Most of us experience the world through competing perspectives. A job or a religion seems important and fulfilling when looked at in one way; but from a different angle they seem tedious or ridiculous. A friend is obtuse from one point of view, wise from another. Continuing to hold both views at once can be unsettling, highlighting conflicts between our own judgments and values, and undermining our ability to live purposefully and effectively. Yet, as Jennifer Church argues in (...) this book, inner conflict can be a good thing, and not just as a temporary road bump on the road to resolution. This book describes several desirable types of "double consciousness"--or being of two minds--and explains why and how they should be maintained. Church looks critically at some common ideas about identity, including a popular belief about narratives that suggests our lives should "make sense" as a story. She also examines how empathy can helpfully cause us to be of two minds, and how various forms of irony and laughter enable us to benefit from holding onto opposing views. Finally, Church shows the merit of acknowledging reality while sometimes being guided by fantasy. Why It's OK to Be of Two Minds is for anyone who's held two opposing views simultaneously, which is to say it's for everyone. Key Features: Argues against a longstanding philosophical idea: that it is important to resolve inner conflicts that result from competing systems of beliefs Examines the role of empathy and friendship in maintaining a valuable form of double consciousness Considers how irony and laughter allow us to dedicate ourselves to our particular projects while acknowledging their ultimate insignificance Shows how fantasies that conflict with our beliefs can make a positive contribution to the way we live our lives. (shrink)

How is it possible for unconscious states to function as reasons? Two challenges are considered—one concerning the apparent dependence of normativity on self-knowledge, the other concerning the apparent irrationality of the unconscious. Both challenges are addressed through a discussion of 'spatial reasoning', which helps to make sense of 'emotional reasoning' as well.

Ruth Byrne presents a three-step argument to the conclusion that counterfactual imagining is rational. Insofar as this argument is valid, the conclusion is weaker than it seems. More importantly, it does not represent the central contributions of this book – contributions that, if anything, point instead to what is irrational about counterfactual imagining.

Experimental philosophy of religion is the project of taking the tools and resources of the human sciences—especially psychology and cognitive science—and bringing them to bear on issues within philosophy of religion toward explicit philosophical ends. This paper introduces readers to experimental philosophy of religion. §1 explores the contours of experimental philosophy of religion by contrasting it with a few related fields: the psychology of religion and cognitive science of religion, on the one hand, and natural theology, on the other. §2 (...) offers a brief history of experimental philosophy of religion. The goal in this section is to highlight the ancient pedigree of this emerging area of research; as the contemporary experimental philosophy of religion literature expands and proliferates, it’s important to remember that this field has deep historical roots. Then, §3 focuses on the following questions: Why should we care about experimental philosophy of religion? And why is it needed? (shrink)

The notion of an explicit representation plays a crucial role in O'Brien & Opie's arguments. Clarifying what explicit representation involves proves difficult, however, as various explications of this key notion fail to make sense of the overall argument. In particular, neither the notion of encoding in discrete objects nor the notion of active versus potentially active representation seems to help in specifying what is distinctive of conscious representation.

While experimental philosophy has fruitfully applied the tools and resources of psychology and cognitive science to debates within epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics, relatively little work has been done within philosophy of religion. And this isn’t due to a lack of need! Philosophers of religion frequently rely on empirical claims that can be either verified or disproven, but without exploring whether they are. And philosophers of religion frequently appeal to intuitions which may vary wildly according to education level, theological background, etc., (...) without concern for whether or not the psychological mechanisms that underwrite those intuitions are broadly shared or reliable. In this chapter, I explore some of the fruit and possibilities for the emerging field of experimental philosophy of religion. First, in Section 1, I will elucidate some of the historical grounding for experimental philosophy of religion. Then in Section 2, I briefly consider how the tools and resources of experimental philosophy might be fruitfully applied to a seminal topic within philosophy of religion, namely, the problem of evil. In Section 3, we’ll sketch some broader applications of experimental philosophy of religion. (shrink)

To demonstrate that a fallacy is committed, Block needs to convince us of two things: first, that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is distinct from that of access consciousness, and second, that it picks out a different property from that of access consciousness. I raise doubt about both of these claims, suggesting that the concept of a phenomenal property is the concept of a property to which we have a special sort of access.

