Ethical concepts are, or purport to be, normative. They make claims on us: they command, oblige, recommend, or guide. Or at least when we invoke them, we make claims on one another; but where does their authority over us - or ours over one another - come from? Christine Korsgaard identifies four accounts of the source of normativity that have been advocated by modern moral philosophers: voluntarism, realism, reflective endorsement, and the appeal to autonomy. She traces their history, showing (...) how each developed in response to the prior one and comparing their early versions with those on the contemporary philosophical scene. Kant's theory that normativity springs from our own autonomy emerges as a synthesis of the other three, and Korsgaard concludes with her own version of the Kantian account. Her discussion is followed by commentary from G. A. Cohen, Raymond Geuss, Thomas Nagel, and Bernard Williams, and a reply by Korsgaard. (shrink)

Christine Korsgaard has become one of the leading interpreters of Kant's moral philosophy. She is identified with a small group of philosophers who are intent on producing a version of Kant's moral philosophy that is at once sensitive to its historical roots while revealing its particular relevance to contemporary problems. She rejects the traditional picture of Kant's ethics as a cold vision of the moral life which emphasises duty at the expense of love and value. Rather, Kant's work is (...) seen as providing a resource for addressing not only the metaphysics of morals, but also for tackling practical questions about personal relations, politics, and everyday human interaction. This collection contains some of the finest current work on Kant's ethics and will command the attention of all those involved in teaching and studying moral theory. (shrink)

Christine M. Korsgaard is one of today's leading moral philosophers: this volume collects ten influential papers by her on practical reason and moral psychology ...

Many forms of virtue ethics, like certain forms of utilitarianism, suffer from the problem of indirection. In those forms, the criterion for status of a trait as a virtue is not the same as the criterion for the status of an act as right. Furthermore, if the virtues for example are meant to promote the nourishing of the agent, the virtuous agent is not standardly supposed to be motivated by concern for her own flourishing in her activity. In this paper, (...) I propose a virtue ethics which does not suffer from the problem. Traits are not virtues because their cultivation and manifestation promote a value such as agent flourishing. They are virtues in so far as they are habits of appropriate response to various relevant values. This means that there is a direct connection between the rationale of a virtue and what makes an action virtuous or right. (shrink)

Content skepticism about practical reason is doubt about the bearing of rational considerations on the activities of deliberation and choice. Motivational skepticism is doubt about the scope of reason as a motive. Some people think that motivational considerations alone provide grounds for skepticism about the project of founding ethics on practical reason. I will argue, against this view, that motivational skepticism must always be based on content skepticism. I will not address the question of whether or not content skepticism is (...) justified. I want only to establish the fact that motivational skepticism has no independent force. (shrink)

Christine Swanton presents a new target centred virtue ethics, which is opposed to orthodox virtue ethics in two major ways. She rejects the 'natural goodness' metaphysics of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics in favour of a 'hermeneutic ontology' of ethics, and she offers a new target centred framework for assessing rightness of acts.

In this paper, I set an aspect of what it is to live a flourishing life against the backdrop of neo liberal trends that continue to influence educational policy across the globe. The view I set out is in sharp contrast to any narrow assumption that education’s main task is the measurement of high performing individuals who will thus contribute to an economically viable society. Instead, I explore and argue for a conception of what constitutes a flourishing life that is (...) embedded in a more pragmatist analysis of what education may be. The argument begins with developing the centrality of embodiment to aesthetic sensibility and goes on to suggest how collective understanding of this within a community could constitute a sense of performance and thus contribute to the educational aim of developing a full and flourishing life. The argument is that this way of seeing life could have implications for educational practice, the role of the teacher and could help to reconfigure how education is experienced by the young. (shrink)

... View (i) The Thesis of Essential Contestedness The view that freedom and other ideals such as justice are essentially contested is important, ...

Christine M. Korsgaard presents a compelling new view of our moral relationships to the other animals. She offers challenging answers to such questions as: Are people superior to animals, and does it matter morally if we are? Is it all right for us to eat animals, experiment on them, make them work for us, and keep them as pets?

Pour contrer le scepticisme au sujet de la connaissance des valeurs, la plupart soutiennent avec John Rawls qu’une croyance comme celle qu’une action est bonne est justifiée dans la mesure où elle appartient à un ensemble de croyances cohérent, ayant atteint un équilibre réfléchi. Christine Tappolet s’inspire des travaux de Max Scheler et d’Alexius von Meinong pour défendre une conception opposée au cohérentisme. La connaissance des valeurs est affirmée dépendre de nos émotions, ces dernières étant conçues comme des perceptions (...) des valeurs. (shrink)

One of the great difficulties with Kant’s moral philosophy is that it seems to imply that our moral obligations leave us powerless in the face of evil. Kant’s theory sets a high ideal of conduct and tells us to live up to that ideal regardless of what other persons are doing. The results may be very bad. But Kant says that the law "remains in full force, because it commands categorically" (G, 438-39/57).* The most weI1—known example of...

