The director of Courage International talks about the work of the apostolate in addressing homosexuality according to the mind and heart of the Church, which he calls “one of the most demanding aspects of education, formation, and pastoral care today.” But it is also an opportunity to attend to the often acute and persistent wounds of those who need healing within what Pope Francis calls the “field hospital” of the Church. The author points out that the work of Courage is (...) not first about homosexuality but about what it means to be human. It is an invitation to consider the question of the fulfillment of the human heart according to God’s gracious plan. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 15.2 : 221–230. (shrink)

In previous work I argued that purely probabilistic accounts of what it takes to promote a desire are mistaken. This is because, I argued, there are desires that it is possible to promote but impossible to probabilistically promote. In a recent article critical of my account, Joshua DiPaolo and Jeffrey Behrends articulate a methodological principle -- Check the Neighborhood -- and claim that respecting this principle rescues pure probabilism from my argument. In this reply, I accept the methodological principle and (...) show that, despite rendering the original argument invalid, there remains a neighboring argument against purely probabilistic accounts of promotion. (shrink)

We investigate a SAT-based bounded model checking method for EMTLK that is interpreted over timed models generated by timed interpreted systems. In particular, we translate the existential model checking problem for EMTLK to the existential model checking problem for a variant of linear temporal logic, and we provide a SAT-based BMC technique for HLTLK. We evaluated the performance of our BMC by means of a variant of a timed generic pipeline paradigm scenario and a timed train controller (...) system. (shrink)

This paper analyses and compares some of the automated reasoners that have been used in recent research for compliance checking. Although the list of the considered reasoners is not exhaustive, we believe that our analysis is representative enough to take stock of the current state of the art in the topic. We are interested here in formalizations at the _first-order_ level. Past literature on normative reasoning mostly focuses on the _propositional_ level. However, the propositional level is of little usefulness (...) for concrete LegalTech applications, in which compliance checking must be enforced on (large) sets of individuals. Furthermore, we are interested in technologies that are _freely available_ and that can be further investigated and compared by the scientific community. In other words, this paper does not consider technologies only employed in industry and/or whose source code is non-accessible. This paper formalizes a selected use case in the considered reasoners and compares the implementations, also in terms of simulations with respect to shared synthetic datasets. The comparison will highlight that lot of further research still needs to be done to integrate the benefits featured by the different reasoners into a single standardized first-order framework, suitable for LegalTech applications. All source codes are freely available at https://github.com/liviorobaldo/compliancecheckers, together with instructions to locally reproduce the simulations. (shrink)

Model checking is a widely used technique that aids in the designand debugging of reactive systems. This paper gives an overview onthe theory and algorithms used for model checking, with a biastowards automata-theoretic approaches and linear-time temporallogic. We also describe elementary abstraction techniques useful forlarge systems that cannot be directly handled by model checking.

This paper concerns model-checking of fragments and extensions of CTL* on infinite-state Presburger counter systems, where the states are vectors of integers and the transitions are determined by means of relations definable within Presburger arithmetic. In general, reachability properties of counter systems are undecidable, but we have identified a natural class of admissible counter systems (ACS) for which we show that the quantification over paths in CTL* can be simulated by quantification over tuples of natural numbers, eventually allowing translation (...) of the whole Presburger-CTL* into Presburger arithmetic, thereby enabling effective model checking. We provide evidence that our results are close to optimal with respect to the class of counter systems described above. (shrink)

This book is primarily about checking and only derivatively about knowing. Checking is a very common concept for describing a subject’s epistemic goals and actions. Surprisingly, there has been no philosophical attention paid to the notion of checking. In Part I, I develop a sensitivity account of checking. To be more explicit, I analyze the internalist and externalist components of the epistemic action of checking which include the intentions of the checking subject and the (...) necessary externalist features of the method used. Crucially, successfully checking whether p is true requires using a method that is sensitive with respect to p, i.e. a method that would not indicate that p, if p were false. In Part II, I use the distinction between knowing and checking to explain central puzzles about knowledge, particularly puzzles centering on knowledge closure, puzzles concerning bootstrapping and the skeptical puzzle. Moreover, the book clarifies a dispute about modal epistemology, concerning the application of the sensitivity principle. By arguing that sensitivity is necessary for checking but not knowing, I explain where our persisting intuitions about sensitivity have their place in epistemology. (shrink)

