Ethical evaluation of deep brain stimulation as a treatment for Parkinson’s disease is complicated by results that can be described as involving changes in the patient’s identity. The risk of becoming another person following surgery is alarming for patients, caregivers and clinicians alike. It is one of the most urgent conceptual and ethical problems facing deep brain stimulation in Parkinson’s disease at this time. In our paper we take issue with this problem on two accounts. First, we elucidate what is (...) meant by “becoming another person” from a conceptual point of view. After critically discussing two broad approaches we concentrate on the notion of “individual identity” which centers on the idea of “core attitudes”. Subsequently we discuss several approaches to determine what distinguishes core attitudes from those that are more peripheral. We argue for a “foundational-function model” highlighting the importance of specific dependency relations between these attitudes. Our second aim is to comment on the possibility to empirically measure changes in individual identity and argue that many of the instruments now commonly used in selecting and monitoring DBS-patients are inappropriate for this purpose. Future research in this area is advised combining a conceptual and an empirical approach as a basis of sound ethical appraisal. (shrink)

Teachers’ instructional practices are important for student learning. However, there are few tools for evaluating instructional practices in social studies. To this end, we present a video-based in...

This article is concerned with the development of philosophy of science in the 1970s. The explanatory framework is the picture of two fundamental split-offs: the controversial establishment of history and sociology of science and of formal philosophy of science as independent disciplines, against the background of more traditional “conceptual” varieties of philosophy of science. I illustrate these developments, which finally led to somewhat “purified” versions of the respective accounts, by examining a case study, namely, that of the structuralist school, which (...) emerged in the 1970s as an attempt to reconcile historical and formal approaches in philosophy of science. I try to explain the failure of this initial program of “Kuhn Sneedified” and its transition to a more purified formalist version, on the basis of the fact that the former attempt was caught somewhere amid the purism of conceptual, historical, and formal accounts of philosophy of science. (shrink)

The paper challenges a recent attempt by Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen to show that since Thomas Kuhn’s philosophical standpoint can be incorporated into coherentist epistemology, it does not necessarily lead to: an abandonment of rationality and rational interparadigm theory comparison, nor to an abandonment of convergent realism. Leaving aside the interpretation of Kuhn as a coherentist, we will show that Kuukkanen’s first thesis is not sufficiently explicated, while the second one entirely fails. With regard to Thesis 1, we argue that (...) Kuhn’s view on inter-paradigm theory comparison allows only for ‘the weak notion of rationality’, and that Kuukkanen’s argument is thus acceptable only in view of such a notion. With regard to Thesis 2, we show that even if we interpret Kuhn as a coherentist, his philosophical standpoint cannot be seen as compatible with convergent realism since Kuhn’s argument against it is not ‘ultimately empirical’, as Kuukkanen takes it to be.Keywords: Thomas S. Kuhn; Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen; Coherentist epistemology; Rationality; Theory choice; Convergent realism. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is, on the one hand, to critically investigate Kuhn’s stance on the assessment of the pursuit worthiness of scientific theories, and, on the other hand, to show the actuality of some of Kuhn’s points on this issue, in view of their critical analysis. To this end we show that Kuhn presents certain tools, which may help scientists to overcome communication breakdowns when engaging in the process of rational deliberation regarding the question whether (...) a theory is worthy of further pursuit. These tools are persuasion, translation and interpretation. However, we argue that the perspective of epistemic semantic monism present in Kuhn’s work obstructs the full applicability of these tools. We show that dropping this perspective makes the notions of persuasion and interpretation more fruitful, and moreover, allows for a pluralism of scientific theories and practices that complements the pluralism based on disagreement among scientists, emphasized by Kuhn. (shrink)

In the last two sections of Structure, Thomas Kuhn first develops his famous threefold conception of the incommensurability of scientific paradigms and, subsequently, a conception of scientific progress as growth of empirical strength. The latter conception seems to be at odds with the former in that semantic incommensurability appears to imply the existence of situations where scientific progress in Kuhns sense can no longer exist. In contrast to this seeming inconsistency of Kuhns conception, we will try to show in (...) this study that the semantic incommensurability of scientific terms appears to be fully compatible with scientific progress. Our argumentation is based on an improved version of the formalization of Kuhns conception as developed in the 1970s by Joseph Sneed and Wolfgang Stegmüller: In order to be comparable, incommensurable theories need the specification of relations that refer to the concrete ontologies of these theories and involve certain truth claims. The original structuralist account of reduction fails to provide such relations, because (1) it is too structural and (2) it is too wide. Moreover, the original structuralist account also fails to cover important cases of incommensurable theories in being too restrictive for them. In this paper, we develop an improved notion of “reduction” that allows us to avoid these shortcomings by means of a more flexible device for the formalization of (partially reductive) relations between theories. For that purpose, we use a framework of rigid logic, i.e., logic that is based on a fixed collection of objects. (shrink)

