. Based on a reconstruction of the development of Rudolf Carnap’s views from the Aufbau until the 1960s, this paper provides an account of the philosopher’s understanding of non-cognitivism, which is here seen as in line with the so-called scientific world-conception of left-wing logical empiricism. The starting point of Carnap’s conception is the claim that every human decision depends on certain attitudes that cannot be justified at a cognitive level, that are neither based on empirical facts nor logical reasoning. The (...) key features of Carnap’s non-cognitivism, however, go beyond this general basis and involve several fundamentally moral commitments, such as a commitment toward science, and the embracing of moral attitudes as the result of a long-term process of rational discourse. I argue that these commitments contained in Carnap’s non-cognitivism/scientific world-conception establish a genuinely political worldview that is characteristic of left-wing logical empiricism and converges with socialism and democracy. (shrink)

This paper argues that some defenses of global antirealism that critique both epistemic foundationalism and ontological priority foundationalism (e.g., Westerhoff 2020) turn on a false dilemma that ignores non-representational approaches to consciousness and cognition. Arguments against the existence of an external world and against introspective certainty, typically draw on a range of empirical findings (mainly about the brain-based mechanisms that realize cognition) and that are said to lend support to irrealism. Theories that incorporate these findings, such as the interface theory (...) of perception and predictive processing, not only retain the notion of the veil of perception, but have continued to assign to it an important theoretical role. While the mathematical frameworks these theories employ do make them viable candidates, neither theory is moving in a direction that would suggest global anti-realism is the more plausible attitude. Rather, I argue that the new paradigm of 4E cognitive science (embodied, embedded, enactive, extended) bolsters epistemological and metaphysical realism. (shrink)

The phenomenon of twinning in early fetal development has become a popular source for doubt regarding the ascription of moral status to early embryos. In this paper, the possible moral basis for such a line of reasoning is critically analysed with sceptical results. Three different versions of the argument from twinning are considered, all of which are found to rest on confusions between the actual division of embryos involed in twinning and the property of early embryos to be divisible, be (...) based on highly questionable ethical assumptions, or to imply inconsistent claims regarding the moral importance of potentiality and/or the moral status of embryos. This is taken to expose a number of related inconsistencies in the moral basis of pro-life positions. In particular, ascribing moral significance to the property of being (in)divisible is found to be incompatible with the claim that human individuals possess unique values which could underpin an absolute moral ban on murder. (shrink)

The ideal of scientific openness — i.e. the idea that scientific information should be freely accessible to interested parties — is strongly supported throughout the scientific community. At the same time, however, this ideal does not appear to be absolute in the everyday practice of science. In order to get the credit for new scientific advances, scientists often keep information to themselves. Also, it is common practice to withhold information obtained in commissioned research when the scientist has agreed with his (...) or her employer to do so. The secrecy may be intended for ever, as in the military area, but also temporarily until a patent application has been made. The paper explores to what extent such secrecy is undesirable, as seems to be suggested by the ideal of scientific openness. Should this ideal be interpreted as having certain exceptions which make the above-mentioned practices acceptable? Are there, on closer inspection, good arguments for the ideal of scientific openness, and for officially upholding it? Possible versions of the ideal of scientific openness are explored and the issue is found to be rather complex, allowing for wide variations depending on the acting parties, beneficiaries, types of information and moral requirements involved. We conclude that the arguments usually given in favour of this ideal are weaker than what seems to be generally believed, and that, on closer inspection, they leave plenty of room for exceptions to it. These exceptions only partly cover the actual practice of withholding scientific information, and there may still be good reason to advocate, teach and enforce the ideal of scientific openness within the scientific community. (shrink)