Can you rationally double-check what you already know? In this paper, I argue that you can. Agents can know that something is true and rationally double-check it at the very same time. I defend my position by considering a wide variety of cases where agents double-check their beliefs to gain epistemic improvements beyond knowledge. These include certainty, epistemic resilience, and sensitivity to error. Although this phenomenon is widespread, my proposal faces two types of challenges. First, some have defended ignorance norms, (...) on which agents are only allowed to inquire about things they don't already know. Second – motivated by strong conceptions of belief or pragmatic encroachment – some have argued that double-checking destroys knowledge. I argue that these competing views fail to capture both the epistemic value of double-checking and the many reasons why agents might double-check. Moreover, they rely on overly strong assumptions about what inquiry, knowledge, or belief requires. Finally, I marshal linguistic data in favor of the compatibility of knowledge and double-checking. (shrink)

Body checking, characterized by the repeated visual or physical inspection of particular parts of one’s own body (e.g. thighs, waist, or upper arms) is one of the most prominent behaviors associated with eating disorders, particularly Anorexia Nervosa (AN). In this paper, we explore the explanatory potential of the Recalcitrant Fear Model of AN (RFM) in relation to body checking. We argue that RFM, when combined with certain plausible auxiliary hypotheses about the cognitive and epistemic roles of emotions, is (...) able to explain key characteristics of body checking, including how body checking behavior becomes habitual and compulsive. (shrink)

Double‐checking one's reasoning is a perfectly normal way of responding to a disagreement between peers. I argue that conciliationist approaches lack the resources to accommodate this phenomenon adequately. On the one hand, conciliationists cannot claim that double‐checking is a rationally impermissible response to disagreement because a compelling case for its permissibility appeals to arguments analogous to those often used by conciliationist in favour of their own view. On the other, they lack the resources to accommodate double‐checking as (...) a rationally permissible response to disagreement. To show this, I draw a distinction between strong and moderate versions of conciliationism. The strong version accepts, whereas the moderate version rejects, that the conciliatory obligation exhausts the rational requirements engendered by disagreements. Strong conciliationists cannot explain the motivation for someone to double‐check if they have followed the conciliationists advice. Moderate conciliationists who try to make space for double‐checking are forced to concede that disputants can respond rationally to disagreement without lowering their confidence in the disputed belief. (shrink)

We consider the model checking problem for Hybrid Logic. Known algorithms so far are global in the sense that they compute, inductively, in every step the set of all worlds of a Kripke structure that satisfy a subformula of the input. Hence, they always exploit the entire structure. Local model checking tries to avoid this by only traversing necessary parts of the input in order to establish or refute the satisfaction relation between a given world and a formula. (...) We present a framework for local model checking of Hybrid Logic based on games. We show that these games are simple reachability games for ordinary Hybrid Logic and weak Büchi games for Hybrid Logic with operators interpreted over the transitive closure of the accessibility relation of the underlying Kripke frame, and show how to solve these games thus solving the local model checking problem. Since the first-order part of Hybrid Logic is inherently hard to localise in model checking, we give examples, in the end, of how global model checkers can be optimised in certain special cases using well-established techniques like fixpoint approximations and divide-and-conquer algorithms. (shrink)

In his The Everlasting Check: Hume on Miracles, Alexander George claims to provide readers with a single unified interpretation of Hume’s ‘Of Miracles’ that demonstrates Hume’s actual argument is philosophically rich and far more robust than is generally thought. This response argues that George is unsuccessful, ignoring crucial passages and misinterpreting others.

Cílem mého článku je podat kritiku fact-checkingu a navrhnout úpravy metodiky vedoucí ke zvýšení jeho epistemické relevance. Nejprve představím současný model fact-checkingu jako odvětví aplikované epistemologie, jeho metodiku a cíle. Dále vymezím a zhodnotím epistemické charakteristiky procesu fact-checkingu modelovaného coby typ přesvědčovacího dialogu. Jakou měrou by měl institucionalizovaný fact-checking ovlivňovat důvěru veřejnosti v hodnocená tvrzení? Jaké jsou epistemologické charakteristiky hodnotících kritérií fact checkingu? Kdy jsou fact-checkingová kritéria objektivní?

