C.S. Peirce, the American philosopher and a principal figure in the development of the modern study of semiotics, struggled, mostly during his later years, to work out a systematic method for classifying sciences. By doing this, he hoped to define more clearly the various tasks of these sciences by showing how their individual effects are interrelated and how these effects, considered in their interrelations, establish pragmatic meanings for each individual science. Much of his work was centered on the (...) meaning and function of logic in relation to other areas of human knowledge. By rightly defining the work of logic, Peirce argued, the work of the other sciences could be pursued with more rigorous reasoning. Beverley Kent closely examines the published and unpublished writings of Peirce and carefully attends to the chronological development of his systems of classification; she thereby shows for the first time in the scholarly literature how seeming contradictions in Peirce's evolving classification are really part of an increasingly clear position. Logic, Peirce came to understand, is actually dependent on ethics and aesthetics for its principles. Kent shows how Peirce's working out of the classification of logic in relation to other sciences is a clue to the significant differences between his early and late philosophy and, perhaps even more important, to a reading of his more general claims for a philosophy of "pragmaticism." This work will be of interest to readers of Peirce and American philosophy, to historians of logic and semiotics, and to those more generally interested in the history of systems of knowledge-classification. (shrink)

The classification of the sciences is one of the most discussed and analysed aspects of Peirce’s corpus of work. I propose that Peirce’s attempt at systematising the sciences is characterised by a distinctive historicity, which I construe in two complementary senses. First, I investigate Peirce’s classification as part of a broader nineteenth-century move toward classifying the sciences, a move that was at the same time motivated by social and epistemological goals. I claim that this re-contextualisation (...) adds an entirely new layer to the otherwise distinctively internalist readings of Peirce’s classification. I then look at how Peirce’s scheme, especially in the form it displayed in the early 1890s, relates to his own historical writings, particularly his history of science. Looking at Peirce as a historical actor in his own right through the lens of his classification, I claim, is indispensable to understand the contemporary relevance of his contributions to the history and historiography of the sciences. (shrink)

Classification in eighteenth-century natural history was marked by a battle of systems. The Linnaean approach to classification was severely criticized by those naturalists who aspired to a truly natural system. But how to make oneself nature''s spokesman? In this article I seek to answer that question using the approach of the French anthropologist of science Bruno Latour in a discussion of the work of the French naturalists Buffon and Cuvier in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. These (...) naturalists followed very different strategies in creating and defending of what they believed to be a natural classification in zoology. Buffon failed, whereas Cuvier''s work appeared to be very successful. My argument will be that, to explain Buffon''s failure and Cuvier''s success, we should not focus on the epistemological or theoretical concerns and justifications of these naturalists, but on the concrete and heterogeneous means or tools through which animals were mobilized, stabilized and combined into ever more comprehensive systems of classification. (shrink)

Biogeography is a multidisciplinary field with multiple origins in 19th century taxonomic practice. The Origins of Biogeography presents a revised history of early biogeography and investigates the split in taxonomic practice, between the classification of taxa and the classification of vegetation. This book moves beyond the traditional belief that biogeography is born from a synthesis of Darwin and Wallace and focuses on the important pioneering work of earlier practitioners such as Zimmermann, Stromeyer, de Candolle and Humboldt. Tracing (...) the academic history of biogeography over the decades and centuries, this book recounts the early schisms in phyto and zoogeography, the shedding of its bonds to taxonomy, its adoption of an ecological framework, and its beginnings at the dawn of the 20th century. This book assesses the contributions of key figures such as Zimmermann, Humboldt and Wallace, and reminds us of the forgotten influence of plant and animal geographers including Stromeyer, Prichard and de Candolle, whose early attempts at classifying animal and plant geography would inform later progress. The Origins of Biogeography is a science historiography aimed at biogeographers, who have little access to a detailed history of the practices of early plant and animal geographers. This book will also reveal how biological classification has shaped 18th and 19th century plant and animal geography and why it is relevant to the 21st biogeographer. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

I discuss two questions: (1) would Duhem have accepted the thesis of the continuity of scientific methodology? and (2) to what extent is the Oxford tradition of classification/subalternation of sciences continuous with early modern science? I argue that Duhem would have been surprised by the claim that scientific methodology is continuous; he expected at best only a continuity of physical theories, which he was trying to isolate from the perpetual fluctuations of methods and metaphysics. I also argue (...) that the evidence does not support the conclusion that early modern doctrines about mathematics and physics are continuous with the subalternation of sciences from Grosseteste, Bacon, and the theologians of fourteenth-century Oxford. The official and dominant context for early modern scientific methodology seems to have been progressive Thomism, and early modern thinkers seem to have pitted themselves against it. (shrink)

In this article, the meaning of concept of sharʿī science gained in the conception of education, which was established in Islamic civilization, was studied. The main problem of the research is to evaluate the idea of education in Islamic Civilization, which is closely related to the concept of sharʿī science, with a false perception that it consists entirely of religious education. The beginning of Islamic Civilization is traced back to descent of the Qur'an. The conception of education that started to (...) emerge after this period is based on the understanding of the Qur'an and hadiths at first. In later times, a wide variety of fields, such as language, literature, logic, wisdom, riyāzat, nature, and astronomy, have been included in the concept of education to encompass the whole existence of the entity. In the following centuries, these fields, which were included in the course curriculum of the madrasahs, were examined in detail in the works of classification of sciences. Therefore, the false perception needs to be reconsidered. For this reason, the article focuses on how the concept of sharʿī science is defined. Historical data analysis method was used to solve the problem. The claim of the article is that the concept of shar′i science has wide perspective to cover the world of meaning, mind and essence of man. As a result, this article, it was determined that the concept of sharʿī science has a meaning to cover the majority of information fields that are subject to instruction in our educational conception.Summary: The formation of the conception of education in Islamic civilization has emerged in the long term through a scientific process. During this time, a rich curriculum on the concept of education was shaped. The sciences that form the curriculum have been diversified in later periods compared to the early periods of Islam. With the advent of the different sciences, which provided this diversification and which were not at first, all the existing sciences were classified according to different perspectives by the ulama (muslim scholars). In the classifications, which have important contributions to the conception of education, the sciences were tried to be introduced and their position in the education life was tried to be explained. The sciences classified have not been dealt with against each other but rather to complement each other in different ways. The distinction of sciences in classification; different approaches such as linguistically, religious, secular, mental, transportation, philosophical and sharʿī have been developed.The concept of sharʿī science, which can be expressed as a general definition of the sciences, is given in almost all of the works related to the classification of sciences, even under the name or different titles. When we look at the classification, it is seen that sharʿī sciences are handled in four different approaches. As the first approach, the sharʿī sciences are among the main elements of main division in the classification. Here, the sharʿī sciences, in general, with the linguistic sciences and mental sciences were included in the top title. In the second approach, there are works in their classification that do not include the sharʿī sciences and the distinction between it. In addition, these works collect the sciences within this scope under other scientific compositions or other names. In the third approach, among the works that give information about the general of the sciences, there are those who mentioned all together without classifying these sciences and others. In the last approach, the sharʿī sciences are seen as the upper description of the knowledge fields that are included in the teaching, which covers the majority of the other sciences except for the linguistic sciences.The approaches presented in the classification of sciences indicate the diversity of the issue. In order to have better understanding of the issue, it is useful to look closely at the meaning of the concept of sharʿī sciences. At this point, three definitions of 2nd, 4th and 12th centuries are given respectively. Firstly, for Jābir b. Hayyān sharʿī science is the most useful politics in terms of religion and the world, because it contains the benefits of the world's interests after death.Secondly, al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111) describes the sharʿī science as the knowledge learned from Şārī ʿ and prophets, but not by the experience and hearing. According to this, the sharʿī science is defined as the knowledge of the sunnah that only gives information about revelation. The information fields outside this definition are also considered as the sciences, which are instrumental in reaching to sharʿī science.The perspective of the third definition of sharʿī science is given by Saçaklızāde (d. 1145/1732). He lists the three definitions made before the time of his life from the specific (hās) to the general (ām). Saçaklızāde gave the aforementioned definition of al-Ghazali in the first sense of the concept of sharʿī science. He points out that the meaning given here is allocated. The second definition belongs to Molla Husraw (d. 885/1480). According to him, the sharʿī science is the sciences that can be reached through the sciences of the Şārīʿ. In other words, it is the sciences that are not used except for obtaining the sciences obtained from Şārīʿ itself. This meaning is a bit more extensive since there are no records as described in al-Ghazali. This definition is also included in the sciences benefited from it. Although it is not the first, there is usūl-i fiqh (Islamic legal theory) within this meaning.In the third definition, sharʿī science is the sciences that form the basis for things arising from Şārīʿ or originating from Şārīʿ. This definition belongs to Ibn Hajar el-Haytamī. He did not consider the partial allocation of the second meaning as given above, and included all the instrument sciences in the definition of sharʿī science. Based on the definitions he gave, three sharʿī science approaches made before the time he lived were listed from specific to general. Thus, in a sense, he depicts the general shape of the sharʿī science perspective. With the approach to generalization, we can say that a sharʿī science perspective that encompasses the majority of the fields involved in education is developing. In the third meaning of sharʿī science, it is seen that the majority of the fields of knowledge in education and training are gathered under one roof. The most important factor gathering the sciences together is the effort to understand the purpose of Şārīʿ, who owns the whole area of existence. The fields of knowledge and sciences needed to achieve this aim can be included in the definition of sharʿī science. The effort to understand the purpose of Şārīʿ is also at the center of the idea of Islamic education. Since there are various dimensions of being, each step taken to understand and learn them is directed in a way to Şārīʿ itself. Whether it is language and literary sciences or other sciences, such as mathematics, physics and philosophies, the aim is to recognize and understand Şārīʿ for the collection of things that fall within the scope of all educational activities. With sharʿī science approach, teaching the whole of the area of existence owned by Allah is possible within the concept of education. In the works written for the education curriculum, it is seen that the perspective covering the majority of the sciences in the definition of third sharʿī science is preserved. First of all, the meaning integrity of the sharʿī science concept has been determined. In the definitions of three different periods given here, it is seen that the approach to the sciences, which are the subject of instruction in education is not exclusive but inclusive. Especially because of the width in the third sense, the majority of the instrument sciences and mental science fields in the curriculum are included in the definition of sharʿī science. (shrink)

I discuss two questions: (1) would Duhem have accepted the thesis of the continuity of scientific methodology? and (2) to what extent is the Oxford tradition of classification/subalternation of sciences continuous with early modern science? I argue that Duhem would have been surprised by the claim that scientific methodology is continuous; he expected at best only a continuity of physical theories, which he was trying to isolate from the perpetual fluctuations of methods and metaphysics. I also argue (...) that the evidence does not support the conclusion that early modern doctrines about mathematics and physics are continuous with the subalternation of sciences from Grosseteste, Bacon, and the theologians of fourteenth-century Oxford. The official and dominant context for early modern scientific methodology seems to have been progressive Thomism, and early modern thinkers seem to have pitted themselves against it. (shrink)