When someone is poised to fail to fulfil a moral duty, we can respond in a variety of ways. We might remind them of their duty, or seek to persuade them through argument. Or we might intervene forcibly to ensure that they act in accordance with their duty. Some duties appear to be such that the duty-bearer can be liable to forcible interference when this is necessary to ensure that they comply with them. We’ll call duties that carry such liabilities (...) enforcement-apt. Not all duties seem to be enforcement-apt. Some, for example, accept that a person in a monogamous marriage has a moral duty to refrain from infidelity, but deny that a spouse can be compelled to comply with their duty to be faithful without transgressing her rights. More controversially, some think that our duties to assist others in severe need are not enforcement-apt. What could explain the contrast between duties that are enforcement-apt while and those that are not? We’ll call this the puzzle of enforceability and our paper considers three broad strategies for responding to it. The first strategy takes the form of identifying some substantive feature or features that are necessary and/or sufficient for a duty to possess some enforcement status. We consider a range of candidate explanations of this sort but find that none are plausible. The second strategy rejects the idea that there are genuinely enforcement-inapt duties and instead seeks to explain why there can nonetheless be marked differences amongst duties concerning how they can be enforced and who can enforce them. We find that this strategy too is largely unsuccessful. The third strategy offered seeks an explanation of differences in enforcement status by appeal to the broader social costs of enforcing certain kinds of duties. We find that this approach holds some promise but note that it requires adopting a controversial set of moral commitments. We conclude by considering our options in the absence of a solution to our puzzle. (shrink)

The standard of proof in criminal trials should require that the evidence presented by the prosecution is robust. This requirement of robustness says that it must be unlikely that additional information would change the probability that the defendant is guilty. Robustness is difficult for a judge to estimate, as it requires the judge to assess the possible effect of information that the he or she does not have. This article is concerned with expert witnesses and proposes a method for reviewing (...) the robustness of expert testimony. According to the proposed method, the robustness of expert testimony is estimated with regard to competence, motivation, external strength, internal strength and relevance. The danger of trusting non-robust expert testimony is illustrated with an analysis of the Thomas Quick Case, a Swedish legal scandal where a patient at a mental institution was wrongfully convicted for eight murders. (shrink)

Many groups make decisions over multiple interconnected propositions. The “doctrinal paradox” or “discursive dilemma” shows that propositionwise majority voting can generate inconsistent collective sets of judgments, even when individual sets of judgments are all consistent. I develop a simple model for determining the probability of the paradox, given various assumptions about the probability distribution of individual sets of judgments, including impartial culture and impartial anonymous culture assumptions. I prove several convergence results, identifying when the probability of the paradox converges to (...) 1, and when it converges to 0, as the number of individuals increases. Drawing on the Condorcet jury theorem and work by Bovens and Rabinowicz , I use the model to assess the “truth-tracking” performance of two decision procedures, the premise- and conclusion-based procedures. I compare the present results with existing results on the probability of Condorcet’s paradox. I suggest that the doctrinal paradox is likely to occur under plausible conditions. (shrink)

Few studies have considered in detail the ethical issues surrounding research in which investigators ask community members to engage in research subject recruitment within their own communities. Peer-driven recruitment and its variants are useful for accessing and including certain populations in research, but also have the potential to undermine the ethical and scientific integrity of community-based research. This paper examines the ethical implications of utilizing community members as recruiters of human subjects in the context of PDR, as well as the (...) authors' experience with a variant of PDR in a research project in South Africa. The importance of situating PDR in a comprehensive community engagement process that is responsive to the constraints of science and local needs and interests is emphasized. The paper will have relevance to bioethicists, health researchers, and research regulators concerned about the appropriate use of peer-driven recruitment strategies in health research. (shrink)

Individuality and collectivity are central concepts in sociological inquiry. Incorporating cultural history, social theory, urban and economic sociology, Borch proposes an innovative rethinking of these key terms and their interconnections via the concept of the social avalanche. Drawing on classical sociology, he argues that while individuality embodies a tension between the collective and individual autonomy, certain situations, such as crowds and other moments of group behaviour, can subsume the individual entirely within the collective. These events, or social avalanches, produce an (...) experience of being swept away suddenly and losing one's sense of self. Cities are often on the verge of social avalanches, their urban inhabitants torn between de-individualising external pressure and autonomous self-presentation. Similarly, Borch argues that present-day financial markets, dominated by computerised trading, abound with social avalanches and the tensional interplay of mimesis and autonomous decision-making. Borch argues that it is no longer humans but fully automated algorithms that avalanche in these markets. (shrink)