In his important and original book, Knowing and Checking, Guido Melchior provides advice on how to tackle skepticism. I argue that his analysis points to a possible virtue-theoretic answer to skepticism, which I call the restraint solution, i.e., activate your self-trust and restrain your inquisitiveness! It leads one to the ideal of bounded reflective curiosity: when it comes to knowledge, we should restrain our second-order, reflective curiosity and stay content with the somewhat Moorean trust in ordinary everyday beliefs. We (...) can preserve our ordinary, first-order vigilance and investigative interest (curiosity) without falling into skeptical over-caution which is basically a reflective, second-order vicious attitude. (shrink)

Like people, academic fields grow, acquire an identity, establish goals, and ultimately impact the world in various ways. Here we check in with our young friend Neuroethics—a field I want to see develop and thrive. This won't happen if it keeps returning to issues like cognitive enhancement or neural causation of behavior and responsibility, with minor adjustments of its analyses. Neuroethics is at its best when scanning the horizon for new scientific and technical developments that intersect in new ways with (...) ethics and law. Consider the development of open‐ and closed‐loop deep brain stimulation for behavioral disorders. Under what conditions are patients responsible for their behavior when it is influenced by an implanted system? Neuroethics has also increased understanding of people's beliefs and attitudes toward neuroscience and its applications because effective policy must take empirical facts into account. (shrink)

In our previous work we have introduced loop-type sequent calculi for propositional linear discrete tense logic and proved that these calculi are sound and complete. Decision procedures using the calculi have been constructed for the considered logic. In the present paper we restrict ourselves to the logic with the unary temporal operators “next” and “henceforth always”. Proof-theory of the sequent calculus of this logic is considered, focusing on loop specification in backward proof-search. We describe cyclic sequents and prove that any (...) loop consists of only cyclic sequents. A class of sequents for which backward proof-search do not require loop-check is presented. It is shown how sequents can be coded by binary strings that are used in backward proof-search for the sake of more efficient loop-check. (shrink)

The distributed temporal logic (DTL) is a logic for reasoning about temporal properties of distributed systems from the local point of view of the system’s agents, which are assumed to execute sequentially and to interact by means of synchronous event sharing. Different versions of DTL have been provided over the years for a number of different applications, reflecting different perspectives on how non-local information can be accessed by each agent. In this paper, we propose an automata-theoretic model checking algorithm (...) for DTL. To this end, we propose a notion of distributed transition system that will be used to specify the system to be verified. The properties that the system should meet are specified in DTL. In order to capture the models of these properties, we propose the notions of generalized distributed Büchi automaton and of distributed Büchi automaton. With these concepts, we are able to adapt results from automata-theoretic approaches to model checking in LTL to the distributed case. (shrink)

We describe how we used the interactive theorem prover Isabelle to formalise and check the laws of the Timed Interval Calculus (TIC). We also describe some important corrections to, clarifications of, and flaws in these laws, found as a result of our work.

Fichte offers separate analyses of the conditions for the possibility of representing or referring to (i) material objects and (ii) other minds – extra-subjective entities of importantly distinct sorts. These analyses are importantly akin, in that both postulate, as a necessary condition for the mental accomplishment under consideration, some sort of basic incapacity or limitation that is partly constitutive of human rationality. But the two accounts also involve interestingly different understandings of the nature and implications of the basic constraints in (...) question. As a first approximation, we can say that, for Fichte, (i) a rational being posits a putatively mind-independent object only if that being’s self-initiated mental activity encounters a pre- or proto-objective “check” or “affront” (Anstoß), and (ii) a rational being can first become concretely conscious of its own capacity for rational self-determination only as the addressee of a “summons” (Aufforderung) that calls upon it to actuate that very capacity. -/- In this essay I roughly reconstruct the indicated arguments. In the process, I endeavor to show that Fichte does not suppose that either argument firmly backs philosophical assent to the existence of material objects or of other minds. On the contrary: the goal of his professed ‘deductions’ of our everyday ‘convictions’ concerning such things is not to philosophically legitimate those prephilosophical beliefs. Instead, the aim of these arguments is to vindicate Fichte’s transcendental idealism – which, if anything, epistemically undermines said beliefs – by demonstrating that any experience that is putatively ‘of’ such things has, as its necessary and sufficient conditions, nothing but states and activities of the I. Thus, in the case of material objects, a radical difference manifest within the I – self-initiated rational activity versus “simple sensation” – is ‘set forth’ (vorgestellt) in a representation (Vorstellung) of an extra-subjective bearer of sensed qualities. And – much more controversially – in the case of other minds, a demand that the I (qua pure reason, constitutively committed to its own unlimited self-activity and efficacy) makes upon itself (qua rational individual capable of intelligent self-determination) is outwardly depicted as an appeal originating from an extra-subjective source. (shrink)

