Kritische bijdragen over ideologisch gekleurde vormen van westerse culturele antropologie.

Subjectivism about well-being holds that an object contributes to one's well-being to the extent that one has a pro-attitude toward this object under certain conditions. Most subjectivists have contended that these conditions should be ideal. One reason in favor of this idea is that when people adapt their pro-attitudes to situations of oppression, the levels of well-being they may attain is diminished. Nevertheless, I first argue that appealing to idealized conditions of autonomy or any other condition to erase or replace (...) adaptive pro-attitudes is mistaken. Second, I show that the most natural version of subjectivism that does not appeal to any such idealizing condition can explain why the well-being of people having adaptive pro-attitudes should not be restricted to the fulfillment of these pro-attitudes. In sum, the existence of adaptive preferences does not militate in favor of the introduction of conditions of idealization but against it. (shrink)

Pour lire ce livre avec passion, point n'est besoin d'être féru de belles illustrations et de connaissances sur les trente millénaires qui ont précédé l'histoire, même s'il apporte tout cela. La documentation photographique est particulièrement esthétique. L'oeil ravi va d'images en images et a, par exemple, le plaisir de découvrir (p. 12), dans la partie la plus reculée de la grotte Chauvet, une représentation du centre du monde qui précède de 30 000 ans celle de G. Courbet! La transmission...

In this paper, I defend the view that our knowledge of our desires is inferential and based on the consciousness we have of our emotions, and on our experiences of pain and pleasure.

This article considers the origins of alphabetic writing, tracing its probable source to ancient Egypt, southern Levant or the Sinai during the Egyptian Middle Kingdom (17th century BCE). It supports the view that the earliest scripts were acrophonic representations of a West-Semitic language, whose use developed under the rule of the Hyksos in Egypt but was arrested there with the expulsion of this foreign dynasty at the end of the 16th century BCE. The development is then traced through the Levant, (...) with particular attention given to the emergence of cuneiform alphabetic scripts in Ugarit (c. 1300 BCE). This form of writing disappeared with the fall of Ugarit, but linear alphabetic scripts were preserved in a variety of Near-Eastern languages, notably Aramaic and Phoenician. These two languages, by becoming linguae francae respectively of the Syria-northern Mesopotamia and the Anatolia-Eastern Mediterranean regions, brought about the spread of alphabetic writing up until the 8th century BCE. The article concludes by examining the influence of the Phoenician script on Greek, Etruscan and ultimately Latin forms of writing. (shrink)

Le titre? Un coup de cœur du comité de rédaction de CLIO séduit à jamais par « Le festin de Babette »! Songer à un numéro sur la cuisine, l'alimentation et les manières de table, c'était retrouver immédiatement dans notre mémoire la nouvelle de Karen Blixen et le film de Gabriel Axel, l'image de Stéphane Audran officiant dans son tablier blanc de domestique et celle de ses invités, empesés de rigorisme puritain et de convenances, délicieusement dégagés de leur gangue et (...) « illuminés d... (shrink)

According to the communitarian view, often attributed to the later Wittgenstein, language is social in the sense that having a (first) language essentially depends on meaning by one's words what members of some community mean by them. According to the interpersonal view, defended by Davidson, language is social only in the sense that having a (first) language essentially depends on having used (at least some of) one's words, whatever one means by them, to communicate with others. Even though these views (...) are importantly different, the arguments given for them--the interpretation argument in Wittgenstein's case, the triangulation argument in Davidson's--are interestingly similar. I see these arguments as complementary and argue that, contrary to what is widely thought, it is the interpersonal view, rather than the communitarian view, that they support. (shrink)

Two readings of Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox dominate the literature: either his arguments lead to skepticism, and thus to the view that only a deflated account of meaning is available, or they lead to quietism, and thus to the view that no philosophical account of meaning is called for. I argue, against both these positions, that a proper diagnosis of the paradox points the way towards a constructive, non-sceptical account of meaning.