Cette étude formule l'hypothèse critique d'une opération de remythologisation par une réactualisation théologico-politique de la tragédie chez Heidegger. Cette opération ne saurait simplement coïncider avec une revalorisation " irrationnelle " du mythe, car elle procède d'abord d'une mise en question, non moins problématique, de la dualité supposée entre muthos et logos pour culminer dans ce qu'une note des années 1950 appellera la " mytho-logie de l'événement ". La réélaboration de la notion de mythe s'accomplit à partir du poème de Hölderlin (...) qui doit préfigurer les dieux de l'" autre commencement " post-judéo-chrétien, selon le projet spéculatif d'une " religion " censée relier le peuple à ses dieux nouveaux via l'être comme événement. L'hypothèse d'une remythologisation théologico-politique doit ainsi permettre d'éclairer non seulement le rôle matriciel de Hölderlin pour la pensée de l'être, mais aussi le surinvestissement illusoire du national-socialisme censé donner lieu au " peuple de Hölderlin ". Pour interroger cette réactualisation théologico-politique du mythe, l'étude se concentre sur les cours que Heidegger consacra à Hölderlin, tout en sollicitant l'intégralité du corpus des années 1933-1945, c'est-à-dire les cours fribourgeois, les traités inédits rédigés dans le sillage des Contributions (Beiträge) et les Cahiers noirs (Schwarze Hefte). (shrink)

The gravitational influence of Jupiter on Saturn produces, among other things, non-negligible changes in the eccentricity of Saturn that affect the magnitude of error of Ptolemaic astronomy. The value that Ptolemy obtained for the eccentricity of Saturn is a good approximation of the real eccentricity—including the perturbation of Jupiter—that Saturn had during the time of Ptolemy's planetary observations or a bit earlier. Therefore, it seems more probable that the observations used for obtaining the eccentricity of Saturn were done near Ptolemy’s (...) time, and rather unlikely earlier than the first century AD. Even if this is not quite a demonstration that Ptolemy used observations of his own, my argument increases its probability and practically discards the idea that Ptolemy borrowed values or observations from astronomers further back than the first century AD, such as Hipparchus or the Babylonians. (shrink)

Monitoring the environment for visual events while performing a concurrent task requires adjustment of visual processing priorities. By use of Bundesen's (1990) Theory of Visual Attention (TVA), we investigated how monitoring for an object-based brief event affected distinct components of visual attention in a concurrent task. The perceptual salience of the event was varied. Monitoring reduced the processing speed in the concurrent task, and the reduction was stronger when the event was less salient. The monitoring task neither affected the temporal (...) threshold of conscious perception nor the storage capacity of visual short-term memory nor the efficiency of top-down controlled attentional selection. (shrink)

This is a response paper to Daniel Russell's paper in the same volume. I raise some challenges to Russell's model of virtue acquisition which draws extensively on the CAPS model in psychology and on parallels between virtues and skills.

Recent literature on the ‘exclusions’ of the modern nation-state has missed a major transformation in the legitimate mode of excluding, from group to individual-based. This transformation is explored in a discussion of universalistic trends in contemporary Western states’ immigration and citizenship policies. Conflicting with the notion of a ‘nation-state’ owned by a particular ethnic group or nation, these trends are better captured in terms of a ‘liberal state’ that has self-limited its sovereign prerogatives by constitutional principles of equality and individual (...) rights. (shrink)

John Searle''s hypothesis of the Background seems to conflict with his initial representationalism according to which each Intentional state contains a particular content that determines its conditions of satisfaction. In Section I of this essay I expose Searle''s initial theory of Intentionality and relate it to Edmund Husserl''s earlier phenomenology. In Section II I make it clear that Searle''s introduction of the notion of Network, though indispensable, does not, by itself, force us to modify that initial theory. However, a comparison (...) of this notion to the notion of horizon from Husserl''s later phenomenology and an interpretation of Husserl''s conception of the determinable X as providing a solution to the problem of perceptual misidentification lead me to conclude that in his discussion of ''twin examples'' Searle had better modified his initial theory. Finally, I critically examine Searle''s claim that anyone who tries seriously to follow out the threads in the Network will eventually reach a bedrock of non-Intentional capacities. In Section III I show in detail, partly in a rather Husserlian vein, that Searle''s four official arguments for the Background thesis, though containing some very valuable contributions to a theory of linguistic skills, are not convincing at all if they are to be understood as going beyond the scope of Searle''s ''content-cum-Network'' picture of Intentionality. The upshot of these considerations is that the Background thesis should be read as a thesis concerning the causal neurophysiological preconditions of human Intentionality rather than concerning the logical properties of Intentional states in general. Recently Searle himself has come to the same result, but he does not say for which reasons. The present essay makes it clear why Searle just had to arrive at this important result. (shrink)