Failings of a categorical systemFor decades, standardized classification systems have attempted to define psychiatric disorders in our mental health care system, with the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.; DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association (APA), 2013) and International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems 10th revision (ICD-10; World Health Organization, 2010) being internationally best-known. One of the major advantages of the DSM must be that it has seriously diminished the international linguistic confusion regarding psychiatric (...) disorders. Since its introduction, it contributed extensively towards one common international language for defining and conceptualizing psychiatric disorders. Strikingly, within the field of psychological testing a similar step forward seems to have not yet been taken. At present, there exists no international standard for the use of psychological tests that takes the definition of a specific symptom as listed in DSM-5 as its starting point, and reliably and validly measures this symptom. Rather, the majority of tests are measuring constructs consisting of a multitude of symptoms. For example, the Beck’s Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 1996) measures core symptoms of depression summing up to a depression score. Accordingly, we believe it is time for a change. The diagnostics of psychiatric disorders, where disorders are defined as nosological units with a single cause, a single organic substrate, and a single time course, has been problematic for centuries. The field of psychiatry has always been ambivalent about its desire to follow a medical model (Blaney, 2015), but afflicted due to its definitions of pathology. The definition of a psychiatric disorder in DSM-5 offers little room for a clear cut pathogenesis and harsh demarcation of syndromes. This is reflected in the DSM-5, where it states: “A mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by clinically significant disturbance in an individual’s cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or developmental processes underlying mental functioning” (APA, 2013, p.20). An unfortunate and recognized consequence of this definition within the current system is that many symptoms overlap within categories of psychiatric disorders and patients end up diagnosed with many co-morbid disorders.Two fundamental problemsRegardless of new attempts to improve the diagnostics of psychiatric disorders, the DSM-5 represents the status quo. Consequently, the distinction between diagnosis and classification remains substantial and more than a discussion on semantics. We identify two fundamental problems within the current framework. Generally, a psychiatric diagnosis is considered to be descriptive (Hengeveld and Schudel, 2003). The clinician will describe a syndrome (its nature, timespan, and severity) within the framework of a disorder, and often include a differential diagnosis, predisposing protective or vulnerability factors, and provoking or maintaining factors. Within the DSM-5 framework, a similar ‘approach to clinical case formulation’ is taken (APA, 2013, p. 19). Evidently, a descriptive diagnosis has a hypothetical character. It consists of the clinician’s hypothesis and is based on his or hers professional considerations according to the abovementioned factors. Once the clinician has formulated a descriptive diagnosis, it is then complementary ‘translated’ into a DSM-5 classification. Herein lies the problem. For the layman, the existence of this distinction between diagnosis and classification is usually unknown. Preceding treatment, the clinician will give the client a classification of the existing psychiatric problems and the client may attribute more meaning to it than appropriate, thereby fostering the risk of reification. Second, the DSM-5 is a categorical system. Thus, individual disorders are regarded as discrete units – ‘you either have it, or you don’t’. DSM-5 states about this: “(…) scientific evidence places many, if not most, disorders on a spectrum with closely related disorders that have shared symptoms, shared genetic and environmental risk factors (…)”. And “(…) we have come to recognize that the boundaries between disorders are more porous than originally perceived.” (APA, 2013, p. 6). This leads to a fundamental problem. Because the overwhelming majority of psychiatric disorders examined thus far using taxometric methods appear to be dimensional in nature (Haslam, 2003; Widiger and Samuel, 2005), consequently all of their categorizations become artificial and debatable. Even though DSM-5 took a modest step towards a more dimensional approach, its core remains categorical. To illustrate, consider the Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD). This classification consists of nine diagnostic criteria of which a minimum of five need to be present for the diagnosis of BPD. A simple numerical combination algorithm leads to a staggering number of 256 distinct presentations of BPD (Albion et al., 2013). Due to this chameleon-like nature, the disorder’s diagnostic validity becomes questionable. Strikingly, this number is relatively small when compared to other conditions, e.g., there are 636,120 ways to have posttraumatic stress disorder (Galatzer-Levy and Bryant, 2013).DSM-5 does propose an alternative model for personality disorders based on personality functioning and traits (APA, 2013, p. 761), as a possible answer to the problem that most patients fit with multiple co-morbid personality disorders or to the category of personality disorder not otherwise specified. In November 2012, the chair committee of APA decided to move this alternative model to section III of DSM-5 and to sustain the categorical system in section II. A potential solutionDSM-5 and its predecessors have brought about an invaluable improvement regarding the formulation of a common international language for psychiatric disorders. However, the individual disorders fit poorly with its starting point of discrete units and strict boundaries. Van Os (2014) has argued for a better balance between the categorical and personalized aspects of psychiatric disorders. We argue for a two-step approach.Particularly due to the ‘weak boundaries’ between disorders, it might be beneficial to limit ourselves by merely categorizing clients into the main categories of the DSM-5 according to their most prominent symptoms (Van Os, 2014), i.e. their main complaint. In other words, clinicians could first ask themselves whether the symptomatology is concerning a neurodevelopmental disorder, or a bipolar and related disorder, or a depressive disorder, and so on. It will drastically reduce the over 400 classifications in DSM-5 down to 20 categories. Van Os (2014) even argues to combine some of the main categories, reducing this number even further to 15 categories. The advantages of reducing the over 400 classifications are fivefold: 1) a syndrome, being an aggregation of symptoms, creates a false relation between symptoms that are that are already heterogeneous themselves; 2) 15 broad categories are functional: it results into a very heterogeneous group of clients within a category and thus prevents stereotypes and invites further personalizing of complaints; and 3) a dimensional measure of a symptom rather than a syndrome will correspond better with the client regardless of it not providing the complete picture. Focusing on the main complaint will indicate where there is an immediate need for care (Van Os, 2014); 4) it will allow clinicians to recognise subthreshold conditions more easily (Magruder and Calderone, 2000); and 5) it might facilitate the development of clear demarcations between normal and abnormal functioning (Kessler, 2002; Widiger and Samuel, 2005). Please, see also Table 1.This also fits well within scientific advances, as thus far strongest evidence has been found for a distinction between internalizing and externalizing disorders, even superseding these 15 main categories (DSM-5; APA, 2013, p.13, but see Weiss et al., 1998). The second step would concern the personalized aspect, which we argue to define on a level of core symptoms of the specific main category, to be agreed upon later. To assess these core symptoms, the field of psychological testing could develop an internationally applicable instrument to reliably and validly measure each (core) symptom on a dimensional scale. Many of these instruments are readily available and have proven its psychometric properties within scientific research. Elements from these instruments could be easily transformed to work within the new system. Within the field of psychology, this approach could aid development of a common international language to define symptoms, analogous to the field of psychiatry. Importantly, current psychological testing mainly implies the use of self-report measures. This leads to an abundance of auto-amnestic information. To increase the reliability and validity of psychological tests to assess DSM-5 symptoms, it may be important to add two additional information resources. This would entail psychological tests where a next of kin answers questions about the symptom of the client, and psychological tests that include the clinicians’ judgment, such as structured clinician-based interviews. Conversely, we also need to acknowledge the well-known limitations of clinical judgment (e.g., Faust, 1986; Garb, 1998). Advantages of a new frameworkThe changes we suggest have big implications and are not easily implemented in the current framework. Clients may prefer the comfort of a single clear label, similar to what they are used to in other areas of medicine. Health insurance providers and policy makers may argue for single labels as well. Therefore, it would require a lot of explanation from our clinicians to promote a change. Our suggestions for broader categories may not disambiguate the current situation better than the existing approach, but it will promote personalisation of health care. Difficulties in diagnostic reliability will remain in disorders that fall on the boundaries of the taxons, e.g., schizoaffective disorder versus bipolar disorder with psychotic characteristics, which may benefit from further study. There are also some politically tinged questions to keep in mind: How will we finance our health care, and how will we ensure a gradual transition from the current financing system, including clients who already have their labels? What about visitations from insurers and health inspection? How can they control for a good standard of quality in health care when considering the increasing heterogeneity? Nevertheless, we argue that the benefits outweigh the disadvantages. We will see a shift from a categorical to a personalized approach, which will lead to less (self) stigmatizing, less estrangement, and it will challenge reification thinking. DSM-V states that “a reformulation of research goals should also keep DSM-5 central to the development of dimensional approaches to diagnosis that will likely supplement or supersede current categorical approaches to diagnosis in coming years” (APA, 2013, p. 13). Our proposition for psychological testing on symptom level could contribute to this development. Furthermore, this new approach will do more justice to the heterogeneity of symptoms within and outside of classification categories, see also Table 1. Moreover, in this new approach we join forces of expert knowledge from the fields of psychiatry and psychological science. Finally, it offers new and potentially better opportunities to map health care needs. This in turn will lead to a better interface for allocation of appropriate treatment. It will present a clearer picture of when preventative care is preferred over treatment and vice versa. Importantly, health care needs will be more closely attuned to the ‘own story’ of the client.We argue for the national and international psychological associations in Europe and the United States of America to support the idea of a collective approach to develop an internationally standardized psychological testing battery to reliably assess all the core symptoms of the main categories in DSM-5. (shrink)

Otto Neurath’s early work on the classification of systems of hypotheses in optics provided some of the key insights of Neurath’s later philosophy of science. The chapter investigates how Neurath developed his theory of theory-classification in response to inconsistencies he stumbled upon while studying the historical theories. Neurath’s empiricism and thoroughgoing fallibilism informed his mapping of the group of theories, locating “elementary notions” of theories and taking into account the “blurred margins” of theories. To replace false dichotomies (...) the project provided a finer-grained analysis of theories and could be utilized to locate unconceived alternatives of a domain. The first sections discuss the close links between Neurath’s optical essays, his notion of an “auxiliary motive,” and his attack on pseudorationalism in the “Lost Wanderers of Descartes” paper. The last sections provide a comparison of the two essays, with an extended table of the elementary notions Neurath listed, and discuss Neurath’s two-tier methodology for historical reconstruction. (shrink)