Stéphane Lemaire | : Subjectivists about well-being claim that an object is good for someone if and only if this individual holds a certain type of pro-attitude toward this object. In this paper, I focus on the dispute among subjectivists that opposes those who think that the relevant pro-attitudes are actual to those who think that they are counterfactual under some idealized conditions. My main claim is that subjectivism should be stringently actualist, though our actual pro-attitudes may be criticized (...) from an intrinsic perspective. To defend this claim, I first present three desiderata that a subjectivist theory of well-being should fulfil. Two of these desiderata result from the fact that a subjectivist theory of well-being should not be implicitly paternalist, while the other is that it should be able to play a normative role. I then show that several actualist theories that introduce light forms of idealization or other conditions that have a similar aim, fail to satisfy at least one of the antipaternalist desiderata. This gives some legitimacy to a very stringent version of actualism. I then describe three features of the kind of stringent actualism that I want to defend, which will explain the ability of what is good for someone to play its normative role. Finally, I show how these features allow us to deal with the classic objection that the objects of actual “defective attitudes” cannot be good for the holder of these pro-attitudes. | : Les subjectivistes à propos du bien-être soutiennent qu’un objet est bon pour un individu si et seulement si cet individu possède un certain type d’attitude positive à l’égard de cet objet. Dans cet article, je me concentre sur le débat à l’intérieur du camp subjectiviste qui oppose ceux qui pensent que les attitudes positives pertinentes sont actuelles à ceux qui pensent qu’elles sont contrefactuelles sous une condition d’idéalisation. Ma thèse principale est que le subjectivisme devrait être rigoureusement actualiste bien que nos attitudes positives actuelles puissent être critiquées d’un point de vue qui leur est interne. Afin de défendre cette position, je présente d’abord trois desiderata qu’une théorie subjectiviste du bien-être devrait satisfaire. Deux de ces desiderata résultent du fait qu’une théorie subjectiviste du bien-être ne devrait pas être implicitement paternaliste, alors que le troisième résulte de ce qu’elle devrait pouvoir jouer un rôle normatif. Je montre ensuite que plusieurs théories actualistes qui introduisent des formes modestes d’idéalisation ou d’autres conditions ayant la même visée échouent à satisfaire au moins un des desiderata anti-paternalistes. Une version très rigoureuse de l’actualisme subjectiviste s’en trouve ainsi légitimée. Je décris ensuite les trois aspects de l’actualisme rigoureux que je souhaite défendre et qui permettront d’expliquer dans quelle mesure ce qui est bon pour un individu peut jouer un rôle normatif. Enfin, je montre comment ces aspects nous permettent de répondre à l’objection classique selon laquelle les objets d’« attitudes défectives » actuelles ne peuvent être bons pour ceux qui ont ces attitudes. (shrink)

Contra an expanding number of deflationary commentators onWittgenstein, I argue that philosophical questions about meaningare meaningful and that Wittgenstein gave us ample reason tobelieve so. Deflationists are right in claiming that Wittgensteinrejected the sceptical problem about meaning allegedly to befound in his later writings and also right in stressing Wittgenstein''s anti-reductionism. But they are wrong in taking these dismissals to entail the end of all constructive philosophizing about meaning. Rather, I argue, the rejection of the sceptical problem requires that we (...) abandon the questions that philosophers have traditionally addressed and that we replace them with more appropriate ones, to which constructive answers are forthcoming. However, though quietism is not the only alternative to reductionism, the rejection of reductionism does oblige us seriously to revise our sense of what constructive philosophy can achieve. (shrink)

