This paper offers a critical reconsideration of the traditional doctrine that responsibility for a crime requires a voluntary act. I defend three general propositions: first, that orthodox Anglo-American criminal theory fails to explain adequately why criminal responsibility requires an act. Second, when it comes to the just definition of crimes, the act requirement is at best a rough generalization rather than a substantive limiting principle. Third, that the intuition underlying the so-called “act requirement” is better explained by what I call (...) the “practical-agency condition,” according to which punishment in a specific instance is unjust unless the crime charged was caused or constituted by the agent's conduct qua practically rational agent. The practical-agency condition is defended as a reconstruction of what is worth retaining in Anglo-American criminal law's traditional notion of an “act requirement.”. (shrink)

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted that what distinguishes a criminal punishment from a civil penalty is the presence of a punitive legislative intent. Legislative intent has this role, in part, because court and commentators alike conceive of the criminal law as the body of law that administers punishment; and punishment, in turn, is conceived of in intention-sensitive terms. I argue that this understanding of the distinction between civil penalties and criminal punishments depends on a highly controversial proposition (...) in moral theory – namely, that an agent’s intentions bear directly on what it is permissible for that agent to do, a view most closely associated with the doctrine of double effect. Therefore, legal theorists who are skeptical of granting intention this kind of significance owe us an alternative account of the distinctiveness of the criminal law. I sketch the broad outlines of just such an alternative account – one that focuses on the objective impact of legislation on a class of protected interests, regardless of the state’s motivations in enacting the legislation. In other words, even if the concept of punishment is unavoidably intention-sensitive, it does not follow that the boundaries of the criminal law are likewise intention-sensitive, because the boundaries of the criminal law may be drawn without reference to the concept of punishment. I conclude by illustrating the application of this view to a pair of well-known cases, and noting some of its ramifications. (shrink)

A basic principle in sentencing offenders is proportionality. However, proportionality judgments are often left to the discretion of the judge, raising familiar concerns of arbitrariness and bias. This paper considers the case for systematizing judgments of proportionality in sentencing by means of an algorithm. The aim of such an algorithm would be to predict what a judge in that jurisdiction would regard as a proportionate sentence in a particular case. A predictive algorithm of this kind would not necessarily undermine justice (...) in individual cases, is consistent with a particularistic account of moral judgment, and is attractive even in the face of uncertainty as to the legitimate purposes of punishment. (shrink)

Criminal law as public law -- Criminal law as public law -- Criminal law as public law -- Mass incarceration and the theory of punishment -- Reasons to criminalize -- Formalism and pragmatism in criminal procedure -- Responsibility without resentment.

The traditional distinction between retributive and distributive justice misconstrues the place of the criminal law in modern regulatory states. In the context of the regulatory state, the criminal law is a coercive rule-enforcing institution – regardless of whether it also serves the ends of retributive justice. As a rule-enforcing institution, the criminal law is deeply implicated in stabilizing the institutions and legal rules by means of which a state creates and allocates social advantage. As a coercive institution, the criminal law (...) requires justification as an instance of legitimate state authority. The operation of criminal justice institutions should therefore not be evaluated by reference to a distinct set of criteria, but should be evaluated by the same criteria that apply to coercive public institutions generally. (shrink)

I defend a new conception of the particular-universal distinction based on considerations about what David Lewis calls ‘amphibians’. I argue, first, that given the possibility of amphibians, two recently popular conceptions of the particular-universal distinction, namely the repeatability conception and the duplicability conception, are both objectionable since they are biased in one way or another. I then propose a more flexible conception that solves this problem by regarding amphibians as belonging to a sui generis sort of property distinct from what (...) I call ‘strong universals’ and ‘strong tropes’. Finally, I respond to some objections directed at this new account. (shrink)

Henrich et al. provide a compelling argument about a bias in the behavioral sciences to study human behavior primarily in WEIRD populations. Here we argue that brain scientists are susceptible to similar biases, sampling primarily from WEIRD populations; and we discuss recent evidence from cultural neuroscience demonstrating the importance and viability of investigating culture across multiple levels of analysis.