This article questions whether enmity is always bad and trust always good. In the borderlands between Ikland in northern Uganda and Turkanaland in Kenya, sometimes violent enmity combines with friendly barter relations between the Ik, a subsistence agricultural people that also hunts, and their goat-and-cattle herding neighbors, the Turkana and Dodoth peoples. “Half-trust,” as some of the Ik call it, works to prevent the escalation of conflict. While the Ugandan groups have been disarmed by their government, the Kenyan Turkana, armed (...) with AK-47s, are allowed into Ugandan territory for pasture during drought, and some Turkana take violent advantage of this power imbalance as they leave. Paradoxically, intervention by Ugandan state institutions that, in the name of peaceful coexistence, welcome the Turkana in Uganda has led to the escalation of conflict, while tribal “half-trust” has kept it relatively limited. (shrink)

In this paper, I show that Maupertuis and Euler offer a contrasting conception of metaphysics of nature. It consists mainly for them in repositioning cosmology in relation to natural sciences. Instead of considering metaphysics to be at the foundation of scientific theories, as was assumed by Descartes, Wolff, and, in a certain way, Kant, or simply prohibiting the very idea of a cosmology, as d’Alembert would stipulate at the same period, Maupertuis and Euler invert the order of disciplines to give (...) priority to physical sciences over metaphysics. This repositioning leads of course to several questions : first, how does scientific theories validate or deny metaphysical principles? Even more important, which role falls to metaphysics of nature given that sciences not only possess a theoretical autonomy, but also a priority over ontological reflections? Besides, it seems that metaphysics would be reduced, for these two philosophers, to the realm of cosmology alone, in particular to questions concerning force and the principle of least action, the ontological status of space and time, and the first constituents of matter, such as extension, inertia, impenetrability, and motion. (shrink)

Die Antike - lebendig und vielfältig! In diesem historischen Epochenband werden ausgewählte Quellen der Antike zum Sprechen gebracht. Eingeordnet in ihren historischen und kulturellen Kontext, zeichnen sie ein lebendiges Bild dieser spannenden Epoche, das aktuelle Forschungstendenzen ebenso einbezieht wie interdisziplinäre Fragestellungen: Problemorientierte Einführung in die Kulturwissenschaft der Antike Gezielte Verbindung historischer, philologischer und archäologischer Themen und Perspektiven Entwicklung beispielhafter kulturwissenschaftlicher Fragestellungen an die Antike in enger argumentativer Verbindung von Text und Bild Exemplarische Aspekte der griechischen und römischen Geschichte: von der (...) Welt des homerischen Adels bis zur hellenistischen Polis, von der römischen Republik bis zur Sakralisierung des Kaisertums Pressestimmen: "Neben einer guten Verständlichkeit und Übersichtlichkeit besticht dieses Studienbuch 'Antike' durch die Aktualität der angegebenen Literatur und der diskutierten Forschungsansätze und -ergebnisse. Dabei werden jedoch alte - ob verworfen oder nicht - Ansätze nicht außer Acht gelassen und immer miteinbezogen. Das Studienbuch Antike bietet dem Studenten einen zeitgemäßen Einblick in die Arbeitstechniken und Fragestellungen seines Studiengangs und verbindet ehemals getrennt betrachtete Disziplinen der Altertumswissenschaften in einer integrierten Darstellung." Sabine Mahnel in: literaturmarkt.info, 8. September 2008 "[Das Studienbuch ist] informativ und thematisch vielseitig." Erdmann Steinmetz in: ekz - Informationsdienst, 3/2009 Kommentare zum Buch: "[...] konziser, auf das Wesentliche beschränkter Inhalt, trotzdem sehr problemorientiert, was deutsche Forschung auszeichnet." Prof. Dr. Winfried Schmitz vom Seminar für Alte Geschichte der Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn. (shrink)

This paper presents two approaches to creativity needed to solve problems.: the Brainstorming from Osborn and the Synectics from Gordon. By a comparison between these two disconnection processes, we try to appreciate the contributions and limits of creativity methods to practical problem solving.