A popular idea at present is that emotions are perceptions of values. Most defenders of this idea have interpreted it as the perceptual thesis that emotions present (rather than merely represent) evaluative states of affairs in the way sensory experiences present us with sensible aspects of the world. We argue against the perceptual thesis. We show that the phenomenology of emotions is compatible with the fact that the evaluative aspect of apparent emotional contents has been incorporated from outside. We then (...) deal with the only two views that can make sense of the perceptual thesis. On the response–dependence view, emotional experiences present evaluative responsedependent properties (being fearsome, being disgusting, etc.) in the way visual experiences present response-dependent properties such as colors. On the response–independence view, emotional experiences present evaluative response-independent properties (being dangerous, being indigestible, etc.), conceived as ‘Gestalten’ independent of emotional feelings themselves. We show that neither view can make plausible the idea that emotions present values as such, i.e., in an open and transparent way. If emotions have apparent evaluative contents, this is in fact due to evaluative enrichments of the non-evaluative presentational contents of emotions. (shrink)

Despite its intuitive appeal and the empirical evidence for it, the hypothesis of cognitive polyphasia (Moscovici, 1961/1976/2008) remains largely unexplored. This article attempts to clarify some of the ideas behind this concept by examining its operations at the level of individuals and by proposing a conceptual model that includes some elements of social cognition. Indeed, calls for a rapprochement between the theory of social representations and cognitive psychology have been made by Moscovici, in particular, in his 1984 paper on The (...) myth of the lonely paradigm and in his paper on La nouvelle pensée magique (1992) in which he argues that the theory of social representations provides an explanatory framework for the descriptions offered by cognitive psychology and that their combining could translate into a finer understanding of contemporary social phenomena.Building on the results of an empirical examination of the controversy that surrounded the MMR vaccination programme in the UK between 1998 and 2005, different ways of engaging into cognitive polyphasia are proposed, including what can be described as cognitive “monophasia”, that is, the exclusive use of one type of knowledge, at least at the level of the individual. A brief discussion about the implications of the proposed conceptual model for our understanding of cognitive polyphasia and of the different ways of making sense of the world around us concludes this article. (shrink)

L’ouvrage est consacré au « mythe » d’Atalante, une figure féminine aux qualités surnaturelles, et par conséquent fabuleuses, d’une incommensurable durée. Elle appartient à la tradition hellénique dès le viie s. Très présente dans la culture gréco-romaine, elle s’est perpétuée en filigrane jusqu’à notre époque. Ce master d’Histoire grecque soutenu à Paris 1 a reçu le prix de l’association Mnémosyne. Ce rite de passage, dans la recherche, a suscité en effet un chef d’œuvre d’une exceptionnelle...

The authors' claim that analogical reasoning is the product of relational priming is compatible with language processing work that emphasizes the role of low-level automatic processes in the alignment of situation models in dialogue. However, their model ignores recent behavioral evidence demonstrating a effect on relational priming. We discuss implications of these data.

Two features are often assumed about emotions: they are intentional states and they are experiences. However, there are important reasons to consider some affective responses that are not experienced or only partly experienced as emotions. But the existence of these affective responses does not sit well with the intentionality of conscious emotions which are somehow geared towards their object. We therefore face a trilemma: either these latter affective responses do not have intentional objects and we should renounce intentionality as a (...) defining feature of emotions; or we have to explain how they actually have intentional, though unconscious, objects; or after all we must deny that they are really emotions. I suggest that the second option is the correct one: we can provide an account of the intentionality of unconscious emotions and its relation to the intentionality of conscious emotions. To do this, I rely on neuropsychological studies that distinguish two kinds of attention: salience as enriched treatment, and focus as a way of turning our attention. Then, given that only salience is always present in unconscious emotional phenomena, I suggest that emotions are intentional because they involve an object being made salient. I further argue that this feature of emotions explains why unconscious and conscious emotions can be taken as organized around their object. Finally, I defend this account against several objections, showing that the account can be applied whatever the cognitive base of the emotions may be and is not falsified by the fact that attentional aspects of emotions may vary in other dimensions. (shrink)

O presente artigo trata do fenômeno da judicialização da saúde no Brasil, a partir do significativo acúmulo de demandas judiciais promovidas pela cidadania ativa, como forma de concretização do direito social fundamental à saúde. Valendo-se de pesquisa bibliográfica e recurso a bancos de dados oficiais, apresenta o percurso doutrinário, a base constitucional e legal, bem como trata das decisões judiciais a essa demanda social como inseridas no contexto de uma política pública judiciária necessária a efetivação de tais direitos, como resposta (...) ao pungente drama existencial humano de acesso aos serviços de saúde. (shrink)