This study empirically examined the effects of ethical leadership and ethical climate on employee ethical behavior in the international port context using survey data collected from 128 respondents who worked in Taiwan International Ports Corporation in Taiwan. Research hypotheses were formulated from the previous literature and tested using structural equation modeling. Results indicated that ethical leadership had a significant impact on ethical climate and the ethical behavior of TIPC employees. Ethical climate was found to be positively associated with employee ethical (...) behavior. The theoretical and practical implications of the research findings are discussed. (shrink)

In recent years, the genetic testing and selection of IVF embryos, known as preimplantation genetic testing (PGT), has gained much traction in clinical assisted reproduction for preventing transmission of genetic defects. However, a more recent ethically and morally controversial development in PGT is its possible use in selecting IVF embryos for optimal intelligence quotient (IQ) and other non–disease-related socially desirable traits, such as tallness, fair complexion, athletic ability, and eye and hair colour, based on polygenic risk scores (PRS), in what (...) is referred to as PGT-P. Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning–based analysis of big data sets collated from genome sequencing of specific human ethnic populations can be used to estimate an individual embryo’s likelihood of developing such multifactorial traits by analysing the combination of specific genetic variants within its genome. Superficially, this technique appears compliant with Islamic principles and ethics. Because there is no modification of the human genome, there is no tampering with Allah’s creation (taghyīr khalq Allah). Nevertheless, a more critical analysis based on the five maxims of Islamic jurisprudence (qawa'id fiqhiyyah) that are often utilized in discourses on Islamic bioethics, namely qaṣd (intention), yaqın̄ (certainty), ḍarar (injury), ḍarūra (necessity), and `urf (custom), would instead reveal some major ethical and moral flaws of this new medical technology in the selection of non–disease-related socially desirable traits, and its non-compliance with the spirit and essence of Islamic law (shariah). Muslim scholars, jurists, doctors, and biomedical scientists should debate this further and issue a fatwa on this new medical technology platform. (shrink)

Using Reidenbach and Robin’s Multidimensional Ethics Scale, this study designs three scenarios related to academic dishonesty dilemmas to explore students’ moral philosophies, behavioral intentions, and ethical judgments and further examines whether students with different individual factors have differences in the above variables. A total of 605 students from two areas, Taiwan and Mainland China, participated in this study. The results indicated that Taiwanese students had stricter moral equity, relativism, and contractualism philosophies in the duplicate submission scenario than Mainland China students. (...) They also had stricter moral equity and relativism philosophies in the incomplete citation scenario. Similarly, relatively harsh relativism and contractualism philosophies accompanied by a low level of willingness to be a perpetrator in the failure to cite research published in other countries scenario were found. In addition, females applied relatively harsh moral equity and utilitarianism to all scenarios, reporting that they and their peers were less likely to engage in all AD activities. Graduates had a stricter egoism attitude toward duplicate submission and had stricter moral equity, relativism, and contractualism philosophies toward the behavior of incomplete citation. Graduate students also had strict moral equity, relativism, egoism, and contractualism beliefs in the failure to cite the foreign research scenario. Finally, regression analysis showed that moral equity, contractualism, and self-behavioral intention are significant predictors of students’ ethical evaluations in the three scenarios. (shrink)

Humanitarian assistance in conflicts sometimes undermines local coping strategies, reinforces wartime economies, and strengthens the existing power structures. This article argues that some victims of conflicts are made extremely vulnerable and uniquely dependent on humanitarian agencies. In this case, humanitarian agencies have a distinct obligation to assist them. This article considers one novel account that justifies the continued provision of aid to victims of conflicts and rejects the widespread view that aid should be withdrawn to avoid its negative impact. This (...) article presents the “Distinct Dependence Argument” to address the aid dependency predicament in conflicts. It explores the degree of vulnerability and dependence of victims of conflicts and evaluates humanitarian agencies’ causal responsibility in causing such vulnerability and dependency. (shrink)