The issue of Christ’s two natures and the Trinitarian persons of God in the Christian conception have posed a conundrum in Christian-Muslim Relations. Islam has historically held to a formulation of absolute unity while the historic Christian faith prefers to see a plurality of union as the proper expression of divine unity. The debate raged throughout the medieval period. The contemporary Egyptian intellectual Awwaḍ Simʽān is one outstanding voice in the current nexus of Muslim-Christian engagement. Simʽān presents a rationally appealing (...) formulation of the Christian doctrine, avoiding or carefully explaining some of the Christian Trinitarian terminology which Muslims regard as most egregious. He appeals to Muslim philosophers as well as historic Christian apologists to buttress his views. It is a winsome and rationally appealing formulation from an Arabic-writing theologian from within the Muslim context. This article seeks to examine the salient points of Simʽān’s formulation and ask if it could be heard in today’s Muslim milieu with all its attending dissonance due to the realities of religious militancy and social displacement. The communal unity of the Trinity may yet find corners of the Muslim world where it is welcomed and embraced. If so, Awwaḍ Simʽān’s formulation will play a visible role. (shrink)

According to their founders, the DVjs, established in 1923, was supposed to develop a specific focus also for medieval literature and culture. This article analyzes how this program was realized and how the relationship between literary studies and intellectual history (›Geistesgeschichte‹) was shaped in different periods from the early articles of Günther Müller, Wolfgang Stammler or Walther Rehm to the reestablishment by Hugo Kuhn around 1950. The authors reconstruct a particular branch of German medieval studies still relevant today.

Als die zwei auch für die Wissenschaftstheorie relevantesten Konversionen der letzten Jahre gelten die von Holzkamp hin zum Marxismus sowie die von Feyerabend hin zum Anarchismus oder Dadaismus. Beide Forscher haben autobiographische Notizen publiziert, die ihre Konversion plausibel machen sollen. Darüberhinaus liegt durch jüngste Publikationen auch bei Feyerabend inzwischen genügend theoretisches Material vor, aufgrund dessen eine erste Bilanz gewagt werden kann. Mit dem Schwerpunkt auf Feyerabend lautet die Hauptfrage, warum er "nur" zum Anarchismus konvertierte, nicht aber zum Marxismus. Bezogen auf (...) die Auseinandersetzung zwischen emanzipatorischer Anthropologie und nomothetischer Methodologie wird zunächst die Kritik der Forschungspraxis aufgezeigt, wie sie vom frühen Holzkamp und von Feyerabend geübt wurde. Spätestens bei dem seit den Analysen von Kuhn aktuellem Bruch zwischen Wissenschaftstheorie und -praxis ist Feyerabend im Unterschied zu Holzkamp nicht mehr motiviert, diesen Bruch rational zu rekonstruieren. Vielmehr tut Feyerabend alles dafür, die Autorität der Wissenschaft zu erschüttern. Die Überführung seines durchaus teilbaren Kampfes gegen ein Falsifikationsprinzip in einen Kampf für pluralistische Methodologie ist letztlich ein Zeichen der Hilflosigkeit einer idealistischen und voluntaristischen Philosophie. Seine radikaldemokratische Konzeption der Wissenschaft als Abstimmungsgeschäft etabliert jene 'Mob'-Herrschaft, die er in seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Lakatos' Basisurteilen noch ablehnte. Als Ursache für den Unterschied in der Konversion bei Holzkamp und Feyerabend wird herausgestellt: Das liberalistische Privatindividuum Feyerabend ist im Unterschied zu Holzkamp nie in der Lage, seine Interessen an Wissenschaft von der Praxis her disziplinieren zu lassen und die positiven Ansätze zu einer "kosmologischen" Analyse in einer umfassenden Reflektion des Zusammenhangs von Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft aufzuheben. (shrink)