First published in 1942, Bradley's Dialectic is a competent survey of Bradley's leading philosophical principles, together with its difficulties. The primary objective is to bring out in somewhat simple terms the essential character of Bradley's dialectic. Here 'dialectic' means a method of elucidation. Professor Church's appraisal of the pertinence of Bradley's dialectic is heightened by his critical discussion of several less elucidated metaphysical features. In this connection, he submits a penetrating criticism of misrepresentations of Bradley's views, especially in the (...) important subject of Relations and its place in the structure and development of Thought. Although brief, Professor Church's analysis is a vital study of crucial themes in philosophy, which will appeal to students of Philosophy and Metaphysics. (shrink)

We can assent to a proposition, build a theory around it, base our actions on it, and affirm its truth—without ever taking it to heart. This frequently happens, for example, to recipients of bad news who figure out what is entailed by the news, make appropriate plans, and pass the news on to others—all without really "taking it in." It happens to those who accept a scientific claim without abandoning their more private views of how things work, and it happens (...) to members of a jury who confidently arrive at a verdict of "guilty" yet remain, on some deeper level, unconvinced. Conversely, people may dismiss their prejudices as mere prejudices while continuing to hold onto them, and a friend may acknowledge a remark to be innocuous yet be offended. Such phenomena are widespread, diverse, and philosophically intriguing. They are not simply cases of weak versus strong belief, or belief that something has a low probability versus a high probability ; nor are they cases of accepting on authority what we only partially understand. Rather, in each case, there is certain lack of depth to one's beliefs. (shrink)

While experimental philosophy has fruitfully applied the tools and resources of psychology and cognitive science to debates within epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics, relatively little work has been done within philosophy of religion. And this isn’t due to a lack of need! Philosophers of religion frequently rely on empirical claims that can be either verified or disproven, but without exploring whether they are. And philosophers of religion frequently appeal to intuitions which may vary wildly according to education level, theological background, etc., (...) without concern for whether or not the psychological mechanisms that underwrite those intuitions are broadly shared or reliable. In this chapter, I explore some of the fruit and possibilities for the emerging field of experimental philosophy of religion. First, in Section 1, I will elucidate some of the historical grounding for experimental philosophy of religion. Then in Section 2, I briefly consider how the tools and resources of experimental philosophy might be fruitfully applied to a seminal topic within philosophy of religion, namely, the problem of evil. In Section 3, we’ll sketch some broader applications of experimental philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Jennifer Church presents a new account of perception, which shows how imagining alternative perspectives and possibilities plays a key role in creating and validating experiences of self-evident objectivity. She explores the nature of moral perception and aesthetic perception, and argues that perception can be both literal and substantive.

First published in 1938, An Essay on Critical Appreciation aims to provide a language suited for the explication on beauty. This explication is not based merely on emotion but is motivated by contemplation and discrimination. By virtue of being rendered in a discourse, an appreciation can claim to be critical or discriminating and 'beauty' can be said to have characteristics. The search of such a language takes the author through the contemplation on the meaning of 'beauty', entertaining contrary views, and (...) reaching at an understanding of the aesthetic situation. This book will be of interest to students of English literature, philosophy and art. (shrink)

Many psychiatric disorders involve problems with the recognition and preservation of personal boundaries. Philosophy can help to clarify what is at stake, both socially and phenomenologically, in drawing such boundaries. In particular, assignments of responsibility and determinations of loss are deeply implicated in the determination of personal boundaries. Understanding these implications can help make sense of the volatile emotions of borderline personality disorder, for example, and it can clarify what is missing from DSM descriptions more generally.

There is an emerging consensus in recent literature that Nietzsche adheres to some form of “naturalism,” that his closest philosophical kin are Hume and Darwin rather than Derrida.1 Despite this consensus, however, scholars disagree as to the relationship between Nietzsche’s naturalism and his ethics.2 The most prominent interpretation is that Nietzsche is an ethical naturalist in the Aristotelian tradition. According to this interpretation, the good life for an individual is derived from natural “type-facts” about him.3 Each individual possesses certain natural (...) interests and capacities in virtue of being a member of a type, such that the satisfaction or fulfillment of these needs or capacities amounts to her.. (shrink)

Virtue in an Age of Identity Politics examines current social justice activism through the lens of Stoic philosophy. While developing a critique of Critical Social Justice, it also explains how Stoicism overlaps with Critical Social Justice in the interest of healing social divisions and promoting honest and nuanced conversations about justice.

R.W. Church was an English churchman and writer. Church was also famous for being the dean of St. Paul's Cathedral in London.Bacon's most famous work is his biography on Francis Bacon, the great English philosopher.

