate, he offers an honest and sometimes distressing overview of the state of education and arts education today. He then examines the arts and economics, presenting a carefully researched exposition of the significance of the arts and their relationship to science and industry. Showing how the arts provide a more comprehensive education, he shows why the arts engage students and make learning relevant and fun. Tackling the controversial question of curriculum, Fowler addresses such questions as who should study the arts, which arts, and whose culture should be taught. Citing a shameful neglect of creativity in our culture, he highlights the negligence of the schools in teaching students to be creative and inventive thinkers, and he shows the capacity of the arts to communicate these essential skills. Fowler concludes the book with suggestions for reform and with practical strategies for winning the support of school boards and school administrators. Finally asking "how do we get there," he offers specific recommendations for changing our schools, providing equal opportunity for all, and--perhaps most critically in today's economic climate--paying the bill. In this elegantly written, passionately argued book, Fowler presents a convincing case for teaching the arts to all children. "A downtrodden army of cultureless children," Fowler warns, "is marching toward a barren and depleted adulthood and taking the future of our civilization with them." Strong Arts, Strong Schools is a clarion call to action for any teacher, parent, policy maker, or citizen concerned about the fate of the arts in American society and about the state of our schools. (shrink)

In the conclusion to the first book of the Treatise, Hume's skeptical reflections have plunged him into melancholy. He then proceeds through a complex series of stages, resulting in renewed interest in philosophy. Interpreters have struggled to explain the connection between the stages. I argue that Hume's repeated invocation of the four humors of ancient and medieval medicine explains the succession, and sheds a new light on the significance of skepticism. The humoral context not only reveals that Hume conceives of (...) skepticism primarily as a temperament, not a philosophical view or system. It also resolves a puzzle about how Hume can view skepticism as both an illness and a cure. The skeptical temperament can, depending on its degree of predominance, either contribute to or upset the balance of temperaments required for proper mental functioning. (shrink)