While in medicine, comparison of the data supplied by a clinical syndrome with the data supplied by the biological system is used to arrive at the most accurate diagnosis, the same cannot be said of financial economics: the accumulation of statistical results that contradict the Brownian hypothesis used in risk modelling, combined with serious empirical problems in the practical implementation of the Black-Scholes-Merton model, the benchmark theory of mathematical finance founded on the Brownian hypothesis, has failed to change the Brownian (...) representation, which has endured for more than fifty years despite the extent of its invalidation by experience. Without any statistical foundations, one mathematical representation has become the established approach, acting in the minds of practitioners as a “prenotion” in the sense the word is used by Durkheim, i.e. a “schematic, summary representation” which has produced a kind of spontaneous epistemology. The question arises of the persistence of this mathematical representation, which has been the basis for every financial risk modelling approach: how can its long life be explained? How was this spontaneous epistemology formed, and why did it prove to be so persistent? To address this question and offer an answer, I will test the various dynamics of scientific knowledge used with reference to financial modelling. All these dynamics are specific ways of describing the relationship between knowledge of a phenomenon and the phenomenon itself. Observing that it is impossible for the positivist approach to solve the financial puzzle, I turn to the three principal postpositivist dynamics, developed by Kuhn, Lakatos and Quine. I shall try to make to speak these representations of science for financial research, in order to reflect on the dominance of the Brownian representation in finance. We shall see that none of the epistemologies examined can explain why the Brownian representation continues to be used in mathematical finance research. I shall then propose an alternative hypothesis, concerning a significant pervading mental model that has irrigated both academics and practitioners in the financial sector: the “principle of continuity” introduced into economics by Marshall in. I consider that this principle of continuity has become a “persistent idea” in the form of a viral approach to representations, and I give this persistent idea the metaphorical name of the “Brownian virus”. Then, to explain the spread of this Brownian virus through the financial sector, the contamination of financial practices by this mental representation founded on the principle of continuity, I introduce the concept of the “financial Logos”, a discourse that structures practices and organisations, calculations, prudential regulations and accounting standards, leading to a general financialisation of society from the 1980s onwards. (shrink)

Auch in der gegenwärtigen Naturphilosophie wird erkannt, dass die klassische Verstehensweise unserer näheren und ferneren „Umwelt“ über ein mechanistisches Weltbild, wie es den Naturwissenschaften lange zugrunde lag, nicht mehr allein angemessen sein kann. Diese notwendige Korrektur,die gerade im Zusammenhang mit dem Teleologiegedanken des Lebendigen besonders diskutiert wird, muss jedoch in phänomenologischer Sicht noch weiter geführt werden, denn es ist die deskriptive Erscheinensvoraussetzung von Differenz oder Transzendenz im modernen Denken selbst, die in Frage zu stellen ist, um „Natur“ aus einem immanenten (...) Einheitsbegriff heraus aufzuweisen. Die philosophie‐ wie geistesgeschichtlichen Sondierungen zu Antike und Mittelalter sollen dabei bewusst machen, dass diese Zweideutigkeit von Immanenz/Transzendenz vom griechischen Physis‐Begriff über den christlichen Schöpfungsgedanken bis zur Moderne weiter vererbt wurde unddaher heute mit einer radikalisierten Phänomenologie zu konfrontieren ist, welche sich zugleich der Verantwortung für eine Einheit von Natur/Kultur in Zukunft bewusst ist.Contemporary philosophy recognizes that the “environment” cannot be understood any longer with a mechanistic conception of the world alone. This is discussed in context with the teleology of the living and descriptive presupposition of appearance of difference/transcendence in modern thinking,in order to exhibit “nature” from an immanent unit term. The ancient philosophy and the middle ages philosophy make conscious that this duality of Immanence/transcendence is a heritage from the Greek term of physisthat passed through the Christian view of Creation to reach the modernity.Today this heritage is confronted to the radicalized phenomenology, in orderto take the responsibility of unifying in the future nature and culture. (shrink)