Does intellectual humility preclude the possibility of religious dogmatism and firm religious commitments? Does intellectual humility require religious beliefs to be held with diffidence? What is intellectual humility anyway? There are two things I aim to do in this short article. First, I want to briefly sketch an account of intellectual humility. Second, drawing from such an account, I want to explore whether intellectual humility could be compatible with virtuous religious dogmatism.

I. The algebra of classes.--II. The algebra of propositions. Applications. Numerically definite reasoning.--III-IV. Set Theory.

Liberal approaches to multiculturalism and cultural nationalism have met with severe criticism in recent years. This article makes the case for an alternative, Aristotelian approach developed in the work of the ‘founding father’ of culture, J. G. Herder. According to Herder, culture is worthy of political recognition because it contributes to the realization of our common but contradictory human telos. Only a plurality of cultures, each realizing a unique balance of our contradictory needs, can bring wholeness to our common nature. (...) In conclusion, I argue for the merits of this Aristotelian approach in resolving some recurring problems of multiculturalism. (shrink)

The difference between first and third person information may be thought of as a difference in either informationalcontentor informationalmodality. Each option faces some problems. I try to sort out some of these issues and raise a question about the explanatory force of the notion of a schema.

Conceptual engineering is the method (or methods) via which we can assess and improve our concepts. Can conceptual engineering be usefully employed within analytic theology? Given that analytic theology and analytic philosophy effectively share the same philosophical toolkit then if conceptual engineering works well in philosophy then it ought to work well in analytic theology too. This will be our working hypothesis. To make good on this hypothesis, we first address two challenges. The first challenge makes conceptual engineering look to (...) be too inclusive; the second challenge makes it look to be too revolutionary (for analytic theology). To address these challenges, we propose a refined characterisation of conceptual engineering. We then turn to consider a number of case studies where analytic theology and conceptual engineering may fruitfully cooperate. These are: theological disagreements, inter-faith dialogue, meaning change, celibacy, AI, the name of God, and conceptual genealogy. (shrink)

Urban and agricultural communities are interdependent but often differ on approaches for improving water quality impaired by nutrient runoff waterbodies worldwide. Current water quality governance involves an overlapping array of policy tools implemented by governments, civil society organizations, and corporate supply chains. The choice of regulatory and voluntary tools is likely to influence many dimensions of the relationship between urban and agricultural actors. These relationships then influence future conditions for collective decision-making since many actors participate for multiple years in water (...) quality improvement. In this policy analysis, we draw on our professional experiences and research, as well as academic and practitioner literatures, to investigate how different types of water quality interventions influence urban-agricultural relationships, specifically examining policy tools on a regulatory to voluntary spectrum. Interactions between farmers and other rural agricultural interests on one hand, and urban residents and their stormwater managers and wastewater treatment plants on the other, influence dynamics relevant for water quality improvement. We suggest that the selection of policy tools within complex governance contexts influence urban–agricultural relationships through financial exchange, political coalitions, knowledge exchange, interpersonal relationships, and shared sense of place. Policy tools that provide a means to build relationships and engage with people’s emotions and identities have potential to influence personal and community change and adaptive capacity, while processes such as lawsuits can catalyze structural change. Engaging these relationships is particularly critical given the need to move out of polarized positions to solve collective problems. (shrink)

Rush, Ormond Review of: Leaving Christendom for good: Church-world dialogue in a secular age, by James McEvoy, pp. 189, hardback US$85.00, eBook US$84.99.

Individuals often lie for psychological rewards (e.g., preserving self image and/or protecting others), absent economic rewards. We conducted a laboratory experiment, using a modified dictator game, to identify conditions that entice individuals to lie solely for psychological rewards. We argue that such lies can provide a ready means for individuals to manage others’ impression of them. We investigated the effect of social distance (the perceived familiarity, intimacy, or psychological proximity between two parties) and knowledge of circumstances (whether parties have common (...) or asymmetric information) on the frequency of lying. We found that lying occurs more frequently when social distance is near and that the effect is exacerbated when information is asymmetric. Our theoretical development suggests that, under these conditions, individuals’ need to manage others’ impression is magnified. We discuss the implications of our findings. (shrink)

Hurley’s is a difficult book to work through—partly because of its length and the complexity of its arguments, but also because each of the ten essays of which it is composed has a rather different starting point and focus, and because few of her arguments achieve real closure. Essay 2 discusses competing interpretations of Kant, essay 4 articulates nonconceptual forms of self-consciousness, essay 5 offers fresh interpretations of commissurotomy patients’ behavior, essay 6 develops an objection to Wittgenstein on rule following, (...) essay 8 attacks an alleged assumption of externalism, and chapter 10 explores the possibility of combining a “motor theory” and a “control theory” of perception. This is a very rich brew, and at least half the challenge this book presents consists in discerning its central argument and conclusion with enough precision to bring criticism to bear. (shrink)