In Germany students sometimes complain that they have to learn too much about National Socialist Germany 1933-1945. They are born after the war and are not responsible for what happened and therefore they have no special responsibility to concern themselves with this darkest part of German history, or so it is complained. In this article I argue that responsibility as accountability should be distinguished from responsibility as care-taking. Although later-born generations certainly are not accountable for what happened before they were (...) born, they can have a special responsibility to care about those events, for instance to remember them for what they were. I claim that in the case of the Third Reich there are two different grounds for ascribing this kind of responsibility: German citizenship and identifying strongly with Germany as a nation. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explore how food can be analyzed in terms of signs and codes of everyday life, and especially how food can be used to express ethical concerns. The paper investigates the potential of a semiotic conceptual analysis: How can the semiotic approach be used to analyze expressions of ethics and food ethics in everyday life? The intention is to explore from a theoretical point of view and with constructed cases, how semiotics can be used (...) to analyze the role of food as an expression of ethics in everyday life among families, friends, and colleagues: How do foodstuffs function as signs of ethics in everyday life? How is food used to send signals about care and concern? How are the signs of food ethics perceived? It is concluded that analyzing ethical considerations with respect to food with the help of the semiotic model can show us perspectives that otherwise would be difficult to see and thus we can address everyday food ethical issues that otherwise might not be noted. The semiotic approach to food ethics in everyday life is a conceptual framework that can be used to draw attention to certain domains and fields of food ethical behavior that otherwise would tend to remain implicit and unspoken. (shrink)

Abstract. The analysis of legal statements that are made from an "internal point of view" must distinguish statements where legal obedience is accepted from statements where legal obedience is only assumed. Statements that are based on accepted obedience supply reasons for action, but statements where obedience is merely assumed can never provide reasons for action. It is argued in this paper that John Searle neglects this distinction. Searle claims that a statement from the internal point of view provides the speaker (...) with reasons for actions that are "self-sufficient" in the sense that they are independent of the speaker's beliefs and desires. This claim is mistaken. A statement that is based on assumed obedience is self-sufficient, but does not give reasons for action. A statement that is based on accepted obedience gives reasons for action, but these reasons are not self-sufficient. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Um den normativen Erwartungen an die soziale Position des Schiedsrichters gerecht zu werden, müssen Schiedsrichter als geachtete Autorität auf dem Spielfeld anerkannt werden. Ihre Autorität setzt sich dabei aus der institutionell vom Deutschen Fußball-Bund abgeleiteten Amtsautorität, der funktionalen Sachautorität und der persönlichen Autorität zusammen. In der Selbstwahrnehmung wird der Regelkenntnis und Ernsthaftigkeit die höchste Bedeutung beigemessen. Für Schiedsrichte­rinnen ist im Selbstbild die Physis ein signifikant bedeutenderer Faktor als bei Schiedsrichtern, die wiederum die Regelauslegung als signifikant wichtiger erachten als die (...) Schiedsrichterinnen. Über alle Spielklassen ist die Regelkenntnis und Ernsthaftigkeit der wichtigste Faktor, während die Bedeutung der Physis in höheren Spielklassen stärker betont wird als in niedrigeren Spielklassen. (shrink)

This paper argues that the question of the compatibility between competition and solidarity needs to be clarified by distinguishing a variety of possible normative frameworks. Using a core metaphor of a race between runners hired by stadiums, I develop and discuss three ethical frameworks: the emergentist perspective, which considers that competition is in itself the locus of solidarity; the social-democratic perspective, which views solidarity as the main counterweight to the abrasive effects of competition – without, however, calling into question the (...) system that generates this competition; and the oppositional perspective, which considers solidarity as an implication of the desire to assist the victims of asymmetrical social power, unfairly distributed through competition, and therefore sees ‘genuine’ solidarity as a means to subvert competitive logic itself. In each case, I deconstruct the fundamental ‘axioms’ that underlie the approach, and I gradually demonstrate why there are compelling ethical arguments for a radical subversion of the logic of competition within a framework of ‘genuine’ solidarity. Thus, while the social-democratic perspective trumps the emergentist perspective, it is in turn trumped by the oppositional perspective. The basic idea is that competition which is statically fair, tends to become dynamically unfair, revealing a deep-lying source of structural alienation. This requires a renewed view of the nature of agents’ rationality, however, and an abandonment of some cherished beliefs and prejudices concerning the alleged fairness of competition in market economies. (shrink)