Le but de l’article est de proposer de suivre en métaphysique la voie de l’analyse conceptuelle par intuition de cas possibles. Pour une part empirique et a posteriori, reposant sur des intuitions dont elle exploite autant les contradictions que les points communs, avant de les tester dans une perspective faillibiliste, l’analyse conceptuelle comporte aussi une partie a priori qu’elle élabore en recourant à la méthode des cas possibles, permettant ainsi de repenser les liens entre nécessité conceptuelle et nécessité métaphysique. Ainsi (...) entendue, la démarche renoue avec l’inspiration propre à la méthode scotiste des possibles-réels qui fut à l’origine de la constitution de la métaphysique comme science. (shrink)

À travers l’analyse de la notion de décor et la figure de décorateur au xix e siècle, cette étude vise à comprendre pourquoi le statut du scénographe et son auctorialité demeurent confus aujourd’hui. Cette étude met en exergue les réformes scéniques aux xviii e et xix e siècles et leurs rôles dans l’émergence d’un langage scénographique et d’une activité professionnelle revendiquant la reconnaissance du statut d’auteur et l’obtention des droits y afférents.

Dans cette introduction, je situe en premier lieu la métaéthique vis-à-vis des autres recherches qui s’intéressent à la morale. Je distingue pour commencer la métaéthique de l’éthique normative et des éthiques appliquées. Alors que ces dernières s’intéressent à ce que la morale nous demande de faire, la métaéthique est une interrogation de second ordre sur la nature de la morale, du discours moral et sur la possibilité de justifier des jugements moraux. Je distingue ensuite parmi ces questions de second ordre (...) celles qui constituent plus proprement la métaéthique par opposition à la psychologie morale tout en soulignant leurs relations de dépendance. Pour finir, je présente assez brièvement les questions centrales propres aux différents sous-domaines de la métaéthique : la sémantique morale qui porte sur la signification des termes moraux, l’épistémologie morale qui porte sur la connaissance morale, et l’ontologie morale qui porte sur les faits moraux susceptibles d’expliquer pourquoi certains de nos jugements moraux sont vrais. Dans cette brève introduction à la métaéthique, notre ambition sera essentiellement de situer la métaéthique par rapport aux autres approches philosophiques de la morale. Nous nous efforcerons en outre de présenter assez sommairement les grandes questions qui structurent ce vaste domaine de recherche. (shrink)

« The Grimké Sisters », c’est ainsi que Sarah l’aînée (1792-1873) et Angelina sa cadette (1805-1879), étaient désignées au temps où elles défrayèrent l’opinion publique. On doit à Colette Collomb-Boureau par la solide présentation qui introduit les textes qu’elle a choisis de rassembler – des « lettres » publiées de leur vivant – de mieux les situer dans la chronologie des événements contemporains qui conduiront à la guerre de Sécession et à l’abolition de l’esclavage, mais aussi de ceux qui...

RÉSUMÉCet article est une réponse aux commentaires de Kirk Ludwig et d'Alexander Miller sur la première partie de Donald Davidson's Triangulation Argument: A Philosophical Inquiry. Il répond aux objections de Ludwig selon lesquelles l'argument de la triangulation ne réussit pas à établir le caractère social du langage et de la pensée. Il répond à l'invitation de Miller à comparer le non-réductionnisme de Davidson avec celui de Crispin Wright, ainsi que l'aspect social de la thèse de Davidson avec celui de la (...) thèse de Saul Kripke. Il répond enfin aux questions de Miller concernant mes affirmations sur la normativité de la signification. (shrink)