In this paper I add credence to Linda Zagzebski's (1994) diagnosis of Gettier problems (and the current trend to abandon the standard analysis) by analyzing the nature of luck. It is widely accepted that the lesson to be learned from Gettier problems is that knowledge is incompatible with luck or at least a certain species thereof. As such, understanding the nature of luck is central to understanding the Gettier problem. Thanks by and large to Duncan Pritchard's seminal work, Epistemic Luck, (...) a great deal of literature has been developed recently concerning the nature of luck and anti-luck epistemology. The literature, however, has yet to explore the very intuitive idea that luck comes in degrees. I propose that once luck is recognized to admit degrees even the slightest non-zero degree (of the relevant sort) precludes knowledge. Connecting this to Zagzebski's thesis, I propose that a given theory of warrant must guarantee truth in order to avoid Gettier counterexamples (or subsequently deny that warrant bears any relationship to the truth whatsoever), simply because a sufficient standard analysis of knowledge cannot allow for knowledge that is even marginally lucky. (shrink)

We critique two popular philosophical definitions of intellectual humility: the “low concern for status” and the “limitations-owning.” accounts. Based upon our analysis, we offer an alternative working definition of intellectual humility: the virtue of accurately tracking what one could non-culpably take to be the positive epistemic status of one’s own beliefs. We regard this view of intellectual humility both as a virtuous mean between intellectual arrogance and diffidence and as having advantages over other recent conceptions of intellectual humility. After defending (...) this view, we sketch remaining questions and issues that may bear upon the psychological treatment of intellectual humility such as whether evidence will help determine how this construct relates to general social humility on the one hand, and intellectual traits such as open-mindedness, curiosity, and honesty on the other. (shrink)

This paper describes a community event organized in response to the appropriation and overreliance on the psychiatric patient “personal story” within mental health organizations. The sharing of experiences through stories by individuals who self-identify as having “lived experience” has been central to the history of organizing for change in and outside of the psychiatric system. However, in the last decade, personal stories have increasingly been used by the psychiatric system to bolster research, education, and fundraising interests. We explore how personal (...) stories from consumer/survivors have been harnessed by mental health organizations to further their interests and in so doing have shifted these narrations from “agents of change” towards one of “disability tourism” or “patient porn.” We mark the ethical dilemmas of narrative cooptation and consumption, and query how stories of resistance can be reclaimed not as personal recovery narratives but rather as a tool for socio-political change. (shrink)

Background: Midwives are required to make ethical decisions with the support of respective codes of professional ethics which provide a framework for decision making in clinical practice. While each midwife should be ethically aware and sensitive to the ever-changing issues within reproduction, few empirical studies have examined the views of student midwives in relation to reproductive ethical dilemmas. Objective: The aim of this study was to explore midwifery students’ reactions to a number of ethical dilemmas relating to women’s experiences of (...) reproductive decision making. Design: A series of focus groups were conducted with midwifery students who were asked to discuss five culturally significant scenarios including issues of knowledge acquisition regarding methods of family planning, removal or insertion of an intrauterine device, and abortion. Setting: A University in Turkey was the setting for this study. Participants: Purposeful sampling was adopted which resulted in five focus groups with a total of 57 midwifery students. Ethical considerations: The study was reviewed and granted formal ethical approval by an ethical committee at the Faculty of Health Science in Atatürk University. The head of the Faculty of Health Science approved the investigation. The participants received both oral and written information about the study and they gave their consent. Results: Five themes were identified from the analysis of the focus group data related to all five scenarios. These themes were ‘the right to information’, ‘choice and protection’, ‘parental rights and welfare of the women’, ‘make a decision’ and ‘women rights and sexual abuse’. Conclusion: This study has shown that while students respected women’s choice, they also expressed great ambivalence in some situations when personal values conflict with dominant societal beliefs and professional ethics. A focus on ethics education to include human rights is suggested as a means to enable students to explore their own social-value judgements, and as a means to limit the possible development of ethical confusion and moral distress. (shrink)

In this chapter: I distinguish the existential problem of divine hiddenness from the evidential problem of divine hiddenness. The former being primarily concerned with the apparent hiddenness of a personal God in the lives of believers amidst terrible suffering. The latter being primarily concerned with the apparent hiddenness of God being evidence against God’s existence. In the first section, I highlight the basic contours of the evidential problem of divine hiddenness, and suggested that the argument rests on two important assumptions: (...) the perfectly loving assumption and the no-fault assumption. In the second section, a few possible responses to the evidential problem of divine hiddenness were considered, which center on rejecting either the perfectly loving assumption or the no-fault assumption. (shrink)

In this short paper, I highlight two potential hurdles for teams of researchers conducting interdisciplinary research: “the translation problem” and the “academic isolation” problem. Along the way, I’ll note some ways those hurdles were overcome within the context of the “Science of Intellectual Humility” project.