Le premier Wittgenstein expose dans le Tractatus une philosophie des sciences marquée par le conventionnalisme complété d’un certain vérificationnisme assuré par la logique de l’ Abbildung. Pour autant il ne développe aucune idéologiste scientiste. A partir de 1929, sa philosophie prend un tournant grammatical : la « grammaire » de la science comporte non seulement les lois logiques, mais aussi la partie théorique des sciences de la nature. L’assimilation des grandes théories (Copernic, Darwin, Freud) à des « vues synoptiques » (...) rassemblant une quantité de phénomènes, comme les paradigmes de Kuhn, n’empêche pas Wittgenstein de donner à sa philosophie le tour d’un incontestable réalisme (au sens de Cora Diamond). La dernière partie de ce texte essaie d’apprécier, à partir de Wittgenstein, les différences et les relations entre science et philosophie dans le naturalisme contemporain. (shrink)

In 1845, John Henry Cardinal Newman wrote a treatise describing the development of Christian doctrine. Since then, his ideas have been challenged, in particular by Protestant theologians who have argued that the development of doctrine does not progress in either a smooth or linear path. In the philosophy of science, Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions has challenged the idea that science is purely driven by objective and rational motives. In this paper, Kuhn's ideas are applied to (...) the development of Christian doctrine. Drawing from historical examples, it is shown that Kuhn's contextual approach to describe the progress of science aids in understanding the way doctrines themselves develop. Although this is not the first time that theology and Kuhn have conversed, the notion of doctrinal development being systematically and methodically shown to have parallels with Kuhn's ideas is novel. Ultimately, this work is another important step in building interdisciplinary links between science and theology. (shrink)

Inhalt: O. Poggeler: Vorwort - Publikationen des Hegel-Archivs (Bochum) - Publications du Centre de Recherche et de Documentation sur Hegel et sur Marx (Poitiers) - G. Planty-Bonjour: In memoriam Claude Bruaire - Die Lehren der Geschichte: J. D'Hondt: Les lecons hegeliennes de l'histoire - N. Waszek: Weltgeschichte und Zeitgeschehen. Hegels Lekture des Globe - B. Bourgeois: Hegel et la deraison dans l'histoire - D. Souche-Dagues: La 'fierte' de l'Esprit - Dialektische Logik und Geschichtsmetaphysik: O. Poggeler: Geschichte, Philosophie und Logik bei (...) Hegel - K. Dusing: Dialektik und Geschichtsmetaphysik in Hegels Konzeption philosophiegeschichtlicher Entwicklung - G. Schmidt: Kausalitat oder Substantialitat? - Geschichte der Philosophie und logische Kategorien: M. Riedel: Erster und anderer Anfang. Hegels Bestimmung des Ursprungs und Grundes der griechischen Philosophie - B. Tuschling: Necessarium est idem simul esse et non esse. Zu Hegels Revision der Grundlagen von Logik und Metaphysik - Entwicklung, Geschichte der Philosophie und Evolution: P. Garniron: Hegels Geschichte der Philosophie der Moderne. Eine Untersuchung auf der Grundlage verschiedener Berliner Nachschriften - H.-Ch. Lucas: Kontinuitat, Einheit und das Neue. Uberlegungen zu Hegel und Thomas S. Kuhn - W. Bonsiepen: Der Zusammenhang von Naturrevolution und geschichtlicher Entwicklung in Hegels Berliner System - Anhang: Abkurzungen und Siglen - Literaturverzeichnis: H.-Ch. Lucas und N. Waszek. - Personenverzeichnis. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper argues that, historically, Christianity emerges out of Judaism by way of a paradigm shift in Thomas Kuhn’s sense of the word and that this emergence has normative consequences regarding the legitimacy of Christianity. Paradigm shifts are characterized by observational anomalies triggering particular kinds of theoretical modifications, e.g. meaning-changes of key terms, leading to a coherent re-disclosure of reality. The first Christians underwent such a paradigm shift: The anomalous experience that the dead Jesus has risen triggered theoretical modifications (...) – the term ‘Messiah’ underwent a meaning-change – so that reality could be coherently re-disclosed as eschatological reality. If Christianity emerges by way of a paradigm shift, this shift should be the foundation of Christological theorizing: Rather than basing Christology on what the ‘historical Jesus’ did or said, the reconstruction of Jesus as the Christ in the context of this shift is foundational for Christ... (shrink)