Christine M. Korsgaard is Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University. She was educated at the University of Illinois and received a Ph.D. from Harvard. She has held positions at Yale, the University of California at Santa Barbara, and the University of Chicago, and visiting positions at Berkeley and UCLA. She is a member of the American Philosophical Association and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. She has published extensively on Kant, and about (...) moral philosophy and its history, the theory of practical reason, the philosophy of action, and personal identity. Her two published books are The Sources of Normativity (1992) and Creating the King- dom of Ends (1996). (shrink)

The classical liberal argument that each human being has equal moral value and is deserving of equal concern and respect has had an enormous impact on our understanding both of equality and of individuals. Using this as a foundation, liberals have formulated theories of what is required for treating individuals with equal concern and respect that have provided ever more substantive interpretations of what individuals need to flourish in social relations marred by a legacy of discrimination and inequality. Yet the (...) view that relationships are of primary significance in the lives of individuals and that individuals are essentially interdependent and dependent beings has played a limited role in equality theory. If anything, these features of selves have been perceived to be inimical to equality, aspects of human lives that need to be transcended or left behind in the political community of fully participating members. ;This essay argues that insights into the relational features of language and of selves in communities provide what is needed to make up for the shortcomings of liberal conceptions of equality. Through a critique of Nozick's libertarianism, Rawls's liberal substantive theory, and communitarianism, a relational conception of the self and a relational theory of equality begin to emerge. I use Gilligan's inadequate account of relationships as a springboard for developing the idea that the interactive relationships between the oppressed and the oppressor, the disadvantaged and the advantaged, the powerless and the powerful have important implications for what should count as full equality and even for political action to eliminate inequalities. ;The essay closes by applying relational insights to a practical policy issue, the issue of affirmative action. Here we begin to see in concrete detail how relational theory can expand an understanding of the conditions needed for treating all individuals with equal concern and respect. (shrink)

This paper criticizes two accounts of the normativity of practical principles: the empiricist account and the rationalist or realist account. It argues against the empiricist view, focusing on the Humean texts that are usually taken to be its locus classicus. It then argues both against the dogmatic rationalist view, and for the Kantian view, through a discussion of Kant's own remarks about instrumental rationality in the second section of the Groundwork. It further argues that the instrumental principle cannot stand alone. (...) Unless there are normative principles directing us to the adoption of certain ends, there can be no requirement to take the means to our ends. The familiar view that the instrumental principle is the only requirement of practical reason is incoherent. (shrink)

La rencontre de Ricœur avec Greimas n’a pas été un événement éphémère, mais une discussion qui s’est étalée sur plus de trente ans. Anne Hénault retrace ici les différentes étapes de ce que Ricœur appelait son “combat amoureux” avec Greimas, et qui illustre à merveille le poème de René Char: “Les loyaux adversaires.” On y retrouve les qualités propres du philosophe dans ses dialogues, le souci de faire avancer son propre raisonnement de façon rigoureuse, mais aussi l’effort pour donner à (...) l’interlocuteur “la chance de son meilleur argument.” Anne Hénault raconte la traversée d’un structuralisme “ennemi” et la conquête d’une “amitié” réciproque exigeante, et fondée sur de véritables convergences intellectuelles. (shrink)

A cell contains many copies of mitochondrial DNA. The distribution of a mitochondrial gene mutation in a cell culture is governed by the way in which the mtDNA molecules of a cell are replicated and partitioned between the two daughter cells during mitosis. Assuming that this partition process is random, we describe the evolution of the mitochondrial genetic state of a cell culture. The mutated mtDNA is ultimately segregated and the rate of the trend to segregation is relatively slow. It (...) is nevertheless greatly accelerated if the model takes into account the spatial mtDNA partition by the mitochondrial compartments. (shrink)

In this theoretical paper, motives for CSR are considered. An underlying assumption is that the commercial imperative is not the sole driver of CSR decision-making in private sector companies, but that the formal adoption and implementation of CSR by corporations could be associated with the changing personal values of individual managers. These values may find expression through the opportunity to exercise discretion, which may arise in various ways. It is suggested that in so far as CSR initiatives represent individuals' values, (...) so the responsibility in evidence is less obviously corporate. Our emphasis on personal initiative is intended to counter a tendency to view the corporation as the agent, and may serve to remind us that individuals can, indeed, make a difference. (shrink)