Although capital punishment has been gradually disappearing from liberal democracies, philosophers remain divided as to its permissibility. The first part of this chapter considers arguments in favor of retention and abolition, with particular attention to recent contractualist arguments. I then consider the United States Supreme Court’s incrementalist approach, under the rubric of “evolving standards of decency.” On this view, the Constitution is limited to sweeping up stragglers; like Minerva’s owl, the Constitution announces a philosophy of punishment only in hindsight. The (...) final section draws on Feinberg’s suggestion that punishment reflects a society’s particular “symbols of infamy.” A society may come to rethink its symbols of infamy, such as capital punishment, but that is unlikely to be because philosophical argument has silenced all reasonable doubt. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Response to Leonard Tan and Mengchen Lu, “‘I Wish to Be Wordless’: Philosophizing Through the Chinese Guqin.”Chiao-Wei Liu“I wish to be wordless” connects Chinese philosophical thinking to music education at large. Through discussions of values associated with the Chinese instrument guqin, Leonard Tan and Mengchen Lu exemplified “how music serves as ‘Truth tool’ in the Chinese philosophical tradition.” Specifically, the authors explored four ideas: “Search for Truth” (求真), (...) “Search for Harmony” (求和), “Search for Ethical Awakening” (求覺), and “Search for Sagehood” (求聖). These ideas embody insights from three major Chinese philosophical traditions: Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism. Time prevents me from exploring the complex issues related to the interpretation and translation of classical Chinese texts, but I will attempt to focus on some of the authors’ arguments and how they relate to the practice of music learning and teaching in the classroom.1Quoting Confucius in their article title, Tan and Lu called attention to the suspicion of language found in the conversation between Confucius and his disciple. Extending the argument, the authors referred to Daoist philosophers and argued that although language can transmit wisdom, words remain limited in their ability to capture “the grand unity of the whole” and thus can “detract us [End Page 199] away from Truth.” Tan and Lu suggested that music, unlike language, serves as a truth “tool” and allows one to arrive at the Dao (Truth). Truth is conceived as a way of understanding the world, “a universal order, a new world perspective....” I agree with the authors about the limitations of language in capturing the complexity of human experiences, yet I am perplexed at how Truth is interpreted throughout the article.For example, in their discussion of “Search for Truth,” Tan and Lu related the art of playing the guqin to the Buddhist notion of mingxin jianxing (明心見性), clearing the heart-mind, seeing the inner-self, and locating Truth within the guqin player. Truth here is framed as good moral qualities residing within one’s innermost self (xing 性). Based on Li Zhi’s argument, Tan and Lu stated that “since a guqin player is all about her heart-mind and one’s music is all about the musician, music is the heart-mind of the musician.” Assuming that the heart-mind of the guqin player and the music are one, Tan and Lu suggested that when music and the musician’s innermost self are in sync, the musician may be able to attain spiritual Enlightenment. The example of Chopin’s Nocturne Op. 9, no. 1 helps readers learn that Truth does not reside within the performer or the music, but is located in the space where the two are in sync: “An ‘authentic’ performance of Chopin is one that is not only ‘true’ to Chopin and the stylistic conventions of his times, but also ‘true’ to the performer’s innermost being.”While Tan and Lu’s argument places Truth in both music and the innermost self (xing) of the performers, herein lies an assumption that qualities aligned with the music are ethically good, whereas those that differ are not. The search for Truth is thus a task of refusing any potential influence by “unethical thoughts” in order to stay true to the music. Recognizing the existing norms guiding various music traditions, I wonder how ethical and unethical thoughts are understood in music classrooms. As a music teacher, if unethical thoughts are interpreted as materials and expressions that are different or irrelevant to the music work, how do music teachers make sense of students’ feelings—whether they are the longing for a sense of belonging in the school ensemble or the desire to excel in certain aspects of school life? Are these feelings or desires “unethical” because they are separate from the musical work? If all acts dedicated to the faithful representation of the music work are considered ethical, how about the different needs of different students?Furthermore, in describing “Search for Ethical Awakening,” Tan and Lu stated that music written for the guqin is often associated with moral stories. Learning about the stories associated with music would be mandatory for performers to be morally and spiritually attuned to the composer. While I agree with the authors... (shrink)

The intent of this book focuses on Australia’s First Nations truth, voice, recognition, diversity, and respect. Hope O’Chin explains that knowledge about Australian First Nations culture and learning can be seen through new conceptual lens, which she refers to as an Ontology of Dreaming Hope for Australians. The book proposes to move from ontological propositions embedded in pedagogies and methodologies that center on the relevance of Indigenous epistemes and ways of doing. O’Chin offers a conceptual framing for engaging (...) with Indigenous peoples, and forming communities of belongingness and relationality. She offers suggestions for ways in which art and education can act as ‘healing’ and a way forward towards a more inclusive civil society. Reflexive practice, ethnographic principles, and action research is described in a way that methodologies provide an understanding of a sense of Belonging. O'Chin argues that theoretical research, art, and educational practice can add to the value of determining a strategy of Indigenous art investment within Australia, and to address how art and education can be used to validate contemporary expression of Aboriginality within contemporary Australian society. Ultimately, the book is about Indigenous strengths and what Indigenous ways of being, knowing and doing can offer, and how one might go about honouring and working in this way respectfully. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend a deflationary account of proportionality, which suggests that proportionality does not explain anything valuable about a system of punishment. Proportionality, rather, is a conventional means for presenting judgments about whether punishment fits the crime. A system of punishment is proportionate to the degree that it coheres with widely shared norms about punishment. There are many reasons such coherence could be valuable, not all of which are retributive. Hence, while on a deflationary view it may be (...) important for a system of punishment to be proportionate, proportionality does not identify a uniquely important retributive value. I motivate the argument for a deflationary account of proportionality by canvassing some of the problems associated with both relative and absolute proportionality and examining how both legal theorists and courts have actually used the concept. I focus on the work of Doug Husak, and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada. (shrink)