Guido Melchior’s important and rich book (Melchior _Knowing and Checking. __An Epistemological Investigation_ 2019 ) draws our attention to the much neglected topic of checking. There are many new leads to follow. Here, I will pick a few that seem to me to allow the most room for discussion and disagreement: the alleged modal profile of checking (Sect. 1), the contrastive aspects of checking (Sect. 2), and the relation of checking to closure (Sect. 3). I (...) will end with two smaller points worth bringing up here (Sect. 4). (shrink)

In this paper, I describe some of the highlights of Melchior’s checking account and then suggest that its explanatory value could be enhanced with a less analyzed concept of checking. This thought inspires a rearguard defense of sensitivity, by no means aiming to rescue it from all its well-known problems, wherein it is suggested that sensitivity fares better as a necessary condition for knowledge when all the bells and whistles with which it has been adorned over the years (...) are stripped away. Finally, I investigate a recognizably Moorean position involving methods that can be construed as sensitive, such that persons using them can claim to have checked that skeptical hypotheses are false. (shrink)

There were more than 36,000 firearm-related deaths in the U.S. in 2015. Under federal law, a background check is required only for gun purchases from licensed dealers. Research suggests that some persons prohibited from owning a gun turn to private sellers, including those identified online, to attempt to obtain a firearm. State-level approaches to make it more difficult for high-risk persons to purchase or possess firearms include universal background check and gun violence restraining order laws. UBC laws, on the books (...) in 18 states as of the end of 2016, can reduce both homicide and suicide rates. After Colorado adopted a UBC law in 2013, the number of background checks conducted by private sellers for sales occurring at places other than gun shows steadily increased. GVRO laws give law enforcement and families the authority to petition a court to temporarily remove firearms from an individual who presents a danger to himself or others during times of crisis, regardless of whether that person has been diagnosed with a mental illness. California enacted a GVRO law in 2014. Data are emerging to suggest the effectiveness of GVRO-type laws at averting suicides and providing an entryway to services. (shrink)

In the introduction the paper presents, based on the work of Michael Devitt, the conflicting ontological positions of Realism and Constructivism. The former insists on the independence of the nature of the world from our conceptual apparatus, language or scientific theories, whereas the latter affirms its dependence. The central part of the paper is concerned with showing that the Realism/Constructivism dispute is unsolvable by way of a thought experiment followed by refutation of the arguments of key constructivists and realists . (...) The views of Hilary Putnam are also briefly assessed and rejected. In conclusion it is argued, partly with recourse to Carnap’s arguments, that the dispute cannot be resolved, that it is a kind of Kantian antinomy, and that being a realist or a constructivist is therefore a matter of decision. In the course of the article a view is also expressed with regard to the nature of philosophy. (shrink)

In his recent book, Knowing and Checking, Guido Melchior argues that, when we attempt to check whether p, we tend to think that we do not know p. Melchior then uses this assumption to explain a number of puzzles about knowledge. One outstanding question for Melchior's account, however, is why this tendency exists. After all, Melchior himself argues that checking is not necessary for knowing, so why would we think that we fail to know that p when we (...) are in the midst of checking that p? I will explore one such suggestion for why this occurs, arguing that the connection between checking and inquiry can shed light on the impact that checking has on knowing. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Santa, Genealogy, and History Power/Knowledge: The Gift That Keeps on Giving “He sees you when you're sleeping”: Foucault's Theory of Panopticism “He's making a list, he's checking it twice” Naughty or Nice: The True Meaning of Discipline The Archeology of Christmas.

Researchers are concerned about whether manipulations have the intended effects. Many journals and reviewers view manipulation checks favorably, and they are widely reported in prestigious journals. However, the prototypical manipulation check is a verbal (rather than behavioral) measure that always appears at the same point in the procedure (rather than its order being varied to assess order effects). Embedding such manipulation checks within an experiment comes with problems. While we conceptualize manipulation checks as measures, they can also act as interventions (...) which initiate new processes that would otherwise not occur. The default assumption that manipulation checks do not affect experimental conclusions is unwarranted. They may amplify, undo, or interact with the effects of a manipulation. Further, the use of manipulation checks in mediational analyses does not rule out confounding variables, as any unmeasured variables that correlate with the manipulation check may still drive the relationship. Alternatives such as nonverbal and behavioral measures as manipulation checks and pilot testing are less problematic. Reviewers should view manipulation checks more critically, and authors should explore alternative methods to ensure the effectiveness of manipulations. (shrink)