In contemporary Western society, people are more often called upon to justify the choice not to have children than they are to supply reasons for having them. In this book, Christine Overall maintains that the burden of proof should be reversed: that the choice to have children calls for more careful justification and reasoning than the choice not to. Arguing that the choice to have children is not just a prudential or pragmatic decision but one with ethical repercussions, Overall (...) offers a wide-ranging exploration of how we might think systematically and deeply about this fundamental aspect of human life. Writing from a feminist perspective, she also acknowledges the inevitably gendered nature of the decision; the choice has different meanings, implications, and risks for women than it has for men. After considering a series of ethical approaches to procreation, and finding them inadequate or incomplete, Overall offers instead a novel argument. Exploring the nature of the biological parent-child relationship -- which is not only genetic but also psychological, physical, intellectual, and moral -- she argues that the formation of that relationship is the best possible reason for choosing to have a child. (shrink)

Comme son titre l’indique, cet ouvrage collectif renouvelle réflexions et analyses autour des mouvements et figures féministes du Japon dans différents domaines. L’introduction nous donne un aperçu historique et synthétique très utile pour resituer les chapitres qui suivent. Elle souligne l’apparition de figures féministes (Kishida Toshiko, Fukuda Hideko) dès le début de la construction de l’État moderne japonais. Leur combat pour accéder à l’espace politique resta minoritaire alors que le pr...

According to many critics of virtue ethics the dominant virtue ethical paradigm of practical reasoning and right action both encourages a dismissive attitude to moral disagreement and offers a bad model for dealing with it. The charge of dismissiveness raises two issues. First, what is it to take moral disagreement seriously? Second, can virtue ethics respond to the charge?In answer to the first question I show that on virtue ethical account of ethics a great deal of pervasive deep disagreement can (...) be explained by the existence of vagueness and cognitive shortcomings. Taking moral disagreement seriously is to appreciate that much disagreement is deep, reasonable, and intractable; and that moral points of view (including those of virtuous agents) are subject to limited perspectives, the narrative particularities of one’s life, and cultural and historical location. The alleged problem with virtue ethics is that it fails to appreciate the perspectival, theory ladenness, and intractability of dispute, for it is commonly assumed that in virtue ethics a virtuous agent is both the determinant of right action and the repository of sound reasoning about which actions are right.In answer to the second question I show that virtue ethics need not be committed to this feature. I assume a dialogical version of virtue ethics where right action is understood in terms of meeting the targets of relevant virtues, many of which pertain to excellence in dialogue. Relative to this account I focus on two areas of disagreement.(1) The status of actions falling within areas where the application of ‘right’ is vague.(2) Disagreement caused by cognitive shortcomings on the part of some or all of the disagreeing parties. (shrink)

Treatment pressures are communicative strategies that mental health professionals use to influence the decision-making of mental health service users and improve their adherence to recommended treatment. Szmukler and Appelbaum describe a spectrum of treatment pressures, which encompasses persuasion, interpersonal leverage, offers and threats, arguing that only a particular type of threat amounts to informal coercion. We contend that this account of informal coercion is insufficiently sensitive to context and fails to recognize the fundamental power imbalance in mental healthcare. Based on (...) a set of counterexamples, we argue that what makes a proposal coercive is not whether service users will actually be made worse off if they reject the proposal, but rather whether they have the justified belief that this is the case. Whether this belief is justified depends on the presence of certain contextual factors, such as strong dependency on professionals and the salient possibility of formal coercion. (shrink)

This paper consists in a critical review of Peter Goldie's book, The Emotion. A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Goldie is right to distinguish between long-term emotions and emotional experiences. And he is also right to reject the view that emotions are reducible to 'feelingless' states plus some extra feelings. However, Goldie's own account in terms of "feeling towards" is problematic. Goldie would have been better advised to claim that emotional experiences are necessarily emotional representations of something as (...) being F (disgusting, attractive, admirable, etc.), that is, that emotional experiences are apprehensions or representations of evaluative features. (shrink)

In The Seven Stages of an Enlightened Teacher, Dr. Christine Jax presents a path to great teaching that shows how and why teaching is "a calling" in the true sense of the words.