We may now ask the question: In what historical perspective should we place the work of Richard Goldschmidt? There is no doubt that in the period 1910–1950 Goldschmidt was an important and prolific figure in the history of biology in general, and of genetics in particular. His textbook on physiological genetics, published in 1938, was an amazing compendium of ideas put forward in the previous half-century about how genes influence physiology and development. His earlier studies on the genetic and geographic (...) distribution of the various species and races of Lymantria contributed soundly to an understanding of the inheritance and development of sex, as well as the genetics of speciation. He was a curious mixture of the experimentalist, empiricist, and theorizer, who could grasp both the large and the small at once and wrap them into the same integrated and coherent package.In insisting on trying to relate genetics to development, Goldschmidt was continually forced to speculate and to forsake experimental fact for generalized theory. In refusing to reconcile a physiological and developmental conception with a corpuscular theory of the gene, he forced himself to substitute for a large body of experimentally verified evidence, vague and general speculations which did not lead in any precise direction. L. C. Dunn summarizes succinctly the effect of Goldschmidt's thinking on the development of genetic theory: Although Goldschmidt's ideas had a considerable influence in directing attention to the developmental processes intervening between genes and characters, they did not lead to the establishment of a general theory of development in genetical terms. In fact, at the end of the period, as signalized by Goldschmidt's book of 1938 [Physiological Gentics] doubt remained whether there was a field with a defined problem which could be identified as developmental genetics.Yet the frequency with which Goldschmidt is cited by later writers suggests that there is a more positive side to his contribution than this. The early Mendelians had recognized the genic constitution of organisms and the Drosophila workers had uncovered in detail the chromosomal mechanism of heredity. These great discoveries were of classical character, solidly based on a multitude of well established facts. By themselves, however, they would not have been sufficient to place genetics in the central position within biology which it was to assume. Beyond the “static” analysis of gene transmission an insight was needed into the dynamic role of genes in cellular physiology, biochemistry, and development. Goldschmidt recognized this aspect and outlined in brilliant generalizations a physiological theory of genetics. Necessarily the prophetic nature of this achievement — romantic in the sense of Ostwald's classification of great scientists and their discoveries — transcended its factual basis. It was the audacity of the theoretician unimpeded by the still scanty data which gave a new focus to biological thought.Some have called Goldschmidt an “obstructionist” in the history of genetics—one whose efforts were largely directed toward useless and continual criticism — challenge for the sake of challenge. As this line of argument goes, time wasted answering Goldschmidt's poorly conceived criticisms could have been better used to pursue new lines of thought within the classical gene theory. Sometimes historians are upbraided for studying the work of such “obstructionists,” or even the work of those whose ideas have later proved to be inadequate. This argument misses the point of history and the lessons which it can teach. Perhaps Goldschmidt did take the time of a number of the classical geneticists who tried to answer his objections to the gene theory; and perhaps many of his own ideas about genes were, by today's view, “wrong.” These are always easier judgments to make by hindsight than at the moment. But that is not the point. Goldschmidt had a considerable influence on his contemporaries, and to dismiss him as an obstructionist because his opponents later proved to be more nearly right, distorts history and obscures significant questions which we might well be asking. It might be valuable to know why Goldschmidt felt compelled to be an iconoclast —and how that impulse, psychological in orgin, led him to overlook critical items of evidence which his opponents considered more carefully. It might also be valuable to try and understand how a contemporary of Goldschmidt or. Morgan really viewed the gene theory — what were its strong and weak point? Such questions are not readily answered by studying the work of only those men who were correct by later standards.Answers to some of the above questions can be gleaned from this study of Goldschmidt — though the first, and most psychologically oriented, question is largely untouched here.On the one hand, Goldschmidt forced classical geneticists to reexamine the foundation of their ideas about the nature, inviolability, and even physical dimensions of genes. He also kept alive the very real problems of gene physiology and its relations to development — a relationship that was given less attention by the Drosophila school in their pursuit of the transmission process. On a broader level he emphasized to the biological community a principle that was in danger of being lost in the enthusiasm surrounding the expansion of the Mendelian-chromosome theory. The point was that all theories in science are transient, logical constructs which should not be held as sacred. Time and again, as the history of science has shown, theories become rigid structures which retard new modes of thought. From Goldschmidt's perspective, the gene theory was in danger of performing just that function, for it was preventing workers from viewing the gene in a functional as well as a structural light.On the other hand, examining the work of critics (or even of outright “obstructionists”) gives the historian an opportunity to observe how the more established community of scholars at some point in time reacts to challenges of its cherished ideas. The fact that many workers in his own day (such as Beadle, Luria, Delbruck, Sturtevant, Bridges, and others), as well as most geneticists today, saw Goldschmidt as having been largely “obstructionist” is useful historical (and/or sociological) data. Clearly, as this paper has tried to show, Goldschmidt's ideas were not all obstructionist, and his viewpoint that genes must be considered functionally was one which was clearly valid, premature as it may have been from an experimental and technique point of view. Perhaps Goldschmidt's major fault was that he developed alternative theories which were not easily testable. Nonetheless, his challenge to a fundamental and established idea brought forth a reaction from many members of the genetic community which indicates how unwilling they were to reconsider the formalized theory on which their work was based. While many of Goldschmidt's criticisms — and particularly his way of making them — arose out of his own idiosyncrasies, they were also a product of his times. His view of the nature of theory-construction, and his rejection of old-style reductionism and mechanism, were part of a growing awareness within the world scientific community that explanations based on reducing complex phenomena to ultimate particles or units were clearly inadequate. The success of the Mendelian-chromosome theory had obscured that fact for many geneticists, but to Goldschmidt it was a point that could not be allowed to pass unnoticed. (shrink)

80 titles published between 1965 and 1996 in multiple languages attest to an increase in scholarly interest in the history of systematic biology, both among scientific practitioners and also among historians and philosophers of science. Topics studied have included the early history of the field (Ray, Linnaeus, Buffon), the influence of essentialism on systematics, the history of systematic diagrams, the development of cladistic analysis, the nature of species, and the growth of phylogenetic thinking.

The sociological study of knowledge infrastructures and classification has traditionally focused on the politics and practices of classifying things or people. However, actors’ work to escape dominant infrastructures and pre-established classification systems has received little attention. In response to this, this article argues that it is crucial to analyze, not only the practices and politics of classification, but also actors’work to escape dominant classification systems. The article has two aims: First, to make a theoretical contribution to (...) the study of classification by proposing to pay analytical attention to practices of escaping classification, what the article dubsclassification egress. This concept directs our attention not only to the practices and politics of classifying things, but also to how actors work to escape orresist classification systemsin practice. Second, the article aims to increase our understanding of the history of quantified and statistical health surveillance. In this, the article investigates how actors in health surveillance assembled a knowledge infrastructure for surveilling, quantifying, and detecting unknown patterns of congenital malformations in the wake of the thalidomide disaster in the early 1960s. The empirical account centers on the actors’ work to detect congenital malformations and escape the dominant nosological classification of diseases, the International Classification of Diseases (ICD), by replacing it with a procedural standard for reporting of symptoms. Thus, the article investigates how actors deal with the tension between the-already-known-and-classified and the unknown-unclassified-phenomenon in health surveillance practice. (shrink)

Islamic scholars, who encountered works on the classification of sciences together with their translation activities, formed their own classification traditions by classifying the sciences from different perspective. These classifications, which position the sciences by considering the connection between reason and revelation, and pointing to the hierarchy and relationship between the sciences, also reflect the understanding of science on which they are based. In this context, we can talk about two different classification traditions (...) put forward by Islamic philosophers on the one hand and Islamic scholars on the other. At this point, Tashkoprīzāda (d. 958/1561), one of the 16th century Ottoman scholars, created an original classification of sciences that influenced the future by benefiting from both traditions. Tashkoprīzāda, who sees the classification of sciences as a branch of science at the same time, has written four valuable books in this field, especially his book called Miftāhu’s-sa‘āda. These works contain rich information about the history of sciences as well as the classification of sciences. He determined the sciences of fiqh and usūl al-fiqh as a sub-branch of shar‘ī sciences and gave both historical and current information about these sciences by focusing on the works of influential scholars. Tashkoprīzāda, who is followed Hanafi sect and saw the Hanafi school as the most virtuous one, handled the fiqh section by putting the Hanafi school in the center. One of the remarkable points is that Tashkoprīzāda completed the part in which he dealt with the historical process of Hanafi fiqh with two great scholars, such as Mewlānā Calāleddīn al-Konewī (v. 672/1273) and Sheikh Badraddin as-Simāwī (v. 823/1420), who stood out with their Sufism. It is also important in terms of showing the mystic environment in which Tashkoprīzāda was influenced and his approach to the relationship between tasawwuf and fiqh. Another point that makes Tashkoprīzāda’s works stand out in terms of the history of sciences is that he mentions famous and acceptable works by referring to the curriculum of his period and surroundings. Thus, Tashkoprīzāda reveals the classification of sciences as a whole with its history, hierarchy and curriculum. (shrink)

We analyze the relationship between evolutionary theory and classification of higher taxa in the work of three ichthyologists: Albert C.L.G. Günther (1830–1914), Edward Drinker Cope (1840–1897), and Theodore Gill (1837–1914). The progress of ichthyology in the early years following the Origin has received little attention from historians, and offers an opportunity to further evaluate the extent to which evolutionary theorizing influenced published views on systematic methodology. These three ichthyologists held radically different theoretical views. The apparent commensurability of claims (...) about relationships among groups of fishes belies differences in what the relationships actually were supposed to be. As well, interpreting classification as genealogical did not lead to agreement about taxonomic methodology; instead, applying evolutionary theory raised new axes of disagreement. (shrink)

This dissertation is a contribution to the contemporary field of phenomenological psychopathology, or the phenomenological study of psychiatric disorders. The work proceeds with two major aims. The first is to show how a phenomenological approach can clarify and illuminate the nature of psychopathology—specifically those conditions typically labeled as major depressive disorder and bipolar disorder. The second is to show how engaging with psychopathological conditions can challenge and undermine many phenomenological presuppositions, especially phenomenology’s status as a transcendental philosophy and its corresponding (...) anti-naturalistic outlook. In the opening chapter, I articulate the three layers of the subject matter of phenomenological research—what I refer to as “existentials,” “modes,” and “prejudices.” As I argue, while each layer contributes to what we might call the “structure” of human existence, they do not do so in the same way, or to the same degree. Because phenomenological psychopathology—and applied phenomenology in general—aims to characterize how the structure of human existence can change and alter, it is paramount that these layers be adequately delineated and defined before investigating these changes. In chapters two through five, I conduct hermeneutic and phenomenological investigations of psychopathological phenomena typically labeled as major depressive disorder or bipolar disorder. These investigations address the affective aspects of depression and mania, and the embodied aspects of depression. In addition to clearly articulating the nature of these phenomena, I show how certain psychopathological conditions involve changes in the deepest or most fundamental layer of human existence—what I refer to as existentials. As I argue, many of the classical phenomenologists (including Husserl and Heidegger) believed that these structural features were necessary, unchanging, and universal. However, this presupposition is challenged through the examination of psychopathological and neuropathological conditions, undermining the status of phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy. While this challenge to classical phenomenology is only sketched in the early chapters, in chapters six and seven I develop it in more detail in order to achieve two distinct ends. In chapter six I argue that psychopathology and neuropathology not only challenge phenomenology’s status as a transcendental philosophy, but also supply a key to developing a phenomenological naturalism (which I contrast with a naturalized phenomenology). Phenomenological naturalism, as I articulate it, is a position in which phenomenology is not subsumed by the metaphysical and methodological framework of the natural sciences, but nonetheless maintains the capacity to investigate how the natural world stands independent of human subjectivity (and how events in the natural world can bring about changes in the most fundamental structures of human existence). In the seventh chapter I argue that a phenomenology in which existentials are contingent and variable rather than necessary and unchanging allows phenomenologists to contribute to new dimensional approaches to psychiatric classification. Rather than begin from distinct categories of disorder, these approaches begin from distinct core features of human existence. These features, referred to as either dimensions or constructs, can vary in degree and are studied in both normal and pathological forms. (shrink)