Both Richard Dawkins’s book The God Delusion and Philip Kennedy’s book A Modern Introduction to Theology: New Questions for Old Beliefs were published in 2006. This article aims to compare the two books and to argue that Kennedy does not oppose Dawkins’s views but, in fact, debates along similar lines. Kennedy is adamant that the Augustinian paradigm of Christianity no longer makes sense, because it is based on an outdated cosmology and anthropology. He firmly maintains that Christianity requires a new (...) paradigm, which is informed by our current knowledge and worldview. Thomas Kuhn’s ideas of paradigm and paradigm changes in the history of natural sciences are utilised in comparing the books, seeing that Dawkins accepts and works within the Darwinian paradigm of evolutionary biology, and Kennedy argues that Christians and Christian theologians adhere to the Augustinian paradigm of Fall-Redemption-Judgement. It is argued that Dawkins should have referred to the paradigm change in the study of the Bible, which occurred towards the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, and the plea of theologians, like Kennedy, for a paradigm change in theology. The article concludes that only a paradigm change in Christianity, which is in line with the modern worldview, will enable Christians to keep the tradition alive. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Annual Meeting of the Society for Buddhist-Christian StudiesMontreal, Quebec, Canada, 6 –7 November 2009Sandra Costen Kunz and Amos YongThe Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies (SBCS) sponsored two sessions in conjunction with the 2009 annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion. The first session was titled “The Boundaries of Knowledge in Buddhism, Christianity and Science.” The theme for the second session was “Buddhist-Christian Dialogue in an Age of Science.”The (...) first session, a panel discussion of The Boundaries of Knowledge in Buddhism, Christianity and Science, edited by Paul Numrich (Göttingen: Vandenhouek and Rupricht, 2008), considered the epistemological questions raised by Buddhist, Christian, and scientific insights on the inadequacies of conceptualization and language for understanding reality. The project that produced the book was funded by the Templeton Foundation, which also generously supported this panel.After a welcome by moderator Miriam Levering (University of Tennessee), the book’s editor, Paul Numrich (Theological Consortium of Greater Columbus), gave a brief overview of the volume, followed by reflections on their chapters by two contributors: Dennis Hirota (Ryukoku University) and Paul Ingram (Pacific Lutheran University). Amos Yong (Regent University School of Divinity) responded to Hirota’s chapter, and Sandra Costen Kunz (Phillips Theological Seminary) responded to Ingram’s. Hirota and Ingram each made a few remarks on these responses, leading into an open discussion including other contributors to the book: John Albright (Lutheran School of Theology), Roger Blomquist (Argonne National Laboratory), Tom Christenson (Capital University), and David McMahan (Franklin and Marshall College).Hirota’s paper, based on his chapter “Shinran and Heidegger on Truth,” examined the epistemology of Shinran (1173–1263), founder of the Japanese Shin Pure Land Buddhist tradition. Hirota noted that for both Shinran and Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) [End Page 197] truth is less a matter of asserting propositions and more a matter of the recognition and turning away from prior perceptual distortion. This permits the emergence of a new structure of awareness, an emergence that parallels Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm shifts in scientific understanding.In his response, Yong called for a greater role for different “particularistic or even confessional approaches” within “the religion-science discussion.” He thus noted with appreciation the grounding of Hirota’s paper in a Buddhist tradition that is not “broadly Tibetan,” like much work in Buddhist-science dialogue. He compared and contrasted Shinran’s teachings about the corruption and purification of human reason with those of the Council of Dordt’s five-point condensation of Protestant reformer John Calvin’s soteriology, pointing out that both have a salvific intention.Ingram argued that while science has amassed reliable information about physical reality, and Buddhist and Christian practitioners have amassed reliable knowledge about the structures of human experience, all three traditions confront epistemological boundaries imposed by their methods of inquiry. Questions arising at these boundaries form the foundation for a science-Buddhism-Christianity trialogue. Noting that science demonstrates that “nature is rooted in a realm... only half-translated into our phenomenal experience,” Ingram reviewed how scientists and Buddhist and Christian practitioners “work back from relevant experiences on the phenomenal level, and then ask what hypothetical reality might constructively explain these experiences.”Kunz pointed out that in his examples of “working back” from experience toward hypotheses, Ingram cites many reasons for epistemological humility. Noting her research on how methods of Christian spiritual discernment might yield hypotheses for reducing the ecological crisis, she argued that Christians who have ignored the boundaries of human knowledge have contributed to this crisis. She suggested that if Western Christians who teach spiritual discernment took Buddhist and current neuroscience insights about human knowing more seriously, their teaching practices might differ less from those of non-Western Christians.The second session, chaired by Amos Yong (Regent University), was a roundtable discussion of Paul O. Ingram’s book Buddhist-Christian Dialogue in an Age of Science (Rowman and Littlefield, 2008). Respondents included Mark Unno, associate professor of East Asian religions at the University of Oregon; Nancy Howell, professor of theology and philosophy of religion at Saint Paul School of Theology in Kansas City, Missouri; Benjamin Chicka, PhD candidate in the philosophy of religion and theology at Claremont Graduate University; and former... (shrink)