This paper shows how the method of cohesion analysis in film provides a strong foundation for constructing coherent filmic narrative across different spatial and temporal settings. Until now the unit of a fine-grained systematic analysis of film viewers' narrative comprehension has been anchored in the shot. This paper provides a semiotic descriptive tool of filmic cohesion for analyzing elements within and across shots, i.e., how viewers comprehend the presenting and tracking of dominant narrative elements such as characters, objects, and settings (...) as a film unfolds. In addition, this paper also reviews the Neo-Formalist exploration of cinematic cohesion and then demonstrates how the semiotics-oriented method suggested here can support more systematically and even strengthen the Neo-Formalist account. Most importantly, this article will explicitly show the potential of this tool for providing empirical accounts of filmic narrative construction by analyzing scene transitions in Wong Kar Wai's film 2046 (2004). (shrink)

Philosophical inquiries into the nature of consciousness have long been intrinsically tied to questions regarding the nature of the self. Although philosophers of mind seldom make reference to the role of cultural context in shaping consciousness, since antiquity culture has played a notable role in philosophical conceptions of the self. Western philosophers, from Plato to Locke, have emphasized an individualistic view of the self that is autonomous and consistent across situations, while Eastern philosophers, such as Lao Tzu and Confucius, have (...) argued for a collectivistic view of the self, one that is interconnected to others and embedded within specific social contexts and situations. Here we argue that a comprehensive theory of consciousness needs to account for the role of cultural context and its bidirectional interaction with neural and genetic mechanisms in shaping a variety of conscious phenomena, from visual perception to self- awareness. We review recent evidence of cultural variation in neurobiological mechanisms underlying these phenomena and discuss the implications of these cultural neuroscience findings for the study of consciousness. (shrink)

The criminal law has at least two goals: to provide a degree of protection to a variety of individual and collective interests, and to communicate to those to whom it applies that those interests are protected. The question I consider is whether the criminal law should be used to advance the second goal independently of its use in advancing the first. Drawing on what I refer to as non-comparative egalitarianism, I argue that it should not. After developing a general argument (...) for this claim, I turn to considering its implications for the criminalization of hate speech, focusing specifically on a line of argument found both in the Supreme Court of Canada’s s.2 jurisprudence as well as Jeremy Waldron’s recent book,The Harm in Hate Speech. I also briefly consider a structurally similar, but broader argument – recently defended by Alon Harel – which suggests that there is a constitutional duty to criminalize conduct that would, if engaged in, interfere with a person’s dominion over how her life goes, regardless of whether criminalization would or would not drive down the actual incidence of the targeted conduct. I claim that egalitarians should not recognize any such duty. (shrink)

Legal philosophers often ask whether a person has a reason to obey the law simply because it is the law. We ask the contrary question: does a person have a reason to disobey the law simply because it is the law? Many philosophers who have considered the question of disobedience have focused on injustice; others have defended disobedience on libertarian or anarchist grounds. In contrast, we argue that there is a content-independent reason to disobey the law even when it is (...) not unjust, illegitimate, or otherwise undesirable. Legal philosophers generally agree that law claims peremptory authority, but they also generally agree that any duty to obey the law is substantially more limited. We argue that insofar as the law makes inflated claims to authority, it generates a content-independent reason to disobey. This anti-authoritarian principle is grounded in the virtue of clearly communicating one’s political commitments to others within a democratic society. By disobeying, one communicates one’s conviction that the law makes inflated claims to authority. We show how our account of disobedience as such is distinct from more familiar theories of anarchism and civil disobedience and argue that it is applicable whether one lives under conditions of justice or injustice. (shrink)

This paper provides evidence for a contrastive account of explanation that is motivated by pragmatic theories that recognize the contribution that context makes to the interpretation of a prompt for explanation. This study replicates the primary findings of previous work in explanation-based category learning, extending that work by illustrating the critical role of the context in this type of learning. Participants interacted with items from two categories either by describing the items or explaining their category membership. We manipulated the feature (...) overlap between the categories and examined both the explanations generated and acquired knowledge of the categories. Explanations for membership in a given category were influenced by the unprompted contrast category, indicating an important role for contrastive processing in the generation of explanations. The influence of the contrast category was similarly seen in the transfer performance of the participants. (shrink)

Katherine Beckett’s new book, Ending Mass Incarceration (EMI), is ambitious and wide-ranging. Beckett tackles one of the most urgent human rights problems of the last fifty years, namely the massiv...

An influential strain in the literature on state punishment analyzes the permissibility of punishment in exclusively deontological terms, whether in terms of an individual’s rights, the state’s obligation to vindicate the law, or both. I argue that we should reject a deontological theory of punishment because it cannot explain what is unjust about mass incarceration, although mass incarceration is widely considered—including by proponents of deontological theories—to be unjust. The failure of deontological theories suggests a minimum criterion of adequacy for a (...) theory of punishment: it must take aggregation sufficiently seriously that it returns plausible results when scaled up from individual cases to large public institutions. In this vein, I briefly sketch a prioritarian metric for evaluating the use of custodial sanctions as a means of creating and allocating social advantage. (shrink)