In a world of ever growing specialization, the idea of a unity of science is commonly discarded, but cooperative work involving cross-disciplinary points of view is encouraged. The aim of this paper is to show with some textual support that Charles S. Peirce not only identified this paradoxical situation a century ago, but he also mapped out some paths for reaching a successful solution. A particular attention is paid to Peirce's classification of the sciences and to his conception (...) of science as a collective and cooperative activity of all those whose lives are animated by the desire to discover the truth. -/- . (shrink)

Dār al-Funūn Theology founded in 1924 was a modern educational institution which adopted both traditional and modern approach to Islamic Sciences. The changes in the field of hadīth during the process of transition to the university caused a change in the definitions and the titles of the courses such as from hadīth al-sharīf and usul al-hadīth to hadīth and the history of hadīth and the time allocated to each course was gradually reduced. The preparation of the texts by the (...) teachers in the hadith history courses and their content will answer the question of whether there is a transformation in the field of hadīth in the early years of the Republic of Turkey. As a matter of fact, Izmirli İsmāʿīl Ḥaqqī’s History of Ḥadīth and Ḥuseyin ʿAvnīʿ Arapkīrli’s al-Buġya al-Hasîs fī Tārīh al-Hadīth which were written in this period, pioneered the studies based on the field of the history of hadīth in Turkish hadīth literature. In addition, these works are the main source in understanding the period. In this study, the mentioned works will be textually analysed through the induction method. Therefore, the subjects that would reflect the ideas of the teachers will be discussed. Thus, it will be tried to determine whether the courses of the history of hadīth are closer to tradition or modern ideas and, how the education of hadīth is practised.Summary: After the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the Faculty of Theology was opened at Istanbul University as a result of the abolition of madrasas issuing a law regarding to the Unification of Education announced in 1924. With the opening of this faculty, the education in the field of Religious Sciences continued its presence on a new foundation, which can be considered modern, until 1933. In this study, it was attempted to trace the courses of Ḥadīth and the History of Ḥadīth given in the Faculty of Theology at Istanbul University between 1924 and 1933. Firstly, a brief history of the courses will be given, and then it is among the purposes of this study to perform a textual analysis of the works written by the teachers of these courses. While doing this, Izmirli Ismail Hakkı's History of Ḥadīth, which was written as course notes and Huseyin Avni Arapkirli's al-Buġya al-Hasîs fī Tārīh al-Hadīth, which has not been known until discussed it this article for the first time, were focused on. These works are very important in terms of initiating the History of Ḥadīth literature. Furthermore, these are the first works in the field of hadīth in the Turkish Republic, and they are very important sources for revealing the ideological infrastructure of the period. To begin with, it is necessary to attract attention to the change in the course names and duration if there is a need to briefly mention the history of hadīth courses in University. In the universities founded before the opening of the Faculty of Theology, the courses were named as Ḥadīth al-sharīf and usul al-hadīth. Besides, these courses were included in the curriculum for four years, which constituted the duration of the education. In the university founded in 1924 after the proclamation of the Republic, the name was changed as Ḥadīth and the History of Ḥadīth. It is seen that the courses of Hadīth and the History of Hadīth were taught three hours a week for two years from the opening of the Faculty of Theology until 1931. From 1931 until 1933, when the faculty was closed, the courses continued to be given two hours a week. When the content of the works is viewed, it can be seen that Izmirli İsmāʿīl Ḥaqqī followed a historical system in his work History of Ḥadīth. Beginning the subject with the classification of sciences, Izmirli touches upon the topics such as the writing and codification of hadīths. Afterwards, he also deals with the methodology of in detail. He then mentions about the history of hadīth by Shiʿā and draws a general map of the history of hadīth as of the third century of the Islamic calendar. This work differs from the previous tradition of the education of hadīth in terms of including the Shiʿā’s the history of hadīth and especially of ahl al-raʾy’s understanding of the hadīth. In addition, the detailed discussion of hadīth practice in the work is significant in terms of showing that the content of the course did not only cover the history of hadīth.Moreover, it is observed that Izmirli touched upon controversial topics in his work such as the writing of hadīth, Bukhari's criticism and hadīth-history relation. However, Izmirli does not express his approach to these topics so clearly. In doing so, he hides his views between lines, using ambiguous statements related to the topics while trying to base the views on authority. For instance, he says that the hadīths were written on the special pages of the companions in the early periods when it comes to writing hadīths, which was one of the most important topics of the history of hadīth. Even though this gives an impression that the hadīths were written in the companion period, it is stated in the following explanations that the hadīths had not been gathered and written down in one place. Izmirli also says that they refer to the hadīths in the hearts of the companion. In another example, he mentions that there is no doubt about the accuracy of the narrations in Bukhārī's work. However, in the following pages, he states that there are narrators, who are not trustworthy, in Bukhārī's work and says Dāraqutnī's criticisms related to Bukhārī. When the aforementioned two examples are examined, it can be stated that Izmirli acted a bit more cautiously especially in controversial topics. When it comes to Ḥuseyin ʿAvnīʿ Arapkīrli, who starts his work with the classification of sciences as Izmirli does, it is seen that he discusses the part of practice much more briefly. Additionally, he gives more attention to Prophet Muhammad and companion period of the hadīth history. In his work, he also provides detailed information about the formation of the hadīth literature in the third century of the Islamic calendar and afterwards. When the issue is reviewed within the scope of the topics discussed by Ḥuseyin ʿAvnīʿ in his work, it is necessary to mention that the topics related to the history of hadīth were more dominant in the work. Unlike Izmir, he does not allocate much space to controversial topics in his work. However, it should also be noted that he partly touched upon some controversial topics such as hadīth -history relation and writing of hadīths. Ḥuseyin ʿAvnīʿ considers the history of hadīth as a sub-heading of history. Regarding the writing of hadīths, he states openly that the hadīths generally were not written down because of the possibility for them to be mixed up with the Qur’ān in the early periods, and this continued until the time of caliphate ʿÖmer bin ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz. Thus, it can be said that both writers, who applied different methods in their works, looked for a new method. However, it should be remembered that these names were a part of the Ottoman educational system and included in a new system together with their background. Consequently, the fact that they were somewhere between old and new. (shrink)

The Sciences of the Qurʾān contain information about the process of Qurʾān and its structural characteristics, language and stylistic features, as well as statistical data on the content of the Qurʾān. This information, which contributes significantly to the understanding of the Qurʾān, is generally classified within the relevant narratives and the classifications are sometimes associated with verses. In this context, the way in which the Sciences of the Qurʾān explain the verses, which do not act solely on methodical (...) premises, differs from the Qurʾānic exegesis books. In the Sciences of the Qurʾān, the subject of revelation forms are classified within the frame of the narrations, and the 51st verse of the Sūrat al-Shūrā is frequently referred to. In other words, the related classifications are matched with the 51st verse of the Sūrat al-Shūrā. In the exegesis, this verse is handled more comprehensively considering its context and the literal possibilities. There are two remarkable comments about this verse in terms of its reflection in the revelation classifications. However, on the contrary, it is possible to encounter examples where the verse is subject to specific discussions. One of them belongs to Jār Allāh al-Zamakhsharī (d.538/1144) and the other to Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Bayḍāwī (d. 685/1286). When the exegesis of al-Zamakhsharī and al-Bayḍāwī are examined, it is seen that this verse is the subject of ru’yat Allah (seeing Allah) discussion between Muʿtazila and Ahl al-Sunnah and the classifications are made in this context. However, it is interesting to note that the classification of al-Zamakhsharī is more suitable for the perspective of the Sciences of the Qurʾān. In this study, the codes of the determinations made by al-Zamakhsharī and al-Bayḍāwī related to the 51st verse of Sūrat al-Shūrā was read on the commentaries. While al-Zamakhsharī explains this verse as a proof for the argument that God cannot be seen, al-Bayḍāwī develops an example of reactionary interpretation upon Zamakhsharī’s view. The Sciences of the Qurʾān (as a discipline), which opens a separate title to the ways of revelation, uses this verse as a template and takes it away from the discussion. In the study, the subjective dimensions of the discussion and classifications made in the context of this verse were evaluated. As a result, it is concluded that a classification similar to classification of al-Zamakhsharī has been made in the literature of the Sciences of the Qurʾān as it provides more comprehensive framework. Summary: During the period of revelation of the Holy Qurʾān not only the sunnah and actions of the Prophet which explained the Holy Qurʾān, but also various sources of information based on language and consultation, were used in order to understand the Holy Qurʾān. The first people introduced to the revelation used their own language/oratory skills, which were natural them, to understand the Qurʾān and were also able to observe the events and problems that brought about the revelation of the verses. These elements, used by those first people for understanding the Qurʾān, were readily available in their society. Therefore, understanding of the Qurʾān while the Prophet was still alive did not require a codification of those resources or treatment of the matter on a theoretical level. Subsequent generations mostly compensated the lack of those advantages by the use of the Sciences of the Qurʾān books penned individually after 2nd Century (A.H.), and those written systematically under the collective name "the Sciences of the Qurʾān" starting from the 6th century (A.H.). These works covered many subjects such as the beginning of the revelation, the accentuation of the Qurʾān, the physical development process of the Qurʾānic text, information based on observation as well as the tone and content of the Qurʾān and provided information details for Qurʾānic interpretations. Over time, this information was classified in the Sciences of the Qurʾān literature, organized under various relevant titles and enhanced with examples, numerical and qualitative information. One of the main topics of the Sciences of the Qurʾān is the subject of “revelation and its forms”. In the literature of the Sciences of the Qurʾān, the classifications made under this topic are generally associated with the verse 51 of Sūrat al-Shūrā. In this verse, the forms of communication between Allah (Jalla Jalaluhu) and the servant/prophet are categorized. The context of the verse 51 of the Sūrat al-Shūrā in the tafsīr literature is different from the context in the Sciences of the Qurʾān literature. As a matter of fact, while this verse is examined in detail with respect to the context, concept analysis, and the possibilities of i‘rāb (classical Arabic grammar), it is merely referred to in the Sciences of the Qurʾān. This is due to the fact that the determinations and classifications made in the Sciences of the Qurʾān are shaped mostly in the light of the historical context and narrations of the subject.It is also possible to encounter examples of tafsīr where the 51st verse is made the topic of detailed discussions. There are two remarkable comments about this verse in terms of its reflection in the revelation classifications. One of them belongs to Jār Allāh al-Zamakhsharī (d.538/1144) and the other belongs to Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Bayḍāwī (d. 685/1286). The tafsīr s of al-Zamakhsharī and al-Bayḍāwī make it clear that this verse is the subject of ru’yat Allah discussion between the Muʿtazila and Ahl al-Sunnah and the classifications are made accordingly. The fact that i‘rāb examinations of the two authors are similar and both took into account other linguistic possibilities despite their preferences, which also prove that the points of conflict are not literal. Al-Zamakhsharī thinks that this verse determines the way Allah speaks not only with his prophets but also with all people. According to al-Zamakhsharī, the 51st verse refers to the three forms of communication that takes place between God and any of His servants. Allah communicates with His servants; a) through inspiration, inspiration to heart or through dreams, b) by making His words heard through certain channels, c) by sending one of his angels as a messenger. In the verse, the first is expressed as revelation, the second is to speak behind a veil, and the third is to send a messenger. According to al-Zamakhsharī, Allah's inspiration to the mother of Moses, the dream that He showed to Abraham regarding the sacrificing of his son and inspiration of Psalms to David, all relate to the revelation concept mentioned in the first option. Al-Zamakhsharī believes that revelation from behind a veil is an adage. This adage can be compared to a king speaking with one of those at his service behind a veil/curtain, where the person hears the voice of the king but cannot see him. Allah only spoke to Moses and angels in that manner, and sent angels to speak to His other servants/prophets.As a response to al-Zamakhsharī, al-Bayḍāwī interpreted the verse concisely explaining the 'revelation' (وحيا) as a secret word that is quickly understood. Because, in terms of its nature, revelation is not a word made up of sound waves that come one after another to make words. In the verse, this word refers both to the Night Journey (Mi‘rāj) and the talk mentioned in the hadiths regarding the ru’yat Allah, and Allah speaking to Moses without Moses seeing Allah. However, in the verse min verâi ḥicâb/attributed to the word 'revelation 'من وراء حجاب makes it clear that the expression refers to a form of speech in which Allah is heard but not seen. Therefore, the word 'revelation' refers to a mutual talk and according to al-Bayḍāwī, this is proof that ru’yat Allah is possible. The fact that the classifications made in the Sciences of the Qurʾān literature agrees with the classification of al-Zamakhsharī, not al-Bayḍāwī. This result is closely related to the structural features of the Sciences of the Qurʾān in which authors strive to make general explanations that are beyond sectarian preferences and views. Understanding the verse as a conversation between Allah and man, and not between Allah and His prophet, provides a more comprehensive classification in terms of the use of revelations (not only the use of the word revelation) in the Qurʾān. Thus, the address that was made to Abraham in his dream, the revelation of to Moses' mother, and inspiration to our holy Prophet and other people can be interpreted according to this verse. In addition, the ru’yat Allah debate was excluded from the subject in the classifications made in the Sciences of the Qurʾān and implication of the verse was limited to the talks made in a worldly manner. (shrink)