There is a strong need of a reasoned defense of what was known as the “independence” position of the science–religion relationship but that more recently has been denigrated as the “accommodationist” position, namely that while there are parts of religion—fundamentalist Christianity in particular—that clash with modern science, the essential parts of religion do not and could not clash with science. A case for this position is made on the grounds of the essentially metaphorical nature of science. Modern science functions because (...) of its root metaphor of the machine: the world is seen in mechanical terms. As Thomas Kuhn insisted, metaphors function in part by ruling some questions outside their domain. In the case of modern science, four questions go unasked and hence unanswered: Why is there something rather than nothing? What is the foundation of morality? What is mind and its relationship to matter? What is the meaning of it all? You can remain a nonreligious skeptic on these questions, but it is open for the Christian to offer his or her answers, so long as they are not scientific answers. Here then is a way that science and religion can coexist. (shrink)

The figure of the Palmyrean queen Zenobia plays an important part in three vitae of the Historia Augusta. The discrepancy in her representation was attributed to different sources or different authors. Since the representation of Zenobia even changes within one vita, there is no need to assume different authors. Being a counterpart to Gallienus, Odaenathus and Aurelianus, the figure of Zenobia changes correspondingly to these male figures. Her voluntary submission to the real – male – emperor finds an equivalent in (...) the nation's voluntary submission to the real – male – ruler. The category of gender proves valuable in the analysis of characterisation and text intention. The vita Aureliani is interpreted as deconstructing the panegyric tones of the vitae Gallieni and triginta tyrannorum. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the educational‐philosophical implications of Michel Foucault's work: It poses the question whether Michel Foucault's remarks surrounding ‘limit‐experience’ can be placed in an educational context and provide an alternative view regarding the relationship that we maintain to ourselves. As a first step, the significance of ‘limit‐experience’ for Foucault's historicophilosophical investigations, his ‘critical ontology of the present’, is examined. Far from being an external marking point, it can be shown that limit‐experience lies at the centre of Foucault's (...) approaches to the history of thought. As a second step, the resistance of Foucault's work against its integration into the educational realm is examined: Coming from Foucault's ‘limit‐experience’, it is possible to problematize a specific way we speak about learning and education. As a subsequent step, this resistance is given a constructive turn: The practices of writing and reading (related to limit‐experience) could provide a valuable irritation for philosophers of education by exposing them to the challenges of ‘singularity’ in education. It is argued that specifically the writing practice could be helpful for educational studies in order to inquire into the complex relationship of subject, power, and truth within the educational realm. Finally, the possibilities and difficulties of provoking such a writing practice are mentioned. (shrink)

COVID-19 confronted many people with an abrupt shift from their usual working environment to telework. This study explores which job characteristics are perceived as most crucial in this exceptional situation and how they differ from people’s previous working conditions. Additionally, we focus on job crafting as a response to this situation and how it is related to employees’ well-being. We conducted an online survey with N = 599 participants, of which 321 reported that they were telework newcomers. First, we asked (...) participants to indicate the three most important advantages and disadvantages they see in telework. The subsequent questionnaire contained a comprehensive measure of working conditions before and during the pandemic, job crafting behaviors, and indicators of well-being. Based on the qualitative answers, we identified three major advantages and disadvantages. Quantitative results indicate perceived changes in all job characteristics for telework newcomers. Concerning working conditions and well-being, job crafting activities that aim to increase structural and social resources are important mediators. The findings underline the need to design appropriate telework conditions and encourage job crafting activities to foster occupational well-being. (shrink)

