This book traces the development of formal logic from its origins inancient Greece to the present day. The authors first discuss the work oflogicians from Aristotle to Frege, showing how they were influenced by thephilosophical or mathematical ideas of their time. They then examinedevelopments in the present century.

William Kneale; XIII—Methods of Designation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 68, Issue 1, 1 June 1968, Pages 249–270, https://doi.org/10.1093/ar.

M. Kneale; XIII—Eternity and Sempiternity, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 69, Issue 1, 1 June 1969, Pages 223–238, https://doi.org/10.1093/aris.

In his 1938 essay “Does Human Nature Change?” John Dewey advances the position that human nature both does and does not change.1 This initially perplexing answer to the question that is the subject of his essay reflects a methodological principle that Dewey employs in his argumentation throughout Experience and Education.2 According to the principle articulated in that book, when one is theorizing, one ought not to fall prey to the human tendency “to think in terms of extreme opposites.”3 Doing so (...) can lead one to a mistaken understanding of the matter about which one is theorizing, which can in turn have pernicious practical consequences. Instead, when theorizing, one ought to depart from rigid “either-or” .. (shrink)

Martha Kneale; I—The Presidential Address: Our Knowledge of the Past and of the Future*, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 72, Issue 1, 1 June 197.

W. Kneale; VI—Time and Eternity in Theology, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 61, Issue 1, 1 June 1961, Pages 87–108, https://doi.org/10.1093/ari.

Though the phrase 'x is true of x' is well formed grammatically, it does not express any predicate in the logical sense, because it does not satisfy the principle of reduction for statements containing 'x is true of'. recognition of this allows for solution of russell's paradox without his restrictive theory of types.

Book Reviews Cherilyn Keall, Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie, FirstView Article.

The author criticizes pear's use of the notion of material implication in his explanation of contrary-To-Fact conditionals. The author attempts to show that universal material implications "have no relevance to contrary-To-Fact conditionals." (staff).

_William of Sherwood's Treatise on Syncategorematic Words _was first published in 1968. Minnesota Archive Editions uses digital technology to make long-unavailable books once again accessible, and are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions. This is the first translation of an important medieval work in philosophy, an advanced treatise by the thirteenth-century English logician William of Sherwood. The treatise draws on doctrines developed in Sherwood's _Introduction to Logic_,which has also been translated by Professor Kretzmann. William of Sherwood (...) is an important figure in the development of the _logica moderna_,the distinctively medieval contribution to logic and semantics. As Professor Kretzmann explains, the _logica moderna _ may have originally aimed only ad providing _ad hoc _rules regarding inferences that involve problematic locutions of ordinary discourse. But its principal aim soon became the development of a more or less general account of the ways in which words are used to stand for things or to affect the meanings of other words. In Sherwood's time the _logica moderna _ seems to have been thought of as having two branches, an account of the "properties of terms" and an account of the signification and function of "syncategorematic words." Sherwood deals with the first branch in his _Introduction to Logic _ and with the second branch in the treatise presented here. The translation is copiously annotated to supply the kind of explanatory material a twentieth-century reader may need for an understanding of a thirteenth-century discussion. As Professor Kretzmann points out, many of the problems dealt with in this treatise closely resemble the problems of twentieth-century philosophical logic and philosophy of language. (shrink)

It is remarkable that we have to-day a number of philosophers who call themselves subjectivists in moral philosophy. For, although the name “subjectivist” is by no means new, philosophers have reserved it hitherto for their opponents, and usually for imaginary opponents at that. Perhaps the chief cause of the change which has taken place in recent years is the discovery of a distinction between descriptive and emotive meaning. In the past the only form of subjectivism considered by writers on moral (...) philosophy was the suggestion that moral sentences such as “You ought to do that” were statements about the speaker's own attitude; and it was easy to refute this by pointing out that we discuss questions of morals in a way which would be unintelligent, and even unintelligible, if moral judgments were only reports of introspection. But those who now call themselves subjectivists maintain that the peculiarity of moral words is their expressive and evocative power. According to their analysis, a speaker who uses one of these words in an indicative sentence may be stating nothing at all, but is undoubtedly trying to influence others to adopt a certain attitude. This, they say, explains how there can be genuine disagreement about questions of morals and why discussion may produce results. If A tries to evoke one attitude in his hearers and B tries to evoke an incompatible attitude, their utterances are opposed, not indeed like contradictory statements, but rather like the efforts of men engaged in a tug-of-war. (shrink)