Developmental perspectives on prejudice provide a fundamental and important key to the puzzle for determining how to address prejudice. Research with historically disadvantaged and advantaged groups in childhood and adolescence reveals the complexity of social cognitive and moral judgments about prejudice, discrimination, bias, and exclusion. Children are aware of status and hierarchies, and often reject the status quo. Intervention, to be effective, must happen early in development, before prejudice and stereotypes are deeply entrenched.

Part I. Aristotle proposed a method of defining an entity, e.g. an animal species, by successive subdivisions of the broader class ( genos) to which it belongs; if fully implemented, this would have resulted in a classification of animals. Definition of bird-species by subdivision of the class Birds would require the description of sub-classes intermediate between the major class and individual species. Examination of Aristotle's main discussions of birds shows that he had no complete system of such sub-classes, but (...) four groups of bird species are repeatedly mentioned and are described in some detail: Hook-taloned birds, terrestrial birds which fly weakly (i.e. Gallinaceous birds), web-footed birds, and fissipede waterside birds. Aristotle must have thought of these groups as, at least, likely to be usable in the definition of bird-species, but made little progress towards formulating such definitions. Part II. Pliny offers a hint of a different approach to avian classification; but in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Edward Wotton, Belon, Gesner and Aldrovandi were most strongly influenced by Aristotle, and so, to a much lesser extent, were Willughby and Ray. Linnaeus and Yarrell are examples of eighteenth and nineteenth century authors who still made use in their classifications of the four groups, of hook-taloned birds etc., described in Part 1. (shrink)

Hermann's Weyl Das Kontinuum has inspired several studies in logic and foundations of mathematics over the last century. The book provides a remarkable reconstruction of a large portion of classical mathematics on a predicative basis. However, diverging interpretations of the predicative system formulated by Weyl have been proposed in the literature. In the present work, I analyze an early formalization of Weyl's ideas proposed by [Casari, E. 1964. Questioni di Filosofia Della Matematica, Milano: Feltrinelli] and compare it with other, (...) more well-known, accounts, such as those proposed respectively by Feferman and Avron. In this way, I fill a gap in the literature on Weyl's predicative mathematics by shedding light on an interpretation that has never been studied. Moreover, Casari's work is plausibly the first systematic reconstruction of Weyl's system. In particular, I highlight the different insights about predicativity that can be found in Weyl's work. Casari's reconstruction focuses on the logical and mathematical processes described by Weyl in the first part of his book. Through the analysis of this unexplored perspective, I shed light on fundamental aspects of Weyl's work and elucidate the alleged ambiguities it presents. In particular, in line with Avron's most recent reconstruction of Weyl's ideas, this analysis supports a stronger conception of predicativity than what is commonly attributed to Weyl in the literature. As a result, this work not only provides an analysis of a neglected interpretation of Das Kontinuum, but also contributes to elucidating Weyl's classical conception of predicativity. (shrink)

Positivism has had a tremendous impact on the development of the social sciences over the past two centuries. It has deeply influenced method and theory, and has seeped deeply into our broader understandings of the nature of the social sciences. Postmodernism has attempted to loosen the grip of positivism on our thinking, and while it has not been without its successes, postmodernism has worked more to deconstruct positivism than to construct something new in its place. Psychologists today perennially (...) wrestle to find and retain their intellectual balance within the methodological, theoretical, and epistemological struggles between positivism and postmodernism. In the process, pre-postmodern criticisms of positivism have been largely forgotten. Although they remain deeply buried at the core of psychology, these early alternatives to positivism are rarely given explicit hearing today. The current piece explores some of the early critiques of positivism, particularly of its scientism, as well as early suggestions to tip the scales (back) in favor ofsapientia(“wisdom”). This third option, largely overlooked within mainstream psychology, is of tremendous value today as it is both deconstructive and constructive relative to the shortcomings of positivism. It avoids the overly reductionistic “trivial order” of positivism, as well as the deeply unsatisfying and disorienting “barbaric vagueness” of postmodernism, while simultaneously embracing important core elements of both currents of thought. (shrink)

Ottoman Turkish or Ottoman –as a mumpsimus – is basically Turkish language, over time it has been substantially influenced by Arabic and Persian. Its alphabet is based on Arabic letters. It has borrowed letters from Persian as well. Its vocabulary is essentially Turkish; however, it has borrowed words from Arabic and Persian at a substantial level. Arabic language attracted attention in mosques because it was the language of the religion, and in madrasahs because it was the language of science. As (...) for Persian, it spread in Turkish states as the literary language and this lifted its effectiveness especially in Seljukian palaces. Arabic writing, which is the common writing form for both languages, became the writing form for virtually the entire Islamic world, and thus, Turks employed Arabic writing form to be able to write in their own languages. According to resources, the first written Turkish language grammar book is Muyassiratu’l-ulum by Bergamalı Kadri. Apart from this book, the earliest sources on Ottoman Turkish grammar and principles were started to be written after 1840. While writing activities about Ottoman Turkish grammar increased in late 19th and early 20th centuries, they have gained further acceleration nowadays. In fact, the statement about a generation who cannot read the grave stones of their ancestors has been influential. After providing education on Ottoman Turkish as a compulsory or elective course as part of high school syllabus by the Ministry of National Education, and due to the natural increase in the numbers of students in Theology and Literature Faculties of universities which are, nowadays, almost in every city, writing activities about Ottoman Turkish have become desirable and a sector has been formed in this field. Many researchers who teach this course started to write an Ottoman Turkish grammar book to use in their own lessons, and this caused the number of Ottoman Turkish publications to increase in the market. According to our findings, grammar books of Turkey Turkish were also written in foreign languages, in late 19th and early 20th centuries. Through writing Turkey Turkish grammar work in German, French, English, Italian, Latin, Hungarian, Russian and Greek, foreign authors aimed to teach Turkish to their own nations. Although all of these works were produced in order to contribute teaching of Ottoman Turkish, efforts to generate solutions for certain problematic issues became a lot more complicated. To illustrate, when case about kaaf (ك) letter, which is the subject of this study, is examined either in grammar books written after 1840s, or in the books written by contemporary researchers, two aspects are noteworthy. One of these is the change in the number of letters forming the alphabet, the other one is the classification and nomenclature regarding kaaf (ك) letter, which effects this number. That Ottoman Turkish consists of three languages and uses Arabic alphabet and vocabulary from three different languages resulted in problems like difference in the number of letters in the alphabet and problems in the articulation of certain letters. It has been determined that one of the reasons why the number of letters in the alphabet is different is directly letter kaaf and that there are problems in both articulation and classification of the letter kaaf used in Arabic, Persian and Turkish words. When the books written on Ottoman Turkish grammar starting from the 19th century until today are analysed, no studies have ever been done either about the changes in the numbers forming the alphabet, or about the classification and articulation problems of letter kaaf (ك) and about the solution offersed to these. In this article, by attracting attention to both the number of letters in the alphabet, and to the classification and articulation problems of letter kaaf (ك), findings regarding the solutions of these problems are presented. The study consists of three main chapters. In the first chapter, the function of various letters is presented and especially the effect of kaaf on the number of letters in Ottoman Turkish alphabet is elaborated and after the analyses, the number of letters is determined. In the second chapter, triplet, quartet and quintet classifications of letter kaaf are examined and its nomenclature and articulations are analysed. In the last chapter, problems about classification and articulation of kaaf are evaluated and a new classification is suggested. Yet, it is obvious that either this classification or the previous ones do not contribute to the question of which sound to use while pronouncing kaaf. Therefore, at the end of the study, some determinations have been made for solving the problem of kaaf’s articulation. (shrink)