After recalling the progress made in the diagnosis of the post-truth phenomenon, thanks to recent experimental findings (from cognitive and social psychology) and theoretical work (post-truth versus half-lies and propaganda, degrees in epistemic vice and scale of responsibility), we indicate four other ways to improve our awareness of the scope and mechanisms of post-truth: we introduce some qualifications so as to distinguish between a post-truth world and an Orwellian universe, the negative and positive sides of emotions, an utter contempt for (...) facts, and the sharp dichotomy between facts and values, and between science denialism and blind scientism. Finally, objective truth being taken for granted, we make some suggestions for a “way out”: we should be aware of our cognitive biases and of possible sources of manipulation, cultivate our epistemic virtues, and keep evidence as a prior demand. We should also work in a “scientific spirit,” i.e., refuse any compromise with society, morality, or practice so as to ensure freedom of conscience within an academic and democratic “space of reasons.” But even more urgently, we should avoid some still too frequent misunderstandings about truth itself and about knowledge (which we identify), and remember that post-truth is serious because it is a threat to reality itself: hence we should also take care of our metaphysical prejudices and work to find better ways of ensuring metaphysical knowledge. (shrink)

While Peirce presented himself as a "scholastic realist of a somewhat extreme stripe", merely adapting the virtues involved in Scotism to the requirements of modern science to erect a plain scientific realistic metaphysics, he was also eager to emphasize that "everybody ought to be a nominalist at first" because such an hypothesis is "simpler than realism" and because "the economy of research prescribes to try the simpler one first, and to continue in that opinion", until one "is driven out of (...) it by the force majeure of irreconciliable facts". Even if, at first, he had been "blinded by nominalistic preconceptions", he also confessed that he had "never been able to think differently on that question of realism" and... (shrink)

Hannah Ginsborg has recently offered a new account of normativity, according to which normative attitudes are essential to the meaningful use of language. The kind of normativity she has in mind –– not semantic but ‘primitive’ — is supposed to help us to avoid the pitfalls of both non-reductionist and reductive dispositionalist theories of meaning. For, according to her, it enables us both to account for meaning in non-semantic terms, which non-reductionism cannot do, and to make room for the normativity (...) of meaning, which reductive dispositionalism cannot do. I argue that the main problem with Ginsborg’s account is that it fails to say what makes it possible for expressions to be governed by conditions of correct application to begin with. I do believe, however, that normative attitudes are essential to meaning, but they have to be thought of as fully semantic. And I suggest that conditions of correct application can be present only when those attitudes are present. (shrink)

Central to the discourse on the intentional structure of consciousness encompasses further forms of experience, for instance, the notion of one’s direct experience of others. In essence, one’s experience of others is materialized through intersubjective engagement which is fundamental in comprehending the relation of the Self and Other. Intersubjective engagement between the two cognizing subjects is evidently interactive negotiation of understanding, thus necessarily meditational. This paper will substantiate the meditational or reflective nature of intersubjective engagement with the phenomenology of self-projection, (...) giving emphasis on the experience of the Self in relation to Others. The activity of self- projection onto others which is argued to take place through introspection, incorporates modes such as representation, simulation, imitation, empathic interaction and self-attribution. Furthermore, this paper will conclude intersubjectivity as an advent of joint construction of meaning and representation between the two cognizing subjects, thus, the collaborative endeavor of shared construction of meaning and representation is attained throughout the process. (shrink)

The papers collected in this issue were solicited to celebrate the hundredth anniversary of Donald Davidson’s birth. Four of them discuss the implications of Davidson’s views—in particular, his later views on triangulation—for questions that are still very much at the centre of current debates. These are, first, the question whether Saul Kripke’s doubts about meaning and rule-following can be answered without making concessions to the sceptic or to the quietist; second, the question whether a way can be found to answer (...) Davidson’s own doubts about the continuity of non-propositional thought and language; third, the question whether normative properties can be at once causal and prescriptive; fourth, the question whether folk psychological explanations can be at once illuminating and autonomous. The fifth paper reexamines Davidson’s take on the principle of compositionality, which always was at the centre of his theorizing about language. (shrink)

Cultuurfilosofisch essay over onze verhouding tot de natuur.