Christiane Bailey and Chloë Taylor (Editorial Introduction) Sue Donaldson (Stirring the Pot - A short play in six scenes) Ralph Acampora (La diversification de la recherche en éthique animale et en études animales) Eva Giraud (Veganism as Affirmative Biopolitics: Moving Towards a Posthumanist Ethics?) Leonard Lawlor (The Flipside of Violence, or Beyond the Thought of Good Enough) Kelly Struthers Montford (The “Present Referent”: Nonhuman Animal Sacrifice and the Constitution of Dominant Albertan Identity) James Stanescu (Beyond Biopolitics: Animal Studies, Factory (...) Farms, and the Advent of Deading Life) Ian Werkheiser (Domination and Consumption: An Examination of Veganism, Anarchism, and Ecofeminism) Cynthia Willett (Water and Wing Give Wonder: Trans-Species Cosmopolitanism) Corey Lee Wrenn (Nonhuman Animal Rights, Alternative Food Systems, and the Non-Profit Industrial Complex) Emily R. Douglas (Eat or Be Eaten: A Feminist Phenomenology of Women as Food) Gary Steiner’s Animals and the Limits of Postmodernism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013) Chloë Taylor (“Postmodern” Critical Animal Theory: A Defense) Patrick Llored (La déconstruction derridienne peut-elle fonder une communauté politique et morale entre vivants humains et non humains?) Jan Dutkiewicz (“Postmodernism,” Politics, and Pigs) Gary Steiner (Response to Commentators). (shrink)

Les sciences cognitives ont redonné de l’actualité au vieux problème des localisations cérébrales, qui a souvent été un motif à plaisanteries. Quant à la question plus philosophique de la localisation de l’esprit, des auteurs comme Peirce, James, Wittgenstein et actuellement Vincent Descombes, ont imaginé délocaliser l’esprit, pour mieux réputer dénuée de sens l’idée même d’un lieu du mental et critiquer le localisationnisme qu’on retrouve chez les cogniticiens aujourd’hui.

O objetivo é, a partir de uma interpretação do § 7 de Ser e tempo, mostrar como o conceito prévio (der Vorbegriff) de fenomenologia, para Heidegger, indica a busca metodológica das condições de possibilidade da manifestação dos entes em seu ser, e de que maneira há a exigência metodológica de interrogar o Dasein acerca de seu ser como ponto de partida da investigação. A exposição, inspirada em leituras transcendentais da ontologia fundamental, acompanha os momentos constitutivos do § 7 a fim (...) de realizar uma interpretação sistemática entre o parágrafo indicado e o projeto proposto por Heidegger em Ser e tempo. (shrink)

La dénomination des âges, résultat d’un construit social, trace des frontières mobiles qui sont autant de marqueurs socioculturels. La frontière a un double statut : objectif et subjectif, externe et interne, elle est continuellement édifiée et reconstruite selon le contexte socio-historique et culturel et les interactions. C’est un mur ou un lieu de passage. Une série d’entretiens auprès de jeunes chômeurs en formation et auprès de personnes âgées confrontées aux bouleversements urbains montre que l’âge peut être vécu soit comme processus (...) dynamique de transformation dans son rapport à soi, aux autres et à son environnement, soit comme processus d’exclusion et de mort sociale.The ways in which we refer to ages in life, which stem from social constructs, point to shifting boundaries that are effectively socio-cultural demarcations. The nature of boundaries is inherently dual: they are objective and subjective, external and internal, and they are continually erected and reconstructed with shifting socio-historical and cultural contexts and interactions. They are barriers but also gateways. A series of interviews with young unemployed people in training and with elderly people trying to cope with urban transformations shows that one’s age can either be experienced as a dynamic process of change in one’s relationships with oneself, with others and with one’s environment, or as a process of exclusion and social death. (shrink)

The political significance of masses is more obvious than ever. The aim of this article is to develop a conceptualization capable of capturing the dangerous as well as promising aspects of masses. It argues that, intricately, the dangers and fruitful potentials of masses are born out of the same fundamental structural features. We may differentiate analytically between different kinds of masses, but all masses contain elements of ambiguity. The mass conceptualization developed builds on a critical, deconstructing interpretation of selected Bataille (...) texts centering on ontological features of individuality and collectivity. Especially, Bataille’s concepts of ‘myth’ and ‘sacrifice’ are accentuated and critically transformed. Contemporary examples of masses – right-wing anti-establishment movements, Occupy Wall Street and Black Lives Matter – are presented and reflected through the prism of sacrifice, with the aim of highlighting the multifaceted and complex nature of the dynamics of masses. (shrink)