Drawing on past and current research in continental philosophy, Measures of Science: Theological and Technological Impulses in Early Modern Thought examines the development of certain founding issues of early modern science. Focusing on three key seventeenth-century figures--Descartes, Bacon, and Newton--and locating his argument explicitly within the approach of Alexandre Koyre, James Barry Jr. explores the philosophical, theological, and technological priorities that established the frame for the full emergence of the new science. In showing how the work of these (...) and other seventeenth-century figures led to the appearance of a dominant new view of nature and perception, Barry's book makes an important contribution to our understanding of the formative period of modern science. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Histories of Science in Early Modern Europe:IntroductionRobert GouldingIn 1713, Pierre Rémond de Montmort wrote to the mathematician Nicolas Bernoulli:It would be desirable if someone wanted to take the trouble to instruct how and in what order the discoveries in mathematics have come about.... The histories of painting, of music, of medicine have been written. A good history of mathematics, especially of geometry, would be a much more interesting (...) and useful work.... Such a work, if done well, could be regarded to some extent as a history of the human mind, since it is in this science, more than in anything else, that man makes known that gift of intelligence that God has given him to rise above all other creatures.1Such a history of mathematics was attempted by Jean-Etienne Montucla in his Histoire des mathématiques (first printed in 1758, and reissued in a [End Page 33] greatly expanded form in 1799).2 Montucla's great work is generally acknowledged as the first genuine history of mathematics. According to some modern historians, previous attempts at such a history had amounted to little more than collections of anecdotes, biographies or exhaustive bibliographies: "jumbles of names, dates and titles," as one writer in the Dictionary of Scientific Biography characterized them.3 Montucla, on the other hand, was thoroughly animated by the Enlightenment project expressed in Rémond's letter, and his Histoire was a philosophical history of the "development of the human mind," as he himself described it.4 It was precisely Montucla's vision of what mathematics meant and his conviction that mathematics itself must change in order to reflect the historical elevation of the human intellect, that allowed him to transform the scattered dates and anecdotes of his predecessors into a genuine history. All subsequent histories of mathematics—until the most recent social histories5 —have been in a sense "footnotes to Montucla."The papers here argue that there were indeed histories of mathematics before Montucla which are worthy of scholarly attention, and that the dismissal of Renaissance histories of science as nothing more than a "cloud of fine adjectives and metaphors" is unfair (although it contains a germ of truth). Anthony Grafton has argued in an article on the historical writings of Cardano, Rheticus, and Kepler, that the purpose of such texts was not so much to trace what actually happened, as to justify the study of a subject often derided—by both humanist and scholastic writers—as obscure, useless and undignified.6 The following four papers go further in arguing that writings in this genre (or, at least, some writings in this genre) were not limited to this characteristically humanist objective. Authors did not just use their histories to persuade others. They themselves relied on historical narratives in order to think about their discipline, define its parts, distinguish among its acceptable and unacceptable forms and prescribe its content [End Page 34] and method of teaching. By placing their discipline into a historical context shared by other, more mainstream humanistic arts, moreover, they could draw upon the large, narrative structures which Renaissance humanists had adapted to understand human intellectual and cultural development, origins, progress and decline.James Byrne's article highlights a disparity of vision between those humanists who treated the origin of the arts as just another subject for humanistic display; and those (like Regiomontanus) who were invested in the arts and wrote their histories from an insider's perspective. Alongside Regiomontanus, one could include several other authors treated in this collection, such as Thomas Vaughan, Peter Ramus, and Henry Savile. In each case, history provided a means for working through problems of the legitimacy and nature of their disciplines. While their writings are not "histories of the human mind," their interests went beyond mere rehearsal of anecdotes. Ramus's histories, for instance, written 200 years before Montucla's Histoire, had the kind of unifying vision which de Montmort demanded, and shared Montucla's concern to find a meaning in the development of mathematics. Ramus, and the supporters and detractors he spawned, were convinced that constructing the history of this science was crucial to understanding how and why human beings have... (shrink)

My chief purpose, in the remaining part of this paper, is to study LAVOISIER'S work upon the Nature of Water in itself and in its bearing on opinion in the eighteenth century: to show how it arose, how it was carried on, how it was published and how it was received.

This article focuses on the under-researched Buddhist textKathāvatthu(“Points of Controversy”) and aims to better determine its place within Indian philosophy. We consider how the text was compiled, its contents, and main characteristics (such as its genre, its classification lists –mātika). To understand some of those characteristics, we suggest viewing them as shared with the whole Pali Canon (a large body of heterogeneous texts, of which theKathāvatthuis part). This article also illustrates the issues of translating religious and philosophical texts from (...) the Pāli language. Particularly, we highlight that theKathāvatthubelongs to the part of Pāli Canon known as theAbhidhamma Piṭaka, and consider how this influences the philosophical discourse presented in this text. We analyze the historical and philosophical content of theKathāvatthu. We argue that such content of this work is consistently revealed in the discussion of issues controversial for the schools of Early Buddhism. At the beginning of the text, there are the most significant questions for Early Buddhism (about the subject (pudgala), about the one who has reached perfection –arhat). As we get closer to the end of the text, the importance of the issues discussed diminishes. Its final part contains the latest questions. The discussion in each question depends on the logical method of the eight refutations, the use of lists (mātika), and the position of the Theravada school to which the final version of the text belongs. In the article, special attention is paid to the determination of theKathāvatthugenre. We conclude that the genre of this work can be considered as a unique example of religious and philosophical dialogue in Early Buddhist literature. (shrink)

This monograph explores the logical systems of early logicians in the Arabic tradition from a theoretical perspective, providing a complete panorama of early Arabic logic and centering it within an expansive historical context. By thoroughly examining the writings of the first Arabic logicians, al-Fārābī, Avicenna and Averroes, the author analyzes their respective theories, discusses their relationship to the syllogistics of Aristotle and his followers, and measures their influence on later logical systems. Beginning with an introduction to the writings (...) of the most prominent Arabic logicians, the author scrutinizes these works to determine their categorical logic, as well as their modal and hypothetical logics. Where most other studies written on this subject focus on the Arabic logicians’ epistemology, metaphysics, and theology, this volume takes a unique approach by focusing on the actual technical aspects and features of their logics. The author then moves on to examine the original texts as closely as possible and employs the symbolism of modern propositional, predicate, and modal logics, rendering the arguments of each logician clearly and precisely while clarifying the theories themselves in order to determine the differences between the Arabic logicians’ systems and those of Aristotle. By providing a detailed examination of theories that are still not very well-known in Western countries, the author is able to assess the improvements that can be found in the Arabic writings, and to situate Arabic logic within the breadth of the history of logic. This unique study will appeal mainly to historians of logic, logicians, and philosophers who seek a better understanding of the Arabic tradition. It also will be of interest to modern logicians who wish to delve into the historical aspects and progression of their discipline. Furthermore, this book will serve as a valuable resource for graduate students who wish to complement their general knowledge of Arabic culture, logic, and sciences. (shrink)

Those standard historiographic themes of "evolution" and "revolution" need replacing. They perpetuate mid-Victorian scientists' history of science. Historians' history of science does well to take in the long run from the Greek and Hebrew heritages on, and to work at avoiding misleading anachronism and teleology. As an alternative to the usual "evo-revo" themes, a historiography of origins and species, of cosmologies and ontologies, is developed here. The advantages of such a historiography are illustrated by looking briefly at a number of (...) transitions: the transition from Greek and Hebrew doctrines to their integrations by medieval authors; the transition from the Platonist, Aristotelian, Christian Aquinas to the Newtonian Buffon and to the no less Newtonian Lamarck; the departures the early Darwin made away from Lamarck's and from Lyell's views. Issues concerning historical thinking about nature, concerning essentialism and concerning classification are addressed in an attempt to challenge customary stereotypes. Questions about originality and influence are raised, especially concerning Darwin's "tree of life" scheme. The broader historiography of Darwinian science as a social ideology, and as a "worldview," is examined and the scope for revisions emphasised. Throughout, graduate students are encouraged to see this topic area not as worked out, but as full of opportunities for fresh contributions. (shrink)

This essay explores various ways in which bibliographies have exhibited “sociality.” Bibliographies are both products of the social contexts that have created them and engines of social interaction in scholarly communities. By tracing the history of the Isis Bibliography, the longest-running and most comprehensive bibliography in its field, this essay explains how different Isis classification systems have been tied to major twentieth-century cataloging efforts. By looking at classification, the essay also attends to the ways in which aspects of (...) the Isis Bibliography in different decades have reflected social mores of their period. Finally, it demonstrates how critical the Isis Bibliography was in the formation of the discipline of history of science and goes on to discuss how that disciplinary connection is evolving in the twenty-first century. By thinking of the bibliography as a network of scholars, not just scholarly works, the essay asks us to reflect on the nature and purpose of bibliography in the digital age. (shrink)

The author considers some essential problems of philosophical considerations of disciplinary classifications in sciences with the reference to some Russian science classification systems. He de­velops the working definition of science and some criteria which make it possible to understand the principles of these classifi­cations. He also observes some modern Russian approaches to the problem of disciplinary classification (in particular, Bonifatiy M. Kedrov’s approach). The author emphasizes some special as­pects of classifications in cognitive science, computer science, and biology.

In Asian countries, there is a tradition that a rabbit, known as the Moon rabbit, lives on the Moon. Typically, two reasons are mentioned for the origin of this tradition. The first reason is that the color pattern of the lunar surface resembles the shape of a rabbit. The second reason is that both the Moon and rabbits are symbols of fertility, as the Moon appears and disappears (i.e., waxing and waning) cyclically and rabbits are known for their high fertility. (...) Considering the latter reason, is the color pattern of the lunar surface not similar to a rabbit? Here, the similarity between rabbit and the lunar surface pattern was evaluated using seven AI architectures. In the test conducted with Contrastive Language-Image Pre-Training (CLIP), which can classify images based on given words, it was assumed that people frequently observe the Moon in the early evening. Under this condition, the lunar surface pattern was found to be more similar to a rabbit than a face in low-latitude regions, while it could also be classified as a face as the latitude increases. This result is consistent with that the oldest literatures about the Moon rabbit were written in India and that a tradition of seeing a human face in the Moon exists in Europe. In a 1000-class test using seven AI architectures, ConvNeXt and CLIP sometimes classified the lunar surface pattern as a rabbit with relatively high probabilities. Cultures are generated by our attitude to the environment. Both dynamic and static similarities may be essential to induce our imagination. (shrink)