There is considerable evidence that animals can time multiple intervals that occur separately or concurrently. Such simultaneous temporal processing occurs both in temporal discrimination procedures and in classical conditioning procedures. The first part of the chapter will consist of the review of the evidence for simultaneous temporal processing, and the conditions under which the different intervals have influences on each other. The second part of the chapter will be a brief description of two timing theories: Scalar Timing Theory and a (...) Packet Theory of Timing. Scalar Timing Theory consists of a pacemaker-switch-accumulator system that serves as a clock, a memory that consists of examples of previously reinforced intervals, and a decision process that involves a comparison of ratios to a criterion; the Packet Theory of Timing consists of a conditional expected time function that serves as a clock, a memory that consists of weighted sums of these values, and a probabilistic decision process that produces packets of responses. Both of these theories will be applied to an example of simultaneous temporal processing by rats, and will serve as the basis for some general comments about the basis for selecting and evaluating quantitative theories of timing. (shrink)

The environment, particularly, land and water, play a powerful role in sustaining and supporting American Indian and Alaska Native communities in the United States. Not only is water essential to life and considered — by some Tribes — a sacred food in and of itself, but environmental water resources are necessary to maintain habitat for hunting and fishing. Many American Indian and Alaska Native communities incorporate locally caught traditional subsistence foods into their diets, and the loss of access to subsistence (...) foods represents a risk factor for food security and nutrition status in indigenous populations. Negative health outcomes, including obesity, diabetes and cancer, have accompanied declines in traditional food use in indigenous communities throughout the United States. (shrink)

Moral diversity occasions conflicts which ecclesial institutions need or simply choose to address, yet there is dearth of scholarship on Catholic Church ethics and on moral diversity. When confronting moral diversity, the institutional Catholic Church tends to prioritize concerns about cooperation with evil, moral confusion, and scandal. These concerns can express genuine love for neighbors, but they can also forego opportunities for deeper engagement, witness, and formation. An ethics of the institutional Church needs to work through such (...) distinctions, connect them to institutional policies, positions, and procedures, and foster moral maturity, prudence, and solidarity in our ecclesial communities and beyond. (shrink)

There is little information about the content of ethics consultations in pediatrics. We sought to describe the reasons for consultation and ethical principles addressed during EC in pediatrics through retrospective review and directed content analysis of EC records at St. Jude Children's Research Hospital. Patient-based EC were highly complex and often involved evaluation of parental decision making, particularly consideration of the risks and benefits of a proposed medical intervention, and the physician's fiduciary responsibility to the patient. Nonpatient consultations provided guidance (...) in the development of institutional policies that would broadly affect patients and families. This is one of the few existing reviews of the content of pediatric EC and indicates that the distribution of ethical issues and reasons for moral distress are different than with adults. Pediatric EC often facilitates complex decision making among multiple stakeholders, and further prospective research is need.. (shrink)

Pilcher, Carmel Review(s) of: Aboriginal church paintings: Reflecting on our faith, by Eugene Stockton Editor with Terence O'Donnell (Lawson: Blue Mountain Education and Research Trust Publishers, 2010), pp.45, $20.00.

Lonergan writes both of a foundation for human knowing as well as of a functional specialty he termed ‘foundations’. Neither of these is the same as ‘foundation’ as the term is used by nonfoundationalists. Lack of clarity and differentiation regarding what is meant by ‘foundationalism’ sometimes informs the perception that Lonergan is a foundationalist. The burden of this essay is to show that Lonergan's philosophical and theological thought, as well as his use of the term ‘foundations’, fall awkwardly, if at (...) all, under anti-foundationalist strictures. There is a need to clarify and differentiate a range of terms and concepts in this regard. Lonergan shares with anti-foundationalists the rejection of ocular metaphors and other naïve approaches to human knowing. Lonergan's own search for ‘foundations’, which I argue is critical for a world Church consciousness and meets the Rahner-test for a world Church, is part of an overall project to situate knowing within identifiable, recurring patterns in the operations of human consciousness. (shrink)