Developmental psychologists have often portrayed young children as stubborn autodidacts who ignore the testimony of others. Yet the basic design of the human cognitive system indicates an early ability to co-ordinate information derived from first-hand observation with information derived from testimony. There is no obvious tendency to favour the former over the latter. Indeed, young children are relatively poor at monitoring whether they learned something from observation or from testimony. Moreover, the processes by which children and adults understand and remember (...) a sequence of events appear to be similar, whether they witness that sequence or are told about it. Children’s early receptivity to testimony raises the question of whether and how children discern what testimony is reliable. Arguably, before the emergence of reflective judgement, children are equipped with a tacit filtering device. To be understood, any new piece of testimony typically needs to be consistent with, and integrated into, what is already known about the topic in question. Children’s impoverished knowledge base will make that integrative process relatively slow. Thus, children’s early ignorance may often save them from misplaced credulity.Author Keywords: Trust; Testimony; Sources ; Cognitive development; Situation model. (shrink)

Automated Vehicles (AVs) are designed and programmed to follow traffic rules. However, there is no separate and comprehensive regulatory framework dedicated to AVs. The current Queensland traffic rules were designed for humans. These rules often contain open texture expressions, exceptions, and potential conflicts (conflict arises when exceptions cannot be handled in rules), which makes it hard for AVs to follow. This paper presents an automatic compliance checking framework to assess AVs behaviour against current traffic rules by addressing these issues. (...) Specifically, it proposes a framework to determine which traffic rules and open texture expressions need some additional interpretation. Essentially this enables AVs to have a suitable and executable formalization of the traffic rules. Defeasible Deontic Logic (DDL) is used to formalize traffic rules and reasoning with AV information (behaviour and environment). The representation of rules in DDL helps effectively in handling and resolving exceptions, potential conflicts, and open textures in rules. 40 experiments were conducted on eight realistic traffic scenarios to evaluate the framework. The evaluation was undertaken both quantitatively and qualitatively. The evaluation result shows that the proposed framework is a promising system for checking Automated Vehicle interpretation and compliance with current traffic rules. (shrink)

Health checks identify disease in individuals without a medical indication. More and more checks are offered by more providers on more risk factors and diseases, so we may speak of an omnipresence of health checks. Current ethical evaluation of health checks considers checks on an individual basis only. However, omnipresent checks have effects over and above the effects of individual health checks. They might give the impression that health is entirely manageable by individual actions and strengthen the norm of individual (...) responsibility for health to the point where people hold themselves and others responsible for health outcomes they cannot reasonably be held accountable for. This process of so-called ‘over-responsibilization’ may result in increased feelings of guilt over health, decreased health solidarity and unfairly distributed health outcomes. Moreover, effects on privacy and peace of mind may be observed. Taking into account all possible harms and benefits of health checks in their ethical evaluation requires evaluation of health checks on an individual basis as well as on the level of all checks. Therefore, we urge the amendment of existing ethical evaluation to include the effects of an omnipresence of health checks. We make a first attempt at the formulation of amended criteria. (shrink)

The development of mathematics toward greater precision has led, as is well known, to the formalization of large tracts of it, so that one can prove any theorem using nothing but a few mechanical rules. -- Godel [11].

This paper described a formal theory of type judgments for propositional logic notations of PM; I felt the need of my own automated type checker to check their examples. The type checker I wrote did indeed serve to help me referee the paper, but also took a rather different approach to notation and typing for propositional functions of PM, which proved worth writing up independently in our own paper: Holmes, M. Randall, “Polymorphic type– checking for the ramified theory of (...) types of Principia Mathematica”, in Fairouz Kamareddine, ed., Thirty–five Years of Automating Mathematics, Kluwer, 2003, pp. 173-215. (shrink)

Fact checking has become a prominent facet of political news coverage, but it employs a variety of objectionable methodological practices, such as treating a statement containing multiple facts as if it were a single fact and categorizing as accurate or inaccurate predictions of events yet to occur. These practices share the tacit presupposition that there cannot be genuine political debate about facts, because facts are unambiguous and not subject to interpretation. Therefore, when the black-and-white facts—as they appear to the (...) fact checkers—conflict with the claims produced by politicians, the fact checkers are able to see only (to one degree or another) “lies.” The examples of dubious fact-checking practices that we discuss show the untenability of the naïve political epistemology at work in the fact-checking branch of journalism. They may also call into question the same epistemology in journalism at large, and in politics. (shrink)