The type of ‘Al-isnād al-āli’ (higher chain of authority) which has great importance for the science of ḥadīths that constitutes the second best source of the Islam, expresses the value in terms of its proximity to the period of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). If ḥadīth has ‘al-isnād al-āli’ in the works of the scholars provides us with assurance on the intend of the ḥadīth. For this reason, the values of the works of those authors who (...) have constructed their works with al-isnād al-āli undoubted in the science of ḥadīth. However the work of Abu al-Jahm al-Bāhilī’s (d. 228/842) named al-Juz‘ had that kind of ḥadīth, it has not appreciated by scholars, he could not get enough attention in his period and after it. His work contains famous scholar al-Layth Ibn Sa‘d’s (d. 175/791) narrative who claimed by ḥadīth scholars that his students neglected and omitted his ḥadīths and knowledge. Al-Layth Ibn Sa‘d was known doing transmission by written copies. The similarity of al-Layth Ibn Sa‘d narrations in al-Juz‘ with al-Layth narrations, which are also found in other sources, strengthens the claims of the existence of a narrative process based on the written texts in the early periods. In this study, these transfers of Abu al-Jahm reflected on other works will be examined and tried to build narrations of his teacher al-Layth Ibn Sa‘d. country, we can say that the article will contribute to the studies of the history of religions.Summary: Ḥadīth works written in the third century of hijri are the most distinguished sources. The most fundamental works in the science of ḥadīth were written in this time. In the following period, numerous studies have been committed to paper on them. One of the eminent works is the named al-Juz’, which belongs to Abu al-Jahm al-Bāhilī (d. 228/842). The author was not a person that was taken into consideration much during his time. It is possible to that he has been criticized about his scientific proficiency (al-Jarh). Nevertheless, al-Juz’ attracts attention due to the fact that it contains the type of ‘al-Isnād al-āli’ (higher chain of authority). Al-Isnād al-āli, which means access with the least number of narration from the author to the Prophet has very major role to determining of being dependable and certainty of the ḥadīths. The work of Abu al-Jahm which contains the ‘al-Isnād al-āli’ did not attract enough attention. However, another value of the al-Juz‘ is that its been included the narration of famous muhaddith Al-Layth Ibn Sa'd (d. 175/791). He is one of the valued mujtahid imams who have played an active and important role in second century of hijri. Al-Layth's narrations have been available insufficient amount present day. At this point the al-Juz‘ of Abu al-Jahm has great important because it contains many narrations of his shaykh Al-Layth Ibn Sa'd.The Juz‘ seems to has attracted the attention of the ḥadīths scholars in the following period. Indeed, various authors had the get authorization to narrate al-Juz‘. Furthermore, it is also known that some scholar in his period utilized his narration in their own study. For in¬stance, it was declared by Ibn Ḥajar (d. 852/1449) that al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870) had a narra¬tion belonging to Abu al-Jahm in his work ‘al-Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī’ with a muʻallaq chain (Omit¬ting his name). In the following periods, we come across famous muhaddith such as Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 241/855), al-Ṭabaranī (d. 360/971), Abū Bakr al-Marwazī (d. 292/905), al-Dāraquṭnī (d.385/995) and al-Bayhaqī (d. 458/1066) who received qualify of Juz's narra¬tion. Although the narrations of Abu al-Jahm are included in the prominent works of schol¬ars, it is clearly seems that the Juz‘ had not enough value except being procure as a written text. As far as we determined there are eleven narration of Abu al-Jahm in the main ḥadīth sources. In addition, we detected that some studies which contain some ḥadīth of al-Juz’ are list them in the same layout and order. This situation indicates that al-Juz’ is owned by these people as a duplicated edition and they narrated by not only orally transmitted but also spread by writing copy. This inference strengthens the theory which conceived by Modern researcher Fuad Sezgin (1924-2018) that ḥadīth transmission had conducted not only through oral transfer but also through written copies.Even though he lived in a very active time of oral transmission of ḥadīth and the time of specific journey for learning and pursuing ḥadīth, it is seen that Abu al-Jahm formed his Juz‘ from the ḥadīths that he procured only from his six shaykhs. That was quite less amount in that period. Juz‘, has an ʿAlāʾ al-Rijāl classification (ranked according to narrators) as ex¬pected in his period method. Abu al-Jahm began his study with his shaykh Al-Layth Ibn Sa'd’s narration, then completed with Sufyān ibn ʿUyayna’s. Juz‘ includes 112 ḥadīths. Ex¬cept two muʻallaq isnāds (omitting one or more narrators), all of ḥadīth has muttaṣil isnāds (narrators in the chain connected each other without omitting). Al-Juz‘ available nowadays in a published form. It seems that some of ḥadīth datas included in the Juz‘ have content against Islamic juris-prudential judgements. For example, the Prophet’s sayings ‘One or two swallow of breast milk does not make haram’ and ‘Nobody can fast or pilgrimage for the benefit of someone else’; allowing to Subay‘a al-Aslamī to marry without waiting her ‘iddah (waiting period of a woman after the death of her husband or divorce); when she gave birth, ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān’s permission to al-Rubay‘a bint Mu‘avvidh not to wait her ‘iddah; when ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar has nasal bleeding he leaves the prayer, goes to wash, then back and continue where he leave off, without taking ablution; and describing marriage with polytheist women as for¬bidden (ḥarām). Of course, all this information must be examined within the framework of Islamic jurisprudence. However, Abu al-Jahm stands alone (tafarrūd) in such issues, it can be seen as the reasons to be recognized as a censured person (majrūḥ).Al-Juz‘ included 66 isnāds of Al-Layth Ibn Sa'd’s narration. Therefore it leaves behind all the works that compile the narration of Ibn Sa'd. That is why, we hypothesize that Juz‘ is a form of Al-Layth’s study that has survived to the present days. As a matter of fact, the muhaddiths who included the narrations of Al-Layth in their works, especially Ibn ḳuṭlūbughā could not ignore the Juz‘ of Abu al-Jahm; on the contrary, they took it as reference. In this case, it should be said that Abu al-Jahm al-Bāhilī is a loyal follower of Al-Layth and the word at¬tributed to Imām Shāfi‘ī and characterizing Al-Layth’s followers with disloyalty is invalid. (shrink)

The eighteenth century has long been a problem for historians of science. The century suffers from an apparent lack of towering individuals and unifying theories, as Geoffrey Cantor observed in an essay published in 1982. Much good work has been done in the forty years since then, most of it aimed at locating science in the Enlightenment. But the Enlightenment is just one of several themes that can help to make sense of eighteenth-century science as a whole. The other themes (...) may be summarised as Classification, the First Scientific Revolution, the Second Scientific Revolution, Discipline Formation, and Natural Philosophy. The articles in this special issue are relevant to all six themes, as a summary of those articles will show. This essay ends with suggestions for future research on eighteenth-century science. The upshot is that we need to go beyond the Enlightenment by considering the five other themes discussed here and by considering events in general history other than the Enlightenment. (shrink)

In some circumstances, children of 5 produce identical classifications to 10 year olds when asked to sort a collection of objects. This has been interpreted as meaning that the process of constructing classifications is very similar at 5 and 10 years. But this conclusion rests on a comparison of the product of children's sortings, rather than on a study of their activity in producing sortings. The present paper argues that the process of classifying is in fact very different for 5 (...) and 10 year olds: whereas the older children treat the whole classification as a single unit composed of interrelated classes, the younger children proceed as though each class were independent of the others. At around 7 years, there is evidence for a transitional phase, in which children directly work on the relations between classes and so organize their initially “juxtaposed” procedures into more coherent systems. The tendency to work on the relations between elements in the process of classifying is not, however, simply an age‐related phenomenon: evidence for a similar effect can be observed in children throughout the age range of 5 to 10 years, during the course of short experimental sessions. Furthermore, the effect is not merely a response to errors or difficulties: the tendency to work on classifying relations can be seen in 5‐year‐old children in a task in which they are already successful. It seems that children spontaneously discover and use information about their procedures and the relations between them. This process is an end in itself. It occurs whether or not its results yield more successful performance. The approach taken in this paper is not confined to one area of behavior. This analysis of children's classifying fits closely with work in a very different domain, i.e. Karmiloff‐Smith's work on children's language and other representational systems. The analysis has implications for computer models of skill acquisition, as well as for psychological theories of development. (shrink)

For the first time in three centuries, this book brings back into print three discourses now confirmed to have been written by the young Thomas Hobbes. Their contents may well lead to a resolution of the long-standing controversy surrounding Hobbes's early influences and the subsequent development of his thought. The volume begins with the recent history of the discourses, first published as part of the anonymous seventeenth-century work, _Horae Subsecivae_. Drawing upon both internal evidence and external confirmation afforded by (...) new statistical "wordprinting" techniques, the editors present a compelling case for Hobbes's authorship. Saxonhouse and Reynolds present the complete texts of the discourse with full annotations and modernized spellings. These are followed by a lengthy essay analyzing the pieces' significance for Hobbes's intellectual development and modern political thought more generally. The discourses provide the strongest evidence to date for the profound influences of Bacon and Machiavelli on the young Hobbes, and they add a new dimension to the much-debated impact of the scientific method on his thought. The book also contains both introductory and in-depth explanations of statistical "wordprinting.". (shrink)

Ian Hacking has defined himself as a philosopher in the analytic tradition. However, he has also recognized the profound influence that Michel Foucault had on much of his work. In this article I analyse the specific imprint of certain works by Foucault—in particular Les mots et les choses—in two of Hacking’s early works: Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy? and The Emergence of Probability. I propose that these texts not only share a debt of Foucauldian thought, but (...) also are part of what I believe is Hacking’s central project: the analysis of the historical and situated conditions of possibility for the emergence of concepts and of objects, inspired also by the French philosopher’s thought. (shrink)

In his many contributions to the history of science and the history of philosophy, the late Charles Schmitt demonstrated the interdependence of these two spheres of thought in early modern Europe. Schmitt was particularly insistent on a large and positive role for Aristotelian philosophy in the development of early modern science.

The philosophy of Karl Popper (1902–94) has gained a range of interest and reaction far wider than that normally received by professional philosophers; in recent times only Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) obtained comparable (probably still greater) attention. Convinced that philosophical problems and issues came from outside philosophy itself, especially science, Popper addressed a broad audience. However, he also entered the professionals’ field, and indeed attacked some major epistemological tenets held there, such as the assumption that knowledge was accreted by the inductive (...) accumulation and classification of facts. The response to Popper’s work has created interest in his life, which was known as falling in three periods: birth and early career in Vienna, followed by nearly a decade in New Zealand, and finally a rather reclusive lifestyle in Britain after the Second World War. This book, devoted to the first two periods, is the outcome of a long research effort by the author started well before Popper’s death and incorporating a doctorate received in 1993. His book shows the incompleteness of Popper’s autobiography of 1974, which hitherto has been our main source. (shrink)

Religion and science dialogues that orbit around rational method, knowledge, and truth are often, though not always, contentious. In this article, I suggest a different cluster of gravitational points around which religion and science dialogues might usefully travel: philosophical anthropology, ethics, and love. I propose seeing morality as a natural outgrowth of the human desire to establish and maintain social bonds so as not to experience the condition of being alone. Humans, of all animals, need to feel loved—defined as a (...) compassionate present-with in dynamic dyadic relation such that one experiences the sense of mattering—but that need has an equally natural tendency to be met by creating biased us-and-them distinctions. A “critical” natural ethics, then, is one in which we become aware of and work to undermine our tendency to reify in-group distinctions between “us” and “them.” Religious communities that work intentionally on this can be seen, to some extent, as laboratories of love—or as sites for co-creating knowledge in perilous times. (shrink)

Research on the nature of science and science education enjoys a longhistory, with its origins in Ernst Mach's work in the late nineteenthcentury and John Dewey's at the beginning of the twentieth century.As early as 1909 the Central Association for Science and MathematicsTeachers published an article – ‘A Consideration of the Principles thatShould Determine the Courses in Biology in Secondary Schools’ – inSchool Science and Mathematics that reflected foundational concernsabout science and how school curricula should be informed by them. (...) Sincethen a large body of literature has developed related to the teaching andlearning about nature of science – see, for example, the Lederman and Meichtry reviews cited below. As well there has been intensephilosophical, historical and philosophical debate about the nature of scienceitself, culminating in the much-publicised ‘Science Wars’ of recent time. Thereferences listed here primarily focus on the empirical research related to thenature of science as an educational goal; along with a few influential philosophicalworks by such authors as Kuhn, Popper, Laudan, Lakatos, and others. Whilenot exhaustive, the list should prove useful to educators, and scholars in otherfields, interested in the nature of science and how its understanding can berealised as a goal of science instruction. The authors welcome correspondenceregarding omissions from the list, and on-going additions that can be made to it. (shrink)