Plato and Kant advance a constitutional model of the soul, in which reason and appetite or passion have different structural and functional roles in the generation of motivation, as opposed to the familiar Combat Model in which they are portrayed as independent sources of motivation struggling for control. In terms of the constitutional model we may explain what makes an action different from an event. What makes an action attributable to a person, and therefore what makes it an action, is (...) that it issues from the person''s constitution, and therefore from the person as a whole, rather than from some force working on or in the person. This in turn implies an account of what makes an action good: what makes an action good is that it is deliberated upon and chosen in a way that unifies the person into a constitutional system. Through deliberative action we constitute ourselves as unified agents. Platonic justice and Kant''s categorical imperative are shown to be normative standards for action because they are principles of self-constitution. (shrink)

Ich vergesse - Diese erschreckende Feststellung wird innerhalb der Geschichte der Philosophie in unterschiedlicher Weise begleitet von einem philosophischen Staunen; einem Staunen über die eindrückliche und gleichzeitig rätselhafte Fähigkeit des Menschen, an sich selbst Vergessen zu bemerken. Die Untersuchung der Formen individuellen Vergessens führt vor Augen, inwiefern der Mensch seinem Denken selbstbestimmt eine Richtung geben kann und auch, inwieweit dies nicht gelingt. Sie liefert damit einen Beitrag zu einer aktuellen Theorie des Gedächtnisses aus geisteswissenschaftlicher, insbesondere philosophischer Perspektive.

Abstract“Chemistry of Concepts” and “Historical Sense”. On Philosophical Concept Formation. The question concerning concepts and their relations to objects and words has had a long and controversial history. Recently, it is challenged by an anew turn towards objects and an emphasized object‐oriented ontology. The article argues that one reason for this is the reduction of concepts towards pure rational constructions and offers arguments for alternative understandings. In this context, the article proposes a re‐reading of Nietzsche’s particular approach and shows that (...) Nietzsche’s thought is decisively shaped by the sciences of his time, especially physiology and chemistry. Before the background of the recent increase in research interest on Nietzsche and the sciences the article examines place and function of the sciences related to the genealogy and justification of concepts. Opposing a strong naturalist reading it makes a plea for understanding Nietzsche’s epistemological critique concerning concepts systematically as a triple one: philological, physiological, and historical. (shrink)

Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex presents phenomenolog¬ical analyses that are intertwined and political proposals that posit that the individual ought to acknowledge the ambiguity of her own experience as human as well as the ambiguity of her relations with the Other and enact this ambiguous encounter. This is possible only with the rejection of the patriarchal system of values and meaning which negates ambiguity through its determinations of the feminine and the mascu¬line. A radical transformation of the social imaginaries (...) permeating our lives is needed. The Second Sex functions as a call to its readers to undertake this transformation. My claim is that in addition to putting forward a concept of political subjectivity as fundamentally ambiguous, Beauvoir also addresses us, the readers, as such subjects. I explain that this work is an instance of what Beauvoir defines as metaphysical literature that performs an appeal to ambiguous agents. (shrink)

L’Angleterre du xviie siècle connut un intense bouillonnement politique et religieux dont le paroxysme se situe au milieu du siècle, lors de la première révolution anglaise. De profondes aspirations égalitaires s’exprimèrent au sein de certains groupes. Les sectes dissidentes qui émergèrent alors offrirent à des individus, jusque-là condamnés au silence par leur position sociale, la possibilité de prendre la parole et la plume pour s’exprimer publiquement. Les femmes furent nombreuses à se sa...

James Tully's Strange Multiplicity uses the example of indigenous minorities in the white settler colonies of North America to develop a remarkably powerful critique of liberal constitutionalism's rule of uniformity. In proclaiming the identity of all persons before the law, he insists, liberal constitutional arrangements commonly discriminate against indigenous and other minorities. While the force of this critique is undeniable, it nevertheless takes at face value one of the central claims of liberal consitutionalism, namely, its claim to be based on (...) the rule of uniformity. Examination of liberal reflections on the government of subject peoples, most of whom were regarded as being, in Mill's words, “not sufficiently advanced for representative government“, suggests a rather different picture. In place of the rule of uniformity we find a variety of alternatives but, most commonly, an insistence, first, that the government of such peoples should focus on their welfare and eventual improvement rather than on their liberty and, second, that they should be governed as far as possible through their own institutions and structures of authority. The result was a highly differentiated form of rule in which what were believed to be indigenous arrangements were adapted to the joint requirements of improvement and administrative convenience. Thus, what seems to be a powerful commitment to individual liberty on the part of liberal political reason should be seen as simply one element in a broader liberal perspective on the government of populations. At least as important in this perspective as the rule of uniformity is the presumption that some cultures are more advanced than others and a corresponding view of many cultural differences in historical and developmental terms. (shrink)