Philosophy of science is a rapidly evolving and increasingly inclusive academic field. It is one of the most dynamic branches of philosophy. However, for the most part, philosophy of science has been taught historically by recounting and tracing through discussions and debates from the early to late twentieth century. Great texts of positivism, instrumentalism, demarcation, falsification, paradigm shifts, realism, observation and so on are handed out to students and critically assessed. There is something rather puzzling about this way of (...) teaching philosophy of science, since contemporary philosophy of science has moved on significantly and is arguably distinct from the historical subject, just as current science has many features different from the science of Kuhn’s and Popper’s day. Such philosophical work, however, often only seems to make a late appearance in such courses. It often seems that we teach philosophy of science solely as an exercise in point and refutation, leaving stu .. (shrink)

The two brothers Julius and Adolf Hurwitz were born in the middle of the nineteenth century in a small town near Hanover (not far from Göttingen). Already during their schooldays, the two of them became acquainted with mathematical problems and both started to study mathematics, but while the younger brother Adolf turned out to be extremely successful in his research, the elder brother and his work seem to be almost forgotten. This paper examines the lives and works of the (...) two brothers with particular emphasis on the contributions of Julius Hurwitz, and the subsequent reception of their research. It deals with the development of an arithmetical theory for complex continued fractions by Julius and Adolf Hurwitz around 1890 and its rediscovery in the twentieth century. (shrink)

Philosophy of science was formed as a distinct discipline in the early twentieth century around the work of the logical positivists, or logical empiricists, originally in Vienna in the mid‐twenties and in other European cities such as Berlin and Prague. It further developed in the United States, where most logical positivists moved to escape persecution by the Nazis or World War II and met the American pragmatist philosophers of science. Logical positivism, or logical empiricism, is the school of thought (...) that is most responsible for the shaping of philosophy of science as a contemporary, distinct academic discipline in the early twentieth century. The historical turn in philosophy of science in the late 1950s and early 1960s has been associated mostly with the work of philosophers such as Stephen Toulmin, N.R. Hanson, Thomas Kuhn, and Paul Feyerabend, who were active publishing books and papers at that time in the United States. (shrink)

The book deals with the changing nature and with the history of the concept of scientific determinism from the classical mechanics until the time immediately preceding quantum mechanics: such a historical-philosophical reconstruction is aimed at (1) signalizing and overcoming the deficiencies of the received opinion on the topic and (2) understanding better a concept which has influenced science from the beginning. -/- Before dealing with historical matters I develop in the first Chapter a kind of new, three-dimensional “measurement system” for (...) analyzing any concept of scientific determinism: many different concepts have been developed in the course of history, and we need a classification system which, on the one hand, is inclusive and broad enough to deal with different concepts; on the other hand, which makes possible to differentiate with some precision between them. My “measurement system” has three dimension or parameter: the “strength” (of the determining link between different states of the physical system), the “depth” (depending on how strong the ontological commitment of the particular concept of scientific determinism is), and the breadth (referring to the domain or the object, to which a deterministic evolution is ascribed). -/- In the second chapter I discuss briefly some main shortcomings of the received opinion about scientific determinism. Then I try to identify the “core” of scientific determinism at its origins while at the same time embedding it in the broader historical-cultural context especially of the Renaissance. On the one hand I show how the core of scientific determinism was mathematical, and this distinguished it from other related concepts, as mechanism, the principle of sufficient reason, and the aristotelic conception of science. On the other hand, precisely the support which these related concepts provided to scientific determinism, together with its mathematical nature, endowed it with an incredible resistance against empirical classification. -/- In the following three chapters I analyze the historic-philosophical development of scientific determinism along the three parameter of my measurement system. -/- In the third Chapter I reconstruct the weakening of scientific determinism with respect to its depth: the starting point is the question about the extent in which the deterministic mathematical descriptions do refer. In the development of mechanics into analytical mechanics the more and more formal character of its mathematical descriptions became evident and it became less obvious that these formal, deterministic structures also have an immediate material truth. Parallel developments within epistemology, starting with Kantian philosophy (which I deal with quite in detail), let the deterministic structures (principle, laws, equations, causal relations) appear less absolute and real and more as a product of reason, as conventions, or as models. A brief consideration of the interpretation of mechanics and its principles by Jacobi, Hertz, Mach and Poincaré shows the implications of these developments. -/- The fourth chapter reconstructs the weakening of scientific determinism with respect to the strength of the determining link: here my work deepens the track which has been opened by Ian Hacking, who interpreted the so-called “probabilistic revolution” in the 19th Century as the main reason for the erosion of determinism. The increasing pervasiveness of statistical methods in the social and natural sciences in the course of the 19th Century gave rise to a conception of scientific laws which could dispense with strict determinism. A new, empirical interpretation of probability (Frequentism) and the statistical explanation of thermodynamic phenomena in physics even suggested chance phenomena to be a necessary condition for the emergence of natural laws. -/- The last part of my work (Ch. 5, 6 and 7) considers the period (2nd half of the 19th century until ca. 1920) in which the concept of scientific determinism became explicit and was discussed as a world-picture or a world-view – that is, in its maximal breadth. I argue that there were two main reasons for the emergence of an explicit and ideological opposition “determinism vs. indeterminism” at that time: the first was the successful application of the deterministic paradigm to sociology, history, physiology and psychology in the course of the 19th Century, which provided scientific determinism with ethical implications (in particular with respect to the problem of free will, which scientific determinism seemed to deny). The second, related reason is that in the 19th Century natural scientists became public men, science was increasingly popularized and scientific issues were increasingly related to life-issues, to worldview-questions, and even to politics. In Chapter 6 I reconstruct the debates on the issue “determinism vs. indeterminism” in such a public, ideological and sometimes even political context. Among the discussants were Fechner, Du Bois-Reymond, Helmholtz, Bernard, Ostwald, Haeckel, Boussinesq, Maxwell, Boutroux, Poincaré, Renouvier, James und Peirce. Also in Vienna the debate on the issue of determinism was fervid and took ideological and political connotations: Michael Stöltzner and Deborah Coen have pointed to a particular tradition of “Vienna Indeterminism” (Stöltzner), or Viennese liberal probabilism (Coen), which was characterized by a strongly empirical conception of science and by the full acceptance and appreciation of statistical thinking in science. In the last Chapter of my work I focus on the early philosophy of Edgar Zilsel, a philosopher who stood near to the Vienna Circle and who has been much neglected in the literature by now, and I suggest considering it as part of the “Vienna Indeterminism”. First, I show how he gave an indeterministic foundation both to statistical and causal knowledge as well as to irreversibility in physics. Second, I inquire into his philosophy of probability and show how it developed in parallel to the ones of Hans Reichenbach and Richard von Mises. Finally, Zilsel happens to be a further, relevant case-study for pointing to the ideological and political side of the issue of determinism. -/- At the end of this reconstruction it should have become clear how no physical theory, no empirical evidence and no experimental confirmation can support or contradict scientific determinism in its non-trivial formulations. The validity of any such formulation depends strongly not only (from the systematical point of view) from the definition of other concepts (like time, physical state, causality etc.), but also from the particular conception of science which more or less implicitly constitutes its background, and which is subjected to historical change. -/- (ISBN: 9783495491034). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Divine Action and Emergence: An Alternative to Panentheism by Mariuscz Tabaczek, O.P.Edmund LazzariDivine Action and Emergence: An Alternative to Panentheism by Mariuscz Tabaczek O.P., (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2021), xviii + 346 pp.One of the most challenging scientific phenomena for metaphysical explanation is the emergence of higher-order properties out of lower-level constituents of a system. This relatively recent scientific observation raises serious questions for (...) metaphysically reductionist materialism and has inspired a great deal of recent philosophical and theological activity, [End Page 1430] varying greatly in their level of understanding of the scientific phenomenon itself.At the same time, contemporary theological discourse about divine action and the sciences has turned more and more toward panentheism as a way to involve God in the scientific workings of the world without disrupting its operations.Fr. Tabaczek addresses both of these major developments in this volume. For those who do not have the stamina or the interest to dive into his exhaustive analytic treatment of emergence in his previous 2019 volume, Emergence: Towards a New Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science, Fr. Tabaczek provides a detailed summary of his findings in the first two chapters of this volume. Rather than repeat the first volume's detailed consideration of different emergent phenomena, Fr. Tabaczek simply identifies different levels of emergent phenomena in inorganic chemistry, molecular biology, fluid systems, macro-organisms, and evolutionary systems before providing a substantial overview of contemporary philosophical perspectives on emergence.Even in this short overview, however, the reader will find mention and references to the fundamental historical figures in late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Anglophone thought on emergence, often omitted by contemporary literature, such as George Henry Lewis, Samuel Alexander, and C. D. Broad. The rest of the chapter consists in a concise classification and description of contemporary views of emergence, explaining and illuminating issues with downward causation-based accounts, whole-part constraints-based accounts, and supervenience-based accounts before moving on to spend a significant amount of time on Terrence Deacon's dynamical depth account of emergence. While full-length treatments of each account are provided in Emergence, the reader will find herself with more than enough philosophical engagement to understand the different models of emergence and Fr. Tabaczek's explanations of their shortcomings. While also much shorter than in Emergence, Fr. Tabaczek's overview of Deacon's account provides the necessary foundations for his Aristotelian synthesis of hylomorphism and emergence in the second chapter.The second chapter once more provides a review of Emergence, providing a comparison between classical Aristotelian metaphysics and "neo-Aristotelian" metaphysics of disposition. In both the classical- and neo-Aristotelian sections, Fr. Tabaczek shows his competence in chemistry by consistently applying Aristotelian notions of hylomorphic constitution, efficient causality, and final causality to chemical and cellular phenomena. While he criticizes neo-Aristotelianism for its lack of commitment to substantial form, he finds that its dispositionalism grounding act and potency [End Page 1431] provides it with a significant advantage over other models when accounting for emergent phenomena. While not fully endorsing it, Fr. Tabaczek's Aristotelian synthesis answers many of the philosophical questions Deacon addresses in his model.The third and fourth chapters of Divine Action and Emergence introduce a much-needed account of the panentheistic turn in recent theology and science literature. Fr. Tabaczek is especially astute to introduce the history of these accounts after the rigorous and sustained questions of the analytic-philosophical analysis of emergent phenomena. After giving a historical overview of the major figures in panentheism—from German idealism through Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne to contemporary theology–science dialogue, Fr. Tabaczek turns his analytic rigor towards dispelling ambiguities in panentheistic claims about God–world relations. Building on the work of Michael Brierley, Fr. Tabaczek argues that the meaning of "en" in panentheism is not a univocal term in the different writings of panentheistic writers, but rather share a Wittgensteinian family resemblance. This disambiguation of the claims of different panentheistic writers throughout history and in theology–science dialogue precedes an overview of the main avenues taken by those writers using emergence in theology–science dialogue before the critical evaluation... (shrink)